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Paths and Crossroads: The State of the Parties and
Party Scholarship
Daniel M. Shea
John C. Green

The 1992 election raises daunting questions about the state of American
political parties. The rise of Ross Perot, deep divisions within governing
coalitions, and the continued decline of voter partisanship all point to a
weakened state of the parties. These patterns are confused, however, by
countertrends suggesting a strengthened state: the return of party government
at the national level, evidence of increased party unity, and the continued
expansion of party organizations. Overall, the parties appear to be in a state
of flux. This situation would be challenge enough for scholars, but there is
the added burden that party scholarship is in flux as well.
Political scientists trained in the paradigms of the 1950s and 1960s
increasingly find themselves questioning the ability of political parties to link
the governed with the government, and, perhaps, in their quieter moments,
the desirability of such linkages. Meanwhile, scholars trained in the 1970s and
1980s find it difficult to teach the old virtues of party government. But even
those who view party decline as the norm are confronted by the increased
vitality of many party organizations. Indeed, the enterprise that many of us
have chosen, learning and teaching about parties, seems increasingly alienated
from real-world politics. The question of how best to think about parties is
being raised precisely when the parties have provided a lot to think about.
At one level, this book does little to resolve the situation. It is only
honest to admit that the state of contradiction and paradox that bedevils the
study of parties is amply displayed here, and the value of these essays stems
as much from the portrait of work in progress as from the picture of the
parties presented. Yet, taken as a whole these essays outline new
understandings of parties and new directions for party scholarship. The
parties themselves confront divergent paths and it is unclear which direction
they will follow. And not coincidentally, party scholarship also stands at a
crossroads, uncertain of what should be studied and how. The good news is
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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that there is no shortage of effort on either front. These efforts can be
usefully organized around three broad topics: party systems, party activities,
and party values.
The focus on party systems involves crucial questions regarding the role
of parties in the political system, including their relationship to citizens, public
officials, and social processes, and what should it be? Also, what elements of
the larger political environment affect parties? Attention to the party activities
raises narrower, but no less important queries: what do the parties actually
do, and what difference does it make? And a focus on party values highlights
parallel concerns namely, what do parties care about and how do these
concerns matter? These are not new questions, of course, and a brief review
of the path of previous scholarship will help set the present dilemmas in
context.
Past Paths: The Tripod and Responsible Party Models

Much of the puzzlement surrounding parties comes from the
confrontation of time-honored postulates with present realities. Chief among
these is the "tripod' view of parties, which conceives of parties as party-inthe-electorate, party-in-government, and party-as-organization. This distinction has been used skillfully by students and teachers for better than half a
century. When combined with another venerable concept, the "responsible"
party model, the results offer a set of empirical and normative expectations
about the operation of parties which once gave persuasive answers to the
questions now posed.
Party was seen as the most important link between voters and government
officials. Voter preferences, the raw material for public policy in a
democracy, were assumed to be the core source of partisan affections. Party
organizations, in turn, sought to use these affections in order to mobilize votes
on behalf of their candidates. If successful at the polls, the preferences of
voters would then be extended to the government. As such, the activities and
values of party organizations bore a direct relationship to the party's linkage
role in the political system. The engine of this process was electoral
competition and the American constitutional arrangements imposed a twoparty structure, which was regarded as at least adequate, if not especially wellsuited, for the task.
For advocates of responsible parties, this linkage was accomplished when
a party's candidates offered clear policy stands to the voters, carried out their
promises when elected, and faced the wrath or reward of the voters in the
next election. Alliances of copartisans in government could overcome the
separation of powers and federalism. Accordingly, policy formulation was the
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key feature of well-functioning parties. Other scholars doubted the practically
and/or wisdom of strict policy responsibility and assumed that parties had
narrower goals, namely winning elections, and that public policy was only one
means of appealing to voters. But this "conventional," "rational-efficient:' or
"pluralist-organizationar' view of parties still largely accepted the tripod
model. Of course, party organizations often failed to perform as expected, but
there was reason to expect they could do better. The "state of the parties''
thus took on great significance and proposals for improving the major party
organizations became a staple of the literature.
The debate over party responsibility aside, the elements of the tripod
were once well-supported by large bodies of research. In many areas this is
no longer the case. For example, studies of the electorate once showed that
partisanship was the dominant influence on vote choice. When tied to
generational change and dramatic events, scholars identified critical elections,
the "mainsprings'' of American politics, that marked the transition from one
period of stable partisanship and public policy to another. However, recent
research suggests a sharp decline in partisanship and the theory of critical
elections is under serious reconsideration. A similar pattern occurred for
party-in-government: partisanship was once the dominant factor in legislative
and executive behavior, but divided government and candidate-centered
politics has reduced its importance. Changes of a different sort have occurred
for party organizations. Once-potent local parties have atrophied and been
replaced by stronger state and national organizations, which are more active,
capable, and sophisticated than ever before, yet more distant from the
citizenry.
The net effect of these changes has been to simultaneously cast doubt on
the usefulness of the tripod and to intensify the debate over party
responsibility. Indeed, advocates and critics of responsible parties have
attacked the tripod, including some in this volume (chapters 21 and 22). The
crucial problem is the ruptures of the link between partisans in the electorate
and government, which some critics lay at the feet of the tripod itself by
identifying separate spheres of party activity. Other critics point to the vitality
of party organizations, and argue that the tripod misspecified parties by the
inclusion of voters and candidates. A renewed demand for responsible parties
has become a potent cross current in these disputes. Other scholars still find
the tripod useful in descriptive terms at least, and others wait with increasing
frustration for the development of an alternative.
It is these considerations that produce the new focus on party systems,
activities, and values. In some respects these topics represent an extension
and abstraction of the tripod, but in other respects they are a narrowing of
concerns and a return to basic questions. And chief among these is the role
that parties can and should play in the democratic process.
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Tire State of the Parties
Divergent Paths: The Party System Under Stress

The first section of this book confronts the role of parties in the political
system. All three authors agree that the state of the parties is poor, but each
offers a different understanding of the problem and possible sources of
improvement. In order, they find the problems outside the party system,
outside of the parties, and within the parties themselves, and argue,
respectively, for renewed partisanship, better partisanship, and a new kind of
partisanship in the electorate and elsewhere. James Reichley (chapter 2)
argues that the American two-party system is likely to weather its current
woes, but there is no guarantee that the present parties will survive, or if they
do, that they will maintain recognizable coalitions. He suggests that the party
system operates on 60 to 70 year "super cycles," and that we are nearing the
end of the present one. Parties are performing poorly because the polity is
confused by the massive societal transformations of our era. As in the past,
these changes may conclude with political settlements of which strengthened
parties and renewed partisanship will be a part.
In partial contrast, Ralph Goldman (chapter 3) finds that the weakened
state of the parties comes from within the political system itself. He argues
that the vital functions parties perform have been misunderstood and
deprecated by political elites. Unless public opinion toward parties is
improved, the major parties will continue to decline, even if the political
situation changes or new reforms are instituted. Goldman proposes a
thoroughgoing public relations campaign and a "bill of rights" for the parties.
All told, the broader linkage role of parties requires the creation of better
partisans, committed to party organizations as instruments of democracy.
Theodore Lowi ( chapter 4) departs sharply from the previous essays by
arguing that the two-party system has outlived its usefulness and that modern
America needs a "responsible three-party system." The parties are performing
poorly because they are old, entrenched institutions unwilling and unable to
confront the problems of the day, to the detriment of the government and the
disgust of the governed. He argues that it is unlikely that societal transformations will renew the party system (as Reichley suggests) or that the
system can be salvaged from within (as Goldman proposes). Thus, a new
system is required with a genuine "third" party as its centerpiece. Lowi
details how such a new party might arise and how this new kind of
partisanship would improve the performance of the system.

A Well~Travcled Path: Party Activities
Whether or not the present party system can be renewed from the outside
or from within, or must be replaced, there remains the crucial question of
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what parties actually do and what impact these activities have. The ten essays
in the second and third sections of this book address this topic with a close
eye on the 1992 elections. Overall, these essays suggest a more positive state
of the parties than the essays in the previous section: parties are shown to be
active organizations and poor performance is certainly not due to lack of
effort. Most of these chapters draw inspiration from the party organizational
studies of the last decade, which have proved to be one of the most
productive research paths in the field.
Anthony Corrado (chapter 5) provides a detailed portrait of the activities
of the Democratic and Republican National Committees in the 1992 election.
Even jaded observers will be impressed by the efforts of the national
organizations to encourage strong candidacies, develop party unity, and deploy
resources effectively. In fact, the success of Bill Clinton owes much to the
efforts of national Democratic leaders, while George Bush suffered from
confusion among the Republicans. The national committees may be catching
up with their congressional counterparts, the efforts of which are detailed by
Paul Herrnson (chapter 6). In 1992, "hill committees'' were challenged by
scandals, retirements, and redistricting. Although facing more demands than
they could meet, both parties were able to effectively deploy a vast array of
resources. In contrast to the presidential campaign, the Republicans appear
to have been somewhat more effective in these efforts. Overall, the much
discussed growth of the national organizations continues unabated.
Such efforts also included extensive financial links between the national,
state and local party organizations, which are reported on by Robert Biersack
(chapter 7). Using newly available data on "soft money," Biersack argues that
the strategic deployment of these resources may represent an important step
toward the integration of national, state and local party committees. John
Frendreis, Alan Gitelson, Gregory Flemming, and Anne Layzell (chapter 8)
report on the activities of county party committees in state legislative races
and find a similarly high degree of activity. Local parties displayed
considerable structural capacity and assistance to local campaign, particularly
traditional grassroots activities such as recruiting campaign volunteers and getout-the-vote efforts.
Grassroots activities were not limited to the major parties in 1992, as
Randall Partin, Lori Weber, Ronald Rapoport, and Walter Stone (chapter 9)
report in their analysis of Ross Perot activists. As one might expect, the Perot
following was characterized by a combination of disgust with the major parties
and attraction to Perot, but, surprisingly, many of his followers had been
previously involved in party and interest group activities. Perot drew
substantially from the existing activist corps, but also expanded that group for
future campaigns. These activists could serve as a foundation for a new party
or as an impetus for the renewal of the existing ones.
Taken together, these essays reveal extensive electoral activities by the
major party-and protoparty-organizations. The range of efforts is impres-
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sive and they appear to have had positive impact on electoral outcomes. The
chapters in the next section focus more narrowly on the question of electoral
success and collectively conclude that party organizations are geared almost
exclusively to winning elections.
The 1992 election was widely billed as the "year of the woman'' and
Barbara Burrell (chapter 10) talces a careful look at how parties aided female
candidates. She reports that while women have made considerable gains as
activists and leaders, women candidates have often had to bypass the party to
gain nominations and elected office. Now that it has become clear that
women are strong candidates, the party organizations are more supportive.
This emphasis on electoral success is echoed by Diana Dwyre (chapter 11) in
her study of a decade of campaign support by the congressional campaign
committees. She finds that these organizations by and large distribute funds
so as to maximize the number of seats won. Janet Box-Steffensmeier (chapter
12) finds much the same pattern for the timing of party allocations within
individual congressional campaigns using an innovative statistical approach.
This emphasis on electoral success also figures prominently in Stephen
Borrelli and Kevin Leyden's (chapter 13) work on leadership activity among
new members of Congress. They find previous campaign support by the
congressional parties as well as factors that are associated with party support,
such as previous elective or party experience, figure prominently in the
ascension to the leadership. Finally, Daniel Shea (chapter 14) examines the
emergence of state legislative campaign committees, the organizational
counterparts of the congressional campaign committees, now operating in
forty states. He finds that, like the national party organizations, these
committees are largely driven by electoral concerns and the desire to
maximize seats. Overall, the "electoral connection' seems to dominate the
activities of contemporary party organizations.
The Path less Traveled: Party Values

Professor Shea ends his analysis of legislative campaign committees with
a cautionary note: these new organizations may actually be a threat to
traditional parties rather than an example of organizational adaptation and
revival. What is strikingly absent in legislative campaign committees is
concern for public policy. In fact, all the research mentioned above notes a
similar lacunae to one degree or another: the extensive activities of party
organizations are removed from the substantive values that gives party politics
meaning.
Of course, the lack of party values is an ancient complaint. After all, the
responsible party model demanded that parties develop and proclaim distinct
values, particularly in the form of detailed legislative programs. Such parties
have been rare in the United States-the disappointment with party programs

Paths and Crossroads

7

has taken on a legendary quality. The lack of progress on policy making,
paralleling the expansion of other kinds of programmatic activities, has surely
made the situation worse. Perhaps as a consequence, there has been
relatively little research on the policy-oriented qualities of party organizations
that fall short of the responsible ideal.
The chapters in Part Four deal with party values in a number of
provocative ways. First, Laura Berkowitz and Steve Lilienthal (chapter 15)
describe the recent policy-making initiatives of the Democratic and
Republican National Committees. Perplexed by the results of the 1992
election, both parties set about encouraging the development of new ideas.
These initiatives are unprecedented in their use of modem communications
technology but, as the authors point out, the interests of office holders and
candidates may eventually limit them.
On the other hand, Jon Hale's (chapter 16) work on the Democratic
Leadership Council (DLC) reveals a novel approach to party policy making:
the institutionalization of a party faction. Born out of the desire of moderate
Democratic office holders to change the policy direction of their party, the
DLC developed a new agenda, which Bill Clinton used to capture the White
House. A similar organization, Empower America, has been recently formed
in the GOP, suggesting that this strategy may become common.
Terri Susan Fine's (chapter 17) essay on symbolism in the 1992 party
platforms offers a novel look at party values. Given the well-known
limitations of the electorate, it may well be that symbols communicate values
more effectively than detailed policy proposals. Philip Klinkner's (chapter 18)
essay on party cultures offers another interesting way of looking at party
values. He finds striking differences in the basic assumptions of major party
elites, and usefully links them to their customary modes of operation and
responses to crises. Finally, Michael Margolis and David Resnick (chapter 19)
present a telling description of the lack of interest of local political parties
in the problems of contemporary metropolitan areas.

Party Concepts at a Crossroads
One might conclude from the foregoing chapters that the poor state of the
party system results from the disjunction between new party activities and
weakened party values. This situation has produced a debate on the focus of
party scholarship, which closely resembles the original debate over the
responsible parties. The watchwords of this disagreement are party "decline"
versus "revival:" Not surprisingly, scholars most interested in party values and
impressed by the apparent rupture between voters and elected officials find
parties in decline, while those most interested in party activities and impressed
by the recent growth of party organizations find them undergoing revival.
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John Coleman (chapter 20) offers a critique of the party revival camp and
organizational studies in particular. What difference does it make, he asks,
if party organizations are stronger and more complex, if voters disdain them
and elected officials ignore them? He argues for integrating the various party
components to changes in the economy, echoing in many respects Reichley's
arguments about cycles in the party system ( chapter 2). Tim Hames ( chapter
21) complements this argument with a broad critique of the tripod model of
parties. Like Coleman, he argues for further integrative work on "party-as-aninstitution."
John Frendreis ( chapter 22) offers a rebuttal to the critique of Coleman
and Hames. Writing at the request of the editors of this volume, he produces
a concise response to the issues raised. While also arguing that the tripod
model of parties should be abandoned, he offers a model of parties using
firms in the marketplace as a metaphor, in language reminiscent of Lowi
( chapter 4 ). Frendreis points out, for instance, that party voters and party
organizations are as separate as customers and the firms selling them
products; there is a similar distinction between parties and elected officials.
The behavior of voters and officials should not be seen as the behavior of
parties, but as a junction of the behavior of parties.
Frendreis concludes his essay with a call for a more systematic effort to
gather data on party organizations, and our final chapter (23) by Andrew
Appleton and Daniel Ward describes an innovative data collection project.
The "State Party Archive Project'' will collect observed data on party
organization and behavior from the records of state parties. In this chapter,
the authors present some preliminary results from this project on
organizational innovation in Texas and Arkansas. Both these new data and
their conceptual apparatus will surely prove interesting to party scholars.

New Directions in Party Scholarship
Just as the parties are in a state of flux, party scholarship is in a state of
transition. It is unclear at this juncture whether a new paradigm lies over the
horizon or if a slow accumulation of research will gradually fill the present
void. Improving upon the tripod and responsible party models is by no means
a simple task. But clearly these essays raise important questions worthy of
more attention.
Concerning party systems, the connections between parties and their
environment is open to new scrutiny. Does economic change underlie the
party system? And if so, what other equally dynamic aspects of social life,
such as demographic transitions, value shifts, and technological
transformations shape party dynamics? Conceivably, "the state of the parties"
is a reflection of the state of American society. In this regard, the "privileged
position" of the two-party system in scholarly discourse is increasingly open

Paths and Crossroads

9

to question. Is it inevitable in the American context, and is it desirable under
present circumstances? These questions lie at the foundation of party
scholarship.
Party activities are clearly central to such an understanding, and there is
much more to learn about them. Scholars are now in a position to move
beyond documenting the activities of parties, which generally implies that
more is better, to exploring their quality and impact. A broad array of data
and techniques are likely to be valuable here, from intensive interviews with
party leaders to archival data to time-series analysis. Overall, what impact do
party activities have on elections, the quality of government, and the party
system itselrl
Along similar lines, organizational innovation and change are important
research topics. Whether it is the creation of new organizations, adoption of
new techniques, absorption of new interests and constituencies, or adaption
to political circumstances, the dynamic context of party activities must be
better understood.
Party values are also certainly pivotal to understanding party change.
What is the connection of party cultures and norms to party activities on the
one hand, and the party system on the other? Will new mechanisms develop
for making party policy? These questions lead us back to basic questions: do
organizational adjustment and growth produce more effective and/or
responsible parties?
These topics are sufficient, of course, to fill a generation of research and
occupy the attention of countless teachers and students for longer than that.
But all should rejoice, however, that efforts to answer these and other
questions are well underway; the state of the parties is in nux, inspiring new
directions in scholarship.

PART ONE

The Two-Party System Under Stress
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The Future of the American Two-Party System
A. James Reichley
Predicting the future of the American two-party system requires answers
to two initial questions: Will parties of any kind continue to play an
important role in structuring American politics? And, if so, will we continue
to have a predominantly two-party system, which of course is unusual in most
democratic polities? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative,
there remain the questions, with which this chapter will principally deal, of
whether the two major parties will be the Republicans and the Democrats, as
they have been since the Civil War, and whether one party or the other will
normally be dominant, as has sometimes occurred (though not recently) in our
history.
On the question of the survival of any kind of party system, I have
elsewhere argued that the parties are in trouble (Reichley 1992:411-33) but
that nevertheless it is difficult to imagine democratic politics completely
without parties, and that given effective leadership and some changes in laws
regulating parties and the ways they function, it is possible and even likely
that before the end of this decade parties will achieve at least modest revival.
Some thoughtful analysts disagree. They have concluded that the current
phenomenon of dealignment, in which more and more Americans feel little
or no connection to either major party, will continue to the point that parties
will be almost irrelevant to either politics or government (Phillips 1993:233).
There is much evidence on their side. About one-third of those
interviewed by pollsters now say they regard themselves as independents.
Analysis has shown that about two-thirds of those calling themselves
independents are about as regular in their support of one party in national
elections as the so-called weak party identifiers (Keith et al. 1992). But the
true lesson of this finding seems to me to be not that most declared
independents are closet partisans, but rather that many who nominally identify
with a party are in fact behavioral independents. Certainly the remarkable 19
percent showing of the independent candidate Ross Perot in the 1992
presidential elections shows that there are a great many voters in the national
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electorate who are quite prepared to cast their presidential ballots for
someone other than the Republican or Democratic candidate.
The old patronage-based state and local machines that used to provide
foot soldiers for the parties are almost everywhere in ruins. The media
perform much of the role of screening candidates that used to be carried out
by the party organizations. Presidential nominees are chosen through state
primaries and caucuses in which party organizations play little part.
Candidates for state, congressional, and local offices rely more on personal
organizations and backing from interest groups than on party organizations.
Many voters think nothing of splitting their tickets between parties in voting
for president and members of Congress.
We are not going back to the times in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries when the major parties were like great popular armies,
almost churches, which fought in well-drilled and enthusiastic ranks in each
campaign. Other force&-the media, interest groups, citizen watchdog
organizations, professional campaign consultants-will continue to rival the
parties for influence in our politics. There is little reason for complacency
among those of us who believe that strong parties make an essential
contribution to democracy. But parties are likely to continue playing a major
role in national politics for the foreseeable future. Actually, during the 1980s
there were some signs of party revival. National party organizations, including
the congressional campaign committees, which used to be relatively weak,
raised more money and were more active than ever before in our history.
Party unity in Congress trended upward. The major parties were more
ideologically distinct than at any time since the early 1930s. All of these
trends have continued into the 1990s.

A Durable System
Will the United States, however, continue to maintain a predominantly
two-party system? Most democratic polities, even in relatively homogeneous
countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, have tended to divide into three
or more parties. Maurice Duverger pointed out long ago (in his formulation
known as Duverger's law) that polities which maintain single-member, firstpast-the-post systems of election, principally the United States and the British
dominions, tend to foster the development of two major parties. Systems
including two rounds of elections or using some form of proportional
representation tend to produce a multiplicity of parties (Duverger 1954:217).
Even polities like Britain, Canada, and Australia, however, which like the
United States, use the first-past-the-post system, have generally had at least
one significant minor party represented in parliament alongside two major
ones. Why have enduring minor parties with significant impact been so rare
in the United States?
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I have argued that American politics has usually been formed, at least
loosely, around two great ideological traditions, which I have called the
republican tradition and the liberal tradition. These are, roughly, the tradition
descended from AJexander Hamilton and represented since the Civil War by
the Republican Party on the one side, and the competing tradition descended
from Thomas Jefferson and represented since the time of Andrew Jackson by
the Democratic Party on the other (Reichley 1992:3-6). A two-party system
has thus been in a sense natural to our politics.
I do not doubt, however, that without the shaping influence of electoral
institutions the political system of a nation so large and economically and
culturally diverse as the United States would long since have produced a
substantial number of competing parties. The first-past-the-post system helps
push us toward a two-party system. But the thing that has really kept this
system locked in place has been the institution of the electoral college for
selecting presidents.
Quite contrary to the Founders' intention, the electoral college, so long
as most states retain the at-large system for choosing electors (not required
by the Constitution), effectively limits the presidential candidates with a real
chance of winning to the nominees of the two major parties ( or at least has
done so since 1860). Ross Perot won 19 percent of the popular vote but did
not receive a single vote in the electoral college. It even makes it unlikely
that a minor party can hold the balance of power between the two major
parties, as has sometimes occurred in Britain and Canada. Strom Thurmond
in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968, running as candidates of states' rights
parties opposing racial integration, were able to win the electoral votes of
several southern states. But the tendency of the electoral college to magnify
the margin of the major party candidate with the larger popular vote usually
produces a safe electoral vote majority for the popular vote winner.
Constitutional change to eliminate the electoral college, which a majority of
voters tell pollsters they favor, would entail a political effort that is unlikely
to be forthcomin~at least until the winner in the popular vote loses in the
electoral college, as occurred several times in the nineteenth century and
almost happened in 1976.
Thus the high visibility of presidential elections shapes our entire political
system. So long as the institution of the electoral college confines the real
presidential competition to the candidates of the two major parties, the
United States will continue to have a two-party system in most congressional
and state elections.

Support for Change

Of course we live in changing times. Two states, Maine and Nebraska,
now elect some of their presidential electors at the congressional district level.
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If this trend were to continue, minor party candidates could pick up electoral
votes from specialized constituencies here and there across the country,
preventing either major party candidate from winning the required absolute
majority in the electoral college and throwing the presidential election into
the House of Representatives.
Even if the electoral college remains with little change, modern
communications and transportation technology enables independent or minor
party candidates to assemble formidable national followings for a single
election. If party ties continue to weaken, Perot or some successor might
cross the threshold at which he or she would have a realistic chance of
winning, overcoming the objection that voting for an independent is "throwing
your vote away:• Significantly, when asked by a Lou Harris poll in 1952
whether" the two-party system is serving this country well," 59 percent of the
participants answered "No:• Nevertheless, the institutional supports provided
by the electoral college as now constituted and the first-past-the-post system
make the emergence of a multi-party system, as both called for and predicted
by Theodore Lowi and other political scientists and commentators,
improbable any time soon (see chapter 4).
This does not, however, necessarily mean that the two major parties will
continue to be the Republicans and the Democrats. Even in countries with
institutionally fortified two-party systems, new parties have at times displaced
one of the major existing parties, as the Republicans did the Whigs in the
United States in the 1850s, and the Labor did the Liberals in Britain in the
1920s.
It has seemed anomalous to many observers that the United States has
never had a true left-wing party in the European sense, and some have
predicted that the Democrats will eventually break up and give way to a
socialist successor. The worldwide decline of socialism in recent years has
perhaps made this less likely, but there is still the possibility that intraparty
revolt against an unpopular centrist Democratic president might produce a
significant break-away party on the left On the other side, at low ebbs of the
Republican Party, such as 1964 and 1976, some conservatives have proposed
abandonment of the Republican label and creation of a new national
conseJVative party. And there is recurring sentiment among the electorate
that what we really need is a new centrist party, divorced from the extremes
of the Republicans and Democrats, which Perot to some extent tapped in
1992.
The difficulties of forming a new major party, nevertheless, are
formidable-as Perot himself discovered. It is no accident that no enduring
new major party has emerged in American politics for more than 130 years.
The existing major parties have proven adept at picking up the issues
attracting support to new parties, as did the Democrats with the Populists in
the 1890s, the Republicans and the Democrats with the Progressives in the
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1910s, the Democrats with various liberal and socialist minor parties, and the
Republicans with various states' rights parties.
The representatives of the two major parties have taken pains to enact
election laws that strongly favor major party candidates. Public financing of
presidential election campaigns heavily advantages the Republican and
Democratic nominees. At the state level, barriers against third-party
candidates are even more severe. In Pennsylvania, for example, Republican
or Democratic candidates for the state senate need only 1,000 signatures on
petitions to get their names on the ballot while minor party candidates require
29,000 (reduced from 56,000 by court order).
A major national disaster or conflict might lead to the creation of a new
major party, as the struggle over slavery gave birth to the Republicans in the
1850s. Barring such a catastrophe, it is probable not only that we will
continue to have a two-party system, but also that the Republicans and the
Democrats will be the main competitors. After all, even the Great
Depression of the 1930s failed to put enduring cracks in the existing two-part
system, though for a time it spawned some successful third parties at the state
level, such as the Farmer-Labor party in Minnesota and the Progressives in
Wisconsin.

Throwing the Rascals Out
Let us, then, concentrate on the two-party system as we know it and
consider what appear to be its electoral characteristics, particularly those that
may give some clue to our likely political future. We still really do not have
very extensive spans of experience for studying the long-range behavior of
party systems (two-party or otherwise): about two centuries in the United
States and Britain; somewhat less in France, some countries of northwestern
Europe, and the British dominions; only since the Second World War in most
of the other democracies; and only two or three years in Eastern Europe and
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, some characteristics of the electoral effects of party
competition seem to appear. First, there seems to be a tendency for voters
to grow disenchanted with a party in power, even if no major disasters occur,
after about ten years. The normal result is for the incumbent party to be
voted out, often by a large majority, and the Conner opposition installed. This
tendency may be countered or outweighed by special circumstances, as when
the fear of including communist parties in government in France and Italy
kept conservative parties in power for extended periods; or when voters'
distrust of the opposition or lack of a fully developed party system produced
long-lasting dominance by one party, such as the Socialists in Sweden from the
1930s to the 1970s, Labor in Israel from independence to the early 1970s, the
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Congress Party in India from the 1940s to the 1970s, and the LiberalDemocrats in Japan from the 1950s to 1993. Even in these instances,
however, accumulation of voter discontent and stagnation or corruption within
the old majority party eventually led to change or party control.
The operation of the ten-year cycle appears particularly pronounced in
countries with two-party systems, probably because this system inhibits
formation of new coalitions through which incumbent parties sometimes are
able to hold onto power under multi-party systems. In the United States, the
ten-year cycle translates into two or three presidential terms. Since the early
1950s, the Republicans and Democrats have regularly alternated in control of
the White House, with three two-term cycles, one three-term (the ReaganBush years), and one that was confined to a single term (the Carter
administration).
Going back somewhat further, since the present party system was formed
in the 1850s, the average duration of party control of the White House has
been 11 years. The only markedly longer periods of party dominance were
the 24-year tenure of the Republicans during and after the Civil War, and the
20-year period of Democratic supremacy during and after the Great
Depression.
Similar cycles appear to operate for the governorship in states with
competitive two-party systems. In the seven most populated states with truly
competitive systems, the average period of party control of the governorship
from 1950 to 1990 was 8.5 years. This average conceals some extended
periods when one party or the other was dominant in New York and
Michigan, and some long stretches of uninterrupted control by the
Republicans in Illinois and the Democrats in New Jersey. But in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California, the two parties exchanged control of the
governor's office with almost rhythmic regularity. Cyclical party turnover now
seems to be developing in some of the Southern states where the Democrats
used to enjoy one-party dominance, such as Texas and North Carolina.
The impulse of voters to "throw the rascals out'' by changing party control
at regular intervals is both understandable and rational. After two or three
terms of one party in control of a nation or state, enough things are likely to
have gone wrong to give voters a taste for change. This may sometimes be
unjust to the party in power, but it at least keeps incumbent parties on their
toes, seeking to come up with policies and solutions that will cause voters to
relent and give them "four more years." Moreover, under conditions of
modem government, a party team that has held office for two terms or more
is likely to be rundown, reduced to petty bickering and bereft of new ideas.
Henry Kissinger used to say that an administration begins to use up its
intellectual capital from the day it takes office.
Since the 1950s, regular shifts in party control have not occurred in
Congress. From the Civil War to the Eisenhower administration, control of
Congress normally accompanied, or slightly preceded, the presidential cycle.
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In only three two-year periods did the President's party not control at least
one house of Congress (under Hayes 1879-80; Cleveland 1895-96; and Wilson
1919-20.) Since 1954, however, the Democrats have controlled the House of
Representatives without interruption, and have held the Senate except for a
six-year stretch from 1981 through 1986. As a result, Republican presidents
during this 40-year span have regularly confronted Congresses controlled by
their partisan opposition, producing the famous deadlock that has wreaked
havoc with the policy-making process. David Mayhew has offered evidence
to show that the effects of divided control have not been so bad (Mayhew
1991). This may be true in some policy areas, but in crucial areas of budget
making and foreign policy the liabilities seem clear.
The breakdown in cyclical change of party control of Congress resulted
in part from the fact that the Democrats happened to be in control at the
time when advantages of incumbency began to rise (or perhaps happened is
not the right word-Democratic majorities after all legislated many of the
advantages such as expanded staffs and campaign finance Jaws swelling the
influence of political action committees that give mainly to incumbents.)
Democrats also, however, have been helped by the reluctance of many voters
to give the Republicans complete control of the federal government. Such
voters, as Byron Shafer has argued, have normally seemed to prefer
Republicans in charge of the executive branch functions, but have relied on
the Democrats in Congress, particularly the House, to preserve the flow of
welfare state benefits (Shafer 1991). I suspect this may reflect something
deeper transpiring in our politics, which may now be in the process of working
itself out, and which I will get to shortly.
In any case, the failure of cyclical turnover in Congress seems to have had
damaging effects on the entire political system. Even apart from the policy
results of deadlock, the long dominance of Congress by the Democrats has
contributed to the impression among many voters that the system is
impervious to electoral change, and this impression probably plays a part in
the long-term decline in voter participation. (The level of voter participation
was up slightly in 1992, but remained far below that of the 1960s). It also has
probably been bad for the congressional Democrats themselves (as a political
force, though not of course in terms of individual members). The effects of
long duration in power by one party that special circumstances have produced
in the politics of, for example, Japan, Italy, and Mexico have been all too
evident in recent years in Congress: arrogance, preoccupation with "perks,"
outright corruption, and stagnation of ideas.

Cyclical Theories

Beyond the normal two- or three-term cycle in party control of the
presidency, the existence of party cycles (or ideological cycles) in national

20

The State of the Parties

politics becomes speculative. Such cycles, if they exist, however, are important
and require inclusion in any overall consideration of parties. Probably the best
known of the theories of long-term political cycles is that of the historian
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1986:32-33) carrying on work begun by his father.
Schlesinger's theory is more closely related to ideology than to party, but also
has party manifestations.
According to Schlesinger, there have been throughout American history
regular alterations between cycles of liberalism and conservatism, each lasting
about sixteen years or four presidential terms. Liberalism is defined as
commitment to "public purpose," and conservatism as defense of "private
interest." The most recent cycles have been the liberal one launched by John
Kennedy in 1960, and its conservative successor that began in the late 1970s.
Right on time, a new liberal cycle began with the inauguration of Bill Clinton
in 1993.
This theo~like almost all cyclical theories-requires some nimble
tucking. The Civil War Republicans, "liberar' under Lincoln, somehow
become "conservative'' under Grant (though in many cases they were the same
people) and hang on long beyond their allotted cycle; Theodore Roosevelt,
Taft, and Wilson are lumped together in a liberal cycle, despite the bitter
interparty and intraparty battles of the time; Nixon and Ford become part of
the liberal cycle that began in 1960; and Carter becomes the harbinger of a
return to conservatism. The primary identifications of conservatism with
private interest and liberalism with public purpose are somewhat suspect,
given conservatism's commitment to publicly maintained moral standards and
liberalism's defense of private choice on questions of personal behavior. Still,
the theory has sufficient resonance in history to suggest the presence of a real
phenomenon. What Schlesinger is on to, I think, is the succession of phases
in a much longer cycle, which I will describe below.
The most widely discussed cyclical theory developed in political science
was introduced by V. 0. Key (1955), linking cycles to "realigning'' or "criticar'
elections which, it is claimed, have periodically purged American politics and
government of accumulated detritus and opened the way to new growth.
Key's work has been carried on in recent years by, among others, Walter
Dean Burnham (1970), James Sundquist (1983), Gerald Pomper (1970), and
Paul Allen Beck (1974:199-21). In most versions of this theory, realigning
elections, ending the dominance of one political party and ushering in normal
majority control by another, have occurred every 28 to 36 years. The root of
these cycles appears to be policy upheaval, coupled with generational change.
There is some dispute over which were the actual realigning elections, but
general agreement places realignments at or just before the elections of
Thomas Jefferson in 1800, Andrew Jackson in 1828, Abraham Lincoln in 1860,
William McKinley in 1896, and Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. (Some theorists
drop the elections of Jefferson and Jackson, on the ground that the party
system did not achieve mature development until the 1830s.)
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A puzzle for believers in the theory of realigning elections is the apparent
failure of one to occur on schedule in the 1960s. Burnham deals with this
problem by arguing that a realignment did occur with the election of Richard
Nixon as President in 1968 and the creation of a new Republican majority in
presidential politics. Certainly the shift of the South away from the
Democrats at the presidential level after 1968 was a major change in national
politics. But if this was a realignment, why did it not produce a change in
control of Congress or of most of the major states, as previous realignments
had done? Everett Carl Ladd (1991) and Byron Shafer (1991), among others,
have argued that realignment theory, whatever utility it may once have had
for political science, has been made obsolete by technological and social
change.
Super-Cycles

The elections usually identified as critical to realignments-1800, 1828,
1860, 1896, and 193~were clearly times when something important happened
in American politics. But were all of these major realignments in the sense
of changing one majority party for another? The victories of the
(Jeffersonian) Republicans in 1800, the Republicans in 1860, and the
Democrats in 1932 certainly were. But what of the 1828 and 1896 elections,
which are needed to maintain the 36 year cycle?
Jackson won in 1828 after a period of about ten years in which national
politics had been in flux and the old hegemony of Jefferson's party appeared
shaken. But Jackson was clearly in the line of the Jeffersonians, and was so
recognized at the time. Martin Van Buren, one of Jackson's principal
lieutenants and his successor as president, wrote: "The two great parties of
this country, with occasional changes in their names only, have, for the
principal part of a century, occupied antagonistic positions upon all important
political questions. They have maintained an unbroken succession .. ." (Van
Buren 1967:2). Jackson carried every state Jefferson carried in 1800 and lost
every state Jefferson lost. Jefferson's narrow victory over John Adams in 1800
was converted into Jackson's landslide triumph over John Quincy Adams in
1828 by the addition of new western states in which the Democrats were
strong. So the 1828 election restored the dominance of the Democrats (under
their new name) instead of bringing in a new majority party.
Similarly, McKinley's victory in 1896 followed a period in which
Republicans and Democrats had taken turns controlling the federal
government, or dividing control, and in which there had been no clear
majority party. The 1896 election represented a rallying of the forces,
temporarily in eclipse, that had made the Republicans the clear majority party
from 1860 to 1876. McKinley won through renewal of the coalition of
northeastern and midwestem states on which the Republican Party had been
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founded. William Jennings Bryan, his Democratic opponent, swept the South,
the Democrats' principal stronghold since the end of Reconstruction. Bryan
also tapped the farmers' revolt and the silver issue in the West to win some
of the normally Republican western states that had been admitted to the
Union since the Civil War. But within a few years most of these were back
in the Republican column where they normally remained until the Great
Depression of the 1930s. The 1896 election, therefore, did not displace the
former majority party, but renewed and strengthened the party that became
dominant after the last major realignmen~a point also made by Pomper
(1970).
What, then, do we have? Not five or six major realigning elections but
three: 1800, 1860, and 1932. Each of these began a cycle in which one party
was generally dominant, lasting not 36 years, but 60 to 70 years. The climactic
elections won by Jackson and McKinley, which I identify as 1832 (rather than
1828) and 1896, were in this scheme elections in which the dominant force of
the cycle that had begun about 30 years before met and decisively defeated
a force trying to turn back the clock to the prevailing ethos of the preceding
cycle (the conservative opposition directed by Nicholas Biddle in 1832 and the
populist crusade championed by Bryan in 1896).
The mystery of why no true realignment occurred in the 1960s is thus
explained: it was not due. What actually happened in the 1960s was the
climax of the cycle dominated by liberalism and the Democratic Party that
had begun in the 1930s. In 1964, Lyndon Johnson decisively defeated Barry
Goldwater, representing a radical version of the laissez-faire economic
doctrine that had prevailed during the preceding cycle. The movement of the
South away from the Democrats at the end of the 1960s was an early sign of
the breakup of the New Deal cycle-similar to the move of the Northeast
away from the Democrats in the 1840s and the swing of major northern cities
away from the Republicans in the era of Woodrow Wilson.
As shown schematically in Figure 2.1, each of the 60 to 70 year long
cycles moved through roughly similar phases: 1. a breakthrough election in
which the new majority gained power under a charismatic leader (Jefferson,
Lincoln, F. D . Roosevelt), followed by an extended period during which the
new majority party changed the direction of government and enacted much
of its program; 2. a period of pause in which the new majority lost some of its
dynamism and the forces that dominated the preceding cycle staged a minor
comeback (J. Q. Adams, Cleveland, Eisenhower); 3. a climactic victory by the
majority party over a more radical expression of the ethos of the preceding
cycle (Jackson over Biddle, McKinley over Bryan, Johnson over Goldwater),
followed by enactment of remaining items in the majority party's program;
and, finally, 4. the gradual decline and ultimate collapse of the majority party,
opening the way for a new realignment and a new majority. There have been
only three such fully developed cycles in our national history, though, as
Figure 2.1 shows, the outline of an earlier cycle can be seen in the nation-
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Figure 2.1 American Political Cycles
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building process that reached its climax with the American Revolution, and
went through its declining, though still fruitful, phase during the Federalist
era.
The phases in the 60- to 70-year-long cycle correspond roughly to some
of Schlesinger's sixteen-year cycles. The long-cycle theory, however, explains
why the Jeffersonians after 1800, the Republicans after 1860, and the
Democrats after 1932 held onto power for longer than Schlesinger's theory
would predict. Those were all periods covered by the initial phase of the long
cycle, during which the new majority is fresh and holds the support of the
public through an extended series of elections. The separate cycles posited
in the 28- to 36-year theory correspond neatly to the rise and decline segments
of the long cycle.
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The Next Major Change

The possibility of a 60- to 70-year cycle has occasionally been glimpsed
by political scientists and historians, and was first discussed, to my knowledge,
by the political scientist Quincy Wright in 1942 (1942:143-145). In recent
years, William Riker (1982:214-16) and Jerome Mileur (1989:1-3) have
suggested the possibility of a 60- to 70-year cycle. Political scientists have
generally been reluctant to consider the possibility of 60- to 70-year party
dominance cycles, largely, I think, because the limited time over which
democracies have so far extended gives us little material against which to test
such a hypothesis. Such skepticism is understandable and even reasonable.
But the long-cycle theory fits the evidence we have better than any of the
other cyclical schemes. There is also some indication that long cycles have
been at work in Britain and France, although this requires further study.
If such long cycles exist, what comes then? Perhaps to some extent it
reflects cycles in the underlying economic system, such as the "long wave"
cycles suggested in the 1920s by the Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff
(1984:32 ff) and discussed often since by futurist economists. Kondratieff and
his followers have claimed to detect cycles lasting about 50 years in which
market economies swing between booms and major depressions caused by
"overbuilding of the capital sector:' Kondratieff long waves correspond
roughly with the long party dominance cycles in American history. The
economic expansion that started in the 1790s petered out through the 1840s
and 1850s, and the expansion that began in the 1860s, though interrupted by
several pauses, did not truly collapse until the depression of the 1930s.
According to Kondratieff theorists, we are now in the down swing of the
expansion that began in the 1940s. For more than a decade, many of them
have been predicting that a new economic collapse is just around the corner.
Political cycles are also probably rooted to some extent in generational
change. Schlesinger argues that his sixteen-year cycles reflect the succession
of political generations. Members of the political generation of John
Kennedy, for example, were putting into effect values and attitudes acquired
during their youths in the liberal environment of the 1930s. The Reaganites
of the 1980s were applying views they had developed during the relatively
conservative 1950s {though many of the Reaganites regarded themselves as
revolting against Eisenhower moderate Republicanism). Members of the
generation of the 1990s, in this theory, are prepared to reintroduce the liberal
values with which Kennedy inspired them during their college years in the
1960s (Schlesinger 1986:33-34).
Schlesinger's analysis, like his larger cyclical theory, captures at least part
of the truth. Truly major changes in political direction, however, seem to
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occur only after persons whose political values and party loyalties were
Conned by a major realignment, including many who were in childhood at the
time, have largely passed from the political scene. So long as generations
whose party ties were shaped by the Civil War remained politically active,
even voting in substantial numbers, the normal Republican majority in
national elections was hard to shake. Similarly, party loyalties formed by the
Great Depression and the New Deal have been exceptionally durable. In the
1990s, the generations whose attitudes were most deeply marked by the
Depression and the New Deal, roughly those born from 1905 to 1930, will
inevitably become a sharply declining share of the total electorate-already
less than 15 percent. This, I think, is a major reason for the increasing share
of voters who feel no particular loyalty to either major party.
The last two major realignments, in the 1860s and 1930s, came at the time
of massive traumas within the larger social system, respectively the Civil War
and the Great Depression. Tu first realignment, in the 1800s, coincided with
huge territorial growth and migration of population. Probably a major
realignment requires both e"traordinary social upheaval and an electorate in
which ties to the e"isting party system have grown weak. We certainly now
have the latter. If the Kondratieff theorists are correct, we will probably soon
encounter severe economic turmoil. But the causes of social upheaval need
not be primarily economi<.-those of the 1800s and 1860s were not. Possibly
an ecological crisis could trigger the next political realignment. Or continuation of current trends toward moral and social disorder and decay could
bring it on. The point is that the political system is now open, as it was not
in the 1960s when the hold of the New Deal alignment remained strong, for
transformation by a major economic or social shock. If the precedent of
earlier long cycles holds, the 1990s may correspond not to the 1960s, but to
the 1850s and late 1920s. Bill Clinton, then, could turn out to be not John
Kennedy, but James Buchanan or Herbert Hoover.
Another factor holding up major realignment during most of the 1970s
and 1980s was divided government. While one party controlled the White
House and the other Congress, the voters found it difficult to fix responsibility
for the conduct of government and therefore to take out discontent on one
party or the other. After one term of united government under the
Democrats at the end of the 1970s, the Republicans won the White House
and the Senate and made substantial gains in the House in 1980. Having
failed to gain complete control of Congress at the time of Ronald Reagan's
first election, however, it was unlikely they would do so thereafter during the
Reagan or Bush administrationrthe voters tending to take out resentments
against the party controlling the White House by voting for the opposition in
congressional elections.
It is possible that 1992 will turn out to have been a critical election.
Though Clinton won with a popular vote plurality of only 43 percent, this was
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actually more than Lincoln's plurality of 40 percent, in a four-candidate race,
in the realigning election of 1860. If the economy flourishes and the Clinton
administration deals successfully with public needs in areas like health care,
crime, and education, the Democrats might settle down to extended control
of both branches of the federal government.
If, however, the Clinton administration is perceived to have failed, the
Republicans should before the end of this decade have an opportunity to
regain the normal majority party status that they lost in 1932 and begin a new
political cycle. This does not of course mean they will do so. Even if the
Republicans win the presidency in 1996 or the year 2000, they will have to
provide creative solutions to the nation's outstanding problems and
opportunities-as Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt did after their parties took
control of government at the start of three earlier cycles. That is why it is
important that Republicans who aim to achieve a lasting political turnaround
should be working now to develop just and effective social, economic, and
international policies to implement when their party next holds the reins of
national power.
If the Democrats fail to make good on their current opportunity, and the
Republicans on their next one, the continued dealigrtfllent predicted by many
analysts may well take place. National politics will then increasingly be built
around personalities, campaign cosmetics, and interest group pressures.
There is another possibility. Public disaffection with both major parties
and the entire party system is now so great that a new political force
promising to transcend all parties and return to something like the
nonpartisan system the Founders intended, might be able to break through the
barriers protecting the existing party system and get control of the national
government, at least for a term or two. The floodgates to major constitutional
change might then be opened, leading to-who knows what? A parliamentary
system? Government by electronic referenda? Or a truly imperial
presidency?
The most likely next major change in national politics, probably in a term
or two, is a strong swing to the Republicans, potentially for an extended
period. But the imponderables of politics make this prospect uncertain. No
doubt history still has many surprises up its sleeve.
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Who Speaks for the Political Parties Or, Martin Van
Buren, Where Are You When We Need You?
Ralph M. Goldman
Congress and the Clinton administration have committed themselves to
major electoral reform. In the past, reforms have been little more than
tinkerings with one of the nation's most vital institutions, namely, its party
system. The most usual changes include new but circumventable limits on
campaign contributions, a modicum of public financing, and slightly more
demanding disclosure requirements. Amidst all the current interest in reform,
little mention is made regarding the principals themselves, namely, the executives
of the nation's political parties. Their failure to make a serious contribution
to the public debate is perceived by many citizens as an admission of guilt for
unnamed sins.
Institutional rationalization of the American, party system is certainly long
overdue, but is difficult to achieve in a suspect and hostile attitudinal
environment. After two centuries of wear and tear, it should be reasonable
to discuss change to the party system. Components of the system need to be
better connected structurally. Desirable functions need to be better protected
and nurtured. Essential activities need to be explained and conducted more
openly. Total system effort needs to be subject to rules and practices that
make the effort more effective and efficient, with full organizational
accountability for management and outcomes. These are significant and
legitimate matters for citizens, legislators, media. and party executives to
examine. The political parties are, after all, legitimate associations whose
service to the community includes such profoundly important duties as the
implementation of popular sovereignty, the formulation of the public agenda.
and the advancement of a democratic way of life.
The Parties' Systematic and Persistent Bad Rap
Unfortunately, a strong, and sometimes justifiable, antiparty tradition has
taken hold in the United States, making a candid and constructive approach
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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to party organization, management, and accountability difficult beyond the
ordinary. Anti-partyism, especially as articulated by the media, by practicing
politicians who should know better, and by competitors for political influence,
has produced a collection of dubious assumptions and unfriendly attitudes that
is brought into play upon revelation of occasional political horror stories
involving bribes, excessive campaign contributions, or unethical use of public
resources. Such revelations are usually accompanied by righteous calls for
harnessing party "monsters'' or, at least, cutting off one or another of their
functional limbs.
This bad rap started a long time ago. The British party system, the first
modern party system, was barely a century old when Viscount Henry St. John
Bolingbroke (1782) pronounced parties obsolete. As a Tory leader during the
early decades of the eighteenth century, Bolingbroke wrote the best
contemporary analysis of party as an institution. A1most always in the
opposition and himself a master of machination, Bolingbroke vented his
frustrations in his analysis, decrying parties as "corrupt," Parliament as
"enslaved' by the parties, and party debate generally "nasty." Bolingbroke
failed to understand that the British party system was the institutional
alternative to English civil wars of the preceding millennia, hence, by
definition, the arena for non-military political nastiness (Goldman 1990:ch.

3).,
A half century later, another notable, President George Washington,
added his antiparty commentary. In his message to the Third Congress of the
United States on November 19, 1794, the president specifically condemned
the activities of "certain self-created societies." His reference was to the
highly partisan county and city political associations that, at that time,
provided support to the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican party.
Washington's statement led to a resolution offered by the Federalists in
Congress strongly supporting the denunciation. James Madison, the
Democratic-Republican leader in the House of Representatives, worked
diligently to water down the resolution and succeeded only when the Speaker
broke the tie vote.
Ironically, the Federalists refused to acknowledge that they were a
political party. One Federalis~AJexander Hamilton-knew better. In 1802,
soon after the Jeffersonians captured the presidency, Hamilton offered his
colleagues a plan to establish a national Federalist association to be called
"The Christian Constitutional Society." This society was to be headed by a
president and a twelve-member national council. There would be "subdirecting Councils'' of thirteen members for each state and as many local
branches as possible. Financed by a five dollar annual fee, this association
would diffuse information about "fit'' men and promote their election. The
association would also pursue "charitable and usefuf' activities, particularly in
the growing cities, through relief societies for immigrants and vocational
schools for workers (Hamilton 1851:540-43). These were precisely the
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activities that political parties performed at that time. Hamilton's Federalist
colleagues would have none of it. The Federalists disappeared as a party
during the next decade.
The nineteenth century was a time of flux, factionalism, and failure in the
party system. Factions came and went with ease and frequency. Party failure
to deal with the slavery issue led to the Civil War and radical Republicanism
produced a vindictive Reconstruction Era. Tammany Hall and Boss Tweed
became the model for urban machines, whose dominance was contested from
time to time by wealthy merchants and other civic-minded citizen. State
machines became prominent toward the latter part of the century, their
alliances influencing national politics and the distribution of national
patronage. The press was sharp-tongued and partisan. Protest movements
arose, sometimes became "third' parties, then disappeared. Corruption made
its appearance at state legislatures. Paradoxically, despite a high level of voter
loyalty to their own party at election time, by the end of the century citizens
in general had little confidence in the party system.
The opening of the twentieth century brought in muckrakers and
progressives, the former to expose partisan evil and the latter to reconstruct
the party system with the direct primary, nonpartisan elections, an expanding
civil service, and a host of other antiparty measures. The credibility of the
parties was further undermined by the emergence of a racist one-party South,
presidential nominations engineered in "smoke-filled rooms," corporate
bribery scandals, and the like. At times, if newspapers and commentary
journals were to be believed, logic demanded the outlawing of parties.
In the reality beyond the media, however, party organizations somehow
managed to nominate and elect distinguished citizens to public offices,
welcome and Americanize millions of immigrants, keep voter participation at
a high level, distribute jobs and assistance to the needy, transform street gangs
into civic safety patrols, and maintain a close watch and an open ear for signs
of popular discontent. In general, Americans seemed willing to pay for these
positive civic functions by tolerating urban and state party machines, various
forms of patronage, and the winner-take-all principle. At the turn of the
century, however, the aforementioned excesses and corruption, together with
the perennial bad rap, brought constraints to the party process.

Deprecating Assumptions and Tongue-Tied Defenders

Progressive factions in both major parties, defectors to third parties,
massive immigration and virulent nativism, the one-party South, and the antiparty predispositions of newly admitted Western states kept the parties in
stress during the first third of the twentieth century. The stress was
aggravated by the enduring antiparty assumptions. Some are quite familiar.
Money in politics is presumed to be either intrinsically evil or a source of evil.
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Party executives are presumed to be power-hungry, self-aggrandizing "slicker(
and "bosses." Corruption, rather than public service, is considered the
principal product of party activism. Contributions to political campaigns are
invariably deemed excessive. Money or patronage for maintenance of party
organizations is thought to be wasteful, if not immoral. These are the more
prominent hostile assumptions.
Those who agree with these assumptions rarely, if ever, acknowledge
parties as the principal instruments of several fundamental extra-electoral
functions: the implementers of popular sovereignty in a democracy; the
institutional alternative to civil war; the principal recruiters of public servants;
the nation's most influential civic educator; the nation's most important
political agenda maker. These critics, perhaps for lack of knowledge about
the history of political institutions, are the last to recognize that failure to
nourish these vital functions could cost a nation its democracy. The case for
these profoundly important extra-electoral functions can be readily and briefly
made.

Popular Sovereignty
Mass participation in the election of national leaders and the making of
public policies was, for the most part, a nineteenth-century development
spurred by theories of popular sovereignty and representative government.
Various election systems were designed to give an authoritative "voice" to the
people, but it was political parties and the many organized interest groups that
coalesced within and around the parties that formulated the arguments about
political issues, legislated the rules of popular participation, and mobilized
voters to exercise their sovereignty at the polls. In the twentieth century,
whether in totalitarian or democratic states, popular sovereignty, as manifest
in election outcomes, has been assumed and has been the event that
legitimizes the holding of government office. In dictatorships as in
competitive party systems, under conditions of duress or in free and fair
elections, party organizations have turned out the votes that give leaders their
mandate from the popular sovereigns.

Alternative to War
England's centuries of civil war ended when a viable party system
emerged in the seventeenth century. The United States' Civil War began
when its party system collapsed in the late 1850s-Whigs disappearing,
Republicans trying to take their place, and Democrats splitting asunder.
Recently, El Salvador, Nicaragua, South Africa, the Philippines, the Russian
Federation, and a host of other nations have struggled to establish competitive
party systems to replace defunct dictatorships and inconclusive civil wars. The

Who Speaks for Political Parties?

31

process that makes these critical transitions possible is observable: the
principal architects are party leaders, and the end product is an enduring party
system (Goldman 1990).

Recruiters of Public Servants
In one way or another, the parties are principal recruiters of citizens
willing to render public service. Through nomination for election and job
patronage in victory, early U.S. parties found and "pre•selectecf' the persons
to fill the offices of government. Jefferson and Madison actively sought out
candidates for Congress in order to challenge the Federalist hold on that
institution, and national party leaders continue to do so. Despite occasional
excesses and corruption, early urban and rural bosses and party machines
played a major role in electing or appointing "their people'' to the local and
state jobs that performed the operations of government. With the adoption
of nonpartisan elections by many communities, party labels have been made
opaque for the election day occasion, but fool hardly anyone. In recent times,
with the diminution of party patronage, much recruitment flows through
lobbying and legislative channels, but almost always with a partisan
orientation.2

Civic Educators
Totalitarian parties are determinative in matters of ideological and civic
education. They organize thoroughly for this purpose and teach aggressively.
In the American context, civic education can be described as casual,
negligible, and indirect. Family and religious sources transmit basic values,
many of them indirectly political and partisan in consequence. Schools deal
lightly with political history, symbols, rituals, and broad structures of
government, usually evading discussion of parties and partisanship. Most
information about politics and government comes to the citizenry, again
indirectly, by way of the contests between the parties and the reports about
this competition by the media. That this information is grossly inadequate is
confirmed by survey after survey. Lack of information is perhaps the major
reason for the low esteem in which U.S. political institutions are held.

Agenda Makers
Gaining public attention, getting onto the policy•makjng agenda, moving
up to the top of the agenda, and coming off the agenda with a favorable
policy decision in hand is difficult and extremely competitive work. Largely,
this is the work of the parties at different stages and levels of government.
For the most part, the national public policy agenda is found in the often
invisible agenda decisions of party leaders in Congress, the rhetoric of
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candidates for office in the heat of an election contest, the unread platforms
of the parties, and the headlines and pictures of the media. Whereas
organized interests and the media have been increasingly influential at the
early stages of gaining public attention and setting up popular attitudes, in the
last analysis it is party leaders who must negotiate the subject-matter and the
priorities of the agenda.
By ignoring these many significant extra-electoral functions, the several
negative assumptions about parties have led to faulty questions about real
pathologies of the party system and its functions. In a Gresham's Law of
analysis, these poorly framed questions drive out the significant ones. This in
turn tends to produce legislation that often puts into place unworkable
panaceas that cause unintended and unfortunate consequences. In such an
environment, it becomes unthinkable, for example, to argue that money, when
given in a public manner and disclosed on the public record, is a legitimate
source of political influence in competitive politics. Limitations on campaign
contributions do not limit; they merely challenge campaigners' ingenuity to
invent new circumventions and subterfuges for giving.
Where is the party executive who will take the time and effort to explain
that political parties are organizations which, like other organizations, must
have staff and funds if they are to render public service? Let us suppose that
the parties were perceived and structured as ordinary stock-issuing
corporations (not that they could or should be). How differently the party
organization, management, financing. and other operational and management
needs would be treated! The party name and symbols would undoubtedly be
legally protected for their good-will value, a protection currently reserved for
corporate names and trademarks in the commercial arena. The party's
nominations would probably take on the character of an explicit contract, with
the nominee making a binding promise to represent the party's program and
constituencies in exchange for acquiring the legitimacy and good will inherent
in the party's name and the promotional effort of the party's organization.
The party's financial operations and records would become public accounts
subject to periodic professional audit and publication. In other words, if the
parties were treated as public utility corporations, perceptions, assumptions,
issues, attitudes, and solutions would be radically altered, and for the good of
American democracy (Epstein 1989:239).
However, these are not the perspectives from which the ills of the U.S.
party system are diagnosed. Consequently, those who are dedicated to party
renewal and party development rush in with suggestions for fixing tire parties:
a reorganization here, a reform there, a panacea elsewhere. Yet, the problem
may have more to do with political culture than political organization. The
approach should be to fix tire political and attitudinal context in wlric/1 the
parties must live.
There are examples in the world of business. When poisoned capsules
were found in Tylenol™ containers, what did executives of that corporation
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do to recover the reputation of their company and product? They eicplained
in detail the circumstances of the problem, they countered accusations of
production negligence, and they proclaimed once again the wonders of their
products. PepsiColaT1I executives acted similarly when people claimed that
they were finding medical syringes in soda cans.
These comparisons may be somewhat overdrawn, but they make the point
that corporate executives have a responsibility to explain problems and defend
their enterprise. Political party executives have exactly the same responsibility: explaining party functions in general; in particular instances, exposing
the details of a bad rap; countering the validity of charges; and proclaiming
the wonders of their organization and the party system. When was the last
time a national party chairman performed such civic education? Jim Farley
and Ray Bliss come to mind.
The independent presidential candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992 brought
into sharp focus serious questions about the viability of the U.S. party system.
A Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted June 24-28, 1992, asked: "Do
you agree or disagree with the following statement: Both political parties are
pretty much out of touch with the American people." The responses were 82
percent agree 15 percent disagree and 3 percent didn't know. A second
question asked: "Thinking about both the Republican and Democratic
parties, do you generally think that political parties are playing a bigger role
or a smaller role in people's lives today than they did in the past?" A total
of 41 percent chose "bigger role," 50 percent thought a "smaller role," 4
percent the same role, and 5 percent didn't know.
Although these data suggest overwhelming disappointment in the two
major parties, total disenchantment with parties in general was not evident.
Sixty-six percent thought it would be good for the country if there were a new
major party to compete with the Democrats and Republicans; only 24 percent
thought adding a new party would be bad. Although the situation seemed
ripe for a Ross Perot third-party effort, there was an even 44 to 44 percent
split on the question of whether Perot should be the one to start his own
independent political party. The most intense anger against the two major
parties appeared among the Perot supporters who, when asked what the term
"political party' meant to them, responded with such phrases as "corruption,"
"rich, wealthy,'' 11 self-serving,'' "good-old-boy networks," "liars," and the like
(Morin and Dionne 1992).
David S. Broder, one of the few pundits who is a serious student of
parties, has more than once issued a call for "the rediscovery of political
parties." But Broder acknowledges that "[l]t will not be easy to persuade
people that this [the need for parties] is the case" (1993). He continues:
••. Parties arc almost invisible in the public dialogue today-especially on television.
On the tube, conflicts arc always personal, not institutional-Clarence Thomas v.
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Anita Hill, not a Republican president against a Democratic Senalc. Individualistic office•
seekers ignore or camouOage their party labels. Federal and state laws impede the parties'
operations.

Broder concludes with a note of urgency and an assignment of
responsibility for "the rediscovery of parties."
.•• One reason that people don't vote along party lines any longer is that the media
on which they depend don't tell them that parties make a difference.
But this is not a task for the press alone. The men and women of
lcaming-cspcaally the historians and political scientists-need to be heard on these
issues. Our experiment in republican government is faltering today. Quack remedies
such as term limits arc being successrully hawked to the public.3 Scholarly
detachment, at such a moment, is a crime. Either we will begin the rescue of
responsible politics and effect.ivc government this year or hasten their disappearance.

The Functional Competitors to Parties

Over the past half century, institutional competitors have emerged and
have arrogated to themselves many of the functions traditionally performed
by the political parties. These competitors include the bureaucracies that
administer the welfare state, the political entrepreneurs who become
Members of Congress, community seivice groups, campaign consultants,
organized interests, and the mass media.

Bureaucracies
It was no coincidence that urban and rural political machines began to
disintegrate soon after the New Deal brought in the welfare state. Federal
civil servants were assigned many of the functions previously handled by party
personnel. The job-finding work of precinct and ward captains was taken over
by the United States Employment Seivice, thus diminishing job patronage,
which, like profit for a business enterprise, is among the major motivations for
seeking party victory. The Social Security Administration provided benefits
to the destitute, the unemployed, and the elderly to a far greater extent and
more reliably than any party organization ever did. Additional government
agencies took over other party activities.

Members of Congress
Rich or poor, citizens used to turn to their local party leaders for
guidance and help in dealing with government agencies. The modest "fee' for
such assistance was usually party loyalty during election campaigns and at the

Who Speaks for Political Parties?

35

ballot box. The past half century has seen individual members of Congress
increasingly rendering the constituent services formerly provided by party
executives. Today, about 50 percent of congressional staff effort is devoted
to constituency service. This transfer of function is undoubtedly correlated
with the decline in the role of the parties in the nomination and election of
members of Congress and senators. In previous times, local party leaders,
meeting in caucus or committees, played the leading role in placing nominees
for Congress on the balloL In recent decades, running for Congress has been
a personal entrepreneurial exercise.
Candidates are self-selected.
Nominations are made in primary elections, with or without party
endorsement. Campaigns are self-directed, with little party support and little
obligation to adhere to party platfonns (Center for Party Development 1993).
This disengagement of members of Congress from party has been facilitated
in part by congressional appropriation of funds for maintaining members'
district offices. Why should a constituent go to local party headquarters for
help when he or she can go directly to the district office of the more
influential member of Congress for faster and better service?

Community Service Groups
For a century and a half the parties provided the energy that kept the
melting pot warm and welcoming. The Americanization of millions of
immigrants, the political management of ethnic ghettos and enclaves, and the
ladder of upward mobility for many of the new citizens were the work of party
organizations. Today, however, local party figures no longer welcome arrivals
at the dock or the airport. Today, these activities are conducted by
community groups, organized principally by ethnic leaders, educators, social
workers, or the staffs of candidates for office.

Campaign Consultants
Ever since public opinion polling became a relatively exact science in the
1930s, voters have been asked about their party affiliation, social
characteristics, eligibility to vote, probability of voting, attitudes toward
different ideological labels and current political issues, perceptions of
candidates, responses to different messages, and so on. As polling technology
improved, so has the precision and marketability of findings. In the course of
this evolution, opinion pollsters have displaced precinct captains as the
principal empiricists in matters of local demography, political issues, partisan
attitudes, voting preferences, and other information about the party-in-theelectorate. Moreover, with this technology have come the experts; traditional
party intelligence operations have become the merchandise of public relations
consultants.
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Organized Interests
Freedom of association and the right of petition under the Constitution
have given rise to thousands of organized interest groups, many of which have
spawned "political action committees'' (PACs). In order to maximize their
influence, interest groups and PACs give major attention to party nominations,
platforms, and election campaigns. They exercise influence in several ways:
informationally, by testimony during legislative and party platform hearings;
organizationally, by supporting voter registration and turnout campaigns; and,
financially, by contributing funds principally to candidate campaigns.
Financial contributions have increased in recent decades in part because
election campaigns have become increasingly competitive and expensive. The
average cost of a campaign for a member of Congress is $600,000 and for
Senator $7,000,000. Almost everyone agrees that campaign costs and
contributions have become exorbitant, but few suggest meaningful alternatives.
Whenever this apparent excess reaches the "outrageous'' level, Congress
passes legislation placing new constraints on contributions. Within one or two
elections thereafter, however, it becomes clear that money, like water, finds
its way through unnoticed cracks, with party organizations the least benefited.
Major contributors would rather give to individual candidates than to a party
agency. The PACs pay attention to candidates' official status, incumbency
record, and issue commitments, regardless of party affiliation. This practice
confounds the fundraising efforts of the parties.

Media
Another class of functional competitors of the parties is the mass media:
newspapers, news and commentary magazines, radio, and, above all,
television. Prior to the 1960s, a candidate for public office usually needed to
convince party peers of his political skills and electability. For example, in the
1960 Humphre~Kennedy contest for the Democratic presidential nomination,
Jack Kennedy challenged Hubert Humphrey in the West Virginia primary,
thought to be "Humphrey country:' Kennedy won, and the party's leaders,
particularly Mayor Richard Daley and other urban bosses, were convinced
that their national nominating convention delegations should vote for
Kennedy.
With the arrival of radio and television into nearly every American home,
it became possible for a candidate, particularly a rich one, to circumvent the
assessments of party peers. A self-selected candidate can win a party's
nomination without a word of endorsement from the leadership or rank-andfile of the party. Several candidates for the Senate were soon doing just this.
In the striking case of Ross Perot, his wealth permitted him to run for the
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presidency without a party. A couple of million dollars worth of television
exposure coupled with perhaps excessive "free" media coverage made his
name a household word within a few weeks.4
But the media are more than a technology and a campaign tool. They
are also publishers, editors, pundits, and reporters with a special opportunity
to determine the perceptions and attitudes of their audiences, the content and
strategy of political campaigns, and, often enough, the outcome of elections.
For example, in presidential election campaigns it is common for television
and newspaper commentators to complain that the candidates are failing to
address substantive issues. Yet, each party has a platform and each
candidate's headquarters distributes elaborate policy statements on almost
every issue. The campaigns are "issueless" mainly because the media fail to
report and analyze these policy statements, preferring to report campaigns as
horse races.
As these competitors take over traditional party functions, what is left for
the parties to do? There are, of course, those" invisible functions" for which
parties were created in the first place: the implementation of the concept of
popular sovereignty; the search for social and governing consensus; the
recruitment and experiential training of political leaders; the articulation of
dissent; and the harnessing of conflict to nonviolent methods of disagreement.
These are hardly small tasks. Political philosophers would probably applaud
these invisible functions and argue that they are worth everything a
democratic community can contribute to their sustenance. How, then, should
party executives and devotees of the party system attack the problem of fixing
the political and attitudinal context in which the parties must operate?

A Public Relations Campaign for the Parties

We are dealing with an antiparty ethic, that is, a long-time, deeply
ingrained attitudinal pattern. This pattern is debilitating, if not destructive,
of a precious political institution. How may we go about fixing the political
and attitudinal context in which the parties must live? Behavioral scientists
will warn how difficult it is to change attitudes. Advertising executives are
much more optimistic and bet their livelihoods on public relations campaigns.
The public relations campaigns defending Tylenol'" and PepsiCola,.,. were
brief, reasonable, and successful. But a PR campaign on behalf of the party
system? Sounds gimmicky. We may expect that the concept of a public
relations campaign on behalf of the party system will evoke ridicule and
controversy.
By separating out the principal negative beliefs in the pattern of attitudes
about parties, the pro-party themes of a public relations program may be
reasonably constructed. Each of the negative beliefs requires exposure, rebut•
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tal, or reformulation, tasks that are common in public relations campaigns.
The following is a short list of negative beliefs that would need to be targeted.
•
•
•
•
•

Money and related resources arc always a negative innuence in public affairs.
Limits on campaign contributions and expenditures wiU prevent corruption and
the exercise of undue inHuence.
Party activity should be voluntary rather than a normaJ cost of democracy.
Party reform or change of any kind is likely to benefit one side in the
competition between parties and also destabilize the work of incumbents.
It is a good thing that functional competitor-bureaucrats, members of
Congress, community groups, political consultants, organized interest groups,
candidates' personal organizations, and the media-have benefited from the
disablement of party function and influence.

What would be some of the elements of a continuing public relations
campaign on behalf of the U.S. party system? Some suggestions follow.

Revive Civic Education
Survey after survey during the last several decades reports that most
parents would not want their children to make a career of politics, that is,
party politics. We also know that children from ages as young as 10 and 11
begin to be aware of and interested in political phenomena Half of all young
adults 18-24 years of age voted for president in the early 1970s; only a third
participated in the most recent elections. At some period between childhood
and parenthood, civic education in the United States is failing miserably.
Elementary and secondary schools are in great need of civic education
programs that are realistic, exciting, informative, and legitimating of our
communal lives as a democratic nation. Textbooks and lectures alone will not
do it. Simulations, field trips, internships, computer-assisted games and
simulations, charismatic party leaders, and inventive teachers have roles to
play. The disagreements and self-interests that manifest themselves in our
party system and other political institutions should be characterized as
legitimate and, if conducted in keeping with the "rules of the game,"
honorable. The nature of professionalism in public service should be fully
and fairly described. Above all, skepticism and inquiry should replace
cynicism and condemnation in what we teach our young and our new citizens
about our party system.

Political Parties Day
Americans commemorate innumerable occasions and causes, from
Ground Hog Day in February to Sadie Hawkins Day in November. A
Political Parties Da., celebrated annually in an enlightening fashion on an
appropriate day could become a salutary ritual. Perhaps the day chosen
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should be the one traditionally associated with the parties, namely, July 4, a
day for patriotic feelings. Name the day and the rest of the celebratory
arrangements can be left to American ingenuity.

Monitor the Media
"Except as a way to hand out patronage, 'the political party' went out with
the icebox and the running board:' This is the view of the executive producer
of CBS's highly influential 60 Minutes (Hewitt 1992). A distinguished political
commentator (Drew 1993) stated the following: "The need to reform the
system by which politicians raise money for their campaigns is by now pretty
well understood. The current system is one of legalized corruption." George
Will, in support of term limits, offers these words on the idea of public
funding of campaigns: "True, public finance would eliminate fundraising, the
most tiresome aspect of careers devoted to politics. But there should not be
such careers. And until the political class will accede to term limits ...
nothing should be done to make the life of the political class less
disagreeable" (1993).
Such antiparty punditry is pervasive and hardly helps improve a precious
institution that is in trouble. Most media references to the parties, unfortunately, are loaded with innuendos and unsupported charges. Politicians
portrayed on television dramatizations tend to be purchasable, sexist, slick,
and/or dim-witted. Print media seem unable to describe campaign activities,
expenditures, and financial contributions without implying theft, corruption,
and other evils. Party leaders attending party fund-raisers are almost
invariably reported as guilty-by-association, implicitly auctioning off their lessthan-sacred honor. And the White House aide who accepts a gift watch had
better pack his bags the next day. The targets of these ad hoc mediagenerated ethical standards are consistently party leaders. The standards are
applied by the media "guardians."
Unquestionably, the media set the perceptions, the attitudes, and the tone
with which the people of the United States see and respond to their political
parties. It does not require a First Amendment scholar to recognize that the
media serve a vital function in our politics. The performance of this function
should be of the highest quality and accountability, particularly as it relates
to the operations of our party system and the work of its leaders. The
situation calls for creation of a commission, a professional group, an
ombudsman, or some other body to monitor, call to account, and promote the
objectivity and fairness with which the media in specific instances treat the
parties and the party system. We should never censor the media, but we need
not acquiesce to their perceptions and behavior, particularly if these are
tearing down our party system.
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A Bill of Rights Statute

All bills of rights are agendas for focusing attention, provoking debate,
and legitimizing reinterpretation of concepts and principles. Consider the two
centuries of attention, debate, and reinterpretation of each of the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution. There could hardly have been
invented a better device to keep such fundamental principles as free speech,
freedom of association, and right of petition close to the lives and minds of
Americans. A legislated Bill of Rights for Political Parties may render similar
sociopsychological as well as political purposes.
A good model for setting forth the mutuality of rights and responsibilities
of parties is the U.S. Bill of Rights. The provisions, which would be
applicable to all party systems, might include the following:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Political parties shall be protected from violence and the threat of
violence and shall themselves refrain from acts of and incitements to
violence and harassment.
Political parties shall share in the rights of freedom of association and
shall accordingly abide by the constitutional and statutory rules of
association.
Political parties shall enjoy the rights of free speech and be assured fair
communication access to the entire citizenry. The parties, in tum, shall
refrain from disruption of communication channels and presentation of
false information.
The name of a political party, its symbols, its declarations, and its
endorsements shall be protected under the laws of copyright and parties
shall abide by these same laws and their own published regulations
regarding these matters.
The nominating prerogatives of legally established parties and the
opportunity for new parties to enter the nomination and election
processes shall be protected under the law. For their part, political
parties shall refrain from frivolous nominations, secret nominating
procedures, and disruption of nonpartisan nominating and election
activities.
In recognition of the public services rendered by political parties, selected
organizational, campaign, nomination. and election functions of duly
established parties shall be financed from public revenues. In order to
remain qualified for public funding, the parties must adhere to the laws
governing ethical uses of private as well as public funds and related
resources and abide by rules of public disclosure of all private and public
receipts and expenditures of funds.
In order that parties may pursue their nomination, campaign, and election
functions with maximum safety, they shall be assured secrecy of the ballot,
security of voting places and ballots cast, and opportunity for their chosen
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agents to observe the administration of the election laws and procedures.
The parties shall respect the security of all polling places, election
officials, and authorized observers.
8. Military personnel on active duty and practicing clergy of any
denomination may not be nominated by political parties for any elective
public office. The parties shall refrain from employing clergy or military
personnel in election campaigns and other activities related to the pursuit
of elective office.
9. Political parties may organize in an overt and legally prescribed manner
across geographical and political boundaries whether within a nation or
transnationally among nations. These transcommunal party associations
shall abide by the laws of the subnational or national entities among
which they operate or associate, and they shall refrain from subversion,
violence, or secret organizing activity that may jeopardize the host
community.
10. The elections and other legal outcomes of party effort shall be
acknowledged by the prompt and peaceful installation of elected party
nominees into the public offices won. The parties shall submit disputed
nominations and elections to an independent judiciary or a nonpartisan
third-party agency for resolution.
Although most of these provisions seem to be already in place and
respected here and in other democracies, closer inspection, the United
States still has a distance to go to meet some of the standards. With respect
to Provision 2, for example, do U.S. parties really share all the rights of
freedom of association? From time to time, this question comes before the
courts. As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed that the
state of Connecticut could not prevent unaffiliated voters from voting in
certain Republican primary elections when the Republican party invited them
to do so (Tarhjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut 1986). Connecticut
argued that it was protecting the two-party system by confining registered
party voters to their own party's primary. The Court declared Connecticut's
attempt to prevent participation to be an infringement of freedom of
association. In this and other cases, the courts have had to be called upon in
order to clarify freedom of association as it applies to political parties.
Provision 6 concerns the public funding of parties. This would probably
be the most loudly debated provision. ls it proper to ask U.S. citizens to pay
the parties a "fee' for rendering public services? It costs money to open and
maintain party headquarters.
Minimal communication with the
citizenry-more during campaign periodr-requires funds or free access to
public channels. If nominating procedures must be conducted in a public
manner, as in primary elections, parties must expend funds and other
resources. The presentation of programs of public policy cannot be done
without financial cost. Participation in election administration is expensive.
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The principle of public funding of party functions is already established for
such activities as the conduct of national nominating conventions, primary
elections, and general elections. Yet, the decline in one-dollar check-offs for
the parties told us that the citizens would rather not fay for these services.
Surprisingly, politicians themselves share this attitude. Is the problem one
of ethics, ignorance, or institutional procedure?
Provision 9 alludes to cross-boundary party collaborations. Americans
know of such collaborations from their experience with federalism and the
coalition of state parties into national parties. However, they know very little
about transnational party collaborations such as those of the Christian
Democratic, Socialist, Liberal, Conservative, and Green internationals. If
anything, many Americans continue to believe that the defunct Communist
International is still among us, largely because the Comintern received
heightened press coverage in the years when it seemed to threaten American
security. Transnational parties are likely to have a substantial role in U.S.
and global politics in the not-too-distant future, but few are prepared to deal
with the emerging challenge to the concept of national sovereignty that
transnational parties pose. In sum, the citizens and leaders of the United
States could profit from a thoughtful debate generated by a proposed bill of
rights and responsibilities for the parties.
A statement of institutional rights and responsibilities such as a Bill of
Rights for Political Parties could reformulate public consideration of the
parties and their problems, emphasizing positive goals and change rather than
negative attributions and constraints. Talk of improvement would replace
condemnation as the content of public discussion about the debilities of the
parties.
These suggestions for a continuing public relations campaign on behalf of
the party system are just that, suggestions rather than panaceas. Any response
to the bad rap needs popular involvement and creative thought. We need to
hear again the words of a somewhat forgotten president of the United States,
Martin VanBuren (1967):
But knowing, as all men of sense know, that political parties are inseparable from
free governments, and that in many and material respects they are highly useful to
the country, I never could bring myself for my part lo deprecate their existence...
The disposition lo abuse power, so deeply planted in the human heart, can by no
other means be more effectively checked; and it has always struclc me as more
honorable and manly and more in harmony with the character of our People and of
our Institutions to deal with the subject or Political P11rtics in a sincere and wiser
spirit.

Notes
1. Two hundred 11Dd sixty years later, E. J. Dionne (1993) asked, A Why has !party) politics
become such II nasty and often inhumane business'!' Dionne offers several possible
explanations, among them the inclination of politicians lo "pound each other, often vicious!~'
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when they are mandated lo but cannot find real answers lo real crises. "Name-calling is
especially widespread on emotive issues:' particularly since adversaries feel that they must
demonizc each other. What Dionne-and Bolingbrokc-did not recall is the historical fact that
party systems often take the place of more violent, hence even nastier, forms of political
controversy.
2. There is an ample political science literature describing the motivations of persons
choosing a career in politics and public service and the avenues of their entry into the system.
3. Apropos term limils, a rcc:c:nt swvcy of former members or Congress (Center for Party
Development (19'13:17) asked whether term limits would, in their opinion, increase or decrease
the inOuence or the political parties in the recruitment or (candidates for Congress). Party
influence would increase acamling lo 453 percent or the former members, decrease in the view
of 12.6 percent, and make no difference in the opinion of 37.9 percent. Comparisons were
made to term-limit practices in Latin America, where party leaders frequently play musical
chairs in high offices, but, as a group, maintain a:,ntroL Term limit legislation may well become
a panacea with unintended C011SC41Uences, such as strengthening rather than weakening the role
of the parties.
4. Bertram Gross has speculated bow a totalitarian future may emerge in the United
States (1980). Some of the tendencies identified by him appear in the Perot" phenomenon!'
5. The implication of this title ~ that Americans would prefer lo celebrate their respective
parties, major and minor, rather than a party system.
6. The survey of former members of Congress (Center for Party Development 1993)
found that 75-80 percent of the former members, as do most of their fellow-citizens, oppose
public funding of organit.ational units or the parties.
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Toward a Responsible Three-Party System
Theodore J. Lowi

One of the best kept secrets in American politics is that the two-party
system has long been brain dead-kept alive by support systems like state
electoral laws that protect the established parties from rivals and by public
subsidies and so-called campaign reform. The two-party system would
collapse in an instant if the tubes were pulled and the IVs were cut. The
current parties will not, and cannot, reform a system that drastically needs
overhauling. The extraordinary rise of Ross Perot in the 1992 election and
the remarkable outburst of enthusiasm for his ill-defined alternative to the
established parties removed all doubt about the viability of a broad-based
third party. It now falls to others to make a breakthrough to a responsible
three-party system.1
At the same time, any suggestion of the possibility of a genuine third
party receives the cold shoulder from the press and bored ridicule from
academics. This reaction should surprise no one. Like the established parties
themselves, social scientists are rarely given to innovation; they are almost
always on the side of conventional wisdom, proven methodology, and the
prevailing canon of their disciplines. Political scientists may call two-party
doctrine a paradigm rather than canon, but they are no less loyal to it. With
almost religious zeal, the high priests of the two-party system have preached
the established faith, and their students who became leading journalists have
perpetuated the two-party dogma. Thus, impetus for reform is about as
unlikely to come from professors as from precinct captains.
To be sure, a great deal of scholarly "analysis'' has been advanced to
explain why third parties quickly disappear and why the two-party system is
both natural and virtuous. Political scientists who believe this hold that the
traditional Anglo-Saxon electoral system-based on first-past-the-post, single
member district!i-produces the two-party system by routinely discouraging
new parties. They reason that since there can be only one victor in each
district, even voters who strongly favor the candidate of a third or fourth party
will ultimately vote for one of the two major candidates to avoid wasting their
vote and also to avoid contributing to the victory of the least preferred of the
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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major candidates. A two-party system is the best of all possible worlds, they
hold, because it produces automatic majorities, enabling the victorious party
to govern effectively for its full term of office.
Interestingly enough, although many scholars present the two-party system
as being inevitable, it has never been left to accomplish its wonders alone.
It has been supplemented by primary laws, nomination laws, campaign-finance
laws, and electoral rules that are heavily biased against the formation and
maintenance of anything other than the two-party system. And even with all
that nourishment, two-party systems have prevailed in only a minority of all
electoral districts in the United States since 1896. Most of the districts, from
those that elect members of state legislatures up to the state as a whole in
presidential elections, have in fact been dominated by one-party systems.
During the past century, most of our larger cities and many counties,
especially those governed by political machines, were admired by social
scientists for their ability to overcome governmental fragmentation and to
integrate immigrants into electoral politics even as they preached the gospel
of the two-party system. While crusading reformers attacked the machines,
most political scientists continued to defend them, even while they criticized
specific abuses. Although academics are often aware of the deficiencies and
strengths of parties, their commitment to the present system prevents them
from considering a new one.
It is now time for a frank, realistic discussion of alternatives. No amount
of tinkering, adjustment, reorganization, or aggressive public relations
campaigns can bring back to life a party system that on its own devices would
surely have crumbled a long time ago and that remains vibrant only in the
hearts of party practioners and political scientists. It is becoming increasingly
clear that the usual scapegoats-divided government, campaign practices,
scandal5-are not the problem. The problem is, and always was, to be found
within the two-party system itself.
The Constituent Function or American Parties

Much of the reluctance on the part of scholars to jettison myths
surrounding the two-party system stems from a fundamental misconception
regarding the true function of American parties. As I have argued elsewhere
and at some lenglh,2 parties perform a constituent or constitutional role in the
American polity. Because this notion bears directly on my argument
concerning the need for a responsible three-party system, a brief summary is
in order.
By stating that parties perform constituent functions, I am not suggesting
simply that they represent certain groups or individuals-all parties at least try
to represent some segment of the public. Instead, I am using the term in a
much broader sense, meaning "necessary in the formation of the whole;
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forming; composing; making as an essential part." Constituent means that
which constitutes. Constitution is the setting up of the way in which a
political regime is organized and the laws that govern its organization. Parties
have played a crucial role-intended or not-in "constituting" the American
political regime by providing much of the organization and rules by which it
is structured, staffed, and operated.
This view of party rests upon the distinction between constituent processes
on the one hand and policy processes on the other. Political parties may
perform both constituent and policy functions; such parties have been labeled
as "responsible." American parties have almost never been responsible,
policy-making parties, and most reform efforts to make them so have failed.
On the other hand, political parties may perform only constituent functions;
such parties have been variously called "pragmatic' or "rational-efficient."
American parties have nearly always been constituent-based, and attempts to
improve their organizational capacity in this regard have often succeeded.
Indeed, the genius of the American party system, if genius is the right word,
is that it has split the regime from policy, keeping the legitimacy of the
government separate from the consequences of governing.
One important effect of constituent parties has been the lack of
development of American political institutions, even as the society grew and
modernized dramatically. A careful review of American history reveals
several important regularities of the two-party system. First, the formation of
new parties (or the dissolution or reorganization of existing ones) produces
changes in the nature of the regime, while the functioning of established
parties does not. In fact, the shift from new to established parties has been
accompanied by a parallel shift in the effects of party, from liberal to
conservative, from innovation to consolidation, or from change to resistance
to change.
Second, new ideas and issues develop or redevelop parties, but parties,
particularly established ones, rarely develop ideas or present new issues on
their own. Party organizations are thus vehicles for changes in policy
originating in other places, but they are not often incubators of policy
alternatives. Once a system of parties is established, the range and scope of
policy discussion is set, until and unless some disturbance arises from other
quarters. Third, the key feature of the functioning of constituent parties has
been the existence of competition and not so much what the competition was
about. The more dynamic and intense the level of competition, the more
democratic parties become, often in spite of themselves. But the more
regularized and diffuse the competition, the more conservative the parties
become. The key to understanding the two-party system, and the current
necessity of a genuine third party, lies in understanding these regularities.
During the first party period, roughly from 1789 to 1840, parties served
a liberating, democratic role. To begin with, the new parties helped
democratize the presidency. The first great organized effort to carry an
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opposition candidate, Thomas Jefferson, into office in the campaign of 1800
was a giant step toward the plebiscitary presidency-namely, the pledging of
electors. By such means the election of the President was decentralized and
popularized by the parties. The growth of parties directly checked or reversed
tendencies towards a "fusion of powers'' at the national level, mainly through
the influence that the new parties exerted upon recruitment and succession
of leaders.
The new parties also helped disperse national power by encouraging the
formation of local organizations. The election of Andrew Jackson, the first
rank "outsider," and the nominating, organizing, and campaigning of
professional politicians around Martin Van Buren increased participation in
the regime. The existence of vibrant organizations dedicated to the pursuit
of many offices provided the raw material for opposition and debate. Grand
alliances of these organizations made it possible to coordinate the activities
of office holders in a fragmented governmental system. Finally, the new
parties helped democratize the electorate. This effect is easiest to document
by the sheer expansion of political activity at local levels. As a result of the
expansion of organized political activity, individual involvement also spread
greatly and mass participation in nominations and elections became highly
visible at all levels of public office. The spread of political activity helped
increase the size of the electorate and produced increasingly large turnout.
None of these consequences of the emerging parties were particularly policy
oriented, of course, but the process of party development linked elites to
masses around the key issues of the day.
By the 1840s, however, the national party system seemed to pause in its
development. Parties would henceforth monopolize all important elections
and party machinery would dominate, if not monopolize, all nominations.
Parties would also monopolize the procedures and administration of Congress
as well as virtually all of the state legislatures. The schemes of party
organization and procedure were to remain about the same for decades to
come. Parties no longer served a liberating or democratic role, but rather a
constricting, conservative one. With a few exceptions, the two-party system
has functioned this way ever since.
The tendencies of established parties were as nearly opposite to those of
new parties as is possible in a dynamic, modernizing society. For one thing,
the established parties contributed to the status quo in government structure.
For example, they helped maintain the centrality of federalism, even as the
national government and the Constitution expanded to meet the problems of
a nationally integrated country. Political leaders, including members of
Congress, developed a fundamental stake in the integrity of the state
boundary because it was the largest unit for electoral office. This force has
had a powerful impact on the substance of much important national
legislation throughout the last centul)', from social insurance to environmental
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protection. Parties have participated in a silent conspiracy to prevent policy
innovations from departing too far from eighteenth-century constitutional
structure.
The established parties also made elective offices less democratic by
resisting leadership change and policy innovation. From the courthouse to the
White House, the parties have not of their own accord brought new elites to
the fore or offered powerful checks on existing elites. Neither do they
regularly bring new issues to the fore. It has been rare for the two major
parties to take opposite stands on new controversies; it is much more common
for new cleavages to develop within the existing parties, providing incentives
to avoid addressing these controversies.
Finally, there is little evidence to suggest partisan competition has any
real impact on electoral mobilization. In many instances closely balanced
parties appear to have actively resisted further democratization of the
electorate. Expanding the franchise to new voters and mobilizing existing
ones often threatens existing party coalitions, and thus established parties have
reasons to ignore or actively oppose such expansions. Along these lines,
established parties have an investment in existing social cleavages and no real
interest in building a consensus across the myriad of ethnic, religious and
regional groupings that characterize American society.
Of course, there have been a few important instances since the 1840s
when the established parties have been programmatic and innovative. At such
times-most clearly in 1856-60, 1896-1900, 1912-14, and 1933-35-significant
differences appeared between the parties and they became innovative rather
than conservative. Each period was ushered in by the "redevelopmenf of one
of the established parties after an earlier political disaster. Such reorganization made the party oligarchies more susceptible to direction from interest
groups with strong policy commitments. Party leaders also became more
susceptible to mass opinion, partly as the result of the mobilization of new
social movements, but also due to increased competition from rivals. And in
these periods, the appearance of a third party was a powerful force in
implementing these changes. Of course, these third parties eventually faded,
once the major parties stole their message and followers, and reestablished
a new, conservative equilibrium.

The Two-Party Impasse
Back when the federal government was smaller and Jess important, the
two-party system could carry out its constituent functions without much regard
to ideology or policy. Its unresponsiveness produced major political blunders
from time to time, but the system was able to right itself after a brief period
of reorganization. But with the New Deal and the rise of the welfare state,
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the federal government became increasingly vulnerable to ideological battles
over policy. Even then, such problems were not particularly noticeable while
the government and the economy were expanding. but in the early 1970s class
and ideological conflicts began to emerge more starkly, and the two-party
system was increasingly unable to offer productive competition.
Thus were born the familiar "wedge" issue.!;-crime, welfare, prayer,
economic regulation, social regulation, truces, deficits, and anticommunism.
No matter what position party leaders took on such issues, they were bound
to alienate a substantial segment of their constituency. While the Democrats
were the first to feel the cut of wedge issues, particularly concerning race,
Republicans are now having their own agonies over abortion, crime, foreign
policy, and budget deficits. Wedge issues immobilize party leadership, and
once parties are immobilized the government is itself immobilized.
Party leaders have responded to this gridlock not with renewed efforts to
mobilize the electorate but with the strategy of scandal. An occasional
exposure of genuine corruption is a healthy thing for a democracy, but when
scandal becomes an alternative to issues, leaving the status quo basically unaltered, it is almost certain that all the lights at the crossroads are stuck on
red. In fact, the use of scandal as a political strategy has been so effective
that politicians have undermined themselves by demonstrating to the American people that the system itself is corrupt.
The established parties have atrophied because both have been in power
too long. In theory, a defeated party becomes vulnerable to new interests
because it is weaker and therefore more willing to take risks. But for nearly
forty years, both parties have in effect been majority parties. Since each party
has controlled a branch of government for much of that time, neither is eager
to settle major policy issues in the voting booth. Voters find it difficult to
assess blame or praise, making accountability judgments and partisan
affiliation difficult. A very important aspect of the corruption of leadership
is the tacit contract between the two parties to avoid taking important issues
to the voters and in general to avoid taking risks.
Even a brief look at the two established parties reveals the urgency of the
need for fundamental reform, and any remaining doubt will be removed
before the end of the ainton Administration. The established parties do not
lack for leadership, and with briefing books a foot thick and plenty of
economists-for-rent, they certainly do not lack for programs. Here Ross Perot
certainly was right: Washington is full of plans, good plans, which the two
parties tum into useless parchment. The Republican and Democratic parties
are immobilized by having to promise too many things to too many people.
Republicans say that they consider government to be the problem, not the
solution, particularly in economic matters. Yet, to attract enough voters to
win elections, they have also pushed measures designed to make moral
choices for all citizens; for example, restrictions on abortions are hardly the
mark of a party that distrusts government action.
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The Democrats like government action: the commitment of government
to new programs with grandiose goals and generous budgets is, for them,
tantamount to solving problems. President Clinton, for example, took bold
stands on a multitude of issues during the campaign, but he conveyed no
sense of priority among them. Once in office, Clinton quickly conceded the
impossibility of the task he had defined. As TIie New York Times put it in a
headline on its front page: "Clinton, after raising hope, tries to lower
expectations."
As in the past, the present two-party system functions to keep leadership,
succession, and governmental structure separate from the actual settlement
of issues. The tendencies of the established parties to preserve institutional
structure, avoid issues, and stine competition are too far advanced for easy
reversal. It is time for a new party organization, championing new ideas, to
make the party system more competitive, as the original American parties did.
A genuine third party would shatter this conservative alliance, jump-start the
development process, and once again make parties agents of liberation,
democracy, and innovation.

The Impact or a Genuine Third Party
Predictably, defenders of the two-party system have devoted considerable
energy to shooting down any suggestion that the status quo can be improved
upon. They have produced all sorts of scenarios about how a third party
could throw presidential elections into the Congress, with the House of
Representatives choosing the president and the Senate choosing the vice
president. Worse yet, if it survived to future elections, a third party would
hold the balance of power and, as a result, wield an influence far out of
proportion to its electoral size. It might, by its example, produce a fourth or
a fifth party. And if it elected members to Congress, it might even inconvenience congressional leaders in their allocation of committee assignments.
There is a great deal of truth in these scenarios: a genuine third party might
well cause such things and as a consequence help reconstitute the American
regime,
With three parties, no party needs to seek a majority or pretend that it
is a majority. What a liberating effect this would have on party leaders and
candidates, to go after constituencies composed of 34 percent rather than 51
percent of the voters. When 51 percent is needed, a party or candidate has
to be all things to all people-going after about 80 percent of the voters to get
the required 51 percent. A three-party system would be driven more by
issues, precisely because parties fighting for pluralities can be clearer in their
positions. Third parties have often presented constructive and imaginative
programs, which have then been ridiculed by leaders of the two major parties,
who point out that third-party candidates can afford to be intelligent and bold
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since they cannot possibly win. But that is the point. In a three-party system,
even the two major parties would have stronger incentives to be more clearly
programmatic, because their goal would be more realistic and their constituency base would be simpler. Thus, each party could be a responsible
party.
Two factors would help prevent the fragmentation that multi-party
systems sometimes cause abroad, as in Israel. First, the American electoral
system is not based on pure proportional representation. That system,
allowing a party garnering a small number of votes to send at least one
representative to the legislature, benefits the smallest of parties. Second, the
fact that voters formally elect the chief executive provides incentives for
splinter parties to coalesce behind one candidate. In a classic parliamentary
system, even a party that has elected only a few representatives can exert a
disproportionate influence on the selection of a premier.
Aowing directly from three-party competition, voting would increase, as
would other forms of participation. Virtually our entire political experience
tells us that more organized party competition produces more participation.
And we already know that genuine three-party competition draws people into
politics-not merely as voters but as petition gatherers, door knockers,
envelope lickers, and $5 contributors-making the three-party system an
antidote to the mass politics that virtually everybody complains about
nowadays.
Even defenders of the two-party system criticize the candidates' reliance
on television, computerized voter lists, mass mailings, and phone banks-which
dehumanize politics, discourage participation, replace discourse with tensecond sound bites, and reduce substantive alternatives to subliminal imagery
and pictorial allusion. And the inordinate expense of this mass politics has
led to a reliance on corporate money, particularly through political action
committees, destroying any hope of collective party responsibility.
These practices and their consequences cannot be eliminated by new
laws-even if the laws did not violate the First Amendment. A multi-party
system would not immediately wipe out capital-intensive mass politics, but it
would eliminate many of the pressures and incentives that produce its
extremes, because third parties tend to rely on labor-intensive politics. Third
parties simply do not have access to the kind of financing that capital-intensive politics requires. But more than that, there is an enthusiasm about an
emerging party that inspires people to come out from their private lives and
to convert their civic activity to political activity.
Finally, the existence of a genuine third party would parliamentarize the
presidency. As noted above, once a third party proves that it has staying
power, it would increase the probability of presidential elections being settled
in the House of Representatives, immediately making Congress the primary
constituency of the presidency. Congress would not suddenly "have power
over" the presidency. It has such power already, in that the Constitution
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allows it complete discretion in choosing from among the top three
candidates. But if Congress were the constituency of the president, the
president would have to engage Congress in constant discourse. The
president might under those circumstances have even more power than now,
but he would have far less incentive to go over the head of Congress to build
a mass following. Even now, with two parties based loosely on mythical
majorities, a president cannot depend on his party to provide a consistent
congressional majority. The whole idea of an electoral mandate is something
a victorious president claims but few members of Congress accept, even for
the length of the reputed honeymoon. Thus, current reality already forces the
president to bargain with members of the opposition party.
Confronting three parties in Congress, each of whose members elected on
the basis of clear policy positions, the president's opportunities for bargaining
for majority support would be more fluid and frequent. In our two-party
environment, issues are bargained out within the ranks of each party and
often never see the light of day, particularly during the session prior to a
presidential election. A third party with a small contingent of members of
Congress would insure a more open and substantive atmosphere for
bargaining to take place-after the election.
A genuine third party would play the role of honest broker and policy
manager, because it would hold a balance of power in many important and
divisive issues. There would be little fear of the tail wagging the dog,
because, unlike European parties, Democrats and Republicans arc not
ideologically very far apart-they have simply not been cooperating with each
other. The presence of a third-party delegation gives the president an alternative for bargaining, but if the new party raised its price too high it would
simply give the president a greater incentive to bargain with the other major
party. Another important myth in the United States is that policy making is
a matter of debate between the affirmative and the negative. But simple yea
versus nay on clearly defined alternatives is a very late stage in any
policy-making process.
Over time, a three-party system would alter the constitution of the
American regime. Very quickly and directly, the entire pattern of recruitment
and succession would change. The separation of powers would begin to
recede until the presidency and both houses of Congress had become a single
institution. The function of the cabinet and the very purpose of cabinet
officers would change. These patterns would develop whether the lead issues
were crime, economic development, health care, or foreign affairs. The
parties would inevitably be more policy-oriented and responsive to the public
will.
The point here is that the third party is a liberating rather than a confining force, a force for open debate on policies. Just as the rise of the twoparty system fundamentally altered the constitutional structure of our
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government appropriately for the nineteenth century, so a three-party system
would alter the structure appropriately for the twenty first century.

Toward a Genuine Third Party
Immediately, one must add an important proviso: A genuine third party
must be built from the bottom up. It must be an opportunistic party, oriented
toward the winning of elections. It must nominate and campaign for its own
candidates at all levels and not simply run someone for president. Of course,
building such a party will be difficult. It will require mobilizing a large
number of people and resources. And it must attract regular Democrats and
Republicans by nominating some of them to run as candidates with the
third-party nomination as well as that of their own party. Joint sponsorship
has been practiced by the Liberal and Conservative parties in New York for
decades. Being listed on two lines on the ballot is a powerful incentive for
regular Democrats and Republicans to cooperate with a new party, if not to
switch over. About forty states have laws preventing or discouraging this
practice, but their provisions will probably not stand up to serious litigation.
Although a genuine third party will not be able to elect a president, it
must elect enough legislators to make a difference. This was a big error for
Ross Perot when he ran for president Not only did he mistakenly assume he
could win, but even if he had won, he would not have had a majority in
Congress; in fact, he would have faced a very hostile Congress. Perot would
have been able to carry out none of his programs. Thus, a third party may
present voters a clear set of policy alternatives but it must be clear on what
it can accomplish. It is not a governing party; it must pursue means other
than taking over the government in order to implement programs.
Here history provides some good examples. While genuine third parties
have been infrequent in the United States, whenever they have organized
from the bottom up they have had significant and generally positive effects on
the regime. One of these is providing a halfway house for groups "wedgecf'
out of the two larger parties. In 1924, the progressive movement succeeded
in forming the Progressive Party in Wisconsin and other midwestern states,
which nominated Robert M. La Follette for president. In the 1930s, the
Farmer-Labor Party flourished in Minnesota, where it eventually fused with
an invigorated Democratic Party. In the process, both of these third parties
provided the channel through which many dissident and alienated groups
found their way back into politics, and their influence lingered long after the
parties themselves. Similarly, wherever the Dixiecrats organized as a party,
that state was later transformed to a genuinely competitive two-party state.
Of course, many third parties in American history have not built from the
bottom up, including left- and right-wing splinter factions, protest movements,
candidate caucuses, and single-issue interest groups, most of which sought
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merely to use a presidential campaign to advance their substantive message.
Few of these groups have wanted or tried to play a continuing role in the
American political system. Here again, Ross Perot provides an instructive
example and a warning. After the election, he chose not to institutionalize his
campaign by building a genuine third party, but chose instead to found a
"citizens lobby," United We Stand America. Our system hardly needs another
sophisticated lobby stirring up the grassroots to pressure the established
parties, particularly one that is dominated by its celebrity founder. The
resources available in the Perot campaign-plentiful money, a dynamic leader,
thousands of committed volunteers, and millions of disenchanted citizens-are
wasted on such an effort. Just imagine where a third party would be today if
a fraction of Perot's expenditures had gone to organizing efforts at the
grassroots level to field candidates from municipal elections on up.
There are, however, numerous efforts under way to exploit the opportunity
Perot has apparently abandoned. A national Independence Party was founded
in 1992, drawing on many former Perot activists but operating on a party
principle rather than a group principle. In 1993, the party's name was
changed to the Federation of Independent Parties to accommodate the several
affiliated state parties operating under different names. Some pre-dated our
national effort, and others were operating in states which do not permit the
use of party labels, such as Independent, that have been used before or might
tend to misrepresent the size or character of the membership. But as with
most such efforts, the national party began to founder in 1994, when at its
organizing convention it was split apart by integration with the New Alliance
Party. The party changed its name to the Patriot Party and the leaders of the
New Alliance Party dropped their name and separate identity in an effort to
indicate that they are no longer a fringe party. Although the future of the
national party was left very much in doubt, the elements of a real national
candidacy were in place. And meanwhile, genuine centrist were forming in
more than twenty states, some affiliated with the national party and some not.
Candidates for governor and Congress and other offices were nominated in
1994, and there was the beginning of real progress toward three-way electoral
contest5--and also two-way contests where the third party candidate offered
at least some opposition to an otherwise uncontested incumbent.
Such efforts that produce few if any electoral victories confirm to
mainstream observers the futility of efforts to form a new electoral party.
However, if the leaders, organizers, and activists within the new party
maintain awareness that victory comes in more than one form-politics is not
a game--the chance of persistence and growth is enhanced. So is the ultimate
goal of transformation of American politics by turning the two-party system
into a three-party system. The results of such a three-party system would be
immediate, unlike the long and unintended developments of party reform
within the context of the two-party system. The first definite possibility is that
the two major parties would, in this three-party context, be able to realize
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more of their own virtues. The programs and goals of the established two
parties are not inherently evil; it is their duopoly that is evil. Both operate as
majority parties, both enjoy much of the satisfactions of majority parties and
have for a long time. Because of that, they are decadent parties. If power,
according to the philosopher, does corrupt, it is usually from having a lot of
it for too long a time. The duopoly has to go.
A second consequence, again an immediate consequence flowing from the
permanent establishment of a three-party system, is improvement in the
legitimacy of political action and public objects. It is no figment of the
imagination that the public is receptive to a new third party organization. The
results of the 1992 election reveal that millions of Americans are willing to
vote for someone and some party other than the Democratic or Republican.
Polls conducted during the most partisan season, the spring and summer of
1992, confirmed that nearly 60 percent of the American people were favorably
disposed toward the creation of a new political party.
Meanwhile, personal commitment to the major parties continues to
decline and public distrust of politicians continues to increase unabated. The
high priests of the two-party system are looking for the explanation
everywhere except where the explanation truly resider-in the present party
itself. Since the two parties are a duopoly and operate as a duopoly, they
have no incentive or will to break open and look publicly at the hundreds of
thousands of established coalitions and networks that support the programs
that give rise to the deficit and the impossibility of reducing it. There is no
way these party leaders can reduce the deficit by screaming at the deficit
figure itself and by passing legislation like Gramm-Rudman or constitutional
amendments to promise some kind of ceiling on the aggregate figure itself.
That is akin to howling at the moon. The gridlock over the deficit and the
growing national debt was never attributed to divided government. It was
attributed to the two-party duopoly and its primordial stake in the
maintenance of the networks of support for existing programs, whether they
are still useful or completely outmoded. A third party with no stake in those
networks will not immediately bring honesty and integrity to government and
will not immediately bring the budget into balance. But it will contribute to
honesty in budgeting, because it will have every incentive, every selfish
incentive, to do so.
Finally, if this new effort to create a genuine third party in a new threeparty system accomplishes nothing else, it will at least make a great
contribution to political pedagogy and public education. It should be
considered a great success if it jolts entrenched political journalism and
academic political science toward a reconsideration of their myth-ridden
conception of the prerequisite of democracy in general and American
democracy in particular. And it can be considered a great success already to
the extent that textbooks and classrooms are raising fresh and new curiosities
about what really works in a democratic political system. We end as we
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begin, with the proposition that there is nothing in the universe that demands
a two-party system, and therefore it is not sacrilegious to advocate an
alternative.
Notes
1. This essay parallels arguments I have made elsewhere, including Lowi 1992a, 1992b,
and 1994.
2. See Lowi 1975.

PART TWO

Party Activities in 1992

5

The Politics of Cohesion: The Role of the National
Party Committees in the 1992 Election
Anthony Comuio

The last two decades have witnessed a resurgence of national party
activity in electoral politics. Once cast as institutions of "politics without
power" (Cotter and Hennessey 1964) in an increasingly candidate-centered
political culture, the national party committees have responded to changes in
their environment by expanding their institutional capacities and restructuring
their operations to provide the services and resources candidates need in
modem elections. They have improved their fundraising abilities, stabilized
their staffs, and enhanced their technological capabilities, which, in tum, has
revitalized their role in political campaigns and their relations with state and
local parties.1 As a result, the national party organizations have been able to
recapture some of their fonner influence in the political process, especially in
congressional elections, where they play a major role in providing campaign
services and financial support to candidates (Hermson 1988, 1989).
The extent to which this renewed level of national party activity has
influenced presidential elections has been a more open question. Beginning
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the national party committees became more
active and asserted their authority to fonnulate delegate selection rules and
procedures for national nominating conventions (Ranney 1975; Shafer 1983;
Price 1984; Wekkin 1984). But these rules changes have had the largely
unintended effect of undennining the role of party organizations in the
presidential nomination process (Crotty 1978; Ceasar 1982; Polsby 1983).
Most importantly, the new rules opened up the selection process, which ended
party control of the presidential nomination and produced more competitive,
even divisive, primaries. Competition was also encouraged by other refonns,
especially the limitations and public funding provisions of the campaign
finance reforms of the 1970s (H. Alexander 1992; Corrado 1993).
Consequently, presidential elections have become candidate-based
contests in which contenders, relying on their own organizations and
fundraising abilities, attempt to mobilize issue activists and other
constituencies behind their individual candidacies. The national party

62

The State of the Parties

organizations generally exercise little influence in this process. Yet, despite
their declining influence, the party committees are still expected to carry out
the difficult task of trying to unify partisan factions divided by the nomination
contest. Their success in fulfilling this role constitutes an increasingly
important electoral objective. As Martin Wattenberg has shown, the
candidate with the most unified party has won every election since 1964,
which has led him to conclude that "unified party support has become more
crucial than ever to a presidential election victory'' (1991b:40) as the role of
partisanship as a general determinant of voting behavior has declined (Stone
1984; Buell 1986).
This chapter examines some of the ways in which the revitalized national
party organizations have tried to promote partisan cohesiveness in national
elections.2 In particular, it discusses the role of the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) and Republican National Committee (RNC) in the 1992
presidential race, and the use of resources designed to promote party
integration and organizational strength in the general election campaign.
An Overview

Since the advent of the modern party reform movement, the national
party committees have participated in the presidential selection process only
to a limited extent. They are responsible for the rules that govern delegate
selection. They organize the national conventions, which are technically part
of the nominating process, and assist in the selection of members to the
convention standing committees, which have the formal responsibility for
drafting convention rules and writing the party's platform. They also provide
indirect assistance to the party nominee through such activities as generic
party advertising and the financing of voter registration and mobilization
programs in the general election.
The DNC and RNC have generally taken a hands-off approach in the
presidential nomination campaign and have eschewed expressing a candidate
preference due to the prospect of an endorsed candidate losing the race. As
Paul Hermson has noted, such an outcome "would be disastrous ... because
the successful, unsupported candidate would become the head of the party's
ticket and its titular leader'' (1994a:58). The parties have therefore, for
political purposes, usually served as no more than honest brokers, allowing
candidates to make their own decisions and form their own organizations in
seeking the nomination.
The presidential race thus presents the party committees with two
challenges that must be addressed in advance of the general election. First,
nomination contests encourage party factionalism, particularly when the
nomination is hotly contested, as in the 1976 Republican selection or the
Democratic contests of the 1980s. But even in races in which the choice of
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a nominee is apparent relatively early, such as the 1988 Republican and 1992
Democratic contests, party divisions may result. Because the party platform
and the convention are often used as vehicles for promoting party unification,
unsuccessful candidates or issue activists within the party may continue to
challenge the nomination in hopes of influencing the party's platform or being
invited to address the convention (Polsby and Wildavsky 1984; Davis 1983;
Shafer 1988). These efforts, regardless of their success, can serve to intensify
splits within the party.
The incentive for candidates or issue activists to continue to mount a
challenge for the party's standard is especially strong in the Democratic Party.
The Democrats' rules mandate the proportional allocation of delegates based
on voter preferences and a fairly open selection process for delegates and
convention committee members, which tend to foster more prolonged contests
or at least provide certain groups within the party an opportunity to realize
voting strength sufficient to have an effect on the platform or other
convention decisions (Kirkpatrick 1979; Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton
1976; Kamarck 1990; Corrado 1991). The Republicans suffer less from long,
divisive primary campaigns due to their greater reliance on winner-take-all
delegate systems (Wattenberg 1991b:41). Despite this, the party has
experienced in-fighting between candidate partisans and different wings of the
party, as in the 1976 contest between President Ford and Ronald Reagan or
the more recent struggles between party moderates and conservative activists.
The second problem the national party organizations must confront is how
to conduct a unified campaign effort. How are the activities of the two
organizational structures, the party committees (national, state, and local) and
the nominee's campaign, to be combined and coordinated? Usually this issue
is resolved in a way that fails to promote party integration or organizational
development; the nominee's campaign committee takes central responsibility
for the general election and often seeks either to control the party
organizations or to bypass them altogether.
In recent elections, presidential campaigns have increasingly relied on
their own personnel to conduct state campaigns and often attempt to co-opt
the party structure by shifting key campaign staff members to the party
payroll. In 1984, Democratic nominee Walter Mondale even attempted to
replace Charles Manatt as party chair during the Democratic National
Convention, only to be rebuffed by members of the national committee
(Germond and Witcover 1985:381-85). Such actions diminish the value of
party organizations and heighten tensions between party officials and the
presidential nominee. Indeed, concern among party officials about their role
in national elections had become so pronounced by the beginning of the 1992
cycle that one of the Democratic presidential aspirants sought their support
by promising that his campaign staff would not be sent into their states to
manage the general election if he won the nomination.3 So, despite their
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supposed revitalization, national party committees were not considered to be
a vital institutional partner in the conduct of presidential campaigns through
the 1980s.
Conventional wisdom argues that the party of the president has an
advantage in resolving these problems and achieving party unity when the
incumbent is seeking reelection. The national party chair is usually the
hand-picked choice of the president and the national committee functions as
an extended political arm of the White House. The incumbent president
normally lacks a serious challenger from within the party for the nomination.
If he is challenged, the nomination is often decided early and his challenger
concedes well before the convention, so there is plenty of time to ensure a
harmonious convention. This is especially true if a Republican holds the Oval
Office, since the Republicans tend to be more cohesive and less likely to
divide over issue concerns (Wattenberg 1991b).
In accordance with this view, George Bush was considered to have a
substantial advantage entering the 1992 election cycle. Besides having the
"traditionaf' edge presumed of an incumbent, Bush enjoyed an extraordinary
level of public popularity in 1991 as a result of the end of the Cold War and
the victory in the Gulf War. Many political observers thought that Bush could
simply sit back and watch the Democrats "tear themselves up'' in a primary
campaign before undertaking a general election victory tour. Many
Democratic party leaders subscribed to this view as well, and some party
officials and putative presidential candidates shifted their focus from 1992 to
the possibilities in 1996. One Democrat who did not follow the pack was
DNC Chair Ron Brown, who instead of conceding the election or shifting
attention to the congressional and state races, took advantage of the
Democrats' adverse position to harness the potential of a revitalized DNC and
unite the party behind a common goal-recapturing the White House in 1992.

The Prenomination Campaign
The Democrats

When Ron Brown was elected chairman of the DNC, he took over a party
organization in disarray. The Democrats had lost five of the past six
presidential elections, including a humiliating loss in 1988 to George Bush.
These elections had highlighted the Republican Party's superiority in
resources and campaign planning. The Democrats' relative organizational
weakness was made particularly clear in 1988, since the party seemed
incapable of halting Michael Dukakis's descent from a double-digit lead in
early August to a resounding defeat at the polls in November.
More importantly, the 1988 experience threatened to divide the
Democratic coalition since it rekindled the internal party debate concerning
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its strategy in national elections. In the aftermath of the election, some party
leaders claimed that the key to future electoral success was to maintain the
party's traditional liberal ideology and focus on strategies designed to register
and mobilize strongly partisan voting blocs, especially minorities and the poor.
Others, especially the leaders of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC),
an institutionalized faction within the party, argued vehemently against this
view (see chapter 16). Instead, they advocated the need to recast the party's
themes and programs to enhance their appeal to moderate, middle-class, and
independent voters. Specifically, they advanced the need for a more populist,
"progressive economic message'' based on the values of upward mobility,
individual responsibility, and equal opportunity that would recognize the
interests of the middle class and the moral sentiments of average Americans''
rather than the liberal social views of the party elite (Galston and Kamarck
1989:17).
The 1988 contest thus left the party confused as to its future, and the
selection of Brown, a member of the party's liberal wing who had formerly
assisted Senator Edward Kennedy and supported the Reverend Jesse Jackson,
did not initially allay many concerns. But Brown quickly articulated a set of
objectives that he hoped would bring the party together. First, he wanted to
strengthen the DNC as a party institution and transform it "into a tough,
aggressive, professional campaign organization' (Brown quoted in Ifill 1992b).
Second, he wanted to strengthen relations between the national committee
and state party affiliates, and assist in the modernization of state party
organizations. Third, he felt the DNC should be devoted to one central goal:
wiMing elections, especially the 1992 presidential election.
Brown's conception of the DNC and its electoral role was modeled on the
RNC. As he saw it, the Democrats' problems in presidential races stemmed
from an over-emphasis on the nomination process; the party and its
candidates had focused on party rules and divisive primary contests at the
expense of general election planning (Ifill 1992b; Nagourney 1991). This left
the party unprepared for the general election, forcing it to "reinvent the
wheer' after each national convention. Conversely, the Republicans paid most
attention to general election campaigns and applied strategies, which enabled
them to provide substantial assistance to their nominee as soon as their
convention was over. "There has been a mindset in the Democratic Party that
you worry about the general election after you get past the nomination,"
Brown said. "We have to reverse that thinking" (Nagourney 1991). To
achieve this purpose, Brown felt the party had to concentrate on the
development of a political organization and a general election strategy that
could be delivered to the party's nominee right after the convention. The role
of the DNC would be to serve as the "designated agent" for general election
planning (Germond and Witcover 1993:87).
While the presidential
challengers competed in the primaries, the national committee would engage
in such tasks as targeting, polling, issues research, and other activities geared
H
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towards the presidential election. Such an approach would highlight the
party's objective of winning elections, as well as help secure an influential role
for the party organization in the conduct of the general election campaign,
since the DNC would be responsible for services that the presidential candiddate would value.
As early as 1989, Brown set about the task of reorienting the party to his
objectives. He began by strengthening the DNC institutionally. Although the
general effect of recent party rules reforms has been to weaken the party's
role in presidential campaigns, the DNC adopted two rules changes shortly
after the 1988 election that served to enhance its role. The DNC overturned
a rule adopted by the 1988 national convention and reinstated the members
of the national committee as automatic, unpledged convention delegates
(Corrado 1991). The committee also changed the term of the party chair to
run from election to election, rather than convention to convention (Longley
1992). This change eliminated the prospect of a potentially disruptive
leadership struggle or major turnover in the party hierarchy in the midst of
the nominating convention.
Brown's primary institutional concern was the RNC's sizeable advantage
in staff and resources (Longley 1992). The DNC embarked on an effort to
enhance its organizational capacity and gave priority to the improvement of
its fundraising, media communications, and research staffs. Robert Farmer,
who had directed Dukakis's successful 1988 fundraising effort and was chosen
to serve as DNC treasurer in 1989, restructured the finance staff and
developed programs for soliciting large gifts and soft money that could be
used on party-building activities. The party developed new press operations,
enhanced its capacity to tape "actualities'' that could be transmitted to radio
stations with the party's response to an issue of the day, and increased its
ability to reach key constituencies through specialized publications such as
minority and union newspapers (Barnes 1989b). The research staff, which in
1988 essentially consisted of two individuals largely responsible for speech
writing, was enlarged to a staff of six. This group was responsible for polls
and focus groups, targeting analysis, issues research, and opposition candidate
research. In addition, the DNC spent more than $30,000 to hire outside
companies to investigate various activities of Bush and his family (Isikoff
1992). These investments in personnel and resources significantly improved
the DNC's capabilities. Yet they still failed to compare to the RNC. For
example, the RNC continued to raise significantly more money than the DNC
(Federal Election Commission 1993b), and even after expanding the
communications division, the DNC staff was still seven times smaller than its
Republican counterpart (Barnes 1989b).
The DNC also focused on its relationship with the state party
organizations. During the 1980s, the national committee had begun an effort
to modernize some state party organizations by providing them with funds,
usually raised in the form of"soft money' not subject to federal contribution
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limits, to build voter files and develop voter mobilization programs. Brown
and Paul Tully, the DNC political director, dramatically expanded such efforts
in order to strengthen the party's organizational ties and enhance its political
efficacy. The vehicle for fulfilling this purpose was the "coordinated
campaign:• The DNC encouraged state party organizations to work with both
the national committee and individual candidates to construct and finance a
central political operation, independent of any particular candidate, that was
responsible for building voter files, registering voters, and mobilizing the
Democratic vote in each state (Longley 1992). These coordinated campaigns
promoted cooperation between party organizations and candidates, and thus
spurred working relationships between these actors, as well as the
coordination of common organizational tasks. Party leaders felt that such
efforts would create a "web of relationships" that would serve as an
infrastructure designed to mobilize the vote in a presidential race (Barnes
1989b:1104). The party would thus be able to offer the nominee a preexisting party organizational network that could be included as part of an
overall general election campaign structure.
To demonstrate the potential benefit of coordinated campaign operations,
the DNC initiated model programs in special congressional elections in 1989
and went on to establish coordinated programs in over 30 states in 1990
(Barnes 1989b; Longley 1992). Then, in 1991, Tully developed a presentation,
which he delivered at a series of party meetings, designed to sell the concept
to party officials and fundraisers and convince them to raise the funds needed
for a more extensive coordinated campaign operation in 1992 (Germond and
Witcover 1993:87; Daley 1991a, 1991b; Edsall and Baiz 1991).
In addition, the DNC research operation initiated a series of polls, focus
groups, and targeting analyses designed to determine a national political
strategy that would form the broader context of the DNC's electoral efforts
and serve as a game plan for the presidential campaign. The DNC thus
generated an approach that "would target key coastal, Midwestern and
southern border states; revive efforts to mobilize black voters, who were
generally neglected in 1988; and concentrate extraordinary resources in
California, which, with 54 electoral votes, is assured of a pivotal role in any
close presidential contest'' (Edsall and Baiz 1991). The party considered
California, which would also be the site of two U.S. Senate races and 52
House contests, so important to its electoral success that the DNC held a
meeting in the state in April 1992 where Brown asked party officials to sign
an agreement to stage an $8 million effort to enhance research on state and
local Republican candidates, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote programs
(Ifill 1992b).
Besides these technical considerations, Brown sought to advance a
message and issue agenda that could unify various groups within the party and
serve as the foundation of a general election theme. Rather than have party
officials debate such contentious issues as the death penalty, abortion, and
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budget policy, Brown attempted to focus the party on domestic concerns,
including the economy, health care, and education. For example, even at the
height of Bush's post-Gulf War popularity, Brown was arguing that the
election would hinge on domestic concerns and that Democrats would benefit
from a weak economy (Dillin 1991). He even encouraged the party leadership to draft policy resolutions on health care and trade to heighten attention
to these areas (Shogan 1991).
Brown's efforts as chair to set an issue agenda for the party helped to
increase the prospects for party unity. By increasing the salience of domestic
concerns, the party highlighted Bush's weaknesses and steered away from the
social issues and liberal policies that had become a source of tension within
the party elite. It also linked the party to issues that appealed to the more
populist, moderate Southern Democrats and middle-class voters, two groups
the party was hoping to recapture in 1992 (see Edsall and Baiz 1991;
Germond and Witcover 1993:87-89).
Brown personally assisted in
establishing these links by conducting a special meeting of Southern
Democrats and by recognizing the DLC as an important group within the
party (May and Drape 1991; see chapter 16). On one occasion he even left a
DNC conference so that he could attend a simultaneous meeting of the DLC.
Interestingly, Brown's actions drew little response from the party's liberal
wing; instead, he seemed to benefit from a general sense of pragmatism that
permeated the party leadership, who were apparently willing to suppress
ideological differences for the sake of winning an election.
One of the unique aspects of Brown's chairmanship was that he adopted
a more interventionist approach to ·the presidential election than previous
party leaders. He wanted the party in effect to nominate a candidate early
in the primary campaign with minimal infighting so that the Democrats would
not start the general election contest at a relative disadvantage. As the field
of candidates began to emerge in late 1991, he intervened on a number of
occasions to try to determine the field. One of his first actions in this regard
was to approach Reverend Jesse Jackson and urge him not to enter the race
so that the party could be relieved of the internal tensions it had experienced
in the previous two elections (Ayres 1992). Instead, he ultimately persuaded
Jackson to work with the party and play a leading role in the DNC's minority
registration and mobilization programs (Broder 1992; Ifill 1992a; Wickham
1992). He also publicly prodded Governor Mario Cuomo of New York to
make a decision concerning a presidential bid by late December so that the
spectre of a Cuomo candidacy would not dominate the race and shift attention
away from other candidates (Cook 1991).
As the campaign unfolded, Brown exerted his authority in an attempt to
prevent bitter partisan bickering. He used his position as party spokesperson
to warn presidential contenders to keep the debate civil, and specifically
rebuked former California governor Jerry Brown in late March for personal
attacks on Bill Clinton (apparently with relatively little effect-Brown
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continued to contest the nomination through to the convention) (Berke 1992;
Ifill 1992b). Once it was clear that Clinton would be the nominee, Brown
asked party leaders to unite behind him. Brown also ensured that representatives of key Democratic constituencies, such as labor, minority groups, and
elected officials, would be included in the deliberations leading up to the
convention. This latter goal was achieved in part through the 25 party leader
and elected official positions (PLEOs) he controlled on each convention
committee (platform, rules, and credentials), which are appointed by the party
chair in accordance with national party rules.
The Republicans

The Republicans entered the 1992 election cycle with high hopes of
another presidential victory. By March of 1991, President Bush's approval
rating was soaring as a result of the Gulf War, as was support for his party.
According to a Times-Mirror survey conducted at the time, 36 percent of the
public identified themselves as Republicans, while only 29 percent identified
themselves as Democrats. The survey also found that 50 percent of respondents wanted to see a Republican win in their congressional district, as
opposed to 40 percent who hoped for a Democrat (Toner 1991b). The RNC
planned to capitalize on this renewed level of support to expand its influence
in elections at all levels.
Institutionally, the RNC was well-positioned to pursue this goal. Unlike
the DNC, the Republicans had been engaged in party-building activities for
more than a decade and had well-established candidate recruitment, campaign
services, and political outreach operations (Conway 1983). They also had a
more secure financial base. In 1990, the RNC raised over $68 million in
federal funds alone, as opposed to only $14 million for the Democrats.
During the first six months of 1991, the RNC raised over $23 million (in both
federal and nonfederal funds), compared to slightly more than $5 million for
the DNC. This financial base, when combined with the RNC's larger staff
and greater technological capabilities, suggested that the Republicans had
achieved a level of organizational development that would allow the party to
play a major role in national and state legislative elections.
Despite their success in presidential elections throughout the 1980s, the
Republicans had been plagued by continuing Democratic majorities in
Congress and most state legislatures. In an effort to reverse this trend, the
party emphasized the importance of "down-ticke(' programs; that is, party
programs designed to assist state and local candidates. These programs,
which included voter registration and mobilization efforts similar to those
being developed by the Democrats, encompassed a wide array of activities, all
of which were designed to increase Republican voting strength at all levels of
government.
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The RNC therefore devoted significant resources to activities designed to
strengthen the party in non-presidential elections. For example, the RNC
considered the redistricting process to be an important vehicle for improving
Republican prospects in 1992 and beyond. Party officials, however, could not
rely on state legislative committees to protect Republican interests, since the
majority of state legislatures were controlled by Democrats. The RNC
leaders also considered the opportunity to gain seats through this process to
be so important that the task could not be left to some other organ, as the
Democrats had done.4 The party therefore spent substantial amounts, primarily from soft money accounts, on redistricting battles in selected states. In
1991 and 1992, the RNC spent over $2.2 million in at least twelve states on
redistricting efforts.6 In most cases, according to Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports, the RNC sent soft money funds to data analysis and
computer graphics firms to research and design various redistricting models.
In other instances, the RNC simply transferred funds to ad hoc committees
organized for the purpose of coordinating redistricting efforts, such as the
Massachusetts Redistricting Task Force. The national party thus provided the
funds needed for what has become a highly sophisticated, technologically
advanced process. It thereby provided valuable assistance to state parties and
state legislative committees, most of which would not have been able to
finance such services on their own.
Many political observers expected that the RNC would also exploit the
favorable political environment of 1991 to prepare for the presidential race.
By getting an early start on fundraising and strategic planning, the party
organization could help lock up Bush's renomination and provide him with a
substantial head start in the election. The party did begin to plan a strategy
along these lines. In late summer and early fall, members of the RNC staff
began to develop an aggressive financial strategy based on a series of
fundraising events designed to raise millions of dollars before the election
year. The plan, however, was never implemented because the party had
problems securing commitments from the White House for scheduling the
President's appearance at these events.11 This experience exemplified one of
the major problems the RNC faced throughout the 1992 cycle-fragmented
party leadership.
As the party in control of the White House, the Republicans had to
operate within a more complicated organizational context than the Democrats.
Because the president is the de facto leader, although not the titular head, of
the party, the party in power has to coordinate its activities with the White
House (Davis 1992). This can benefit the party since it provides the
organization with access to the government and the perquisites that
accompany the Oval Office. But it also limits the national party organization's
efficacy, since policy is largely dictated by the White House and political
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operations are split between the White House political staff and the party
apparatus, which can produce internal tensions and lack of coordination
(Barnes 1989a).
This coordination problem might have been resolved if Lee Atwater,
Bush's hand-picked chair, had not fallen ill. At the time of Atwater's
selection, "it seemed likely that Bush would run his reelection out of the
RNC, thus placing the party apparatus at the center of presidential politics to
a degree unseen for years' (Ceasar and Busch 1993:36-37; see also Barnes
1989a). After Atwater's death and the selection of Clayton Yeutter, a former
CEO of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Secretary of Agriculture in the
Bush administration, as his replacement, this plan was never fully put into
effect. Instead, party decision making was further complicated as the election
year approached, since the creation of Bush's campaign committee established
yet another organization with responsibility for electoral and political
activities. This organizational disarray continued into the election year and,
in February 1992, Yeutter, who was criticized for being an ineffective party
manager, was replaced with Rich Bond, a former deputy chair of the RNC
and Bush's 1988 deputy campaign chair.
Despite these obstacles, the RNC did take some steps during the
primaries to assist President Bush. First, the RNC and some state party
organizations undertook "a concerted effort" to keep David Duke, the former
Ku Klux Klan leader, off Republican primary ballots (Smith 1991). Duke,
who declared his candidacy for the Republican nomination on December 4,
1991, hoped to enter 28 primaries, but his ballot access efforts were opposed
by Republican officials in a number of states, which often forced his campaign
to pursue non-party-related means to make the ballot, such as court
challenges and ballot petitions (Smith 1991; Cook 1991). In some states, such
as Georgia and Florida, where the party controlled the ballot access process,
the party successfully kept him off (Cook 1992). The chief objective of these
efforts was not to deny Duke the nomination (no party leaders thought he had
a realistic chance of beating the president), but to ensure that he and his
followers would not be represented at the national convention, where they
might gain the sort of media exposure that would link Duke to the Republican
Party {Smith 1991).
The national party organization was less successful in stifling the
insurgent candidacy of former Nixon speech writer and conservative television
commentator Pat Buchanan. Buchanan entered the race in December on a
platform designed to mobilize conservative activists. He attacked Bush for
violating his tax pledge and advanced a policy agenda based on trade
protectionism, immigration restrictions, and foreign policy isolationism.
Buchanan's candidacy thus highlighted conservative dissatisfaction with Bush
and asked right-wing activists to abandon the president for the sake of
ideology.
Buchanan's challenge also demonstrated the limits of party influ-
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ence in nomination contests. Even with the Republicans' renewed institutional strength and party-oriented delegate selection rules, any individual
with resources and adequate levels of personal support can enter a bid for the
nomination. What is most interesting about the Buchanan challenge is that
the national party leadership did not take a hands-off approach towards the
race or even present a public image of neutrality. Instead the party leadership
actively sought to discourage this challenge. Buchanan charged that the party
hierarchy was treating him like Duke, noting that he was denied access to
party contributor lists, denied opposition research on Democrats, and given
no assistance in his efforts to qualify for the ballot in certain states (Cook
1991:3736). Chairman Bond did little to disavow this perception; in fact, in
a nationally televised interview, he claimed that one purpose of Buchanan's
campaign was to "basically highjack David Duke's message on race and
religious tolerance and put a jacket and tie on it and try to clean it up'' (Bond
quoted in Jehl 1992). This and other statements from Bond calling for
Buchanan to end his campaign and support the president Jed Buchanan, at
one point, to call for Bond's resignation and urge his supporters to withhold
contributions to the RNC until Bond was removed (Jehl 1992; Dionne and
Devroy 1992; The Washington Post 1992). Bond remained, but so did
Buchanan, who had no chance at gaining the nomination yet stayed in the
race in hopes of having some influence on the party platform and convention.

The Conventions
Although the national party organizations have the formal responsibility
for the presidential nominating conventions, in practice the nominee's
campaign operation exercises the greatest influence over these quadrennial
spectacles. The party committees oversee site selection and logistics, and are
technically responsible for enacting the nomination, passing a party platform,
and managing the convention program. But in recent decades these activities
have been overshadowed by the convention's role as a public relations vehicle
for promoting the presidential ticket and general election themes and
strategies (Davis 1983; Shafer 1988; Smith and Nimmo 1991). The orchestration of the convention has therefore become of crucial concern to
presidential candidates. Consequently, campaign operatives and political
consultants have usurped many of the functions formerly carried out by party
officials. The party leadership still participates in these functions, but they are
usually relegated to the role of assisting in the implementation of candidate
strategies and providing less visible media services for the party's
nonpresidential candidates (Herrnson 1994:59). One of the functions the
party leaders do perform is to help broker relations be tween competing
candidates or between the nominees and various groups within the party.
This often takes the form of assisting campaign staff in the development of
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platform concessions or convention speaking opportunities that can be used
to satisfy reticent groups or former opponents. A party chair's effectiveness
in fulfilling this role, however, depends on a number of factors, especially the
chair's internal party political relationships and ability to influence convention
decision-making. The varying levels of success the party chair may achieve
are suggested by the experiences of the party leaders in 1992.
Given his actions prior to the convention, it is not surprising that Ron
Brown actively sought to ensure the event's success and produce a united
party for the fall campaign. He supported the position that only those who
had endorsed Clinton would be allowed to speak and served as Clinton's
liaison to Reverend Jackson in the period prior to the convention (Ayres
1992). Brown also relied on his personal relationship with Cuomo, perhaps
the party's most prominent liberal spokesman, to encourage him to deliver the
speech nominating Clinton (Germond and Witcover 1993:344-345).
Brown further helped to guarantee a unified party and convention by
using his authority over the platform committee to ensure that the platform
would reflect the positions of the party's nominee, Bill Clinton, which were
essentially the positions staked out by the DLC. The DNC chair has the
potential to influence platform deliberations because he holds significant
authority with respect to the composition of the platform committee. Under
party rules, most of the 161 committee members are selected at the state
level, but the chair appoints the cochairs of the committee, the vice chairs,
and 25 party leaders and elected officials who serve as committee members
(Maisel 1994). In addition, the DNC head is responsible for selecting the
membership of the Drafting Committee, which in practice is the most
influential group in the platform-writing process because it develops the draft
that becomes the working document for committee deliberations.
In 1992, Brown selected the Drafting Committee with two goals in mind:
to assure the domination of Clinton supporters so that the platform would
reflect the positions Clinton would run on in the fall, and to include
representatives of groups considered critical to a winning coalition in the
general election. As L Sandy Maisel has noted in his study of the 1992
process:
Chairman Brown named New Mexico Congressman Bill Richardson as chair of the
Drafting Committee early in the proa:ss, but he did not name the other members
until early June, well after the nomination of Bill Clinton was assured. The
appointment or Drafting Committee members rcnected Brown's desire that the
convention be run in such a way as to enhance the nominee's chances in November.
Thus, Brown permitted the Ointon staff to dictate roughly half of the members of
the committee. He in turn used the remaining committee slots to guarantee
representation by those groups. important to the party, that he did not want to slight
(1994:676).
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The document produced by this group met Brown's expectations; it
reflected the central themes and issues that formed the basis of Clinton's
candidacy. Although the draft did go through some changes when considered
by the full committee, this body was clearly controlled by the Clinton forces
and few substantive changes were made (Maisel 1994). In the spirit of party
unity, the committee, with the Ointon campaign's support, even approved four
minority planks put forth by the Tsongas camp for full convention
consideration. These planks, however, were not a source of major controversy, and eventually the Tsongas forces withdrew all but one of the
proposals.
Since DNC rules mandate the proportional allocation of convention
committee positions based on each candidate's vote share in caucuses and
primaries, Clinton supporters would have formed the majority even without
Brown's assistance. However, Brown's actions minimized the potential for
internal party divisions surrounding the platform deliberations and thus
guarded against the showcasing of intraparty squabbles at the convention.
Brown's effectiveness was also in large part a function of the fact that he was
working to assist the nominee, who already had control of the convention.
Moreover, he benefited from a general sense of pragmatism that permeated
the party by the time of the convention. After enduring so many presidential
losses, potential critics of the platform, particularly party liberals, were in no
mood to weaken the party by engaging in a divisive platform debate.
Although Jerry Brown was still contesting the nomination at the convention,
the delegates were not interested in a fight and the Democrats enjoyed their
most unified convention of the postreform era.
In sharp contrast to the Democrats, the Republicans faced serious internal
party divisions in advance of their convention. Buchanan's challenge had
served to heighten conservatives' dissatisfaction with Bush's economic policy
and the Christian Right had been active throughout the primaries to
guarantee that they would have a voice in convention proceedings (Oldfield
1992). These activists succeeded in gaining representation on convention
committees in part because RNC rules are less candidate-oriented than the
Democratic guidelines. Although the RNC chair is responsible for selecting
the chair and cochairs of the platform committee (which is technically called
the Committee on Resolutions), the 107 members of the committee are
appointed by state party organizations in a manner largely determined by the
individual states. Moreover, while Bond appointed the chair and cochairs,
these selections were "in fact dictated by the president's reelection committee"
(Maisel 1994:681}.
The selection of Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma to chair the
Republican platform deliberations represented an effort by the Bush-Quayle
committee to provide the conservative wing of the party with a candidate with
whom it could be comfortable. This selection also reflected the GOP's
broader convention strategy. In June, campaign officials developed a plan
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designed to use the convention as a vehicle for reassuring the conservative
wing of the party about Bush's candidacy in order to form a conservative
coalition they felt would be the key to victory in a prospective three-way
presidentiaJ race with Clinton and Perot (Wines 1992; Duffy and Goodgame
1992:272). To mobilize this constituency, Bush strategists returned to the
theme of "cultural warfare" that had worked well in previous elections
(Dionne 1991; Baer et al. 1992). By emphasizing "traditional family values:•
the Republicans hoped to assuage the rightwing, especially Buchanan and his
supporters (Goldman and Matthews 1992:68-69), and distinguish Bush from
Clinton, while at the same time elevating the concerns of the plurality of the
electorate who did not trust Clinton and had an unfavorable view of his
personal life (Kelly 1992).
This focus on family values fueled a debate within the party over the
campaign's message. Some party leaders, including Buchanan, Vice President
Quayle, and officials of Christian Right organizations, accepted this approach,
arguing that the party should position the Democrats as out of touch with
average Americans due to their advocacy of such issues as abortion and gay
rights. Others, including Representative Vin Weber of Minnesota, argued that
"values issues'' had to be linked to an economic agenda (Baer et al. 1992).
Bush and the RNC leadership appeared uncertain about the direction the
campaign should take. Thus, in the weeks leading up to the convention, the
party leadership failed to set a clear course. During this period the
Republicans also displayed other signs of dissension, including forcing Bush
to reject the advice of some party leaders "to drop Quayle from the ticket, to
fire his economic team as a sign that he would now address the economy, and
even to step aside and let another candidate carry the Republican banner"
(Quirk and Dalager 1993:69; see also Goldman and Mathews 1992a:65-69).
The issues debate might not have been so prominent if the Republican
platform committee members had been as submissive to the wishes of the
party chair and nominee as their Democratic counterparts. But the Republicans were not so fortunate. Since it became clear early on that Bush would
win the party's nomination, issue activists devoted their attention to being
selected as delegates and convention committee members. This was especially
true of members of the Christian Coalition, who wanted a party platform that
reflected their preferences on such core issues as abortion, gay rights, and
religion. As a result, the platform committee included a significant number
of conservative activists. In fact, according to one estimate, 20 of the 107
members selected at the state level were members of the Christian Coalition
(Oldfield 1992). The rules and dynamics of the Republican nomination
process thus allowed the sorts of "issue amateurs'' who are normally
associated with the Democratic party to exert an influence on the Republican
proceedings. This phenomenon was also observed by Maisel, who concluded
that "in an ironic twist, issue activists whose prime concern was not with
winning the election but rather for specific policies came to play a key role
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in a Republican convention because of lack of candidate competition, the
exact opposite circumstance under which issue purists gained prominence in
the Democratic party' (1994:682).
Accordingly, the party platform became a focal point of party and media
attention in the weeks prior to the convention. Conservatives upset with
Bush's economic policy, led by Weber and Congressman Robert Walker of
Pennsylvania, pushed for a return to Reagan-era economic principles and, at
one point, adopted proposed platform language stating that Bush had made
a mistake in agreeing to the 1990 budget compromise, which included a major
tax increase. Christian activists, hoping to protect the antiabortion language
of past platforms, defeated a weak effort to change the party's position and
went on to add provisions on a host of preferred policies, including a
paragraph lauding the two-parent family, new passages on home schooling and
pornography, and a specific reference to the country's "Judeo-Christian
tradition." The committee also adopted a number of antigay and lesbian
provisions, apparently with little input from the Bush campaign (Oldfield
1992:27-28). In the end, the party produced a document the President could
stand by, but not before Bush campaign officials had entered into some
relatively public arm-twisting, including the need for Charles Black, a Bush
consultant, to convince an economic subcommittee to reconvene and eliminate
the reference to Bush's tax "mistake'' (Maisel 1994:689).
Bond also did his part to unite the conservative coalition at this time. He
launched a bitter attack against Hillary Clinton in a speech before the RNC,
and joined Quayle in an attack on the news media (Germond and Witcover
1993:408). He thus assisted in the overall implementation of the Republican
"cultural warfare'' strategy. Ultimately, the Republican right was appeased by
the platform that emerged, as well as by the attention given to the values
issues by the speakers, primarily conservatives, selected to address the
convention. But this party cohesion was achieved at a significant cost: The
Republican convention left a distinct impression on the public of a party that
had gone too far to the right. According to polls taken after the event, a
majority of the electorate felt that the president had spent more time
attacking the Democrats than explaining what he would do; they disapproved
of the emphasis placed on homosexual issues; and 76 percent felt that the
criticism of Hillary Clinton had gone too far (Frankovic 1993). Or, as Mary
Matalin, a former RNC official and top Bush campaign advisor, frankly
observed: "We were in a deep, deep hole after the convention" (Wines 1992).

The General Election
Both national party committees played a significant role in the general
election campaign. Although the presidential campaigns were managed by the
respective candidate organizations, and the parties' activities were limited by
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the provisions of federal campaign finance law, the RNC and DNC still
mounted extensive political operations designed to assist their presidential
nominee as well as other federal and non-federal candidates running under
their party's banner. Both party organizations provided their candidates with
the kinds of campaign services and assistance that had become commonplace
in the 1980s. For example, they established communications outreach
programs for distributing daily messages to media outlets and partisan opinion
leaders; they made their media facilities available to candidates to develop
television advertisements and videotaped messages; they made coordinated
expenditures on behalf of their federal candidates; and they made direct
campaign contributions to selected federal and nonfederal candidates. In
addition, they conducted a range of programs designed to improve voter
turnout and party support.
Major party candidates who accept public funding for their general
election campaigns are prohibited from accepting private contributions from
other sources, including political parties. Federal Jaw does, however, allow
party committees to raise and spend funds on party-building and other generic
activities, such as voter registration drives and mobilization programs, that are
designed to benefit all party candidates and thus indirectly benefit the
presidential nominee. Because these programs, which are known as "joint
activities," help both federal and nonfederal candidates, they may be financed
through a combination of federally limited and nonlimited funding. The latter
type of funding is popularly known as "soft money," since it is not subject to
the more stringent limits of federal law. In 1992, both parties relied heavily
on soft money to influence the outcome of the elections.
While the RNC has been conducting extensive soft money efforts for
some time, the DNC has usually been hampered by its failure to match
Republican fundraising efforts. In 1992, however, the Democrats effectively
competed with the Republicans due to the fundraising generated by the
favorable political circumstances following their national convention. Relying
on a fundraising effort managed by Rahm Emmanuel, who had served as
Clinton's chief fundraiser during the prenomination campaign, the Democrats
capitalized on Clinton's popularity and promising electoral prospects to raise
about $20.1 million in nonfederal funds from July 1 to election day, as
compared to an estimated $12.8 million for the Republicans. This success
allowed the Democrats to narrow the resource gap that had developed over
the first 18 months of the election cycle, when the Republicans had surpassed
the Democrats by a margin of about $11 million.7
The DNC's financial success in the months after the convention was a
crucial factor in the 1992 race because it allowed the party to implement the
electoral strategy it had been developing since 1988. The cornerstone of this
strategy was the coordinated campaign operation, which served as the main
vehicle for registering and mobilizing Democratic voters. The DNC targeting
plan and coordinated campaign program were implemented in almost every
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state, with heavy concentration on states the DNC political operation had
identified as essential to a presidential victory. The program encouraged the
state party organization, with DNC support, to serve as a coordinating agent
for various federal and state and local campaigns, and carry out a joint
program of voter identification and turnout on behalf of all participating
Democratic candidates. The party and campaign organizations worked
together to conduct extensive phone bank and canvassing operations to
identify and mobilize the Democratic vote, usually in shared headquarters,
relying on computerized voter lists and targeting infonnation developed by the
party.
To finance these efforts, the DNC transferred approximately $9.5 million
in soft money funds to 47 states, much of which was used to develop voter
files, conduct registration drives, and cover overhead expenses. The DNC also
spent at least $1.9 million on telephone bank equipment that was sent to 34
state parties. The Democrats thus conducted an extensive party-based voter
identification effort similar to those carried out by the RNC in past elections.
The RNC, as well, also sponsored registration and mobilization efforts in
1992, as it continued to provide the services that have become almost a
standard part of the party's operations in national election campaigns. The
RNC transferred approximately $5.4 million in soft money funds to 42 states,
and provided at least 25 state party organizations with telephone bank
equipment, at a cost of over $ 1.5 million.
The RNC and DNC also spent significant sums from their soft money
accounts to assist party campaign organizations and candidates. The RNC
emphasized direct contributions to party committees and candidates. The
party transferred funds to state legislative campaign committees, as well as
state party committees, in at least 15 states. The RNC also contributed a
total of $1.2 million in nonfederal funds to candidates seeking office at the
state level, including about $800,000 to candidates in 23 states during the
general election period. These efforts were conducted as part of the RNC's
"down-ticket'' programs to help build Republican support in state legislatures
and capitols around the country, and thus reverse the pattern of recent
elections in which the party wins the presidential race but fails to capture a
majority of the nation's state houses.
The Democrats spent none of their soft money during the 1992 general
election on direct contributions to candidates. The contributions that were
reported were actually "in-kind'' contributions of polling information. The
DNC hired the firm of Stanley Greenberg, Clinton's campaign pollster, and
five other Washington-based polling organizations to conduct surveys in 31
states. In 27 of these states, all of which were targeted by the coordinated
campaign operation, polls were conducted at least two or three times during
the course of the campaign. The results were shared with the state party
committees, the presidential campaign, and other candidates in an effort to
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help them target their appeals and voter canvassing efforts. Soft money thus
allowed the Democrats to provide a valuable resource, statewide polling data,
to state parties and candidates.
The RNC also did some polling, although apparently on a more modest
scale. The Republicans report spending some $220,000 on polls and surveys
in 39 states that were shared with state parties and candidates. This DNC
and RNC activity benefitted affiliated party committees and candidates in a
number of ways. It provided high-quality survey research to a substantial
number of committees and candidates. Such information helps promote
effective communication with voters and enhances the ability to target
resources more efficiently. In addition, in most cases, this service facilitated
access to information that the recipient committee might not have been able
to afford on its own, or at least reduced the cost incurred by the recipient for
polling services since it helped defray the amount the candidate had to spend
on polling services. This is especially true with respect to the presidential
campaign, in that the party polling allowed the campaign to assess its support
in targeted states without having to conduct polls of its own on a regular basis
in each state.
The national party organizations also invested heavily in generic
advertising, especially television advertising, that encouraged the electorate to
"Vote Democratic" or "Vote Republican." The DNC and RNC both used a
combination of federal and nonfederal monies to pay for the production and
broadcast of ads. Overall, the Democrats spent about $14.2 million on
advertising and the Republicans spent about $10 million (Frisby 1992). The
Republicans basically followed the strategy employed in the past few elections,
in which they spent substantial amounts of soft money on generic advertising.
The scope of the DNC's efforts, however, vastly exceeded those of the past.
While the party did broadcast some ads in 1988, the total amount spent was
only about $1 million (Labaton 1992). The resources available to the party
in 1992 allowed it to dramatically increase this aspect of its electoral program.
Generic advertising allows the national committees to participate
meaningfully in elections and build support for party candidates at all levels.
This form of communication can be especially beneficial to the party's
presidential ticket, particularly when the ads are designed to reinforce the
nominee's message, as they were in 1992. The Democrats, for example, used
soft money to finance ads that did not mention Bill Clinton directly (to do so
would violate federal contribution laws) but did emphasize the economic
message that was the foundation of Clinton's campaign. These ads also
helped the presidential campaign to decide where to allocate its resources.
During the last week of the campaign, for instance, the Clinton campaign was
running tight on money and thus decided to buy a half-hour of national
television time as opposed to additional broadcast time in the highly
competitive state of Texas. The Democrats, however, did not leave Texas
unattended; instead, the DNC broadcast generic ads in the state to spread the
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party's message. The Republicans adopted a similar strategy. The Bush
campaign, facing substantial resource demands because the president was
trailing Clinton in a majority of the states, relied on party advertising to
strengthen its support in traditional Republican strongholds and in crucial
battleground states like Texas and Florida (Frisby 1992).

Conclusion
The 1992 presidential election highlights the organizational revitalization
of the RNC and DNC that has been widely noted in recent years. Although
the presidential selection process remains a largely candidate-centered system
in which the candidate's campaign committees play the leading role, both
parties were active participants at each stage of the process. Most
importantly, each national party organization provided its presidential ticket
with substantial electoral assistance in the general election through party
spending designed to benefit the ticket indirectly, either by building support
for the party or by identifying and mobilizing partisan supporters.
The major change from past elections is that the Democrats were better
prepared to compete with the Republicans as a result of the particular
dynamics of the 1992 contest. As Paul Herrnson and David Menefee-Libey
(1990) have noted, the organizational development of party organizations is
associated with two conditions: a perceived crisis that opens a window of
opportunity for change and a political entrepreneur who takes advantage of
this opportunity. Both of these conditions existed for the Democrats in 1992.
When Ron Brown assumed the leadership of the DNC, the Democrats were
demoralized, and emerging factions threatened to divide the party. Brown
seized the opportunity created by the Democrats' string of defeats in national
elections to establish clear electoral goals for the party. By focusing attention
on common electoral goals rather than potentially divisive ideological
concerns, Brown was able to minimize intraparty tensions and restructure the
national party organization to fulfill his objectives. He then pursued a course
of action designed to promote party unity and ensure a meaningful party role
in the conduct of the 1992 presidential campaign.
Interestingly, Brown was able to achieve his objectives in part by relying
on the limited authority the DNC chair is granted under party rules.
Although the rules are generally considered to have undermined the role of
the party leadership in the presidential selection process, Brown used his
position to broker relations between members of the DNC and the DLC, and
to try to moderate the tone of the nomination contest. He also used his
authority to influence the platform and convention proceedings in a way that
helped unify the party behind Clinton's candidacy. His success, however, was
in large part due to the personal relations he enjoyed with key party members

The Politics of Cohesion

81

such as Cuomo and Jackson, his willingness to implement the Clinton strategy,
and the lack of major opposition from issues activists within the party.
In contrast, the Republicans enjoyed few of the conditions that led to the
Democrats' success. After the death of Lee Atwater, the party organization
lacked strong leadership and eventually, with the support of the White House,
a new chair was appointed during the election year. The new leader, Rich
Bond, was confronted by divisions among party moderates and conseivatives
over economic policy and social issues, which rose to the forefront as a result
of the nomination bid by Pat Buchanan and the heightened attention to party
policy that developed in the absence of a serious challenge to President Bush.
In addition, the party rules allowed issues activists to gain access to the
platform-writing process, which forced an internal party debate that
culminated in a convention that failed to attract wide support among the
electorate.
Whether the party organizations will continue to play a prominent role
in future presidential elections remains to be seen. The 1992 experience
produced no major change in the factors that encourage candidate-centered
elections and was shaped more by the particular circumstances that
accompanied the election than any institutional changes in the national party
organizations. The role of the party organizations in the future, as in the past,
is likely to depend on the entrepreneurship of the party leaders, the
opportunities for influence available to the party committees, and the
particular dynamics of the race. It will also depend on any actions the
Congress may take with respect to campaign finance reform, since reform may
alter the provisions for soft money financing that were crucial to the financing
of party electoral activity in 1992. Whatever the future holds, the 1992
experience clearly shows that national party organizations can play an
important role in presidential elections and can have a substantial influence
on electoral outcomes.

Notes
1. Sec Cotter and Bibby 1980; Conway 1983; Schlesinger 1985; Kayden and Mahe 1985;
Huckshorn, Gibson, Cotter, and Bibby 1986; Hermson 1988; Sabato 1988; Frantzich 1989.
2. The author thanks Erik Belenky for his assistance with the research for this chapter
and acknowledges the support or the Colby College Social Science Grants Committee.
3. After Michael Dukakis's 1988 defeat in the presidential election, many DNC members
expressed dissatisfoction with the campaign staff members from the Northeast who had been
sent to manage their states in the general election. Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, one or the
candidates for the 1992 Democratic presidential nomination, thus sought 10 appeal lo these
party leaders in September 1991 when he declared at a mccling of the DNC: "If I'm your
nominee, you will not sec hordes of young Iowans coming into your slate lo tell you how to run
your state' (Toner 1991c).
4. Because of their limited fundraising success from 1989 to 1991, the DNC could not
commit sizeable sums lo redistricting battles. Most of the funding on the Democratic side was
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generated through an independent group, Impact 2000, which was established by major
Democratic fundraisers and labor groups lo finance redistricting c ITorts.
5. These slates included Illinois, Virginia, California, Massachusetts, New Mexico,
Maryland, New Hampshire, Oregon, Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, and Arkansas. Figures
arc based on amounts disclosed in reports liled al the Federal Election Commission.
6. Remarks delivered by Margaret Alexander at the Citizens' Research Foundation
Presidential Finance Officers conference, Washington, DC, 1992.
7. Unless otherwise noted, the figures reported here and throughout the rest of this
section arc based on the FEC disclosure reports for nonfcderal accounts liled by the DNC and
RNC for the 1991-92 election cycle.
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Party Strategy and Campaign Activities
in the 1992 Congressional Elections
Paul S. Henruon

There was an old woman who lived in II shoe,
She hnd so many children she didn't know what to do,
She gave them some broth without any bread;
She whipped them all soundly and put them to bed.
- from the Annotated Mother Goose,
William S. Baring-Gould and Ceil Baring•Gould, eds.

The 1992 congressional elections posed many challenges and opportunities
for political parties. The election cycle was characterized by a record number
of congressional retirements, widespread public dissatisfaction with
government, and an emphasis on" change" among politicians. Over a decade
of organizational modernization enabled national party committees to amass
the resources needed to play a significant role in these elections. However,
allocating these resources would not be an easy task. Both parties fielded
unusually large numbers of highly qualified challengers and open•seat
candidates, and many House and Senate incumbents were extremely anxious
about their prospects for reelection. The 1992 congressional elections
presented party decision makers with an acute case of a familiar ailment.
like the old woman who lived in the shoe, the parties had a severe shortage
of resources-in this case campaign money and services-and an abundance
of deserving beneficiaries clamoring for them.
This chapter analyzes the strategies and activities of party organizations
in the 1992 elections. Interviews with the staffs of the Democratic and
Republican national, congressional, and senatorial campaign committees and
the managers of over a dozen PACs provide insights into how the political
parties selected candidates for support and the kinds of assistance they
distributed. Survey data collected from 362 major party congressional
candidates and campaign managers, and personal interviews with a smaller
group of campaigners, give insights into their perspectives on party campaign
activities.1 Campaign finance data furnished by the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) are used to examine the parties' spending patterns.
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Some of elements of the political climate that surrounded the 1992
congressional elections were typical of recent election cycles. An incumbent
president was gearing up for reelection, the nation was suffering from a weak
economy, and Americans were taking pride in their country's most recent
display of military force in the Middle East. Following the completion of the
census and the reapportionment of House seats, state governments began
redrawing congressional districts. George Bush was enjoying record levels of
presidential popularity during the Gulf War; only after the war did his levels
of support plummet (Frankovic 1993).
Civil rights continued to occupy a place on the political agenda, both in
some familiar and some new forms. Racial and gender discrimination and
violence were relevant issues in many campaigns due to the highly publicized
studies of the unequal salaries and advancement prospects for women and
blacks, the beating of black motorist Rodney King by four white police
officers, and Anita Hill's testimony against Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas. Gay rights found its place on the agenda after the military's
longstanding policy against homosexuals serving in the military became a
salient issue. The Supreme Court's ruling in Thornburg v. Gingles, which
declared that states could not draw election districts in ways that diluted
minority representation, had a major impact on several House elections.
Perennial issues like health care and education also occupied a space on
the political agenda. Moreover, as has been the case in most recent elections,
voter dissatisfaction with the political establishment in Washington was high.
The savings and loan crisis, government "gridlock," and congressional scandal
left many voters frustrated and angry with their elected officials. Much of this
hostility was directed toward Congress, and many incumbents were preparing
to respond using a strategy that had served them well in the past-running for
reelection to Congress by campaigning against the institution itself (Fenno
1975). Nevertheless, all of these issues took a back seat to the economy,
which was on almost everyone's mind.
Although no one of the events or conditions that preceded the 1992
election was particularly unusual, collectively these factors created some
unique possibilities for congressional candidates, parties, PACs, and other
politically active groups. Redistricting. scandal, declining job satisfaction, and
a myriad of personal considerations led an unprecedented 66 House members
to retire.2 An additional 19 members of the House lost their primary
elections nominations, and another two died before the general election.3
The result was record numbers of new, redrawn, and open House seats. The
retirement of 8 Senators and the defeat of another, Senator Alan Dixon, in
the Illinois Democratic primary, also insured that many seats in the upper
chamber would be competitive.4 The sheer number of open-seat contests-91
for the House and 9 for the Senat~gave politicians who had been waiting for
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the chance to run for Congress on a level playing field the opportunity to do
so. It also gave parties and interest groups the opportunity to try to replace
some of their old foes in Congress with more sympathetic members. The
political conditions that preceded the election insured the appearance of many
new faces in the 103rd Congress.
The political climate affected every aspect of the 1992 congressional
elections. It affected who ran for office, the strategies they used, the
resources at their disposal, and the decisions made by the over 104.4 million
citizens who voted on election day (Federal Election Commission 1992). It
also influenced the funding decisions of political parties, PACs, and wealthy
campaign contributors. The climate created intense competition among
congressional candidates both in their election districts and in the nation's
capital. Candidates had to compete with opponents in their election districts
for votes and with other congressional candidates, including their fellow
partisans, in Washington, D.C., for campaign resources.

Political Parties and Contemporary Congressional Elections

The roles that political parties play in congressional campaigns have been
shaped by the same forces that fostered the development of the modern,
candidate-centered election system (Sorauf 1980; Herrnson 1988). This
system emphasizes campaign activities requiring technical expertise and
in-depth research, which many candidates lack. Incumbents usually turn to
political consultants, PACs, and interest groups for campaign assistance.
Nonincumbents, particularly House challengers, have more difficulty
assembling the money and expertise needed to wage a competitive bid for
Congress.
Party committees in the nation's capital have developed into major
repositories of campaign money, services, and political advice. The Democratic and Republican national committees focus most of their efforts on
presidential elections, giving some attention to gubernatorial, statehouse, and
a small number of mayoral elections. They also undertake considerable
efforts to strengthen state and local party organizations. The national
committees' involvement in House and Senate elections, however, is relatively
limited. It usually involves conducting a few candidate training seminars,
furnishing candidates with party manifestos and "talking points," and
cooperating with their congressional, senatorial, state, and local campaign
committees in a coordinated campaign effort to mobilize voters.
Congressional candidates in search of money, election services, or assistance
in running their campaigns rarely turn to their national committee for help.
The parties' congressional and senatorial campaign committees,
sometimes referred to as the "hill committees," 6 on the other hand, have
developed into major centers of support for House and Senate candidates.
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The congressional campaign committees focus the vast majority of their efforts
on House races and the two senatorial campaign committees focus on Senate
contests, though party committees at all levels cooperate with one another in
a variety of areas. In 1992, the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (DCCC) amassed a budget in excess $12.8 million, while its rival,
the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) raised just under
$34.4 million. The two senatorial committees-the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee (DSCC) and the National Republican Senatorial
Committee (NRSC)-raised $25.4 million and $72.3 million, respectively.8
In addition to their members, who are selected by their colleagues in the
House or Senate, the hill committees employ highly skilled political
professionals. The DCCC and OSCC employed 64 and 35 full-time staff
respectively, and their Republican counterparts had 89 and 130 full-time
employees during the 1992 election cycle. For the most part, the members
function like boards of directors, setting priorities and giving staff the support
they need to raise money and recruit candidates. The staffs oversee the
committees' daily operations, are very influential in formulating campaign
strategies, and play a major role in implementing those strategies, particularly
in selecting candidates for and delivering campaign assistance. The campaign
committee staffs are divided along functional lines; different divisions are
responsible for administration, fundraising, research, communications, and
campaign activities. In 1992, both the DCCC and the NRCC added
redistricting divisions to focus on the decennial redrawing of House districts.
The NRCC also added an in-house polling operation to its political division.
Party Strategy, Decision Making, and Targeting

The hill committees have a common overriding goal of maximizing the
number of seats their party holds in Congress (Jacobson 1985-86}. They
become heavily involved in some elections, giving selected candidates large
campaign contributions and making substantial campaign expenditures on
their behalf. Many of these candidates also receive assistance with aspects of
campaigning requiring technical expertise, in-depth research, or connections
with PACs, campaign consultants, and other groups that possess some of the
resources needed to conduct a congressional campaign. Finally, the campaign
committees participate along with other party committees in generic,
party-focused election activities that are designed to help the entire ticket get
elected.
The campaign committees focus most of their efforts on competitive
House and Senate contests, but protecting incumbents is also a major priority.
Pressures from nervous incumbents can skew the distribution of committee
resources away from competitive challenger and open-seat candidates and
toward members of Congress who hold relatively safe seats. The funds
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available to a committee and the aspirations of its chair and other members
can also affect the way it distributes resources (Herrnson 1989).
National political and economic conditions are additional factors that
influence which candidates get campaign resources. When the president is
popular and the economy is strong, the campaign committees of the
president's party usually invest more resources in competitive challenger and
open-seat races. Conversely, the out-party committees use more of their
resources to support incumbents. When national conditions do not favor the
president's party, the patterns are reversed: the in-party committees take a
"protectionist'' posture that favors incumbents and the out-party committees
go on the offensive, using more of their resources to help nonincumbents
(Jacobson and Kernell 1983). The unpredictable nature of national political
conditions, economic trends, and events that take place in states and
congressional districts means that committee decision making and targeting
are necessarily imperfect.
As a result, some safe incumbents and
uncompetitive nonincumbents inevitably receive committee assistance, while
a number of competitive nonincumbents get little or no help.
The conditions surrounding the 1992 election cycle made strategic
decision making and targeting very difficult, especially for the two House
campaign committees.7 Redistricting, a process that is always fraught with
ambiguities, was complicated by the Supreme Court ruling in Thornburg v.
Gingles. It caused many states to run behind schedule in redrawing the
boundaries of their congressional districts, resulted in many redistricting plans
being challenged in court, and delayed primary elections in several states.
Factors besides the huge number of redrawn or newly created seats
complicated the committees' tasks. President Bush's popularity seesawed up
and down, making it difficult for the committees to decide whether to pursue
offensive or defensive strategies. The House banking and post office scandals,
and the hostility that voters directed toward Congress, had a similar effect.
Bounced checks and other ethical lapses resulted in a large group of
incumbents, like Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH), Bill Goodling (R-PA), and Nick
Mavroules (D-MA), finding themselves in jeopardy, and gave numerous
challengers an unexpected boost. The late retirements of some House
members and the primary defeats of others further complicated the
committees' efforts.
As a result of the uncertainty surrounding the 1992 elections, the NRCC
and DCCC delayed drawing up their "watch'' lists of "opportunity' (or
competitive) races and had difficulty paring their lists down to size. The lists
that committees initially compiled were extensive. Each included roughly 300
elections, more than three times the number listed in a normal election cycle.
These lists were revised and shortened over the course of the election cycle,
but going into the last week of the election both committees listed over 150
races as top priorities-more than three times the number they had included
in the 1990 election.
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Individual candidates are selected for placement on the committees' watch
lists on the basis of several criteria. The competitiveness of the district and
incumbency are the first two considerations. Candidates running in districts
that were decided by close margins in the last election or competing in open
seats are likely to be placed on a committee's watch list and targeted for
campaign assistance. In 1992, House members running in incumbent vs.
incumbent contests or who were in jeopardy for other reasons were also
considered top priorities.
The strength of the candidate and the quality of his or her campaign
organization are considerations for nonincumbents. Those who have had
political experience, are well known, or who have celebrity status are also
likely to be targeted. Challengers and open-seat contestants who have
assembled professional campaign organizations are prime candidates for party
support as well (Herrnson 1989). A professional campaign organization
assures the committee that the resources they contribute will be properly
utilized, especially if campaign committee officials are familiar with the
consultants who have been hired.
A variety of idiosyncratic factors may also come into play when the
committees select the candidates who will initially be given the most support.
An incumbent who is accused of committing an ethical transgression, is
perceived to be out of touch with people in the district, or is in trouble for
some other reason is a likely candidate for extra committee help. These
difficulties also often provoke a response by the other party's campaign
committee, resulting in the incumbent's opponent also benefiting from extra
party money and campaign services.
Although 1992 was proclaimed to be "The Year of the Woman," and
party leaders worked aggressively to recruit women to run for Congress,
campaign committee staff maintain that gender was not a criterion used to
decide who would be given campaign assistance (Biersack and Herrnson
1994). Women were targeted only to the degree that their races were
expected to be competitive.
Finally, ideology is not a stated criterion for targeting candidates.
Campaign committee staffs explain that ideology is irrelevant in all of their
decisions, except to the degree that it can influence a particular candidate's
competitiveness. An extreme right-wing Republican challenger running in
very liberal Democratic district, for example, would be evaluated as
uncompetitive not because of the candidate's political leanings, but because
of being out of step with the district. As Deborah Flavin, Director of Political
Education at the NRCC, explains:
Al the NRCC our only ideology is that you have a "big R" by your name. There is
no litmus lest on any issue. We ask candidates how they reel on "issue X'.' and "issue
Y'. Then, we help them articulate what they feel. We arc here lo help Republicans
win.

The staffs of the Democratic committees voice similar sentiments.
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The committees' lists of competitive elections are continuously revised
throughout the election cycle. Campaign committee field coordinators who
are assigned to monitor congressional races within designated regions advise
their colleagues in Washington, D.C. about the latest developments in
individual elections. As a result, some candidates drop in priority and are cut
off from party help, while others gain more committee attention and support.
The tremendous uncertainty surrounding the 1992 elections was expected to
make targeting very difficult for party committees. Early in the election cycle
both House campaign committees decided to distribute their resources
broadly. As Tom Cole, Executive Director of the NRCC, stated in December
1991, "We are going hunting with a shotgun instead of a rifle this year:"
DCCC decision makers confirmed that they, too, would employ the "shotgun"
approach.

Campaign Spending

Party spending in congressional elections is severely restricted by the
limitations imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
National, congressional, and state party campaign committees can each give
$5,000 per primary, runoff, and general election to a House candidate.8 The
parties' national and senatorial campaign committees can give a combined
total of $17,500 to a Senate candidate. State committees can contribute an
additional $5,000 to Senate candidates.
Parties can, however, spend larger sums of money on behalf of individual
candidates. This spending, often referred to as "coordinated expenditures''
because they can be made in direct coordination with a candidate's campaign,
typically consists of campaign services that a hill committee or some other
party organization gives to an individual candidate or purchases from a
political consultant on the candidate's behalf. Coordinated expenditures
frequently take the form of polls, radio advertisements, television
commercials, fundraising events, direct-mail solicitations, or issue research.
They differ from campaign contributions in that the party retains some control
over them, giving it the ability to influence some aspects of how the campaign
is run. Originally set at $10,000 each for a state and national committee, the
limits for coordinated expenditures on behalf of House candidates are
adjusted for inflation and reached $27,620 per committee in 1992.9 The limits
for coordinated expenditures in Senate elections vary by the size of a state's
population and are also indexed to inflation. They ranged from $55,240 per
committee in the smallest states to $1,227,322 in California. Although state
and national party committees are each authorized to spend the same amount
in coordinated expenditures, the committees often create "agency agreements''
that allow the parties' congressional or senatorial campaign committee to take
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over a state party's share of the expenditure in situations when a state party
committee does not have the funds to make them (Herrnson 1988).
Coordinated expenditures are the vehicle of choice for most party activity
in congressional elections. Their higher limits, possibility for creating agency
agreements, and the direct role they afford party committees in individual
candidates' campaigns make coordinated expenditures an attractive avenue for
party involvemenL Not surprisingly, the campaign committees spend greater
portions of their money on coordinated expenditures than on contributions
(see Table 6.1). Another reason for the attractiveness of coordinated
expenditures is that they enable the parties to take advantage of economies
of scale when purchasing and distributing campaign services. Because the
parties purchase the services of political consultants in large quantities, they
pay below-market rates, which enables them to provide candidates with
services whose true market value exceed the FECA's coordinated expenditure
limits.10
Most party spending in congressional elections is done by the four hill
committees. In 1992, the NRCC spent over $5.85 million in the campaigns
of Republican House candidates, roughly $900,000 more than the DCCC.
The RNC and NRSC spent an additional $1.7 million. Total Republican

Table 6.1. National Party Spending in the 1992 Congressional Elections•

House
Coordinated
Contributions
Expenditures
Democrats
DNC
DCCC
DSCC
Stale and local
Total

818,846
10,000
366,477
1,195,323

$913,935
4,132,292
2,600
750,4S1
5,799,278

Republicans
RNC
NRCC
NRSC
Stale and local
Total

$778,503
686,916
78,500
626,057
$2,169,976

$832,347
5,166,647
0
868,908
$6,867,902

so

Senate
Coordinated
Contributions Expenditures

so
709,831

$195,351
2,606
11,233,120
487,415
11,918,492

$9,000

so

3,500
614,814
127,960
$755,274

0
16,485,039
3,617,303
$20,102,342

18,682
618,450
72,699

• Figures include contributions and coordinated expenditures by the parties' national,
congressional, and senatorial campaign committees for all major party candidates in two-party
contests, except incumbent vs. incumbent House elections. They do not include soft money
expenditures.
Souree: Federal Election Commission.
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spending in House races reached $9.04 million, over $2 million more than that
spent by the Democrats. Although the Democrats were outspent by their
Republican counterparts, the spending gap between the two parties has closed
considerably over the last six election cycles.11 This is due both to a fall-off
in Republican receipts and improved Democratic fundraising.12
Democratic and Republican state and local party committees spent
$1.1 million and $15 million, respectively, in the 1992 House elections. This
accounts for only 16 percent of all party spending made directly in House
campaigns. Although House campaigns are waged locally, national parties
play a bigger financial role in them than do state and local parties.
National parties also outspent state and local parties in Senate
elections. The NRSC was the more active of the senatorial campaign
committees, outspending its rival by $6.3 million in 1992. The Republican
committee also transferred almost $2 million more to state party committees
than did the DSCC.13 The two senatorial committees accounted for the lion's
share of party spending in Senate elections.
As expected, the national parties distributed most of their campaign
money to candidates in close elections (see Table 6.2).14 Turning first to the
House, the Republicans' allocation patterns indicate that they pursued a fairly
aggressive, offensive strategy. The NRCC, and other Washington-based
Republican committees, directed 75 percent of their contributions and
coordinated expenditures to challengers and open-seat candidates. The
remaining money was committed to incumbents.
GOP money was fairly well targeted. Hopeful challengers (whose
elections were decided by margins of 20 percent or less) and open-seat
prospects (whose elections were decided by the same margin) got 34 percent
and 26 percent of the party's funds. Incumbents in jeopardy (whose elections
were decided by 20 percent or less of the vote) got 22 percent. The party
gave only 5 percent of its funds to "shoo-ins'' (incumbents whose contests were
decided by margins greater than 20 percent), 10 percent to "likely losers''
(challengers whose races were decided by margins greater than 20 percent),
and 5 percent to open-seat candidates running in one-party districts (where
the race was also decided by more than 20 percent of the vote).
The Democrats' allocation strategy is more difficult to discern from its
spending patterns. This is partially due to the impreciseness of DCCC
targeting. Democratic House members, who outnumbered Republican
incumbents 267 to 167, received a total of 43 percent of the party's
expenditures, with Democratic shoo-ins raking in a full 21 percent.16
Democratic challengers received 36 percent of the party's money, and the
party allocated more money to challengers who were likely to lose than those
who had better odds of winning. Democratic spending in open-seat contests
was somewhat better targeted, but as has been the case in previous elections,
the Democrats continue to spend substantial sums of money on incumbents
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who do not need it and on nonincumbents who are not likely to benefit from
it (Jacobson 1985-1986; Herrnson 1989).
It is relatively easy for the parties to target their money in Senate
elections. DSCC and NRSC officials have to assess their candidates'
prospects in only 33 to 35 races that take place within borders that do not
shift every 10 years because of redistricting. The result is that virtually all of
their money is spent in close elections. In 1992, the Democrats spent all but
10 percent of their money in competitive contests, favoring hopeful
challengers and oRen-seat candidates over incumbents in jeopardy, shoo-ins,
and likely losers. 6 The Republicans distributed all but 13 percent of their
funds to candidates in close elections, but favored incumbents in jeopardy
over hopeful challengers and open-seat contestants. Both parties perceived
open-seat elections to be contests where some hard fought battles would take
place. These spending patterns indicate that the Democrats took a highly
aggressive posture, and the Republicans took the complementary defensive
position.
From a candidate's point of view, the most important thing is the
actual amount of party money in his or her campaign. Republican House
candidates in close races benefited from greater national party spending in
1992 than did the Democrats they ran against. GOP committees in
Washington spent an average of $34,000 on Republicans in jeopardy, about
$12,000 more than the Democrats spent on the challengers who hoped to take
away their seats (see Table 6.3). These figures amount to 5 percent of the
total spent in the campaign of a typical GOP House member in jeopardy and
11 percent of the funds spent on the average Democratic hopeful.
Democratic national party organizations typically spent just $17,000 on their
House members who were in close races, which amounts to $16,700 less than
the GOP spent on the challengers who hoped to defeat them. These figures
represent 2 percent and 10 percent of the money spent in these campaigns.
The GOP also outspent the Democrats by better than two-to-one in
competitive open-seat contests. Although Republican House candidates
benefit from their party's greater wealth and superior targeting, hopeful
challengers of both parties, who have the most difficulty in raising money, are
the greatest beneficiaries of party spending.
In 1992, Republican Senators in jeopardy benefited from the most
national party spending, an average of almost $285,000 more than was spent
on the Democratic hopefuls who hoped to take away their jobs. These figures
represent 16 percent and 15 percent of these candidates' respective budgets.
Republican hopefuls benefited from approximately $508,000 in national party
spending, roughly 21 percent of the campaign spending in their races, and
about one and one-half times as much money as the Democratic party spent
on the incumbents these GOP candidates tried to unseat.

Party Strategy and Campaign Activities

93

Table 6.2 The Allocation of National Party Funds in the 19'J2 Congressional Elections

Democrats
Incumbents
In Jeopardy

22%

(7W
Shoo-ins

Challengers
Hopefuls
Likely losers

Open scats
Prospects

21
(121)

16
(41)
20
(79)

15
(50)

One-party areas

Total••

House
Republicans

Senate
Democrats
Republicans
18%
(6)

5

5

{7'J)

(8)

39%
{6)
8
{6)

34
(72)
10

42
(6)

19
(6)

5

5

(121)

(6)

(8)

26
(50)

29
(8)

29
(8)

$10,907
(34)

$16,037
(34)

2.0%
(41)

5

5

(34)

(34)

$5,479
(397)

$7,074
(397)

• Number of r.ices arc in parenthesis.
• • In thousands or dollars.
Source: Compiled from Federal Election Commission data.

Both parties were important players in Senate open-seat contests, accounting
for 11 percent of the money spent in Democratic campaigns and 17 percent
in GOP bids for office. Bruce Herschensohn was the greatest beneficiary of
national party money. The NRSC spent a total of $2,472,144 million in his
race for California's open Senate seat, which comr.rised 24 percent of the
funds spent directly in conjunction with his campaign. 7 The DSCC and DNC
invested a total of $1,635,960 in the campaign of Congresswoman Barbara
Boxer, the ultimate victor in the race.18 This accounted for 14 percent of all
the funds spent in conjunction with her campaign. Spending by Republican
party committees in the nation's capital broke the $1 million mark in five
1992 Senate races and Democratic national party spending exceeded it in
three.19
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Table 63. Average National Party Spending in Congressional Elections•

Democrats

House
Republicans

Senate
Republicans
Democrats

Incumbents
In Jeopardy
Shoo-ins

$16,SliO
9,705

$34,410
4,'227

$333,100
63,814

$1,052,900
208,544

Challengers
Hopefuls
Likely losers

21,888
13,563

33,565
5,906

767,910
98,255

507,816
91,712

Open scats
Prospects
One-party areas

16,941
8,093

36,466
11,379

400,148

585,972

All candidates

13,802

17,818

320,083

471,677

• Figures include contributions and coordinated expenditures by the parties' national,
congressional, and senatorial campaign committees for all major party candidates in two-party
contests, except incumbent vs. incumbent house elections. They do not include sort money
expenditures. The number of races arc the same as in Table 6.2.
Source: Compiled from Federal Election Commission data.

Campaign Services

The parties' congressional and senatorial campaign committees provide
selected candidates with assistance in specialized campaign activities, such as
campaign management, gauging public opinion, issue and opposition research,
and campaign communications. They also provide transactional assistance,
acting as brokers between candidates, PACs, individual contributors, and
political consultants. The DCCC and NRCC typically become closely involved
in the campaigns of candidates on their watch lists and have little involvement
in others. Their Senate counterparts work with all of their candidates, but are
less involved in the details of running their campaigns. All four committees
play important roles in congressional elections.

Campaign Management
Candidates and their campaign organizations can get help from their
hill committees with hiring and training campaign staff, making strategic and
tactical decisions, and other management-related activities. The committees
maintain directories of campaign managers, fundraising specialists, media
experts, pollsters, voter list vendors, and other political consultants that
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candidates and managers can use to hire staff and purchase campaign services.
Committee officials sometimes recommend particular consultants, especially
to House challengers and open-seat candidates.20
The campaign committees also train candidates and managers in the
latest campaign techniques. The DCCC and the NRCC hold training
seminars to introduce campaigners to innovations in targeting, fundraising,
and other election activities. Seminars for incumbents, which are held in the
committees' headquarters, cover such topics as staying in touch with the
district, getting the most political mileage out of congressionally franked mail,
defending unpopular votes, and PAC fundraising. Seminars for chaJlengers
and open-seat candidates focus on more basic subjects, such as the "stump"
speech, filing campaign finance reports with the FEC, and building coalitions.
Even long-term members of the House and Senate find the seminars
beneficial, if for no other reason than they remind them to do things they
already know they ought to be doing (Anderson and Binstein 1993).
In 1992, both committees introduced a number of innovations in their
management-related service programs, including the use of precinct-level
election results, geodemographic data and polls to help campaigns plan their
mailings, electronic media ads, voter mobilization drives, and candidate field
trips. Over the course of the election cycle, the NRCC held training schools
that were attended by 199 candidates and 76 spouses. The committee also
cosponsored, with the RNC, a series of week-long intensive programs in
campaign management, communications, and fundraising that were attended
by 314 campaign staffers (National Republican Campaign Committee 1992).
Although this activity pales next to the six- to twelve-week training programs
the committee once conducted under the guise of the Republican Campaign
21
Academy, it is more extensive than the training sessions organized by the
Democrats. According to DCCC National Political Director Rob Engel, the
Democrats traditionally devote fewer resources to candidate and campaign
manager training because they "have a very deep bench [of candidates and
consultants}, a much deeper bench than the Republicans."
The hill committees also serve as centers of strategic advice.
Committee field representatives and staffs in Washington serve as important
sources of tactical information. Because they follow congressional elections
nationwide and can draw on experiences from previous election cycles, the
committees are among the few organizations that have the knowledge and
institutional memory to advise candidates and their managers on how to deal
with some of the dilemmas they encounter (Hershey 1984).

Gauging Public Opinion
Candidates can also receive significant assistance in gauging public
opinion from natural party committees. The DNC and RNC circulate the
findings of nationwide polls in newsletters and memoranda they distribute to
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members of Congress, party activists, and congressional candidates. In 1992,
the DNC undertook a major polling effort that included statewide polls
designed to furnish information to the Clinton-Gore campaign and to
Democratic candidates for governor, state legislature, the House, and the
Senate. The RNC focused most of its attention on the presidential race.
The congressional and senatorial campaign committees conduct or
commission hundreds of polls and targeting studies in a given election cycle.
In 1992, the NRCC hired a director of survey research to conduct polls for
117 Republican candidates and to assist others in purchasing and interpreting
surveys from private polling firms. The committee took benchmark polls for
incumbents, challengers, and open-seat contestants, recruitment surveys for
potential candidates, and tracking polls for a small group of candidates who
were running neck and neck with their Democratic opponents at the end of
the election. Many of these polls, which had a market value between $8,000
and $10,000, were given to candidates as in-kind contributions or coordinated
expenditures of $1,800 to $3,500 using a depreciating option allowed by the
FEC.22 The committee also carried out two national surveys to measure the
effects the check-bouncing scandal had on public opinion, to test some
anti-Congress and anti-Democratic attack themes, and to examine public
response to several defense-related issues.
The DCCC did not hire a director of survey research or conduct
"in-house" polls for its candidates in 1992. It explored this possibility after the
1990 election cycle, but chose to continue to rely on private polling firms
instead. As it had in the past, the committee gave selected candidates surveys
that were purchased from prominent Democratic consultants as in-kind
contributions or coordinated expenditures. It also cooperated with the
Democratic national and senatorial campaign committees in taking statewide
and national polls.
Selected candidates also receive precinct-level targeting studies from
the hill committees. In 1992, the DSCC and DCCC used geodemographic
data and election returns provided by the National Committee for an
Effective Congress (NCEC), a leading liberal PAC, to help Democratic
candidates design their voter mobilization strategies, guide their media
purchases, and carry out other communications and field activities (Herrnson
1994b). Republican House candidates received similar assistance from the
NRCC's redistricting and campaign divisions, and Republican Senate
candidates got targeting help from the NRSC's campaign division.

Issue and Opposition Research
During the 1980s, national party organizations became major centers
for political research. The DNC and RNC extended their traditional research
activities in several new directions, most of which are party-focused rather
than candidate-directed. Members of Congress, governors, state legislators,
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and candidates and activists at all levels are routinely sent issue briefs and
talking points on salient national issues.
Candidates for Congress also receive party-focused research materials
from the senatorial and congressional campaign committees. The parties
write issue booklets that discuss the economy, crime, drugs, health care, and
other national concerns to help candidates formulate their positions and
prepare for campaign debates. The booklets include footnoted facts,
summaries of a party's major achievements, and criticisms of the opposing
party's performance and programs. In 1992, the NRCC distributed its issues
handbook to 350 Republican primary and general election challengers and
open-seat candidates. House Democrats distributed their issues handbook to
all of their candidates, and to thousands of Democratic activists.23
More important than the issue booklets are the issue packages the hill
committees provide to selected candidates. These include information drawn
from major newspapers, the Associated Press wire service, the Lexis/Nexis
electronic data base, and government publications. The packages present a
detailed description of the district, hard facts about issues that are important
to local voters, and talking points that help candidates discuss these issues in
a thematic and interesting manner. Candidates can access additional
information by dialing into the committees' electronic bulletin boards. Many
candidates make extensive use of this information when developing their
campaign themes and policy positions. Open-seat candidates and challengers,
who have none of the congressional perks enjoyed by incumbents, use party
research as a substitute for the studies that House members get from their
staffs, the Congressional Research Service, or the General Accounting Office.
In 1992, the NRCC conducted opposition research on every
Democratic member of the House. Highly detailed opposition research
packages were assembled on the 120 most vulnerable Democratic House
members (National Republican Congressional Committee 1992). The DCCC
had a smaller task to perform since fewer Republicans occupy House seats.
Each hill committee also conducted opposition research on many of its own
members of Congress so they could "innoculate" themselves against attacks
they anticipated would be made by their opponents.

Campaign Communications
The hill committees also give selected candidates assistance with
campaign communications. Both the DCCC and NRCC have state-of-the-art
television and radio production facilities on their premises and can furnish
candidates with technical and editorial assistance in producing TV and radio
ads. They also have satellite capabilities that enable candidates to beam their
television communications back to their districts instantly and interact "live"
with voters. This technology is extremely popular with incumbents from
western states.
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Each media center produces several "generic' or "doughnut" ads that
they customize to meet the specific needs of individual candidates. One
generic radio ad that was heard in connection with House campaigns across
the country was based on the television show "Lifestyles of the Rich and
Famous'' and portrayed incumbent Democrats as jet-setters who vacation
around the world at taxpayers' expense. Originally developed during the 1990
election, this NRCC ad was also used by many Republican challengers in
1992.
House candidates and their consultants can use the congressional
campaign committees' recording and editing suites to produce individualized
radio and television commercials.24 Committee production staff are available
to give technical and editorial advice. In a small number of campaigns, the
NRCC goes several steps further. A communications division staffer meets
with the candidate, his or her pollster, campaign manager, and a party
political operative to design a full blown media campaign. The staffer
develops advertising themes, writes television and radio scripts, and produces
the ads. The staffer may also help design flyers and other printed matter
(Herrnson 1988).
In 1992, the NRCC produced 188 television advertisements for 45
House candidates: 23 incumbents and 22 challenger or open-seat candidates.
According to Peter Pessel, one of the committee's producers, two-thirds of the
ads were specifically designed for individual candidates. The remainders were
doughnut ads with visual inserts and voice-overs. The committee also
produced radio ads for 45 House members and 44 nonincumbents. The
DCCC provided a much larger crop of candidates with less personalized
service. Just over 170 House members and 70 nonincumbents used the
Democrats' Harriman Communications Center to record and edit their
television commercials. Under 20 used the committee's facilities to record
their radio advertisements most preferred to tape their radio ads in their
campaign headquarters and other sites.
By providing candidates with issue packages and communications
assistance, the congressional and senatorial campaign committees have clearly
contributed to the nationalization of American politics. Few congressional
candidates needed to be told the economy was the major issue in 1992, but
the hill committees helped them discuss this issue thematically and frame it
in ways that were more meaningful to voters. The committees' opposition
research also contributed to many campaigns, but in ways that many voters
might not look upon favorably. Just as the hill committees assist candidates
in putting a positive spin on some aspects of their campaigns, they help them
put a negative spin on others, thereby contributing to the mudslinging that has
become commonplace in congressional elections.
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Fundraising
In addition to providing contributions, coordinated expenditures, and
campaign services, the hill committees also help selected candidates raise
money from individuals and PACs. To this end, the committees give the
candidates strategic advice and fundraising assistance. They also expend
tremendous amounts of time and other resources furnishing P ACs and
Washington insiders with infonnation that they can use when fonnulating their
contribution strategies and selecting individual candidates for support.
The hill committees help candidates raise money from individuals in
a variety of ways. They help candidates design direct-mail fundraising letters
and give them tips on how to organize fundraising committees and events.
Sometimes the committees host the events or assist in setting them up. In
1992, the NRCC introduced an innovation in fundraising when it employed
satellite technology to help candidates raise big contributions from wealthy
individuals. The committee arranged for Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development Jack Kemp, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich, and other
GOP leaders to address contributors at Republican fundraisers across the
country from the party's national convention in Houston. The broadcast
"appearances'' of these dignitaries helped bring in large sums of money.
The committees also work to steer large contributions from wealthy
individuals, PACs, or members of Congress to needy candidates. It is illegal
for the parties to "earmar~• checks they receive from individuals or PACs for
specific candidates, but committee members and staff can suggest to
contributors that they consider giving a contribution to one of the candidates
on their watch list. The NRSC has led the way in pioneering new ways to
broker money to congressional candidates, but all four hill committees have
been innovative in brokering contributions to congressional candidates in
competitive races. Some of the most successful recent innovations have been
introduced by DCCC Chair Vic Fazio. In 1992, Fazio succeeded in getting his
House Democratic colleagues to contribute money from their campaign chests
and PACs to the DCCC and Democratic candidates in close contests. He
raised over $600,000 from House Democrats to help retire the DCCC's 1990
election debt (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 1992).
Following the death of Republican House Member Sylvia Conte in February
1990, Fazio was able to convince over 50 Democratic House members to
"pony up'' large contributions to help Democrat John Olver beat Republican
Steven Pierce in a special election held in Massachusetts' first district. Fazio
and the DCCC also played a critical role in steering over $300,000 in
contributions from Washington PACs, lobbyists, and other insiders to Olver's
successful campaign (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 1992).
The campaign committees assist candidates in raising PAC money in
two ways. First, they give candidates the knowledge and tools to raise PAC
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money. The committees help candidates design PAC kits they can use to
introduce themselves to members of the PAC community.25 Candidates can
get lists of PACs that include each committee's address, a contact person, and
a mailing label that can be used to send a solicitation. The lists also indicate
how much cash each PAC has on hand so candidates will not waste their time
soliciting committees that have no money or take "no" for an answer when a
PAC manager "claims poverty' but still has funds.
The committees also tutor candidates on how to approach PACs for
money. Kristine Wolfe, the NRCC's Director of Coalitions and PACs,
explains that most nonincumbents need to be coached on how to fill out the
questionnaires that many PACs use to learn about candidates' issue positions.
According to Wolfe, giving an answer that is only marginally different from
a PAC's stand on a core issue can cost a candidate a contribution. Moreover,
answering a question in a misleading way can result in a candidate getting a
reputation as a "chameleon" and freeze up prospects for raising PAC money
once the managers of different PACs confer with one another.
The hill committees also assist candidates with designing the grassroots
part of their PAC fundraising strategies. They instruct candidates on how to
win endorsements from state-level branches of federated PACs and how to
build coalitions among local PAC donors. As Wolfe's assistant, Matt
Niemeyer, explains, "It's difficult for the manager of a national PAC to say no
to a request (for a contribution] when it comes from a PAC's state affiliate or
local donors!'
A second way the parties help candidates raise money from PACs is
through the manipulation of the information environment in which PACs
make their contribution decisions. This is one of the major activities of the
campaign committees' PAC directors and other top party officials. A PAC
director's major goals are to channel the flow of PAC money toward their
party's most competitive congressional contenders and away from their
opponents. This an especially difficult task to perform on behalf of House
challengers and open-seat candidates because they are largely unknown to the
PAC community and unable to use the powers of incumbency to leverage
PAC money. Some junior House members also need to have attention called
to their races. The campaign committees often enlist the support of party
leaders, committee and subcommittee chairs, or ranking members to attend
a candidate's fundraising event or call a PAC manager on a candidate's
behalf. Former DCCC chair, Tony Coelho, was legendary for his ability to
"fry the fat' out of PACs (Jackson 1988). All four hill committees make
28
meeting rooms and telephones available to facilitate PAC fundraising.
The hill committees use a variety of approaches to circulate
information about House and Senate elections to PACs and other potential
contributors. The committees' campaign expenditures are one form of
information that can have a tremendous impact on the fundraising prospects
of nonincumbents. Large party expenditures can help them raise money
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because they draw the attention of PACs, wealthy individuals, and political
journalists who give contributions or write about congressional elections
(Herrnson 1988). PAC receptions, often referred to as "meet and greets''serve
similar purposes. They give candidates, especially nonincumbents, an
opportunity to ask PAC managers for contributions. The hill committees
routinely hold meet and greets in their headquarters buildings. In presidential
election years, they are also held at the parties' national conventions.
The committees also mail watch lists and information packages that
discuss individual candidates' electoral prospects and financial needs to
supportive PACs. Other mailings provided details on candidates' races,
including poll results, press clippings, endorsements, campaign highlights, and
revelations about problems experienced by their opponents. These mailings
commonly range from 10 to 20 pages in length and are sent to approximately
1,000 PACs. During the heat of the election season, the campaign
committees' PAC directors sent out mailings on a weekly or biweekly basis.
In addition to mailings and meet and greets, the committees' PAC
directors hold briefings to discuss their opportunity races and inform PAC
managers about their candidates' progress. These briefings provide PAC
managers with the opportunity to ask committee staffers questions about
specific campaigns and afford PAC managers an opportunity to discuss their
contribution strategies with one another. PAC briefings are an important
forum for networking among campaign finance elites.
PAC directors and party leaders spend a tremendous amount of time
making telephone calls on behalf of their most competitive and financially
needy candidates. Some of these calls are made to PAC managers who are
recognized leaders of PAC networks. The DCCC and DSCC, for example,
work closely with the NCEC and the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political
Education (COPE), while their GOP counterparts work closely with the
Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC). The committees encourage these "lead' PACs to endorse their top contestants and communicate
their support to other PACs in their networks.
Finally, the hill committees send streams of communications to the
editors of the Cook Political Report, the Rothenberg Political Repot1, and other
political newsletters that are heavily subscribed to by PACs. These newsletters handicap congressional races and provide information on developments
in campaigns located across the country. Party officials undertake tremendous
efforts to keep the newsletter editors abreast of the latest developments in
their candidates' campaigns, speaking with them several times a week.
Charlie Cook and Stuart Rothenberg, who edit the newsletters that bear their
names, confirm that hill committee officials are major sources of their
political information.
By helping candidates understand how the PAC community works and
furnishing PACs with information about candidates, the congressional and
senatorial campaign committees have become important intermediaries in the
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fundraising process. They have entered into symbiotic relationships with some
PACs that have enabled them to become brokers between candidates and
PACs (Sabato 1984; Jackson 1988). The relationship is based largely on
honest and reliable exchanges of infonnation about the prospects of individual
candidates. In some cases the infonnation exchange is bilateral. The NCEC,
BIPAC, and other "lead' PACs have information that they share with the
committees (Biersack 1994). Campaign committee officials recognize that any
attempt to mislead a PAC manager by providing inaccurate information could
harm the committee's credibility, curtail its influence in the PAC community,
and undercut its ability to help its candidates (Herrnson 1988).
Hill committee communications to PACs are somewhat controversial
because they can have a major impact on the fundraising prospects of
individual candidates. Candidates who receive their campaign committee's
endorsement derive significant advantages in raising PAC money, while nonincumbents who are not usually unable to collect significant funds from PACs.
PAC managers have been known to justify refusing a contribution request
because a nonincumbent was not included on a hill committee's watch list.
The campaign committees' brokerage activities clearly play to the advantage
of some candidates and hann the prospects of others.

The Impact of Party Services
When asked to discuss the importance of campaign assistance from
local, state, and national party organizations, PACs, unions, and other groups
in aspects of campaigning requiring professional expertise or in-depth
research, candidates and campaign aides involved in the 1992 House elections
rank their party's hill committee first. About one-third of all House
candidates and managers consider their congressional campaign committee to
be at least moderately helpful in campaign management. Roughly 40 percent
gave similar assessments for hill committee assistance in gauging public
opinion. Over half of all the House contestants report that committee issue
research plays at least a moderately important role in their campaigns, with
20 percent describing it as very important and another 11 percent asserting
that it is extremely important. More than 40 percent of the House candidates,
mostly challengers, also rely heavily on their congressional campaign
committee for opposition research. About 30 percent of all House campaigns
receive significant DCCC or NRCC help in producing their campaign
communications. Slightly more candidates and campaign aides find hill
committees to be moderately important to their fundraising efforts. However,
House candidates report receiving greater fundraising assistance from PACs
and other interest groups. The DCCC and NRCC are also rated lower than
state and local party organizations and interest groups in grassroots activities,
reflecting their lack of direct involvement in these aspects of campaigning.
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Most Senate candidates and campaign managers give evaluations of hill
committee assistance that are as favorable as those given by House candidates
even though the DSCC and NRSC staff tend to be less involved than their
House counterparts in formulating or implementing candidates' campaign
strategies.27 Instead, senatorial campaign committee staffs provide candidates
with feedback, advice, campaign contributions, and election services purchased
from political consultants. They also help candidates collect money from
PACs and wealthy contributors. The senatorial campaign committees are
rated above any other group in every area of campaigning except for
providing information about voters, voter mobilization, and volunteer
recruitment, where state and local party organizations and interest groups are
ranked higher.
The evaluations of House and Senate candidates and campaign aides
indicate that most hill committee help is given to candidates in close races,
reflecting the parties' goal of winning as many seats in Congress as possible.
As was the case with campaign spending, the NRCC distributes its campaign
services more effectively than its Democratic counterpart. Both senatorial
campaign committees also concentrate their resources in close races. Hill
committee assistance is more important to hopeful challengers and open-seat
prospects than it is to incumbents in jeopardy, reflecting the fact that
incumbents have problems in getting reelected, but they are rarely due to an
inability to raise money, assemble a campaign organization, or communicate
with voters.28
The hill committees also play bigger roles in the campaigns of
Republican House and Senate candidates than in the campaigns of their
Democratic opponents. The campaign evaluations, like the distribution of
national party money, indicate that the NRCC and the NRSC outperformed
the two Democratic hill committees in 1992. The gap between the
committees has shrunk in recent years, but a Republican advantage persists.

Party Differences
There are major differences in the parties' performance in House
elections. The Republicans spend more money, distribute more services, and
target them better than the Democrats. For example, over 80 percent of all
national party spending in House contests was done in close races, as opposed
to only 54 percent of all national Democratic party spending. The spending
differences in open-seat races are especially telling. The Democrats spent, on
average, just under $17,000 to help House candidates for open-seats in
competitive districts and an average of $8,000 to help open-seat candidates in
one-party districts. The Republicans, on the other hand, typically spent over
$36,000 and $11,000 to help GOP candidates in these same contests.
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The disparities in party targeting merit some explanation. First,
Republican party organizations have traditionally taken a more business-like
approach to allocating campaign funds. The NRCC's decision-making process
is more staff driven and less politicized than that of its Democratic
counterpan (Herrnson 1989). The Democrats' control of the House, greater
diversity, and the leadership aspirations of DCCC chairmen and members
occasionally override the committee's stated goal of maximizing House seats.
Second, the NRCC has been one step ahead of the DCCC in gathering
campaign infonnation. The Republican committee was the first to have staff
observing campaigns in the field. Its new polling division may have given it
an advantage over the DCCC in targeting. Third, Rob Engel explains that
House Democrats' heavy use of the DCCC's media center, which the
committee counts as a contribution or coordinated expenditure, to some
degree inflate the figures for party money spent in connection shoo-in
incumbent races. Finally, according to Engel, a difference in philosophy might
have been at work. His committee tried to "keep more races alive, for a
longer period, before bailing out:' which led Democratic funds to be
distributed more broadly, and less effectively, than Republican money.

Conclusion
The 1992 elections provided political parties with the opportunity to
contribute to the sea change that was expected to take place in the U.S.
Congress. Democratic and Republican party committees located in the
nation's capital were poised to play a role in this election, but were
confronted with a barrage of requests for help from an unusually large
number of highly talented candidates. Moreover, they had to select
candidates for support under conditions of extreme uncertainty. The NRCC
was able to cope with the demands of this unusual election cycle better than
its Democratic counterpart. The parties' senatorial campaign committees had
a less complex task to perform and both committees targeted their resources
extremely effectively. Nevertheless, all four hill committees, as well as many
other party organizations, made important contributions during the 1992
congressional elections.

Notes
1. The material in this chapter is drawn from chapters 4 and 6 of. A detailed discussion
of the survey and the data is presented there. I wish to thank Robert Biersack for assistance
with the analysis or campaign finance data; Michael Gusmano, Robert Tennant, and Candace
Kahn for assistance with data entry; and students from my Honors Seminar on Campaigning
for Congress for assistance with data collection. Financial support for this research was
provided by a grant l'rom the Graduate Research Board and the Center for Political Leadership
or the University or Maryland.
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2. The previous modem (post-1946) record for House retirements was 49, set in 1978 (sec
Ornstein, Mann, Malbin 1992).
3. The previous modern (post-1946) record for House members defeated was 18, set in
1946 (sec Ornstein, Mann, Malbin 1990).
4. The number of Senate retirements in 1992 has only been exceed twice since 1946: 9
Senators retired prior to that election and 10 retired prior to the 1978 election (sec Ornstein,
Mann, and Malbin 1992).
5. The term "hill committees' to refer to the congressional and senatorial campaign
committees probably originates from the fact that they were originally located in congressional
office space on Capitol Hill.
6. These figures include only " hard' dollars that can be spent directly in federal
campaigns (sec Federal Election Commission 1993).
7. The information on committee strategy, decision making, and targeting in 1992 is drawn
from personal interviews that were conducted over the course of the election cycle. Interviews
were held with several officials at the congressional campaign committees, including Rob Engel,
National Political Director, DCCC; Eric Wilson, Deputy Director, DCCC; Marty Stone,
Regional Field Coordinator, DCCC; Tom Cole, Executive Director, NRCC; Kris Wolfe,
Director of PACs and Coalitions, NRCC; Mall Neimeyer, Deputy PAC Director, Kevin
O'Oonncl~ Director of Survey Research, NRCC. On committee strategy and decision making
in previous elections, sec Jacobson and Kernell (1983) and Hcrrnson (1989).
8. These arc each considered separate elections under the FECA. Party committees,
however, usually only give contributions to general election candidates.
9. Coordinated expenditure limits for states with only one House member arc $55,240.
JO. Party committees can also gjvc "in-kind' services in lieu of cash contributions, however,
they arc more likely to use the coordinated expenditure route.
11. In 1982, for example, the NRCC spent just under $7.S million on House elections and
the DCCC spent a total of $761,000 (Sorauf 1992).
12. An NRCC decision to transfer almost $1.9 million to 21 state party commillces instead
of forming agency agreements with those commillees also contributed to the decline in NRCC
money that was contributed to or spent on behalf of Republican House candidates. According
to Tom Cole, the NRCC negotiated agreements to transfer the funds, much of it "sofl" money
that could not be spent directly on federal candidates, with the understanding that the stale
committees that rcccivcd the funds would spend an equal amount of" hard' money on their
House candidates' campaigns. The transfers enabled the NRCC to use its "sofi' money, which
Dows outside of the FECA's amtributions and spending limits reporting requirements, to help
its House candidates. The DCCC transferred about half as much money lo Democratic state
committees and most of the money it transferred was hard money that could have been spent
legally on federal candidates. On soft money, sec Drew (1983); Sorauf (1988). The information
on party transfers is from FEC (1993b). The information on NRCC strategy is from a personal
interview with Tom Cole on January 11, 1993.
13. The transfers include both hard and soft money.
14. The figures include spending by all three national party organizations because they arc
subject to a common limit and thus must be made in coordination with one another. Crossover
expenditures, such as those made by the senatorial campaign committees in House campaigns,
usually consist of polls that arc shared among House and Senate candidates. Separating hill
committee spending from all national party spending barely affects the ligurcs in Table 6.2.
Similarly, the pallcrns for the distribution of all party money, including state and local
committee expenditures, resemble those in the table.
15. Rep. Bernard Sanders, an Independent from Vermont, accounts for the 435th House
scat.
16. The Senate candidates arc grouped using the same vote margins as arc House
candidates. All of the open-seat Senate races arc classilicd as competitive.
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17. Herschensohn spent a total of $7,859,072, and received $17,500 in contributions from
the NRSC, $5,CXXJ from the California Republican Party, and $1,000 from the Republican Club
of Leisure World. He also benefited from an additional $2,454,644 in NRSC coordinated
expenditures. These figures exclude party soft money expenditures and independent
expenditures by PACs and other groups.
18. Boxer spent a total of $10,363,251, and received $17,500 in contributions from the
DSCC, $950 from the DNC, $5,000 from the Democratic State Central Committee of
California, $1,258 from the Sacramento County Democratic Committee's United Campaign
Committee. She also benefited from $16,735 in DNC coordinated expenditures, and $1,600,775
in DSCC coordinated expenditures, and $118,614 in Democratic State Central Committee
coordinated expenditures.
19. In addition to the Herschensohn race, the Republicans spent over $1 million in
c.ampaigns waged by John Seymour, Alfonse D'Amato, Arlen Spector, and Paul Coverdell. The
Democrats spent over $1 million on Boxer's, Dianne Feinstein's and Robert Abrams's
campaigns.
20. In some cases, the congressional campaign committees require candidates to use the
services of one of their preferred consultants as a precondition for committee support.
Although these cases arc rare, they can arouse the ire of both candidates and political
consultants (Herrnson 1988; Frantzich 1989; Salmore and Salmore 1989).
21. The NRCC closed down its campaign academy because of the difficulty its graduates
had in finding employment in nonclcction years and because the costs of maintaining the
academy became prohibitive. For more information on the academy (sec Hcrrnson 1988:57, 15,
156--157.)
22. The allocable costs of the polls varied by type, size, and when they were released to
the candidates. FEC regulations specify that candidates must pay 100 percent of the costs if
they receive the poU results within 15 days of when it was completed, 50 percent if they receive
them between 16 and 60 days, and 5 percent if the results arc received between 61 and 180
days. After 180 days, a poll can be give to a candidate free of charge.
23. The Democrats' issues handbook, Taking Charge of America's Future, was written and
printed by the House Democratic Caucus with the assistance of staffers from the DCCC, DNC,
the Democratic Leadership Conference, and the Clinton campaign.
24. A small number of Senate candidates and other party dignitaries also use the
committee's media equipment.
25. PAC kits typically include information about the candidate's personal background,
political experience, campaign staff, support in the district, endorsements, issue positions, and
campaign strategy.
26. Outside meeting rooms and telephones arc necessary because it is illegal to solicit
campaign money from the capitol complex.
27. It is difficult to make generalizations about Senate campaigns because of the small
number of Senate elections that occur in one election cycle, the tremendous diversity in the size
and composition of the states that form U.S. Senate districts, and a different one-third of all
Senate scats arc up for election every two years. The fact that only 28 (41%) of the Senate
campaigns returned completed questionnaires is additional cause for concern. In order to
improve the strength of the fm~ about Senate campaigns, the generalizations in this section
are based on observations that span the 1984, 1986, and 1992 election cycles.
28. Incumbents rarely have difficulty raising money; and, as Gary C. Jacobson notes, their
fundraising and spending arc driven largely by their perception of the threat a challenger poses
lo their reelection (Jacobson 1980, 1992).

'
Hard Facts and Soft Money: State Party
Finance in the 1992 Federal Elections
Robert Biersack
American political parties have been forced to evolve in the face of a
changing political environment. Confronted with a world in which neither
candidates nor voters are tightly linked to parties, the national Republican
and Democratic committees and their state and local counterparts have been
forced to redefine their role and develop organizations consistent with their
place in the political world.
Party committees now primarily provide services to candidates. Rather
than merely delivering votes on election day-although voter mobilization
remains an important party activity-they supply polls, issue research, media
assistance, direct mail, financial support, and campaign expertise to targeted
candidates. They also act as "brokers'' between sources of money, service
vendors, and candidates (Herrnson 1988). Providing these services efficiently
requires a level of financial stability not common for parties in the days when
the labor of precinct volunteers represented the currency of party activity.
The parties literature has documented this transformation by tracking
increasing financial strength and organizational capability and describing how
those resources have been translated into specific campaign services (see
chapters 5 and 6). How those funds are raised and distributed among na
tional, state, and local organizations is, however, not clearly understood. This
chapter describes changes in one element of the federal campaign reporting
structure which took place in 1991, its impact on what parties do, and what
we know about the parties activities.
The shift from voter-centered activities to campaign services may have
also altered relationships among national, state and local organizations. Once
described as a stratarchy (Eldersveld 1964}-where each subunits had a
significant degree autonomy-today the structure may resemble more closely
a centralized hierarchy. This change occurred primarily because of the large
scale fundraising capabilities of the national organizations, particularly with
regard to "soft money!' 1
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Understanding these and other nuances, and describing the condition of
party organizations overall, has been difficult because of the rules under which
parties raise and spend money. The wide variety of elective offices at
different levels of government, along with the constitutional sovereignty of
states in conducting these elections, complicates the process for participants
and observers alike.
In 1992, for the first time, the national parties were required to disclose
all of their financial activity in one place. Using this data we now see that
national party organizations are heavily involved in financing party activities
at all levels. One of the assumptions generally made about soft money is that
it is simply raised and spent in conjunction with the presidential campaign.
That is, big dollar contributions are made to soft-money accounts in order to
influence the presidential election. Findings presented here suggest softmoney spending patterns are considerably more complex, influenced by a wide
set of variables independent of presidential election dynamics.
While still incomplete, an expanded picture of state party activity is now
available as well. These units are financially sound and involved in a variety
of activities. Moreover, while state parties are by no means completely
dependent on the national organizations for financial support, the soft money
linkage is clearly an important new development for both levels of the
organization.
The Regulatory System Bdorc 1991

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) recognized the
paramount role of state and local parties in the conduct of state and local
elections. Regulations were thus sought that define the boundaries between
federal elections and state and local party activities that might impact federal
elections. However, many of the things political parties do during and
between campaigns are aimed at helping the full slate of candidates; success
in these activities translates into votes for candidates for many offices. It is
also clear that the financial resources required to conduct these activities are
highly flexible and their impact on specific races can be difficult to
ascertain-funds used for one purpose may free resources for another. This
combination of externalities inherent in many political activities, along with
the fungibility of money, makes regulation of political finance more of an art
than a science.
Prior to 1991, the burden of making judgements about how much generic
party activity was directed toward federal elections and how much was related
to state or local campaigns was largely left to the party organizations
themselves. The ·law required activity having some impact on a federal
election be conducted with financing allowable under federal law in the same
proportion as the activity's impact. In other words, if party headquarters and

Hard Facts and Soft Money

109

staff were devoted to federal campaigns 20 percent of the time, then 20
percent of the funding for those activities must have come from federally
allowable sources. (No corporate or labor union funds are eligible, for
example, and contributions from individuals to a state party committee could
not exceed $5,000 per year.) Any activity related solely to federal candidates,
such as direct contributions to the campaign or coordinated expenditures,
were limited and must be paid with federal funds. A few other activities
related to presidential campaigns, such as the preparation and distribution of
yard signs and bumper stickers, were specifically exempted from normal
contribution or expenditure limits as a result of the 1979 amendments to the
act, but the financing for such activities are restricted to federally allowable
sources.
With regard to implementing these rules, parties determined the
proportion of their activity that was geared toward federal candidates by using
"any reasonable method' to allocate their costs. The definition of
"reasonable" was exceedingly broad and parties were only required to support
their allocations when specifically questioned. Moreover, parties were
required to report to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) only the
portion of these "shared' expenses from federal funds. This regulatory and
reporting scheme applied to party organizations at all levels. National parties
could create nonfederal organizations to support state and local candidates,
and they could also allocate administrative and other overhead expenses
between federal and nonfederal sides. The only disclosure required was the
portion being paid for with federal receipts. As a result, readily available
information about party finance was limited and fragmented, and was
dependent on the reporting requirements of each states.

The Regulatory System aner 1991

Federal court rulings handed down in the late 1980s required the FEC to
write new regulations that would identify a more specific standard for
allocation among federal and nonfederal election!i-as well as insure that the
allocation rules were being followed. The long and complex rule-making
process that followed resulted in a number of changes in the way party
organizations allocate their expenditures. It also modified the disclosure
requirements to permit more comprehensive reporting of financial activity of
national, state, and local party organizations. In brief, the previous standard
of "any reasonable method' to allocate expenses was replaced with specific
allocation procedures.
The procedures have two basic elements. First, administrative expenses
and the cost of generic activities that indirectly affect all candidates must now
be allocated according to specific percentages for national party committees
(at least 60 percent federal in nonelection years, 65 percent federal in election
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years) and according to the composition of the next general election ballot for
state and local party organizations. In these cases, each type of race
(president, U.S. Senate, U.S. House, governor, other statewide offices, State
Senate, State House of Representatives, local offices) receives one point. The
allocation ratio is the proportion of federal offices to total offices on the
ballot.2 In the 1991-92 election cycle, this ballot composition ratio ranged
from a low of 25 percent federal in Delaware to a high of 75 percent federal
in Maryland.
Other types of activity continue to have flexible allocation rules. For
example, fundraising costs may be paid on a "funds received' basis, where the
cost of the fundraiser is allocated according to the proportion of funds actually
received which would be allowable under federal restrictions. Accordingly,
if 20 percent of the funds received from an event met FECA requirements,
one-fifth of the costs must be paid from federal funds. A similar rule is used
for activities which are exempt from contribution or expenditure limits by the
1979 amendments (yard signs, etc.) and for activities that support both federal
and nonfederal candidates. These activities must be paid according to a
"funds expended" method, where the federal share of the cost is
commensurate with the federal portion of the activity.
Second, the method for paying bills and reporting activity was changed to
require greater disclosure of party activity and allow for review of compliance
with allocation rules. National party organizations are now required to
disclose activity of all aspects of the organization-whether federal, nonfederal, or mixed. State and local party organizations are required to pay bills
for allocable activity from their federal account and report transfers received
from nonfederal accounts to pay the nonfederal portion of these expenses.
This change effectively reversed the flow of funds and reporting; prior to this
time only transfers out of federal funds for these purposes were disclosed, but
now the full value of the activity is reported with the nonfederal portion being
transferred into the federal account.
As a result of these changes, information available at the FEC now
accounts for all national party financial activity and a significantly greater
proportion of state party finance. The only aspect of state party activity that
is not reported is that activity which is exclusively devoted to state and local
campaigns.

Party Finance In the New Regulatory Era

With these reporting requirements on the books, a new picture of overall
party finances emerges. Party committees at all levels reported receipts of
about $680 million in 1991-92, up from about $300 million in 1990 and $375
million in 1988. Approximately 25 percent of all activity money but not data
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reported by the two major parties represented activity disclosed for the first
time during the 1992 election cycle.
The national Democratic committees, including the national committee
and the senatorial and congressional campaign committees, reported $37
million in nonfederal funds while their counterparts at the state and local
level reported $35 million as the nonfederal share of allocable expenses.
Republicans at the national level raised $52 million in soft money, while state
and local Republican committees reported $29 million as the nonfederal share
of their allocable activity. Although complete information about the
nonfederal activity of national parties is unavailable for earlier years, it is
likely that this activity is much higher during presidential elections. It is
generally estimated that the two parties raised $20-$25 million each from
these sources during the 1988 campaign (Alexander and Bauer 1991). In
1990, however, the combined total for both parties was reported to be about
$25 million (Goldstein 1991).
Federally allowable funds raised by the two major parties at all levels also
increased in 1992. The national Democratic committees increased their
federal fundraising from $91 million in 1988 to $120 million in 1992, while the
national Republican committees raised $192 million in 1988 and $211 million
in 1992.
State and local Democratic committees raised $58 million in "hard'
money acceptable under FECA restrictions during the 1992 cycle, up from $36
million in 1990. Republicans at the state and local level reported $64 million
in federal revenue in 1992, compared with $39 million raised from these
sources in 1990. While some of this increase may represent greater
fundraising success in a competitive election year, including a presidential
race, clearly at least part of this growth at the state and local level is the
result of mandated ballot composition ratios for federal and nonfederal funds,
as described above. Patterns of fundraising over several cycles suggest that
the use of the ballot as a guide for allocating activity between federal and
state/local races results in a greater need for funds consistent with FECA
limits than under the allocation methods previously used.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the receipts of the Democratic and
Republican National Committees during 1991-92. This represents a full
accounting of all monies raised by these committees, including nonfederal
accounts. The charts show that at least two-thirds of all funds raised by the
national committees were raised within the restrictions and prohibitions of the
FECA Both national committees relied more heavily on contributions from
individuals, which fell within the limit of $20,000 per person per year, than
any other source of funds-hard or soft. Moreover, the RNC raised more
absolute dollars from individuals in increments of less than $200 each than it
raised from all soft money sources combined. While Republican organizations
have experienced some difficulty with their direct-mail fundraising operations
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Figure 7.1 DNC National Party Rcccipls 1991- 1992
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Figure 7.2 RNC National Party Receipts 1991- 1992
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of late (resulting in declining revenue in several cycles leading up to 1992),
that program remains the most formidable part of their fundraising apparatus.
The DNC, by contrast, showed greater reliance on larger contributions
and was more dependent on institutional support. It is noteworthy that the
DNC received more financial support from corporations in its nonfederal
accounts than it received from organized labor. This does not include direct
campaign involvement by labor organizations, however, nor does it include
union efforts to mobilize their members.
The senatorial and congressional campaign committees are similar to
their parent organizations with regard to sources of funds. Republican
committees (NRSC and NRCC) have substantial direct-mail donor bases,
where small contributions accounted for a vast majority of the "hard' dollars
raised. The Democratic units (DSCC and DCCC) raised considerably less
than their Republican counterparts, and were more dependent on larger
contributions and PACs.
The two senatorial committees diverged in terms of soft money, with the
DSCC raising only $600,000 outside federal limits, all intended for support of
its facilities. The NRSC, on the other hand, raised about $9 million and
transferred about $1.5 million to state party organizations. Totals raised by
the nonfederal accounts of the two House campaign committees were similar
-$6 million for the Republicans and $5 million for the Democrats. Here
again, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee used most of its
soft money for administrative expenses and facilities, while its Republican
counterpart transferred $1.7 million to the states.
Figures 73 and 7.4 compare the spending of the two national committees
in 1991-92. Funds raised and spent under the restrictions of the FECA are
examined separately from those raised and spent outside federal law. The
data suggest the two parties used somewhat different spending strategies
during the campaign. The RNC allocated a larger proportion of its funds on
national overhead expenses, including purely federal operating expenses,
fundraising, and building funds. They spent comparatively less in direct
support of state and local party organizations. For example, while the DNC
spent 10 percent of its federal dollars and 31 percent of its nonfederal funds
in direct support of state parties, the corresponding percentages for the RNC
were one percent in federal and 15 percent for nonfederal funds.
It is important to note that both national committees made a significant
portion of their transfers to states in the form of in-kind services. For the
DNC, many of the nonfederal transfers were actually regional polling results
commissioned by the national committee a nd distributed to the states. The
RNC spent most of the federal dollars in support of state party voter
mobilization phone banks, which operated in the last days of the general
election. In many cases, these in-kind transfers can have considerably greater
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Figure 73 RNC National Party Spending 1991-1992
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Figure 7.4 DNC National Party Spending 1991- 1992
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real value than the dollar value attributed to them because the national
parties provide these services for considerably less than the private sector
might.

State Party Activity in 1992

Table 7.1 summarizes the expanded, but not complete, reporting of
1991-92 financial activity of state party committees under the new reporting
rules. It shows these organizations have developed substantial financial
resources. In only one-fifth of the states did the Democratic organizations
raise less than $500,000 during the election cycle. For Republicans, 28
percent of the states reported receipts under one-half a million dollars. In
contrast, about 95 percent of all PACs that reported rrusing money in 1991-92
compiled less than $500,000. While there are significant differences on a state
by state basis between the two parties, overall there was remarkably equal
access to financial resources.
Improved disclosure of state party activity does not, however, mean
complete disclosure. Any activity related exclusively to state and local
elections remains completely within the purview of state law and is only
disclosed if required by that state. In some respects, the limited information
about state parties included here makes suggests their financial position may
be even more impressive than at first glance. Purely state and local activities
would only enhance the already strong financial position these organization
appear to already have.
On the federal reports one state party organization-the New Jersey
Republicaru-chose to disclose all of its financial activity. New Jersey is one
of only two states which holds state elections in odd numbered years, so it
may represent an unusual case. With this in mind, about 25 percent of the
total funds spent during the cycle were devoted to direct support of state and
local candidates in an election cycle with no gubernatorial campaign ($1.2
million out of $4.6 million). Generalizing from a single case is very
hazardous, but it seems likely that in many cases total state party activity
would be at least 25 percent more than reported to the federal government.
Table 7.2 provides similar information for local party organizations which
have chosen to register and report under federal law. The 1979 amendments
were intended in part to free local party organizations from the recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed on other levels of the party
organization. Many of the activities local parties participated in that are
directly or indirectly related to federal races are specifically exempted from
federal rules so long as the amounts spent were relatively modest. Even with
this special treatment, several states have many local party committees which
reported sizable receipts and disbursements during 1991-92.
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Tables 7.3 and 7.4 identify the primary sources of disclosed state party
receipts, first for Republican organizations, and then for the Democrats. The
fundraising pattern apparent for national parties is again suggested here.
Republican state parties are more dependent on contributions from
individuals and less dependent on the national organization than the
Democrats. It is also noteworthy that the nonfederal share of allocable
activities undertaken by the states represents roughly one-third of their overall
revenues. This likely reflects the bulk of funds used for overhead and generic
activities conducted by state parties (primarily get out the vote efforts) since
any activity that indirectly affects federal elections must now be disclosed. It
does not include funding for programs and activities directed exclusively
toward state and local campaigns.

Party Integration
The regulations and reporting rules now in place permit a fuller
examination of the financial relationships between national and state parties.
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 list the sum of all national party support for each state,
along with several variables which might help explain variations.
The Democratic national organizations provided some monetary or inkind support to every state organization, with amounts ranging from $10,750
for Alaska to nearly $1.9 million for California. The Republican national
organizations provided financial assistance to all states except Hawaii and
Nebraska. They provided nearly $1.1 million in funds and services to the
Ohio Republican Party alone.
Roughly two-thirds of the support given by national committees came
from sources outside the restrictions of the FECA to be used for nonfederal
elections. Some funds might have been used as part of the state soft money
share of joint activities. They might also have been used for strictly state and
local purposes, which would mean its ultimate use could not be isolated in
state party filings at the FEC. The full scope of state party activity thus
remains out of reach. This limitation affects our ability to fully specify the
relationship between national parties and their state counterparts. We know
the total amount that the national organizations have provided to the states,
but do not have a full picture of how much money the state parties generated
on their own. As a result, our conclusions about the dependence of
"subordinate" levels of party on national fundraising must be seen as
preliminary.
How the national committees choose among the states when allocating
financial resources is no doubt a complex calculation. Clearly the size of the
state and competitiveness of elections are important factors. It is also
reasonable to assume the nature of presidential campaigns will shape national
party priorities, as would the existence of competitive state-wide races. Other
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factors might include the capacity of the state party to use funds efficiently,
and the relationship between state party leaders and the national committees.
Finally, state campaign finance law may restrict the types of national party
support that can be accepted.
For illustrative purposes, indicators of some of these factors are included
in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. States are arranged by the number of electoral votes,
an indicator of state size, which when combined with the margin of victory in
the presidential race would account for national party allocation of soft money
if this activity were guided only by the needs of the presidential campaign.
The existence of a gubernatorial race, along with the proportion of the ballot
in the state made up of federal races, are included as well.
A cursory examination of DNC transfers to state parties suggests that
while the demands of the presidential campaign are plainly associated with
the distribution of soft dollars, other factors are as work. There are states
with large numbers of electoral votes and a close presidential margin, where
the state committees received relatively little DNC soft money (Florida,
Virginia, and Indiana, for example). On the other hand, some relatively small
states received much more soft money than their size and competitiveness
would suggest, such as Louisiana. Deviations from a purely presidential
strategy are also apparent for RNC transfers as well. Here states like North
Dakota, Washington, and South Carolina received far more soft money
support from the national party than their place in the presidential campaign
would imply. Large, competitive states like Texas, New Jersey, and Florida
received less than one might guess. The existence of competitive gubernatorial elections seem to play an important role.

Conclusion
This chapter has described some of the restrictions within which state and
national parties raise and spend the "mother's milk of politics." As such, it
represents a starting point for further consideration of the role of money in
the development of parties at all levels. The information provided reinforces
other studies of party organization by demonstrating once again that parties
are, for the most part, large and complex financial organizations. How these
resources are translated into meaningful political activity is an important
question in need of further research.
We have also begun to probe the financial relationships among different
levels of party, finding some states that appear quite dependent on their
national counterparts, while others are more inclined (or more able) to go it
alone. All state parties receive some national financial assistance, however,
and the ability of the national committees to control important resources has
undoubtedly increased their influence over aspects of state party activity.
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$879,375
$4,500,364
$1,220,291
$369,436
$2,988,964
$2,423,004
$1,929,723
$397,437
$1,552,094
Sl,641,666
$598,369
$1,199,529
$1,505,330
$3,527,789
$3,361,370
$932,973
$1,565,973
$910,846

Receipts
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$138,263
$67,859
$54,050
$339,683
$168,130
$2,905,713
$1,840,471
$221,341
$937,153
$294,739
$382,158
$1,262,821
$19,403
$147,192
$279,778
$524,887
$947,087
$106,175
$63,634
$225,224
$919,070
$163,698
$304,249
$103,864
$33,417,912

$11,250
$23,925
$47,750
$100,100
$78,000
Sll,000
$132,650
$92,750
$108,909
$21,250
$94,500
$195,075
Sll,500
$40,000
$74,270
$112,450
$78,600
$28,800
$100,600
$16,000
$64,000
$18,330
$124,780
$5,100
$3,835,506
$93,137
$117,793
$225,778
$3,800
$7,151,018

$2,306

$10,100
$194,223
$445,786
$5,800
$35,622

$30,288

$10,600
$14,683
$42,800
$655,027
$99,322
$243,037
$167,897
$9,350
$620,931
$15,263
$132,956
$364,672
$40,140

$16,205
$292,138
$83,265
$4,115,294

so

$103,482
$4,300
$22,300
$100,191
$81,034
$5,001
$12,700
$63,881
$177,809
$63,803
$113,276
$600
$7,107
$66,790
$0
$95,255
$430,824
$80,040
$70,605
$353,583
$175,041
$228,687
$187,800
$1,298,287
$454,146
$938,182
$1,238,918
$270,193
$1,725,764
$43,392
$408,589
$1,170,519
$39,901
$206,861
$255,987
$219,608
$2,284,825
$318,656
$222,702
$421,109
$235,281
$152,332
$837,345
$31,552
$34,273,618

$483,885
$497,638
$397,885
$2,955,715
$851,855
$4,325,444
$4,0CJl,444
$846,392
$4,146,675
$418,417
$1,042,744
$3,166,953
$129,484
$518,334
$856,436
$1,195,184
$4,224,844
$562,791
$532,051
$1,076,394
$1,455,140
$561,506
$233,946
$233,946
$89,044,607

Note: Hard dollars meet the limiLs and restrictions of the FECA. Stute Soft Money is the nonfedcral share of spending that effects all campaigns.
Source: Federal Election Commission.

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Norlh Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Soulh Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total
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Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Kansas

Iowa

Indiana

California
Colorado
CoMecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

Arkansas

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona

State

$542,477
$64,410
$683,352
$347,973
$4,081,837
$1.284,155
$372,167
$354,767
$2,459,308
$978,609
$183,546
$327,271
$911,472
$1,347,571
$1,674,725
$489,854
$556,650
$221,732
$15,755
$696,721
$1,343,356
$2,5(,0,561
$1,563,744
$77,800
$966,362
$315,554

Coatno from
Individuals

$1,000
$2,500
$2,000

$5,000

$3,500
$14,250
$95,340

so

$9,684
$31,075
$2,700
$15,000
$33,000
$1,600
$8,000
$24,500
$14,625
$4,500

so

$5,206

S5,000

$33,244

so
$15,225
so

$6,000

Contrib from
PACs

Table 7.4 Sources or Receipts for Republican State Parties

so

$154,742
$30,177
$20,356
$44,725
S554,216
$2,524,396
$1,068,995

$950,680
$93,668

so

St26,m

so

$115,015
$125,520
$1,881,045
$979,741
$146,765
$619,599
$1,946,822
$1,101,313
$60,000
$568,292
$530,516
S1,091,611
$284,976

$88,207

$185,154

Stale Soft
Money

$6,300
$90,533
S585
$19,000
$19,300
$306,758
S12,939
$14,500
$41,853
$20,153

$9,340
$69,231

$96,033
$53,334

$1,625
S133,650
$18,500
$6,250
$201,519
$224,181

so

$35,596
$21,450
$96,800

Hard DoUars •
National Cmlcs

$1,140,922
$1,848,656
$2,470,944
$2,233,042
$670,249
Sl,073,955
$350,JU
$46,722
$774,432
$1,936,822
$5,568,711
$2,745,218
$90,638
$2,057,881
$432,232

$272,377

$815,113
$174,068
$1,149,610
$519,287
$6,275,385
$2438,076
$1,054,196
$1,001,656
$4,826,829
$2,506,770

Receipts
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$488,745
$170,998
$283,919
$1,185,223
$198,596
$807,762
$1,575,988
$500,833
$2,861,208
$463,746
$444,990
$2,196,565
$149,315
$463,571
$436,439
$1,205,207
$5,253,226
$317,424
$218,748
$1,362,133
$1,710,132
$171,820
$1,491,824
$172,864
$48,553,005
$808,846

$39,730

so
so

$2,500

$500

$35,500
$1,000
$27,900
$128,421
$6,300
$5,000

so

$27,000
$47,950

so

$32,479

so

$88,115
$11,722

so

$1,250
$18,000

so

$2,530

so

$312,210
$2,500
$3,000,773

$4,000

$211,325
SS,275

$6,200

so

$51,369

$89,066

$2,500

so
so

$750
$65,977
$113,442
$18,525
$20,500
$42,479
$106,775
$128,2()1)
$15,299
$9,766
$295,176

so

$470,464
$56,905
$27,976,081

so

$179,195
$45,898
SI,334,929
$432,541
$189,922
$373,458
$1,058,522

so

$3,125,032
$285,591
$617,332
$245,599
$127,141
$2,639,701
$80,903
$24,375
$655,318
$147,943

$490,445
$101,564
$984,833
$274,563
$390,624
$4,627,660
$497,638
$2,416,776
$1,938,340
$702,6()1)
$6,017,237
$566,999
$494,365
$3,530,942
$301,049
$543,681
$675,413
$1,425,633
$7,024,126
$772,143
$441,692
$1,941,375
$2,598,902
$199,791
$2,702,669
$274,991
$85,818,154

Source: Federal Election Commission.

NOie: Hard dollars meet the limits and restrictions of lhe FECA. Stale Soft Money is the nonfoderal share of spending thal effects all campaigns.

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
W1Sconsin
Wyoming
Total
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California
New York
Texas
Florida
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
North Carolina
Virginia
Georgia
Massachusetts
Indiana
Wisconsin
Washington
Tennessee
Missouri
Maryland
Minnesota
Alabama
Louisiana
South Carolina
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Arizona

Stale

10
10
9
9
8
8
8
8

11
11
11
11

54
33
32
25
23
22
21
18
15
14
13
13
12
12

14%
16%
3%
2%
9%
14%
2%
8%
2%
1%
4%
1%
18%
6%
3%
11%
5%
10%
15%
12%
7%
5%
8%
6%
9%
2%
X

X

X

X

l(

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

2

X

X

2
44%
37%
29%
43%
33%
SO%
33%
29%
33%
30%
40%
33%
40%
33%
43%
33%
33%
30%
SO%
40%
50%
33%
43%
43%
37%
34%

S<i68,039
$243,037
$445,786
$35,694
$364,672
$230,608
$620,931
$431,073
$655,027
$167,897
$2,306
$404,671
$270,744
$13,800
$225,778
$93,137
$194,223
$191,0M
$89,023
$14,094
$16,766
$58,043
$30,288
$92,000
$15,263
$61,372

Electoral Presidential Gov Senate
Federal
DNC
Margin
Race Race % or Ballot Hard Transfers
Voles

Table 7.5 DNC Support of State Parties, 1991-92

so

$52,215

$1,204,814
$612,125
Sl,035,766
$116,896
$5'72,579
$463,132
$279,043
$330,627
$243,258
$596,300
$25,812
$648,497
$1,500
$19,999
$215,146
$82,492
$260,961
$337,464
$74,300
$161,020
$53,291
$378,432
$52,276
$135,222

$1,872,853
$855,162
$1,481,552
$152,590
$937,251
$693,740
$899,974
$761,700
$898,285
$764,197
$28,118
St,053,168
$272,244
$33,799
$440,924
$175,629
$455,184
$528,548
$163,323
$175,114
$70,057
$436,475
$82,564
$227,222
$15,263
$113,587

$12,632,625
$4,322,320
$4,233,267
$1,016,542
$2,901,905
$2,857,360
$3,864,038
$3,549,243
$3,586,538
$4,085,669
$1,066,432
$4,492,793
$1,451,734
$2,647,955
$1,742,400
$1,503,530
Sl,109,940
$1,563,712
Sl,286,890
$3,334,483
$1,104,129
$1,835,185
$456,798
$1,074,158
$413,164
$822,909

DNC
To1alDNC
Stale Party
Soft Transfers to Stale Party Spending-Federal
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4
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4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
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s
s
s
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8
8
7
7
7
6
6

4%
3%
6%
9%
9%
18%
5%
17%
16%
8%
13%
14%
11%
2%
1%
8%
18%
9%
12%
4%
16%
6%
8%
2%

Source: Federal Election Commission.

Colorado
Kentucky
Iowa
Oregon
Mississippi
Arkansas
Kansas
Nebraska
Ulah
New Mexico
West Virginia
Idaho
Hawaii
Nevada
New Hampshire
Maine
Rhode Island
Alaska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Vermont
Wyoming
Delaware
Montana

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X:

X

X

X:

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

33%
33%
43%
33%
25%
50%
50%
40%
33%
29%
25%
50%
43%
43%
37%
33%
25%
50%
37%
37%
33%
33%
25%
25%
$40,140
$2,750
$9,350
$10,100
$35,622
$3,800
$37,316
$24,560

$82,442

$111,909
$34,000
$120,745
$132,956
$2,300
$402,725
$12,016
$10,600
$5,800
$99,322
$117,793
$11,100
$17,518
$14,683
$26,400

$88,261
$106,000
$172,262
$171,540
$100,000
$231,537
$12,778
$14,500
SB,000
$92,018
$0
$20,500
$30,000
$36,101
$84,800
$63,232
$10,000
SB,000
$54,150
$43,103
$43,420
SB,000
$40,431
$108,689
$11,800
$77,747
$133,249

$79,042

$200,170
$140,000
$293,007
$304,496
$102,300
$634,262
$24,794
$25,100
$13,800
$191,340
$117,793
$31,600
$47,518
$50,784
$111,200
$145,674
$50,140
$10,750
$63,500
$53,203

$2,054,502
$1,526,498
Sl,929,523
$1,015,521
$896,281
$2,122,218
$390,061
$485,017
$559,785
$807,692
$500,545
$382,924
$1,199,356
$516,446
$393,813
$543,241
$134,874
$284,869
$841,235
$864,024
$534,611
$229,509
$472,153
$1,098,643
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Florida
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey
North Carolina
Virginia
Georgia
Ma.ssachusctts
Indiana
Wtsconsin
Washington
Tennessee
Missouri
Maryland
Minnesota
Alabama
Louisiana
South Carolina
Connecticut
Oklahoma
Arizona

Texas

California
New York

State

5%

10%
15%
12%
7%
5%
8%
6%
9%
2%

12
11
11

11

11
10

9
9
8
8
8
8

10

u

21
18
15
14
13
13

22

14%
16%
3%
2%
9%
14%
2%
8%
2%
1%
4%
1%
18%
6%
3%
11%

54
33
32
25
23

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

2

X

X

2
44%
37%
29%
43%
33%
50%
33%
29%
33%
30%
40%
33%
40%
33%
43%
33%
33%
30%
50%
40%
50%
33%
43%
43%
37%
34%

so

$18,500
$10,875
$96,800

S1,625
$20,500
S51,369
$201,519
$7,350
S53,334
$128,200
$306,758
S113,442
S42,479
$211,325
$179,181
$19,300
S4,000
$237,210
SS,275
$89,066
$41,853
S19,000
$12,939
$35,596
$90,533

Electoral Presidential Gov Senate
Federal
RNC
Margin
Votes
Race Race % of Ballot Hard Transfers

Table 7.6 RNC Support of State Parties, 1991-92

so

$69,903
$68,400

so

S10,850
$23,731
$30,177
$239,500

$90,497
$20,000
$256,725
$22,522
$207,987

so

S184,377
$222,432
$226,381
$175,785
$968,891
$307,325
$184,793
$325,452
S9,000
$292,860

so

$489,650
S491,275
$20,500
$235,746
S423,951
$233,731
$229,119
s1,oc.n,100
$614,083
$298,235
$367,931
$220,325
S472,041
$19,300
$94,497
$257,210
$262,000
S111,588
$249,840
$19,000
$23,789
$59,327
SU0,710
$239,500
$18,500
$80,778
$165,200

$6,251,173
$2,369,607
S7,002,858
$4,750,182
$3,455,392
$1,815,648
$6,016,173
S5,528,094
S4,652,854
S1,959,998
S1,938,146
$2,413,472
Sl,9!14,830
$2,143,796
$2,689,962
$2,593,580
$1,380,925
$1,959,781
$773,296
$2,661,001
$813,960
$338,759
S539,481
$1,051,007
$558,166
$1,154,509

RNC
Total RNC
State Party
Soft Transfers to State Party Spending-Federal
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3
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3
3
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3

5
4
4
4
4
4
4

5

5

8
8
7
7
7
6
6

4%
3%
6%
9%
9%
18%
5%
17%
16%
8%
13%
14%
11%
2%
1%
8%
18%
9%
12%
4%
16%
6%
8%
2%

Source: Federal Election Commission.

Nebraska
Utah
New Mexico
WcstVu-ginia
Idaho
Hawaii
Nevada
New Hampshire
Maine
Rhode Island
Alaska
North Dakota
South Dakota
Vermont
Wyoming
Delaware
Montana

Kansas

Colorado
Kentucky
Iowa
Oregon
Mississippi
Arkansas

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

33%
33%
43%
33%
25%
50%
50%
40%
33%
29%
25%
50%
43%
43%
37%
33%
25%
SO%
37%
37%
33%
33%
25%
25%
$11,153

$6,200
$2,500
$6,250

so

$21,450
$61,775

so

$585

$750
$40,977

so

$18,525
$4,000
$12,875

so
so
so
so

$69,231
$9,766
$12,000

Sl,300

$50,650

$25,178
$101,833
$7,880
$61,750
$54,221

$253,115

$49,366
$8,500
$25,671
$14,000
$13,550

so
so
$22,627
so
$15,625
so

$74,401
$51,059
$136,921
$20,000
$8,500
$11,500
$15,000

so

$50,116
$49,477
$'26,256
$14,000
$35,000
$315,550
$25,178
$108,033
$10,380
$68,000
$65,374

$41,152
$4,000
$28,500

so

so

$125,051
$52,359
$206,152
$29,766
$20,500
$11,500
$15,000
$492,485
$104,707
$538,299
$668,910
$996,567
$756,632
$524,736
$194,477
$1,107,779
$302,979
$278,933
$387,573
$48,667
$302,944
$176,433
5728,970
$707,292
$438,556
$274,180
$949,102
$431,425

$2,223,873

$2,438,319
$1,051,156
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National committees enjoy more widespread access to all sources of funds-those controlled by federal law as well as the soft money sources beyond the
bounds of federal regulation. Their ability to decide where those funds are
used inevitably makes them a powerful force, potentially shaping the agenda
at all levels.
How these growing financial ties will effect intraparty
relationships is another area of inquiry that the information presented here
can only partially reveal.
Notes
I. In campaign linance jargon, money that would be permitted in elections for stale or
local oHice but would not be permissible in foderal elections is described as "sort money!'
Some states, for example, permit corporations or labor unions to directly contribute to
candidates for state and local office. Political parties that arc active in all campaigns must
therefore find a way lo meet the restrictions or both systems. In general, any money allow-.ible
under state or local rules that might have even an i11dirrc1 effect on a federal race is sort money.
2. During 19!11 the FEC amended the rule to add an additional nonfcdcral point for each
state.

8
Local Political Parties and Legislative Races in 1992
Jolin Frendreis
Alan R. Gitelson
Gregory Flemming
Anne Layzell
Shortly before Speaker Tip O'Neill's retirement from the House of
Representatives in 1986, he reminded a group of constituents of the one law
of politics that had governed his overall perspective of the American political
system: "All politics are local." This often-repeated quote has been used
over and over again by textbook authors to remind our students that the nexus
of the political system is located at the local level, where politics and
government have such a significant impact on public policy.
Ironically, the locus of most contemporary scholarly research and
journalistic attention on party organization has focused elsewhere-at the
national and state levels. This pattern is at once understandable, valuable,
and problematic. It is understandable in that national and state politics are
both more dramatic and more accessible to scholars and national columnists.
It is valuable in that much has been learned about the new and changing
nature of party organizations at the national and state levels;1 those changes
and the subsequent debate on the nature of party transformation over the past
thirty years are reflected in several of the chapters in this volume. However,
it is also problematic because the past three decades have been marked by a
dearth of scholarship on local party organizations in their manifold roles of
organization building, fundraising, recruitment, getting-out-the-vote, campaign
coordination, and patronage, particularly in subcongressional races. Here we
attempt to address this limitation in the extant literature, focusing on the
electoral role of contemporary local parties in state legislative races.
Local Political Parties and the Electoral Process
To observe that there has been limited research on local political parties
is not to suggest that there has been no research in this area (see, for
example, Crotty 1986; Margolis and Green 1992). Indeed, one type of local
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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party organization, the urban machine, has been described as "the most
written about, the best recorded, and the most romanticized in U.S. political
history' (Crotty 1991a:1155). However, research on political machines has
little relevance for an understanding of contemporary local parties. Other
2
research on local parties extended beyond the study of machine politics. The
collective scholarship of Cutright and Rossi (1958), Katz and Eldersveld
(1961), Wolfinger (1963), Cutright (1963, 1964), and Crotty (1971), seeking to
identify the electoral consequences of county, municipal, and precinct-level
party activity, found moderate relationships between party activity and
electoral outcomes. However, prior to 1980 almost all research on party
organizations below the state level were case studies with little
generalizeability. In addition, with the exception of Crotty's 1971 article, all
of the work documented party activity from the 1950s and early 1960s, a
period that pre-dated much of the perceived decline in local and other party
organizations. As we have noted elsewhere (Frendreis and Gitelson 1993),
with popular and scholarly accounts advancing the thesis of party decline, the
stage was set for the contemporary period of research into the structure and
activity of local parties.
The 1980s marked an important new generation of research on local party
organizations beginning with the Party Transformation Study (PTS), the most
systematic and broad-based research study generated in this century to
examine state and local party structures (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and
Huckshorn 1984; Gibson, Cotter, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1985). The PTS
focused on the measurement and analysis of party organizations' roles and
functions. In effect, Cotter and his colleagues asked the classic question of
whether parties matter. They argued that local party organizations, in
reacting to a changing political environment, maintain a fairly high level of
programmatic activity and that their conclusions" [di)d not support the thesis
of party decline" that was common in other accounts (1984:57).
Three significant conclusions about local party organizations stemmed
from this work. First, despite the evolving and changing roles and functions
of party organizations over the past three decades, local party organizations
continued to be an integral and essential actor in the political process. This
finding directly disputed the decline of party thesis. The second conclusion
directly challenged Eldersveld's theory of" stratarchy," asserting that the party
organizations at the national, state, and local levels were far more integrated
than Eldersveld's model suggests. This view was also supported by the later
work of Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz (1989).J A third conclusion was that
the strength of party organizations was independent of the strength of the
party-in-the-electorate and the party-in-government.
Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz, drawing on a subsequent survey of the PTS
county organizations, found further evidence that local county party
organizations were involved in electorally pertinent activities, "including candi-

Local Political Parties and Legislative Races in 1992

135

date recruitment, joint planning with candidate organizations, and various
independent campaign activities" (1990:225). These authors surmised that
county party organizations are dynamic and autonomous political institutions
and that party organizations do have an impact on electoral politics.
Some of the conclusions of this work have not gone unchallenged. In a
1986 study examining local party organizations in twenty-five New Jersey
communities in Middlesex County, Lawson, Pomper, and Moakley (1986) took
issue with Cotter and his colleagues regarding the prevalence of party
organizational stratarchies and the legitimacy of Eldersveld's (1964) party
decision-making model. A separate analysis of the New Jersey setting by
Pomper (1990) also questioned the electoral relevance of local party activity.
The work of Lawson and her colleagues, however, does seem to confirm the
findings of the other studies that local party leaders "seek and get electoral
linkage with the political process'' and that those leaders are "active and they
direct their activism into electoral campaigns'' (Lawson et al. 1986:367).
Overall, then, the literature is mixed in its view of local party
organizations. Although possessing a storied machine past, it is evident that
the role of local parties has diminished over time. However, the most recent
studies which have focused on local party organizational attributes describe
organizations which are vital-and, in fact, are becoming stronger, not weaker.
This paradox of organizations which are becoming structurally more
developed, but functionally less effective, demands further investigation.
While many scholars are dubious that the parties are electorally
irrelevant, there is relatively little empirical evidence that directly addresses
the electoral role of local parties in the age of candidate-centered
campaigning. Like studies of local party leaders, surveys of candidates reveal
a modest role for local parties. Two candidate-based studies focusing on
congressional races contribute to our understanding of the role of party
organizations in the electoral process. Paul Herrnson's research (1986; 1988;
1993) makes it clear that party organizations, while not inconsequential, have
less impact on the campaign process than a candidate's own organization,
PACs, and campaign consultants. This general conclusion is important
although it masks significant variation regarding specific campaign functions.
While party organizations play a less important role in activities fundraising,
at the same time they play a relatively significant role in volunteer recruitment
and get-out-the-vote efforts (Herrnson 1986). A later study by Kazee and
Thornberry (1990), focusing on the recruitment of congressional candidates,
replicated the Hermson findings, noting a moderate role for party
organizations in this phase of the electoral process. Studies of party leaders
suggest, however, that the overall role of local parties is greater for more local
races at the county or state legislative district level (see Frendreis et al. 1990;
Pamper 1990).
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We have argued elsewhere that there are three reasons why studies of
local parties should focus on lower level offices.4 First, local party leaders
themselves believe their organizations are most pertinent and effective with
regard to lower-level offices. Second, lower-level offices, including state
legislative and county offices, are accountable for public policy that is
substantively important and collectively represents billions of dollars in annual
revenues and expenditures. Third, what transpires at the local level is
relevant for electoral and partisan politics at higher levels. For example, the
underdevelopment of the Republican party in many parts of the South, may
be more a function of party activity and partisan politics at the local level
than it is of national and state-wide politics (Frendreis et al. 1990:231-232).
Local Party Organizations and the 1992 Election

This chapter focuses on the structural attributes and electoral roles of
local party organizations. While our core analysis centers on a survey
conducted of county party chairs in eight states in the 1992 elections, we also
briefly report, from that same survey, on analysis appearing elsewhere
(Frendreis, Gitelson, Fleming, and Layzell 1993) addressing the perspective
of those people actually contesting elections-state legislative candidates-and
their perceptions of the role of party organizations in the campaign process.
In 1992, we surveyed all Democratic and Republican county party leaders
and all Democratic and Republican general election candidates for the upper
and lower state legislative houses in eight states: Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. These eight
states were selected in order to provide representative coverage with respect
to regions and the degree of party strength and competitiveness within each
state (based on data reported in Cotter et al. 1984).
Two separate survey instruments were developed, one for chairs and one
for candidates, but, where possible, the two sets of subjects were asked
identical questions. In order to maintain comparability with previous
research, our questions for candidates were modeled on those previously
asked of congressional candidates (see Herrnson 1988), while our party chair
survey was modeled on the PTS surveys (Gibson et al. 1989 and Cotter et al.
1984).5 A total of 1,657 candidates for state legislative office and 1,016 county
party leaders were surveyed. With valid responses from 986 state legislative
candidates and 659 chairs, the response rates are 60 percent and 65 percent,
respectively.
Our findings are organized in order to focus on three specific questions
regarding the electoral roles of local parties:

Local Political Parties and Legislative Races in 1992
1.
2.
3.

131

What are the structural attributes and resources of contemporary local
party organizations?
In what electoral activities do local parties actually engage?
What roles do local party leaders see their organizations playing in the
1992 elections?

In addition to these three questions, we will briefly address two issues
regarding the electoral roles of local parties as perceived by state legislative
candidates:
1.

2.

What roles do candidates see party organizations playing in the 1992
elections?
To what extent are the assessments of the parties' roles congruent
between candidates and party leaders?

The Structural Strength of Local Party Organizations
In 1992, local party organizations continue to display the structural
attributes noted in previous research. As a baseline for comparison, we have
included in Table 8.1 comparable percentages reported in Gibson et al. (1985)
for the 1979-80 PTS nationwide survey.6 It is clear that in terms of these
indicators of structural strength, local parties have not weakened over the last
decade and, if anything, they have become slightly stronger. This finding is
significant, since there is some indication that the structural strength of local
parties has greater electoral consequences than their activity level in a given
election cycle (Frendreis et al. 1990). Our findings here of continued
structural strength parallel those reported by Gibson et al. (1989) for major
county organizations for the 1980-84 period. Most differences over time are
slight; the largest increases are seen when the party chair devotes more time
to party business during nonelection periods and when the county organization
has a telephone listing. There are few significant differences between the
parties; the largest include a tendency for Democrats to hold more county
committee meetings and for Republicans to have formal budgeting
procedures.
This pattern of steady or slightly increasing structural strength should not
mask the fact that these organizations remain essentially volunteer operations.
Parties report the greatest level of development in areas requiring little or no
cxpenditurei;--having officers, holding meetings, and having by-laws. In areas
requiring the accumulation and outlay of cash-paid staff, formal budgeting,
and maintenance of a year-round office-most local party organizations
remain relatively underdeveloped. But, this lack of development does not
represent a weakened state from a previous level of high structural strength.
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Table 8.1 Structural Attributes of Local Party Organizations, 1980 and 1992.

Percent
Republicans
1980
Has complete set of officers
Has at least 90% of chair
positions filled
Chair works at least 6 hrs. per
week (election period)
County committee meets at least
bimonthly ( election period)
Has constitution, rules,
or bylaws
Has formal annual budget
Chair works at least 6 hrs. per
week (nonelection period)
County committee meets at least
bimonthly (nonelection period)
Has some paid, £ull-timc staff
Has some paid, part-time staff
Chair receives salary
Has year-round office
Has telephone listing
Has campaign headquarters
Maximum N

Percent
Democrats
1980

Percent
Republicans
1992

Percent
Democrat
1992

81

90

92

94

49

63

n/a

n/a

78

77

82

79

57

59

57

75

68

68

31

20

77
34

71
23

26

24

40

34

49
4
6
1
14
16

53
3

56
2
4

60

55

58
4
8
1
21
27
59

1,872

1,984

330

352

5
2
12
JI

1

12
21
57

Source: 1980 data reported in Gibson ct al. 1985; 1992 survey by authors.

Taken as a whole, our findings support the early conclusions of the PTS
regarding the structural strength of local party organizations in the United
States.
The Local Party Chairs' View: The Electoral Role of Local Parties

Our survey of county party chairs found that local party organizations
were active in various spheres of electoral politics during 1992.' The range
of electoral operations covered everything from involvement in candidate
recruitment to direct participation in campaign activities and responsibility for
differing phases of individual candidates' campaigns. The prevailing opinion
of county chairs was that their organizations were reasonably effective and
productive as electoral actors.
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Table 8.2 summarizes the percentages of Democratic and Republican
chairs reporting that their party organization engaged in a variety of direct
campaign activities during the 1992 election. An examination of the table
reveals two patterns. First, as with structural strength, between the 1980
baseline year and 1992 there is no pattern of decline in campaign activity. In
fact, the 1992 party organizations are a bit more active than the 1980
organizations. While there are declines of at least 5 percentage points in the
organizations' reported activity in a few areas, such as voter registration and
the buying of radio/TV time by Republican organizations, there are also
increases of this magnitude in other activities for both the Democratic and
Republican party organizations, including distribution of posters and lawn
signs, distribution of campaign literature, arranging fundraising events, and
organizing campaign events. This finding that party organizations are at least
as active in 1992 as they were in 1980 also replicates the longitudinal findings
of Gibson et al. (1989) for the shorter 1980-84 period.
A second pattern in Table 8.2 is that neither the Republican nor
Democratic party has a distinct advantage with regard to direct campaign
activities. Overall, the average Republican organization engaged in 9.0 of the
17 activities measured, while the average Democratic organization engaged
in 9.4 activities. However, these differences, as well as the pairwise
comparison between parties, are not statistically significant. But there were
some Republican-Democratic differences that are statistically significant:
Republican organizations are more likely to contribute money to candidates,
while Democratic organizations are more apt to conduct registration drives,
buy radio/TV time, coordinate PAC activity, and conduct get-out-the-vote
efforts.
In addition to our findings regarding these direct campaign activities,
party chairs also reported their organizations as actively involved in the
campaigns of individual candidates. As the data in Table 8.2 indicate, over
a quarter of each party related that their organization made formal or
informal preprimary endorsements of candidates. An even larger percentage
were involved in the broader process of candidate recruitment, with well over
three-quarters of the chairs in each party reporting involvement in the
recruitment of county and state legislative candidates. In all cases the
percentages are higher for Republican organizations. The RepublicanDemocratic differences are statistically significant for all organizations for
county and state legislative offices, but pairwise onJy for county offices. About
two-thirds of the chairs report involvement in the recruitment of congressional
candidates. The recruitment data reconfirm earlier results indicating that
local chairs discern their role to be greater for lower-level partisan races than
for higher-level races such as for Congress. Overall, these data represent an
increase over the 1980 baseline and, in fact, exceed the comparable 1984
figures for major local party organizations reported by Gibson et al.
(1989:Table 1).
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Table 8.2 Campaign Aclivity Levels of Local Party Organizations, 1980 and 1992

Percent
Republicans
1980
Direct C11mpalgn Activity
Distributes campaign literature
Arranges fundraising events
Organizes campaign events
Contributes money to candidates
Organizes telephone campaigns
Buys newspaper ads for party
and candidates
Distributes posters or lawn
signs
Coordinates county-level
campaigns
Prepares press releases for
party and candidates
Sends mailings to voters
Conducts registration drives
Organizes door-to-door
canvassing
Buys radio/Iv time for party
and candidates
Utilizes public opinion surveys
Purchases bill board space
Coordinates PAC activity
Conducts get-out-the-vote effort
Candidate Recruitment
"Ver}' or "somewhat' involved
in candidate recruitment:
For city and local offices
For county offices
For state legislative
offices
For congressional offices
Makes formal or informal
preprimary endorsements

Maximum N

Percent
Democrats
1980

Percent
Republicans
1992

Percent
Democrat
1992

70
65

79
71
68
62
61

88
74
77
75
58

90
76
81
67
62

62

62

60

65

62

59

90

89

56

57

57

59

55
59

55

45

47
56

62
58
39

65
51
50

48

49

52

55

33
16
13
n/a
n/a

33

24

11

15
9

31
15
7

79
68

65

10
n/a
n/a

4

IO

60

70

45

44

71

69

48
94

42
87

75
64

74
62

86
69

81
64

28

32

31

27

1,872

1,984

330

352

Sourr:e: 1980 data reported in Gibson ct al. 1985; 1992 survey by authors.
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The party chairs were also asked to assess the importance of their own
county organization in various aspects of candidates' campaigns. Our findings,
presented in Table 8.3, generated three conclusions. First, county chairs
overwhelmingly see their organizations as predominately local actors. With
only a few minor exceptions, for each of the five campaign areas examined,
there is a monotonic decline in chairs' evaluations of their organization's
importance as the scope of the race increases. An analogous pattern holds
for their assessment of their organizations' overall effect on electoral
outcomes: chairs feel that the local party organizations are more effective for
local offices and less effective for higher offices. Second, there is
extraordinary similarity of viewpoint between Republican and Democratic
8
chairs. This similarity of perspective across party lines suggests that the
parties have not cultivated different strategies at local levels. Third, while the
chairs feel their organizations are of moderate importance to candidates'
campaigns, they see their organizations as most important in such nuts-andbolts areas as recruiting campaign volunteers, organizing campaign events, and
get-out-the-vote effortr-each of which is a grass-roots activity emphasizing
ties to local voters.
The Candidates' View: The Electoral Role of Local Parties

Thus far we have reported on the structural attributes and the electoral
role of local party organizations as seen by county party chairs. But how do
candidates see the involvement of county parties? Our survey of state
legislative candidates reveals a very similar view of county parties, with a few
expected differences. (These data are more fully presented in Frendreis et al.
1993.)
First, as with research on congressional races (Herrnson 1988), we found
that family and friends were the most important factor in influencing a
potential state legislative candidate's decision to run for office. However,
local party organizations were the second most important factor affecting their
recruitment. Second, our data show that state legislative candidates regard
local party organizations as being of greatest benefit with regard to grass-roots
activities like voter registration, organizing campaign events, recruiting
volunteers, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Third, local party organizations are
regarded as less important in campaign management and the development of
campaign strategy. Apparently it is in this area that candidate-centered
campaigning has taken over most fully.
Overall, the evaluations by state legislative candidates in 1992 suggest that
candidate-centered campaigning is developing as much at this level as it is at
higher levels of electoral politics. Candidates do not rely exclusively on local
party organizations to facilitate and promote their races for office. At the
same time, however, there is agreement between candidates and party chairsas
to which aspects of a campaign local party organizations have the most and
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Table 8.3 Chairs' Evaluations or the Importance of Their County Organii.ation in Various
Aspects of Candidates' Campaigns•
Republicans

Democrats

county candidates
state legislative candidates
congressional candidates
gubernatorial candidates
presidential candidate

3.21
2.67
2.15
1.93
1.68

3.05
2.62
2.17
1.97
1.84

Fundralslng
county candidates
state legislative candidates
congressional candidates
gubernatorial candidates
presidential candidate

3.21
2.81
2.37
2.39
1.96

3.11
2.74
2.43
2.37
2.08

Rccniltlng Voluntccn
county candidates
state legislative candidates
congressional candidates
gubernatorial candidates
the presidential candidate

3.73
3.59
3.33
3.34
3.16

3.61
3.51
3.23
3.25
3.20

3.59
3.27
2.94
2.78
2.36

3.56
3.32
2.98
2.73
2.46

county candidates
slate legislative candidates
congressional candidates
gubernatorial candidates
presidential candidate

3.32
3.23
3.13
3.15
3.10

3.44
3.39
3.36
3.31
3.29

Maximum N

330

352

Campaign Management and Strategy

Organizing Campaign Events

county candidates
state legislative candidates
congressional candidates
gubernatorial candidates
presidential candidate
Get-Out•The-Vote

Table entries arc mean scores, measured on the foUowing scale: l cs not important; 2 • slightly
important; 3 • moderately important; 4., very important; 5=extremely important.
Source: Survey by authors,
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least to offer. While there are substantial gaps between the absolute ratings
the chairs and candidates give to the county party organizations, there is basic
agreement on the relative importance of parties to the different aspects of
campaigning. Local organizations are perceived by party chairs and state
legislative candidates as most important in reaching out to the grass-roots-recruiting volunteers and getting voters to the polls-while least important to
the creation and maintenance of the campaign infrastructure-fundraising and
campaign management.

Local Political Parties and the Democratic Process

Contemporary debate over the status of party organizations has spanned
the past four decades, beginning with the report of the American Political
Science Association Committee on Political Parties (1950) calling for a
"responsible party'' system. That debate has engendered considerable concern
over the state of parties in the post-World War II era. Indeed, a decade ago,
a team of prominent political party scholars observed that "[t]he last twenty
years have not been kind to American political partid' (Gibson et al.
1985:139). In fact, few American political institutions have seen their collapse
(Broder 1971; Sundquist 1982; Crotty 1984; Wattenberg 1990, 1991b), and
alternately, their revitalization (Schlesinger 1985; Kayden and Mahe 1985;
Pamper 1981; Price 1984; Gitelson, Conway, and Feigert 1984), reported so
often in scholarly publications, textbooks, and the popular press.
Unquestionably, the past four decades have been marked by a volatile and
changing party system.
We have argued here that any definitive evaluation of the tangible roles
of local party organizations is hampered by the limited amount of
contemporary research on their status. Further research may reveal the
propensity for the continuing evolution of American parties; for simplicity we
identify three possibilities (Frendreis and Gitelson 1993). First, American
parties may be emerging into "responsible parties" (American Political
Science Association Committee on Political Parties 1950). Although our
research and PTS found an increase in organizational strength among local
party organizations coupled with signs of a growing vertical integration of
national, state, and local organizations, there is little evidence of movement
toward the responsible party model.
A second prospect is what might be called the "disintegrating' model in
which parties continue to lose influence with candidates and voters. Some
research suggests that this is the case, particularly research on the hold parties
exercise over the long-term loyalties of voters (e.g., Wattenberg 1990).
Further support for this thesis is found in the evolving move from party-run
to candidate-centered campaigns for major offices including presidential,
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gubernatorial, and congressional races. However, without further research,
it is premature to assume the wholesale extension of this phenomenon to
more local races.
We have chosen to label a third possibility the "adaptive brokerage"
model. In this view, local parties (as well as national and state parties) have
adapted to changes in the electoral environment, developing new roles,
particularly that of bringing together candidates, consultants, and contributors.
The specific role of political parties varies according to the electoral context.
Where a party has been historically weak, the local party organization-aided
by state and national organizations-may play a broader role in recruitment
and direct electioneering. In more competitive areas and for higher visibility
races, where candidate self-selection is the norm, adaptive brokerage parties
would deliver resources to candidates-money, volunteers, newly registered
voters-while the candidates themselves would be expected to deliver the
votes. This view of parties as adaptive organizations was the view of the PTS
researchers and seems to reflect the intuitions (and hopes) of many other
party scholars (e.g., Gitelson, Conway, and Feigert 1984).
Essentially, the key unanswered research question is whether local parties
are closer to the disintegrating model or the adaptive brokerage model.
Democratic theory is not impartial with regard to these two possibilities,
however. While adaptive brokerage parties may be less than perfect vehicles
for the organization of political debate and the development of public policy,
the most likely alternatives-electorally irrelevant parties-are wholly
inadequate to the requirements of American politics. The need to better
understand the evolving form and functions of local and other parties is more
than a scholarly imperative; it is a practical necessity.

Notes
1. Key 1956; Colter and Hcmcssy 1964; Huckshorn 1976; Conway 1983; Schlesinger 1985;
Epstein 1986; Bibby 1986; Hcrmson 1990; Paddock 1990; and Bibby 1990.
2 Both this research and the work on political machines is reviewed more extensively in
Frendreis and Gitelson (1993) and Frendreis ct al. (1993).
3. This difference in lindings may be due to the time differences in the two studies, but
by the 1980s, while party structure in the United States was not, strictly speaking, hierarchical,
it was increasingly organizationally integrated.
4. For a fuller examination of this thesis, sec Frendreis and Gitclson (1993) and Frendreis
et al. (1993).
5. Copies of the complete questionnaires arc available from the authors.
6. We are employing the earlier PTS data as a baseline because both data sets arc based
on surveys or the universe or county organizations, whereas the 1984 survey of county
organizations by Gibson et al. (1989) oversampled major party organizations. Comparisons
over time in this and other tables must be tentative, since such comparisons arc between the
8 states surveyed in 1992 versus all 50 states surveyed by the PTS researchers. We note,
however, that the 8 states surveyed in 1992 were selected in such · a way as to be a
representative grouping of states with regard to local party strength.
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7. The results reported in this section arc developed more fully in Frcndrcis cl al. (1993).
8. Only 1 of the 25 Republican-Democratic differences is statistically significant (gel-out•
the-vote activities for congressional candidates}-exactly what would be expected by chance.
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Sources of Activism in the 1992 Perot Campaign
Randall W. Partin
Lori M. Weber
Ronald B. Rapoport
Walter J. Stone

In the spring of 1992, H. Ross Perot moved from being an interested
citizen-billionaire being interviewed on "Larry King Live" to a potential
presidential candidate virtually overnight. There is no doubt that Perot
benefited from having deep pockets, but without a cadre of volunteer activists
committed to overcoming the barriers to an independent campaign
(Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus 1984), he could not have succeeded in getting
his name on the ballot in all 50 states, let alone garner a substantial portion
of the popular vote in the November general election. In many respects, the
mobilization of thousands of grass-roots activists in the spring and early
summer of 1992 was the most remarkable feature of Perot's campaign. What
caused these people to become active on behalf of H. Ross Perot during the
1992 campaign, and what are some of the possible consequences of that
activism?
Sources or 'Third Party Activism
Explanations of political participation have long emphasized individual
beliefs, attitudes, and resources (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Beck and Jennings
1982; Verba, Scblozman, Brady, and Nie 1993), although there is an equally
long tradition emphasizing the importance of party mobilization ( e.g., Katz
and Eldersveld 1961; Crotty 1971; Kramer 1971; Beck 1974b). In their recent
analysis of mobilization and political participation, Rosenstone and Hanson
(1993) suggest that any complete explanation of participation must combine
individual characteristics and resources with an understanding of mobilization
effects. However, in the case of an independent candidacy like Ross Perot's
in 1992, which individual attitudes and characteristics are likely to be
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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important? How are mobilization effects likely to be manifested in a
nonpartisan campaign?
In this chapter we present a preliminary analysis of the sources of activism
in the Perot movement by examining three broad classes of potential
explanation:
1. Individual demographic characteristics typically associated with political
participation, such as income, education, and age. These are usually treated as
politically relevant resources enabling individuals to bear the costs associated
with political involvement. Similarly, they may help account for participation
because they place individuals in social contexts where they are more likely
to be induced by others to participate (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).
2. Attitudes toward the candidates and parties. Whether from a socialpsychological or from rational-choice perspective, an individual's attitudes and
preferences are relevant not only to vote choice, but to how involved they
become in the campaigns. Exactly how these attitudes work in the context of
a third-party campaign is not especially clear. However, Rosenstone, Behr,
and Lazarus (1984) offer perhaps the most comprehensive theory of thirdparty support. They and others argue that roughly four groups of variables
help account for support of third-party (and independent) candidates:
perceived failures of the major parties, negative attitudes toward the majorparty nominees, generalized alienation from the political system, and
attraction to the independent candidate (cf Mazmanian 1974; Canfield 1984;
Smallwood 1983; Carlson 1981; Gillespie 1993). For our purposes here, we
reduce these factors to a simple "push-pull" model of Perot support based on
attitudes toward the candidates and parties: potential activists are "pushed'
away from the major-party campaigns by their disaffection from the two
political parties and/or their nominees; simultaneously, they are "pulled'
toward the Perot presidential bid by their attraction to him, either because of
1
ideological considerations or based on positive general evaluations of him.
3. Mobilization effects. In previous work on activism in contemporary
presidential nomination campaigns, we have found that political mobilization
from these contests tends to "carry over" to the general election (Stone,
Atkeson, and Rapoport 1992). We have also found that this political
mobilization "spills over' to activism in lower-level campaigns and perhaps
even into party activity such as office holding, as well as interest-group activity
(Rapoport, Stone, Partin, and McCann 1992). We argue that the highly
visible nature of the contemporary nomination process draws people into
campaign activity on behalf of nomination contenders. Once mobilized, they
become ripe for involvement in other partisan contests.
We take these previous findin~ to be broadly consistent with the sorts of
mobilization effects Rosenstone and Hanson ( 1993: 174) discuss in describing
the results of party appeals to potential activists. They suggest that such
mobilization can affect perceptions of the stakes people have in political
outcomes, and thereby encourage more involvement than otherwise would
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have occurred. These sorts of effects are easy to imagine at work in a party
campaign where a formal apparatus exists to draw people into campaigns and
other partisan arenas. Our research on nomination campaigns, however, leads
us to ask whether similar kinds of mobilization effects may have been present
in the Perot movement, deriving from either the major parties or interest
groups activities. Indeed, the attitudes, habits, and skills learned in one
electoral arena may transfer quite readily to another. Thus, we expect to find
mobilization from parties and interest groups into the Perot movement.2

Data Sources
Our principal analysis is of a national sample of individuals who called
the Perot toll-free telephone number during the spring and early summer of
1992. This is a sample of"potentiaf' Perot supporters because merely calling
the Perot phone bank did not necessarily constitute active support for Perot's
candidacy. At the time we sampled from the data base in August of 1992, it
contained the names of about 450,000 people who had called throughout the
spring and early summer. We mailed questionnaires to a sample of 1901 just
after Labor Day, and received usable responses from 1334 for a response rate
of 70 percent. As it happened, Perot reentered the campaign on October 1,
when all but a handful of questionnaires had been returned. Immediately
following the 1992 election, we mailed a follow-up questionnaire to all
respondents to the first wave. We received 944 responses to the post-election
wave, for a response rate of 71 percent among respondents to the first wave,
and just under 50 percent of the original sample.
During the early fall wave of the survey, we asked respondents about their
activity levels for Perot prior to his dropping out of the race and for the
candidates for the major party presidential nominations. We also asked about
1988 campaign activity levels in national, state, and local races. In addition,
we included questions on attitudes toward and perceptions of the candidates
as well as respondent demography. In the postelection wave, we asked about
general election campaign involvement for Perot, Bush, and Clinton, and
other subpresidential races. We repeated a range of attitudinal and perceptual items. Finally, in both waves we asked questions about involvement
in a variety of political and nonpolitical organizations.
For purposes of describing our Perot sample, we make comparisons with
the electorate by way of the National Election Study's (NES) 1992 Survey.
Unfortunately, because Perot dropped out of the campaign in July, the NES
asked very few questions about Ross Perot. Therefore, only limited
comparisons with the national electorate are possible. We also compare the
Perot activists with samples of 1992 activists drawn after the election from
Iowa Democratic and Republican caucus attenders and Democratic attenders
3
in Yirginia. These comparisons will allow us to define the contours of our
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sample of potential Perot activists by placing them in a context. In addition,
we can gel a preliminary feel for the viability of the broad explanations of
Perot involvement by making these comparisons.

Who Were the Perot Activists?
As demonstrated in Table 9.1, our sample of potential Perot activists is
relatively well off, highly educated, and white. In these ways it is different
from the electorate as a whole, much as we would expect when comparing a
relatively active population with the general public. Whereas only a quarter
of the electorate falls into the greater than $50,000 annual income bracket, a
plurality of the Perot sample (47.5 percent) is placed there. Similarly, only
235 percent of the national electorate achieved an education level of college
graduate or postgraduate work while just under half of the Perot sample
reached this level of educational attainment. With respect to age, the Perot

Table 9.1 Demographic Charaderistics or the National Electorate, Potential Perot Volunteers,
and Major Party Caucus Attenders in 1992

National
Electorate

Perot
Activists

Caucus Attenders
Democratic
Republican

50.3%
25.0%
24.5%

25.2%
27.3%
47.5%

1.6.4%
30.9%
42.6%

33.8%
32.2%
34.1%

High School Grad or Less
Some College
College Grad or Postgraduate

51.9%
24.6%
23.5%

15.9%
34.5%
49.6%

19.8%
21.2%
58.9%

22.9%
29.8%
47.3%

Age
Under 30
30-50
50-60
Over 60

19.6%
43.4%
12.1%
24.9%

8.5%
42.1%
18.3%
31.3%

6.6%
42.6%
18.1%
32.7%

8.1%
38.3%
19.2%
34.3%

Female

53.4%

37.9%

50.1%

40.6%

Nonwhite

15.3%

4.4%

5.9%

1.3%

N

2487

764

385

Income
Less Than $30,000
$30,000-$50,000
Greater Than SS0,000

Education

1334

Sauret: 1992 National Election Study; survey by authors.
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sample is slightly older than the national electorate. Finally, our sample of
potential Perot activists is remarkably unrepresentative of the national
electorate when it comes to sex and race-only 38 percent of our sample is
female (compared with 53.4 percent of the national electorate) and 4.4
percent of our sample is nonwhite (compared with 15.3 percent of the
national electorate).
The first two of these demographic characteristics (income and education)
are comparable to activists in general, while the last shows considerably
smaller minority representation than among our sample of Democratic caucus
attenders, but close to the typical percentages among Republicans. In sum,
although our sample of potential Perot activists appears to differ from the
national electorate with respect to demographics such as income, education,
sex, and race, it seems to be comparable to major-party activists in these
respects.
Table 92 presents the partisan affiliation and ideological self-placement
of the Perot sample alongside that of the national electorate and those of our
samples of Republican and Democratic caucus attenders. Not surprisingly,
Perot activists are predominantly independent in their partisan attachments,
with over 20 percent claiming strict independence and an additional 40
percent describing themselves as independents "leaning' toward one of the
two major parties. In comparison, about 12 percent of the public and under
2 percent of caucus attenders are strict independents. Notice, too, that the
potential Perot activist is slightly more Republican than Democratic; 23
percent identify with the former and 17 percent with the latter. In the
electorate as a whole, Democrats held a 36 percent- 25 percent advantage.
IdeologicalJy, the Perot sample is just right of center, with a bare plurality at
the moderate position. The electorate as a whole is a bit more centrist, but
also leans to the conservative side. On ideology, the Perot sample is far more
representative of the public than party activists. As is typical of committed
partisans, the Democratic caucus attenders were predominantly liberal, while
Republican attenders were mostly conservative.
Table 9.3 presents activity levels for both the Perot and caucus attender
samples in partisan campaigns in 1988 and in 1992 (comparable activity items
are not available in the NES sample), as well as the percentages of each
sample holding party office, and the degree of interest-group involvement.
Overall, callers to Perot's toll-free telephone number were not political
neophytes. With respect to the 1992 election year, our sample of potential
Perot activists was remarkably involved in politics. Over 70 percent of the
sample was active in some way for Ross Perot during the preconvention phase
of the campaign.4 Furthermore, over one-quarter of the sample participated
in Democratic nomination campaigns, and just under 15 percent were active
in the Republican nomination race. These rates of activity are about the
same as those observed among party activists: fully 84 percent of the Perot
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Table 9.2 Polilical Identification or the National Electorate, Potential Peral Volunlcers, and
Major Party Caucus Attenders in 1992

National
Electorate

Perot Sample

Portis11nshlp
Strong Democrat
Democrat, not so strong
Independent, leaning Dem
Strict Independent
Independent, leaning Rep
Republican, not so strong
Strong Republican

18.1%
17.6%
14.4%
11.7%
12.4%
14.2%
11.2%

7.3%
9.6%
19.7%
21.1%
19.7%
13.0%
9.7%

64.0%
18.6%
13.0%
1.8%
1.5%
1.1%
0.0%

0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
1.5%
12.0%
22.2%
64.0%

Ideology
Extremely liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Middle oC the road
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Extremely conservative

2.7%
11.5%
13.4%
31.4%
203%
17.2%
3.5%

2.1%
16.3%
13.4%
23.0%
22.8%
22.9%
4.6%

8.3%
39.7%
22.9%
17.0%
7.9%
4.0%
0.2%

0.0%
1.5%
2.9%
8.8%
17.1%
56.9%
12.7%

N

2487

1334

647

344

Caucus Allenders
Republican
Democratic

Sourre; 1992 National Election Study; survey by authors.

sample was active in a preconvention campaign for Perot or in one of the
parties (not shown in Table 9.3). In comparison, 86 percent of the Democrats
and 77 percent of the Republicans were active in their respective party's
nomination campaigns, with only scattered activity for Perot among party
activists.
In the general election stage of the 1992 campaign, activism for the
eventual standard-bearer fell across the three columns in Table 9.3. Just over
60 percent of the Perot sample was active for the Perot-Stockdale ticket in the
fall, while larger proportions of caucus attenders remained active after the
convention for their respective nominees. Sub-presidential races were partisan and it is not surprising that the Perot sample shows lower rates of
involvement than the party activists.
Even looking at party office, these Perot advocates show a significant level
of involvement. About one in six either have held or are currently holding
party office for one of the major parties (about half as great as the percentage
for the party caucus participants). Finally, although the Perot sample was less
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Table 9.3 Political Acti~tics among Perot Activists and Major Party Caucus Attenders in 1992

Perot
Activists
Activism in early 1992
Democratic nomination
Republican nomination
H. Ross Perot campaign

Caucus Attenders
Democratic
Republican

28.5%
14.9%
72.9%

86.4%
0.5%
4.5%

4.7%
77.1%
7.8%

12.3%
21.6%
62.0%
9.1%
10.4%
10.5%
13.0%

2.3%
75.9%
5.9%
1.4%
ZS.9%
1.4%
35.5%

72.9%
4.2%
5.7%
42.2%
3.6%
43.8%
2.1%

Bush/Quayle
Dukakis/Bentsen
Republican House Race
Democratic House Race
Republican State/Local
Democratic State/Local

22.8%
14.5%
10.5%
10.5%
13.8%
13.8%

3.2%
55.0%
0.9%
25.5%
0.5%
34.5%

68.2%
2.1%
32.8%
1.0%
47.4%
2.1%

Party Office-holding
Democratic Office
Republican Office
Either Party Orfice

10.2%
7.8%
16.1%

29.2%
0.3%
29.3%

1.0%
31.4%
32.2%

Overall Levels or Group Activity
Active in no groups
Active in one group
Active in two or more groups

31.0%
24.9%
44.1%

28.8%
31.0%
40.1%

25.5%
31.9%
42.6%

General Election Activism, 1992

Bush/Quayle
Clinton/Gore
Perot/Stockdale
Republican House Race
Democratic House Race
Republican State/Local
Democratic State/Local
General Election Activism, 1988

Source: Surveys by authors.

active in 1988 than partisan caucus participants, such is not the case when we
tum to group activity. The percentage of our Perot sample that purports to
be active in at least two groups ( 44.1 percent) is higher than the
corresponding percentages from our sample of Democratic and Republican
caucus attenders. As Table 93 shows, the potential Perot supporters' overall
level of past group activity is almost precisely the same as for the two sets of
caucus participants, if not higher.
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Even this cursory examination of the history of political involvement
among Perot respondents suggests possible links between the traditional
parties, interest groups, and the Perot movement. These links may be
consistent with a mobilization hypothesis: those drawn to activity by parties
and groups may, as Rosenstone and Hanson (1993) suggest, become socialized
to campaign activity and sensitized to their stake in electoral outcomes. In
1992, Ross Perot may have been able to tap into partisan and interest group
quarters for his volunteer supporters, although it is clear that he mobilized a
large cohort of newcomers to campaign activity as well.

Explaining Activism for Perot
Our strategy of sampling from Perot callers to identify activist volunteers
in the 1992 Perot movement was successful. A substantial majority of our
respondents were involved for Perot in some way, many quite extensively. At
the same time, however, about 30 percent of the sample was not involved in
the preconvention stage of the campaign, and almost 40 percent opted not to
do anything for Perot after he redeclared in October. Indeed, only about 54
percent of our Perot respondents voted for the Dallas businessman. We thus
have substantial variation within our sample of potential Perot volunteers.
This variation allows us to explain activism on behalf of Perot by comparing
those who became active with those who did not.
In searching for the sources of activism on behalf of Perot, we begin by
drawing upon the three explanations outlined above: individual demographic
characteristics, attitudes toward the parties and candidates, and mobilization
effects of prior political activity. Despite the importance assigned to
demographic factors in the literature, none of the social characteristics
discussed above had any appreciable effect on activism for Perot (data not
shown). Differences across age cohorts are small and inconsistent, both in the
preconvention and fall stages of the campaign. Similarly, there are no
consistent differences across the measures of education and income-although
there does seem to be a small effect of income on pre-convention activity on
behalf of Perot, with those with higher incomes being slightly more active.
Gender and race likewise showed no significant differences. These sorts of
characteristics therefore do not help explain activism within a population
predisposed toward activity for Perot. We know from Table 9.1 that income,
education, and sex differences between the Perot sample and the general
population exist, but these differences do not help explain activism within the
population of callers.
In addition to these measures of politically relevant resources, the "push"pull" model of support leads us to consider a range of attitudinal and
perceptual variables. Respondents attracted to Perot, or who perceived him
as close to their own ideological preferences, should be more likely to become
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active on his behalf-hence the "pulf' towards Perot. Table 9.4 presents the
percent perfonning one or more activities on behalf of Perot during the early
and late phase of the campaign by perceived proximity to Perot and by overall
evaluation of Perot. In contrast to the demographic variables, these "pulf'
factors appear to have an effect. There is, for example, a monotonic effect
of ideologica1 proximity on activity. Likewise, overall affect toward Perot has
an impact: those who gave positive evaluations were much more likely to be
active for Perot in both phases of the campaign than were those who were
neutral or negative. Finally, the percent of the popular vote the respondent
expected Perot to win-a measure of the "electability'' of Perot-is positively
related to the level of activism on Perot's behalf. The relationship is positive
and monotonic for both early and late Perot activity. This "electability'' effect
shows that respondents in our sample were susceptible to a "wasted vote''
argument. As the expected success of Perot varied, the amount of activism
on his behalf differed as well,
The "push" side of the explanation received a great deal of attention in
1992, and Perot himself played to this topic by being critical of the two parties
and their candidates. Table 9.5 presents the effects of several evaluative
measures of the two parties, of Bush and Clinton, and measures of longstanding affiliation with the major parties. As expected, the more negatively

Table 9.4 Evaluations of Ross Perot by Perot Activists

Percent Active
for Ross Perot

Percent Active
for Perot/Stockdale

84.1%
79.4%

74.4%
69.2%
623%
41.8%

Proximity lo Perot
0 (closest)
I
2
3 (furthest)

65.2%
58.8%

Evaluations of Ross Perot
Positive
Neutral
Negative

86.2%

58.1%
46.8%

152%
46.6%
36.8%

Predicted Vole for Perot
31-100%
21-30%
11-20%

0-10%
Source: Survey by authors.

86.6%
77.0%
72.6%
65.0%

85.4%

72.1%
65.3%
48.4%
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respondents viewed either party, the more likely they were to become active
on behalf of Perot. Nearly 75 percent of the respondents who viewed either
party or either nominee negatively were active on behalf of Ross Perot in the
preconvention period, while somewhat lower percentages of those who were
positive toward the major-party candidates and parties were active for Perot.
The absolute percentages drop with respect to fall activity, but the monotonic
relationship between evaluations of the parties and candidates and activity for
Perot remains.
However, there is reason to suspect these findings do not adequately
capture the "push" element in Perot activism. Respondents who affiliated
with either major party may have viewed their own party/nominee favorably,
and the opposite party/nominee negatively. This pattern could contribute to
the relationships in Table 9.5 without really capturing a generalized discontent
toward both parties. To check this, we present activity levels for respondents
who viewed either both parties or both candidates negatively. These results
remove the partisan effect and demonstrate a true "push'' element. About 80
percent of the respondents who either viewed both parties or both nominees
negatively were active for Perot in the preconvention period, and between 75
and 79 percent of the same respondents were active in the fall. On both these
party and candidate indicators, activity levels were higher than in any of the
categories of evaluation of the candidates or parties individually. This is
added evidence in favor of the" push" effects.
Table 9.5 also shows that stronger partisans were less likely to become
involved for Perot than weak partisans and strict independents. This is
consistent with findings in other recent independent races (Converse, Miller,
Rusk, and Wolfe 1969; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994) and with the
push-pull model because independence is associated with disaffection from the
parties. Notice, too, that the drop-off in activity between the preconvention
and fall phases of Perot's campaign is greatest among strong partisans (about
16 percent) and smallest among strict independents (7 percent). Independents may have been more susceptible to the "push" away from the major
parties, whereas partisans were more likely to return to their party's nominee
in the fall. Finally, as presented in Table 9.6, Republican identifiers as a
whole were more likely to become involved in the Perot movement than
Democrats. This is due to the significantly more negative attitudes
Republicans had toward Bush than Democrats had toward Clinton.
In Table 9.6 we test the notion that past political activity stimulated
involvement for Perot. This relationship is likely to be a good deal more
complex than carryover effects from nomination to general election campaigns
in the same party (Stone, Atkeson, and Rapoport 1992). Even nomination
activists who supported a losing candidate are involved in a partisan contest
that presumably unites all nomination activists in a common purpose. In the
case of past partisan activity (which we have already seen is substantial), Perot
activists must transfer their loyalties away from a party cause to an independ-
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Table 95 Evaluations of the Major Parties and their Presidential Nominees by Perot Activists

Percent Active
for Ross Perot

Percent Active
for Perot/Stockdale

55.4%
69.1%
74.5%

61.7%
62.9%

59.1%
68.6%
75.0%

54.0%
63.1%
62.8%

64.0%
70.7%
73.4%

35.9%
53.1%
72.1%

61.5%
73.0%
74.2%

38.3%
62.9%
69.6%

79.7%

75.7%

81.2%

79.2%

57.3%
68.6%
73.0%
82.1%

40.9%
C.0.7%
64.6%
75.1%

65.9%
70.5%

49.4%
66.2%

Ev11luallons of lhe Republican Purty
Positive
Neutral
Negative

48.4%

Ev11lu11tlons of George Bush
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Ev11lu111lons or the Democratic Party
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Evaluations of Bill Clinton
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Evalu111lons of bolh parties
Negative

Evaluations or both nominees
Negative

Strength of Party ldenlllicatlon
Strong partisan
Weak partisan
Leaning independent
Strict independent

Partisanship
Democrat
Republican

Source; Survey by authors.
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ent candidate. This is clearly a less straightforward effect. As a result, it is
not surprising that our results are inconsistent While early activism for Perot
increased as the level of presidential activity in 1988 increased, there is no
relationship for later Perot activity in the fall stage of the campaign. This
may reflect the difficulty of transferring to an independent candidate among
those with past commitment to a partisan campaign. On the other hand,
there is a clear and consistent effect of group activities on both early and late
Perot support. Increases in past group activity (measured here as the number
of groups a respondent was active in during the past year) appear to lead to
increases in activism on behalf of Perot, both in the pre- and post-major party
convention stages of the campaign.
In sum then, we find little support for the individual resources
explanations for Perot activism. In contrast, the attitudinal explanations were
supported by strong potential effects of an attraction or "pulr' towards the
Perot campaign and a similar "push'' away from the major parties and their
respective nominees. Finally, with regard to the mobilization explanations, we
find weak evidence in support of a partisan mobilization effect, with those
active in past partisan campaigns becoming active on behalf of Perot in the
early stages of the campaign and no comparable effects on activism for Perot's
general election bid. However, we find some suggestive support for
mobilization from group activism, with those most active in groups also being
more active on behalf of Ross Perot's presidential bid.

Table 9.6 Past Political and Group Activity by Perot Activists
Percent Active
for Ross Perot

Percent Active
for Perot/Stockdale

68.0%
68.8%
74.6%

60.9%
60.5%
4.8%

65.9%
70.6%
75.6%
811.3%

51.5%
63.0%
69.6%
68.9%

General Election Actlvll)', 1988
0

1
2

Past Group Activities
0

1
2
3

Source: Surveys by authors.
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Multivariate Analysis
In order to capture adequately the impact of these possible explanations
for activism on behalf of Ross Perot, we must estimate a multivariate model.
By doing so, we will be able to control for some of the combined effect or
spuriousness of these explanations. For example, the effect of past partisan
activity on early Perot activity may be attenuated by strength of partisanship
(already shown to affect Perot activism)--those with the strongest ties are less
likely to support Perot by their actions. Not coincidentally, they are also those
most active in past partisan campaigns (who are also less likely to become
active for Perot). This analysis employs the same variables as above, including demographic characteristics, the "push-putr' attitudinal factors,
partisan identification, expectation of Perot's vote, and levels of past participation.6
We present three parallel models predicting activism on behalf of Perot
in both the early and late stages of the campaign. The first model predicts
the degree of involvement in the early stage of the campaign. The second
model predicts the degree of involvement in the general election stage of the
campaign. Finally, we reestimate this second model including the possible
mobilizing effects from the earlier stage of the campaign. The results of these
analyses are presented in Table 9.7. Not surprisingly, given the absence of
bivariate effects, the demographic variables have little impact on Perot
activism, with sex falling just short of statistical significance in both models of
general election activism.
The indices of negative ratings of the candidates and parties also do not
quite reach statistical significance in explaining preconvention activity for
Perot, but both arc significant in the first general election equation (not
controlling for mobilization earlier in the campaign). However, when
controlling for mobilization in the early stage of the campaign, only the
candidate index reaches the level of statistical significance, while the party
index falls short. Strength of party identification has a reasonably strong (and
highly significant) effect on preconvention involvement and general election
involvement (from the first model), but just misses statistical significance in
the fall once we controlled for preconvention mobilization.
Both evaluation and proximity to Perot (measuring a "putr• towards his
campaign) affect participation in the spring and early summer, and in the
general election stage. Once we control for the possible mobilization effects
of preconvention Perot activism, both of these "pulf' factors drop out of the
model. This suggests that the effect of these variables on Perot activism in
the fall was heavily mediated by activity in the spring-summer. That is, these
attitudes generated activity for Perot in the preconvention period, but did not
have an independent effect on involvement in the fall once spring activity is
accounted for. Including preconvention activity in the fall equation fully taps
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Table 9.7 Pre- and Post-Convention Activism for Perot: 01..S Regression Analysis

Pre-convention
Activity

General Election
Activity

General Election
Activity

0.089
0.039

0.000

0.208
0.041
0.021

0.156
-0.013
-0.041

0.081
0.060
0.159°

0.105•
0.104°
0.201•

0.082•
0.054
0.081

0.431"
0.126'

0.368°
0.096°

0.120
0.041

0.113°
0.090•

0.085
0.103•

0.120•

0.017°

-0.019
0.039
0.677°
0.055
0.001•

0.120
636

0.210
593

Demography
Gender
Age
Education
" Push" Factors

Neg11tivc ratings or candidates
Negative ratings or parties
Strength or partisanship
• Pult' Factors

Evaluation or Perot
Proximity or Perot
P11rtlclpatlon Effects
1988 campaign activity

Past group activity
Preconvention Perot activity
Partisanship
Expected Perot vote
Adjusted R2

N

0559
593

"Significant al the .05 level or better; figures are unstandardized regression coefficients.

any predisposition toward active support for Perot. Indeed, the same pattern
is present for the participation variables. Both 1988 campaign activism and
group involvement measures affect preconvention participation for Perot, past
group activism affects general election activism for Perot (with no comparable
effect of general election activism from 1988), and neither has an independent
effect on general election activity once previous participation for Perot is
taken into account.
Finally, there remains a tendency for Republicans to be more active for
Perot than Democrats in the preconvention Perot campaign, even taking into
account the other variables in the analysis. In addition, we can see that
potential Perot activists were influenced by their perceptions of how well he
would do in the fall campaign. Independent of the various affective measures,
the more popular votes they thought he would receive, the more involved in
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his fall campaign they became. Candidate viability apparently affected potential activists' willingness to become involved in Perot's campaign.

Conclusion
Our research suggests mixed conclusions about the sources of active
participation in the 1992 Perot movement. In the analysis of the Perot sample
itself, we find very little effect of the usual demographic predictors of political
participation. This does not mean the personal resources and other
characteristics of Perot activists played no part in enabling their participation.
We saw that the full Perot sample differed from the general population in
quite predictable ways in income, education, and other measures. Since the
population from which our Perot sample was drawn was self selected, these
factors apparently had a greater impact on calling in to the Perot number in
the first place than they did in differentiating among levels of activism among
those who called.
We do find significant effects of our attitudinal measures and preliminary
support for both the "push" and the "pulf' sides of our model. The more
attracted activists were to Perot, the more active they were, and the more
repulsed they were by the major parties and their nominees, the more
engaged in the Perot campaign they were. Perot attacked "politics as usual"
and our evidence shows that he was successful in attracting a constituency of
the discontented.
From the perspective of understanding the long-term consequences of the
Perot movement for major party change, the participation effects we
uncovered are perhaps most suggestive. We found support for the idea that
past interest group and major-party involvement stimulated participation for
Perot. This suggests that Perot activated volunteers who might have been
available to the major parties had he not been on the scene. Of course, he
also attracted substantial numbers of newcomers as well. Presidential
campaigns are highly visible, permeable affairs that attract large numbers of
activists who then remain involved and can change the face national politics.
The Perot movement, while formally "nonpartisan'' and antiparty, may
ultimately have its greatest impact by affecting party politics in the years to
come.
This may be the enduring legacy of the 1992 presidential election. Perot
tapped massive discontent with politics as usual in the electorate. His
supporters were energized in part because he was not part of the parties. At
the same time, past involvement in the parties contributed to their willingness
to volunteer in his campaign. Ties between the Perot and major-party
campaigns suggest that the Perot movement in 1992 may stimulate party
change by reorganizing party loyalties and perceptions and by drawing new-
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comers into the electoral process who may eventually move toward the
parties. Perot's ability to hold the loyalties of his followers in 1992 will affect
his political influence in the short term; the immense success his campaign
had in identifying and mobilizing a constituency is likely to affect national
politics in ways neither he nor anyone else can anticipate.

Notes
1.

Elsewhere we have taken up the errects of more generalized alienation from the

political system (Atkeson, McCann, Rapoport and Stone 1994). We have also considered the
importance of" strategi<!' factors in explaining activism in a three-way race although that too
deserves a more complete analysis than we can include here. The authors wish to acknowledge
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research for access lo the 1992
National Election Study.
2. Although we do not examine it here, we also cxpcd lo find mobilization from the Perot
movement back into campaign activity for the major parties, particularly in the longer run.
3. We certainly do not argue that our caucus slates somehow represent the entire nation,
but we have found that cross-slate variations within party samples arc fairly smal~ especially
on most of the indicators of interest in this paper (Abramowitz, McGlennon and Rapoport,
1983; Stone, Abramowitz, Rapoport 1989).
4. We asked the Perot sample about the following activities: collecting signatures for a
ballot petition, attending meetings or rallies, trying to convince friends to vole for Perot,
telephoning or door-to-door canvassing, organizing meetings or cofrecs, and holding a position
in the campaign. Caucus attenders were asked a similar list, excluding collecting signatures.
For purposes of Table 9.3, we count as active respondents those who have engaged in any of
the activities.
5. The variable we employ is respondents' estimate of the popular vote Perot would
receive in the fall election. We asked the question in our September-wave survey, when Perot
was not a candidate. The variable, therefore, should be considered an imperCect estimate of
respondents' perceptions of Perot's chances once be redeclared his candidacy in October.
Interestingly, the aggregale mean estimates by the sample of each candidate's popular vote in
November were almost exactly correct: Perot 18 percent, Bush 39 percent, and Clinton 49
percent.
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Women's Political Leadership and
the State of the Parties
Barbara C. Bun-el/
What does the state of the parties have to do with women's political
leadership in the United States? The women's movement has been one of the
major social and political phenomena of the past quarter century. If the
major parties were not to be marginalized, they would have to respond and
adapt to feminism. But women have been vastly under-represented as activists,
leaders, nominees, and elected officials within the Democratic and Republican
parties. Even in 1992, women made up only 12 percent of all Democratic and
Republican primary candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and
only 13.2 percent of all nonincumbent candidates.
Nevertheless, the parties have been affected by the revolution in women's
roles in a number of ways. The difference in the voting behavior and attitudes
of men and women in the 1980s, the so-called "gender gap," stimulated a
party response. The Republicans were especially driven to action, as they
appeared to be on the wrong side of these issues. Second, the increasing
presence of women as party leaders is an element in the transformation of the
parties. As I have stated elsewhere, women "may be leaders of organizations
with little life or influence in the electoral process, or they may be catalysts
in the revival of the parties'' (Burrell 1993). Third, women's campaigns for
public office have received much attention, culminating in the 1992 "Year of
the American Woman in Politics!'
All of these features of women's political participation-electoral,
organizational, and candidacies-are related in their effect on the state of the
parties. The gender gap has stimulated party efforts to recruit and promote
women candidates and advance women in their organizations. The increased
influence of women within the organizations has effected attitudes and party
behavior toward women candidates. And partly as a result, increasing
numbers of women have been major party nominees for national and
statewide office.
This chapter outlines the development of these relationships in the
contemporary party system. Major issues to be explored include the increased
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influence of women within the party organizations and the effect this change
has had on the role of the parties in recruiting and supporting women
candidates. Beyond description of these changes, there are theoretical
questions concerning the importance of the state of the parties for those
interested in women's political leadership. I conclude that strengthened
political parties, particularly their organizational capacity, would be a positive
force in women's pursuit of political leadership in the United States.

Women and Party Organizations

As suffrage appeared imminent, Carrie Chapman Catt, an earlier leader
of the women's suffrage movement, urged women to target their political
energies on the parties. "The only way to get things done is to get them done
on the inside of a political party.... You will see the real thing in the center
with the door locked tight. You will have a long hard fight before you get
inside. . .but you must move right up to the center" (Chafe 1972:34).
Although women achieved some sense of parity within the ranks of party
activists early on, they did indeed have a long battle to gain influence.
Although contemporary feminists have often scorned the parties and party
politics and have seen party organizations as something to be overcome, their
activities suggest an acknowledgment of the importance of parties in the
electoral process. The initial focus of the National Women's Political Caucus
(NWPC) on gaining equality for women in the delegate selection process of
the Democratic and Republican presidential nominations illustrates the
significance of the parties to contemporary women's rights activists from their
early years of organizing1 (Shafer 1983; Baer and Bositis 1988). Since then
the NWPC has established Democratic and Republican task forces to push for
greater influence for women, to increase the number of women candidates
each party nominates, and to promote women's issues within those
organizations. In May 1976, for example, the two task forces held a joint
press conference attacking the failure of both parties to achieve even the
same number of women delegates they had in 1972 (Feit 1979). The
Appointments and Elections Section of the 1976 Houston Women's Rights
Convention adopted a plank which, among other things, called on the parties
to "encourage and recruit women to run for office and adopt written plans to
assure equal representation of women in all party activities, from the precinct
to the national level, with special emphasis on equal representation on the
delegations to all party conventions'' (Bird 1977).
The parties thus have been targets of efforts by women activists during
much of the contemporary era (Freeman 1988, 1989, 1993; Costain and
Costain 1987). Within the organizations, staffers, professionals, strategists,
managers, and even chairs and directors are more and more likely to be
women (cf. Burrell 1994 for a more extended discussion of this "backstage
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revolution"). In 1988, Susan Estrich became the first woman to manage a
presidential campaign when she took over the Dukakis race. Mary Matalin
perhaps received the ultimate political insider compliment when in the 1992
presidentia1 election she was referred to by the media as a "strategist'' for the
Bush campaign. Photos accompanying a U.S. News and World Report news
story about the campaigns further illustrate the inroads women have made.
The Bush campaign was represented by a picture of Mary Matalin in action
and the Clinton camp was captured by a photo of Betsy Wright at her deskand the story was not about women in politics (Baer 1992).
The issue of the presence and influence of women in party organizations
has achieved such prominence that the presidential candidates were quizzed
about it in the third debate of the 1992 election. Susan Rook asked the
candidates, "I acknowledge that all of you have women and ethnic minorities
working for you and working with you, but when we look at the circle of the
key people closest to you-your inner circle of advisor5-we see white men
only. Why, and when will that change?'' President Bush, in response, cited
Margaret Tutwiler as a key person and then listed his cabinet appointees and
his appointment record in general. Mr. Perot emphasized his history of hiring
women in his business and the presence of his wife and "four beautiful
daughters:• Governor Clinton responded that he disagreed" that there are no
women and minorities in important positions in my campaign. There are
many:• He went on to talk about his appointment record in Arkansas.
In 1993, women were chairs of eight Democratic and seven Republican
state party organizations. They were also executive directors of 25
Democratic and eight Republican state parties. Two former female state
party chairs serve in the 103rd Congress.2 In its June/July 1993 issue,
Campaigns & Elections highlighted "74 Women Who Are Changing American
Politics.'' Twenty-nine of those women either currently or formerly held
positions in party organizations.3 Even though equality has yet to be
achieved, a sea change has occurred within the parties regarding the role of
women from a quarter of a century ago.
What accounts for this change? It is a confluence of factors. Women
filled a vacuum as the parties became less central to the political lives of men.
For example, Romney and Harrison describe the hiring of a group of women
by the Republican National Committee in 1975: "there were about a dozen
women who came in within six months or so of each other. There was no
money and not much structure, and women were hired for jobs they might
never have been offered if things had been more organized' (1987:182).
Thus, party decline provided opportunities for women. And as the parties
became more professional, different skills became more valuable. With
college educations increasingly common among women, they are more likely
to have these important skill!i-media expertise, computer skills, writing ability
and especially public relations techniques. Feminists, too, played a role in
promoting women within the parties. One prominent example has been Mary
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Louise Smith, who became the first female chair of the Republican National
Committee in 1974. She had been a founder of the National Women's
Political Caucus-Iowa in 1973, and has continued to fight for women's rights
within the party.
The Parties and Women Candidates

Both conventional wisdom and empirical data suggest party support for
female candidates prior to 1980 was limited primarily to hopeless races. With
the transformation of party leadership, party organizations are less of a barrier
to women candidates. In addition, the structure of the electoral process also
has changed leaving the parties with less control over nominations.
Past Efforts

Initial party efforts to increase the pool of women candidates and to assist
their nominees consisted primarily of conferences, workshops, and a few
targeted fundraising efforts. As early as 1974, the Democratic Party sponsored a "Campaign Conference for Democratic Women!' Twelve hundred
women attended and passed resolutions urging the party to do more to
encourage women candidates. The conference occurred primarily because
women in the party demanded it (Freeman 1987). Similar conferences did
not happen within the Republican Party until nearly a decade later to offset
the perceived negative effects of the gender gap in the 1980 election. Sessions
geared toward the particular problems of female candidates became part of
both parties' regional and national candidate training workshops during the
1980s.
Perhaps the most significant party effort prior to 1992 aimed at women
candidates was Senator Richard Lugar's plan, in his capacity as chair of the
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, to provide special funds for
female Republican senatorial candidates in the 1984 election. He issued a
press statement declaring: "a concerted drive by the Republican Party to
stamp itself as the party of the woman elected official would serve our nation
as well as it served our own political interests . . . The full political
participation of women is a moral imperative for our society, and intelligent
political goal for the Republican Party." Thus, he pledged to
commit lhc RSCC lo the maximum legal fonding and support for any Republican
woman who is nominated next year, regardless or how Democralic lhc slate or
apparently formidable the Democratic candidate. I am prepared to consider dirccl
assistance lo women candidates even prior lo lhcir nomination, a sharp departure
from our usual policy (Lugar 1983).
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The pledge to aid women in primaries was particularly significant. The parties
traditionally do not get involved in primary elections because of the danger
that the party-supported candidate might lose.
In 1988, for the first time, the national party platforms included statements
endorsing "full and equal access of women and minorities to elective office
and party endorsement" (Democrats) and "strong support for the efforts of
women in seeking an equal role in government and (commitment) to the
vigorous recruitment, training and campaign support for women candidates at
all levels" (Republicans). These planks were symbolic statements and they
were not substantive mandates to implement specific action. Their significance lies in the recognition of the problems women candidates face, and in
the ability of influential party women to make that recognition explicit and
public. However, no reference was made in either party's platform to women
candidates in 1992. Indeed, conferences and workshops have become pass:
by the 1990s because women candidates have become more integrated into
the parties.
The 1992 Election
The 1992 elections has been referred to as the "Year of the American
Woman in Politics" after other years touted as such proved unworthy of the
title. But Senator Bob Dole complained that it was the year of Democratic
women in politics and that the media had been unfair to Republicans (Dole
1992). Yet, what made it a year of such prominence for women candidates
was not a media bias against Republicans or for Democrats. It was the
number of Democratic female nominees and the way in which they had
obtained their party's nomination that attracted media attention. The
Democratic women achieved media attention early on because they defeated
establishment candidates, not because they were part of the establishment.
They were viewed as outsiders and that is what made it a story for the press.
In the past, Republicans had nominated women for national office, but they
had not received the same type of publicity in part because they were
"establishment" candidates. Had Republican Jane Doe defeated Senator
Robert Dole in the primary, female Republican candidates would have
received much more media exposure. In addition, significantly fewer
Republican women sought their party's nomination in 1992. In the primaries,
121 female nonincumbent Democrats and 70 nonincumbent Republicans ran.
Fifty-seven female Democrats competed in open seat primaries compared with
25 Republicans. Seventy Democrats and 36 Republicans won party
nominations (including incumbents).
Democratic women became political stars by capturing the imagination
of the country through their upset victories in party primaries. It began with
Carol Moseley Braun's win over Senator Alan Dixon in Illinois and was en-
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hanced by Lynn Yeakel's defeat of the Democratic lieutenant governor in
Pennsylvania. The momentum continued when both Barbara Boxer and
Dianne Feinstein won their senate primaries in California. Never before had
two women simultaneously won their party's nomination for U.S. Senate from
the same state.4 Some feminists complained that had Feinstein been a man
she would not have had primary opposition, that the party would have
discouraged any opponents. But party organizations were basically irrelevant
to the nomination of these women. Once women achieved so much success,
however, and grabbed media attention, the party capitalized on it. This was
especially well illustrated at the 1992 Democratic National Convention.
The Women's Caucus of the Democratic National Committee consists of
women members of the DNC, accounting for approximately one-half of the
national committee women in 1992. The Caucus played a prominent role in
the convention with its daily "theme" meeting hosted by DNC Vice Chair
Lynn Cutler. The first day focused on "Issues Moving Women in '92." The
second day highlighted women candidates, an event cosponsored by the
Women's Campaign Fund, EMILY's List, and the National Women's Political
Caucus. On the third day abortion was discussed, and the final day featured
"A Call to Arms." These daily sessions came to be seen as" the place to be";
among other things, both Bill and Hillary Clinton appeared at them. In
addition, the caucus produced a booklet to help all candidates deal with
gender issues, and each day included campaign training sessions for women
candidates.
Thanks to Harriett Woods, president of the National Women's Political
Caucus, the Democrats featured their women senatorial candidates on the
opening night of their convention, dubbed "Ladies Night." Those who had
already won nominations for the Senate were given the chance to speak on
prime time to a national audience. This event won much applause for the
party. Building on the splash women candidates had made in the primaries,
the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee initiated the "Women's
Councif' in May of that year. This council was touted as the "only official
party organization dedicated to recruiting and supporting women candidates''
in its fact sheet. However, it was created too late to be active in recruiting
efforts and did not get involved in primaries. It did raise $1.5 million which
it allocated to ten Democratic women Senate nominees. In 1993, the
Women's Campaign Council concentrated on expanding its female donor base
and encouraging persons in that base to become more visible and involved in
the party.
A much different situation existed for the Republicans in 1992. Although
the Republican Party has historically received some praise for promoting
women within the organization and as candidates (Freeman 1989), it has been
criticized for holding seeming "antiwoman'' public policy stands. Beginning
in 1976, the Republican Party started to back away from its traditional support
for the Equal Rights Amendment and began to take anti-abortion stances in
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its platfonn. In 1980, the process was completed and has remained ever since.
Thus, moderate women (and men) in the party have found themselves in
battle with the party leadership. Energy devoted to overturning these planks
has taken away from efforts to encourage and support women candidates. The
primary activity of the Republican Task Force of the National Women's
Political Caucus in 1992, for example, was an attempt to modify the
Republican platform's anti-abortion plank.
Indeed, it is widely felt that many potentially good female Republican
candidates have not run because of the party's opposition to abortion rights
and the difficulty of winning primaries against the right-wing of the party.
Those who have run and won have expressed dismay at the party for not
championing them more (Schwartz 1992). This was especially notable at the
1992 Republican National Convention when GOP women candidates were not
showcased as their counterparts had been at the Democratic Convention.
Instead they chose to spotlight women in the administration and, of course,
in a controversial speech, Vice President Dan Quayle's wife Marilyn delivered
a keynote address stressing women's traditional roles. Barbara Bush also gave
a prime-time talk focusing on her family. The problem for the Republicans
was how to advance a more public role for women while at the same time
advocating a conservative political philosophy.
This is not to say that the Republican Party has become entirely antifeminist. At their 1992 convention, former Representative and Secretary of
Labor Lynn Martin (who is pro-choice) nominated George Bush, while Kay
Bailey Hutchinson was elected to the senate from Texas and Christine Todd
Whitman as governor in New Jersey in 1993. Also, groups within the party
are working on behalf of women candidates, including the WISH List, which
held training sessions for female candidates in 1993, RENEW (Republican
Network to Elect Women), and the National Federation of Republican
Women. Jeanie Austen, Vice Chair of the Republican National Committee
is bringing this group together. Of no little consequence, a majority of GOP
female candidates for high office in 1992 were pro-choice.5

Women's Political Leadership and Renewed Party Organizations

The women's movement of the second half of the twentieth century has
profoundly altered American political and social life. Women's rights activists
have adopted insider strategies to affect change in the party system. Making
the parties more "women-friendly" has been one of those strategies. In
response, the parties have acted to increase the presence of women in
leadership positions. But American parties have been in a weak position to
substantially affect the number of women in elective office. One weakness
has been the single-member district structure of the electoral process:
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Gcncra.lly the party list/proportional rcprcscnlalion (PL/PR) sys1em results in higher
women's parliamentary representation than docs the single member district system .
. . . The single member district electoral system is a major cause or women's low
representation in the U.S. House or Representatives and in lhc state legislatures
(Ruic and Norris 1992:44).

Another weakness is the inability of American parties to control
nominations. As part of the Progressive Movement at the turn of the century,
and later the opening-up of the system in the early 1970s, primary elections
have become the means by which candidates are chosen to run under the
party's label. Unlike other countries where the parties operate as private
organizations, selecting their nominees and presenting them to the voters,
American party nominees are chosen by voters. Thus, from a party
organization perspective, the recruitment of different types of candidates is
restricted.
This "fact of life" presents two possibilities. On the one hand, the
entrepreneurial system allows individuals and groups historically shut out the
opportunity to run. To be sure, much of the openness of the nomination
system is a direct credit to the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s.
Candidates such as Lynn Yeakel, Carol Moseley Braun, and Dianne Feinstein
need not seek the blessing of party organization officiali;-historically men-to
launch their campaigns. Women might be hesitant to return to the smokefilled rooms now that a bit of fresh air has been let in.
But on the other hand, the current system allows individuals to flood
campaigns with personal funds and beat someone who may have labored
within the party and developed responsible positions. Or it allows an
extremely committed group, not necessarily representative of the majority of
party adherents, to oveiwhelm the party structure in a primary election. Even
if the parties encourage women to seek the nomination in winnable seats,
there is no guarantee that they will get the nomination. Party organizations
rarely get involved in primary elections, although they can, and do in some
areas, operate under a system of preprimary endorsements. But these
endorsements can be a negative asset; outsiders often use them to suggest the
process is undemocratic. Thus, the idea that the parties can mak~ greater
efforts to run more women candidates rings hollow. In a sense, the success of
early feminist activitiei;-the opening up of the syste11rmay now serve as
golden handcuffs.
What role is left for the parties to increac;e the number of women in party
affairs and elected office? We have seen that the organizational capacity of
the party has increased over the last decade. Party units now represent the
largest single source of contributions to congressional elections. As suggested
in other chapters in this volume (chapters 11 and 12), there is considerable
variance as to which candidates are slated for assistance-the foremost criteria
being the closeness of the race. Yet, if the parties wish to develop a competitive edge in the long run, and if they take the gender gap seriously, they
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should broaden their targeting criteria to heighten the importance of female
candidates. Moreover, if Paul Herrnson (1986, 1988) is correct that party
organizations have become "brokerage" units, they can narrow the historic
distance between large, nonparty contributors (PACs and fat cats) and women
candidates. It would also be to the advantage of the parties to encourage local
party organizations to support women candidates. They might draw up lists
of potential candidates, aid their election efforts, and ultimately use these
groups as "farm clubs'' for higher level runs. After all, most of the successful
women in congressional and senatorial elections in 1992 had considerable
experience in governing and running for local office. Ultimately, the success
of women in party politics will be judged by the number of female candidates
the parties help get elected.
In recent times, women have become more prominent and skillful within
the parties-both as insiders and as candidates. If parties continue to advance
the cause of women it is likely they will remain viable instrument in the
electoral process. If parties are primarily concerned with winning elections,
this new direction simply makes good sense.

Notes
1. Anne and Douglas Costain have argued that the women's movement did not focus on
the parties as a means lo political power until the 1980s. They may have underestimated the
extent to which transforming the parties was a tactic undertaken by clements of the women's
rights community earlier ( 1987).
2. Nancy Pelosi, (D-Ca.) and Jcnnifor Dunn (R•Wa.)
3. Many of the others had strong tics to one of the major parties including such
individuals as Hillary Clinton and Tipper Gore.
4. Of course it is an unusual set of circumstances when two senate scats in one state arc
open at the same time.
S. In 1993, 50 percent of the female Republican members of the U.S. House of
Representatives voted to repeal the Hyde Amendment which prohibits federal financing of
abortions, compared with only 4 percent of male Republicans.

11
Party Strategy and Political Reality:
The Distribution of Congressional
Campaign Committee Resources
Diana Dwyre

For the last two decades, the congressional campaign comntlttees (CCCs)
have provided the bulk of major party support to candidates for the United
States House of Representatives. Yet, we know little about how these party
units have spent their money over time. Previous studies have examined only
one election cycle at a time and have only looked at CCCs' disbursements
together with those from other national party committees (Herrnson 1989,
1992; Jacobson 1980; 1985-86; 1993). This gap has not gone unnoticed.
Barbara Sinclair suggests that "Comprehensive studies of the growth in size,
function, and technological sophistication of the [congressional campaign]
committees and of their changing patters of giving are still lacking . .
Certainly the committees deserve more attention ..." ( 1990: 128). Biersack
and Wilcox point out that "no effort at longitudinal analysis has been
attempted [to gauge] the critical role of party resources in effecting a rational
and efficient allocation of financial support'' (1990:225).
This chapter examines ten years of CCC allocations to House candidates
during the five election cycles in the 1980s. Federal Election Commission
(FEC) campaign finance data are used,1 as well as interviews with congres
sional campaign committee directors and staff. Findings suggest a seat
maximization strategy generally guides resource distribution, but that there is
some slippage, much of which can be explained by party status, availability of
resources, and regulatory restrictions.
The Congressional Campaign Committees and Party Goals

The congressional campaign committees, also known as "the hill
committees," are the party force in contemporary congressional elections (see
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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chapter 6).2 In 1988, the two hill committees-the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the National Republican Congressional
Committee (NRCC)--accounted for some 91 percent of party spending in
House and Senate races (Sorauf and Wilson 1990:190). Although the House
CCCs do not contribute to every congressional campaign, they assist most
House candidates in some way. For example, in 1988 the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee made cash contributions and/or
coordinated expenditures3 to 83 percent of the party's general election
candidates, and the National Republican Congressional Committee gave to
84 percent of their House candidates.
For nonincumbents in close races-candidates for which party assistance
can make the most difference-the proportion of funds from the party can be
considerable, possibly turning an otherwise hopeless bid into a strong
challenge. Hermson reports that in 1988 "party money accounted for almost
14 percent of the general election funds spent by, or on behalf of, Republican
non-incumbent candidates for the House" (1992:61). Party support is also
thought to be more valuable than other money: it is often given as "seed
money" early in a campaign and in-kind services are sometimes worth more
than their reported va1ue.4 The role of the congressional campaign committees
is thus significant beyond the actual contributions made to House candidates.
But do the national parties' CCCs distribute their resources in a rational
manner? Have spending patters changed over time? In order to answer
these questions it is necessary to first understand party goals. American
political parties are wholly motivated neither by ideological or policy goals nor
by electoral success. Rather, a division of labor among party units exists
whereby different segments of the party are primarily responsible for each of
these goals.
As the in-government structure, a party's caucus ( or conference, as the
Republicans call it} is primarily responsible for policy development. Yet it is
also concerned with electoral success in order to affect the policy process.
As an electoral organization, a congressional campaign committee is
responsible for electing members to government. This is not to suggest the
hill committees are incapable of promoting the party's policy objectives,
simply that they will do so only if it does not interfere with the goal of
winning elections. It is not surprising that scholars have found little evidence
that these organizations follow a loyalty maximizing strategy when distributing
resources (see, for example, Porter 1993; Wilhite and Theilmann 1989).
A more subtle method of party influence may, however, be at work.
Kayden and Mahe (1985:187) maintain that the issue-oriented assistance the
parties provide candidates (party-line issue papers, advice, research, and so
forth) contributes to a higher level of cohesion among partisans in Congress.
Jacobson has also noted that "some credit for Republican unity clearly
belongs to the national party's electoral work. Party committees had of course
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assisted many of the new [1980) Republican members with campaign money
and services and so established some degree of obligation" (1985:166; see also
Leyden and Borrelli 1990). Indeed, party cohesion in the House increased
during the 1980s, along with the activities of the congressional campaign
committees. But it is these more subtle influences rather than any concerted
attempt by the committees to induce party loyalty that may have contributed
to the increase in party unity.
Winning may not be everything, but it is the overriding concern of the
congressional campaign committees in allocating resources. As past DCCC
chair Beryl Anthony noted: "There is ultimately one way to judge the success
of the DCCC: does it win races'!' (The Washington Post 1989)

An Efficient Distribution or Party Resources

An efficient distribution of resources requires that a CCC distribute its
funds to candidates in accordance with their likelihood of getting elected.
Overall, the return on investments will generally be greatest for open seat
candidates, followed by challengers and then incumbents. Candidates of any
type in close races clearly offer a greater potential return for the party than
sure winners or sure losers.
Open seat candidates represent the best chance for a party to gain a
House seat. As former NRCC Director Tom Cole explained, "Clearly an
open seat situation is a seat you're going to look harder at. .. you may
actually do more in an open seat than a Republican seat now held by a
Democrat, because he's got the advantage of incumbency."6 Indeed, both
parties invest heavily in most open seat races-particularly the NRCC in an
effort to win more seats and move closer to majority status.
Challenger races pose a variety of possibilities. A challenger in a close
race might receive a large marginal gain from an added dollar spent while a
challenger with little chance of defeating a strong incumbent might gain
substantially with the first dollars spent, because of increased name
recognition, but quickly reach a point of diminishing returns. Other
challengers might be able to achieve their highest level of gain once into the
campaign if political circumstances change in their favor and they have the
resources to take advantage of them (Jacobson 1985-1986; 1993:132- 135).
Incumbents are generally less needful, for they enjoy a tremendous
fundraising advantage over challengers as well as the perks of office such as
franked mail and travel allowances.11 First term incumbents, however, are
more vulnerable to a strong challenge than more senior members. Jacobson
suggests that in 1982 "Democrats were especially likely to challenge
Republicans first elected in 1980 and thus thought to have comparatively
precarious holds on their districts' (1985-86:615). In 1986, 34 percent of all
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newly elected House members (16 of the 48) won with over 60 percent of the
general election vote, while 86 percent of all other incumbents won by that
margin.7 Freshman incumbents are simply less safe than other incumbents,
and the CCCs should give more to these members.
There are, however, less direct ways that a hill committee might pursue
its goal of winning elections. Both the NRCC and the DCCC contribute to
incumbents who eventually win by large margins, a strategy that has been
characterized as a waste of party money (Jacobson 1993:118). They justify
these allocations as a means to insure that seemingly safe incumbents avoid
serious challenges in the first place. They are investments that help the party
retain House seats. The Democratic organization may be more inclined to
support seemingly safe incumbents in order to protect its majority status,
particularly in years when incumbents are thought to be vulnerable. Genie
Norris, DCCC Executive Director, explains:
The main focus is to have as many Democrats in Congress as there arc, and the first
place you start is making sure the people Lhal are there stay there ... The electorate
is very volatile ••. nobody's entirely safe •. . So, we don't look at somebody who won
big the last time and say we don't commit any attention to them, because every race
8
is different and every year is different.

The Republicans protect their incumbents by giving each an in-kind
donation-"the equivalent of $5000 in a two year cycle that can be used for
services, communications programs, satellite feeds, studio time, and things of
that nature:" It is used to "help the person avoid a race in the first place."9
Party decision-makers themselves do not think that spending on incumbents,
even on some who appear electorally safe, is an inefficient use of party
resources.
Often, "four-year plans' are implemented. That is, both CCCs invest in
challengers with little chance of winning, believing that support in the current
election will provide increased name recognition and enhance the candidate's
viability the next time around. What looks to be an inefficient use of party
money in one election may actually serve the party's seat maximization goal
in the next. Given the dearth of experienced Republican challengers,
especially in the South (Jacobson 1990:63-65), the Republican organization
may be particularly inclined to use this strategy.
Other concerns that might deter a party from funding only candidates in
close races include attempts to elect more women and minorities. While both
CCCs report that they do not consider gender or race in the distribution of
resources, both have made efforts to rec,uit women and minority candidatesan activity that requires some expenditure of party funds. Such efforts, while
seemingly less efficient, may well attract voters in the long-run.
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Constraints on the Efficient Distribution of Party Resources

While seat maximization-in its various forms-guides congressional
committee activity, there are several constraints. Some of these pressures are
less difficult to overcome, but all potentially limit a party's resource
distribution efficiency.

Federal Election Campaign Act
A significant constraint on the distribution of party resources is the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Political parties can give House
candidates $10,000 in cash and in-kind contributions; $5,000 for the primary
and $5,000 for the general election. They are also allowed to make
coordinated expenditures on behalf of candidates. These limits are not only
higher than those for direct contributions, they are adjusted for inflation, so
that the limit for House campaigns (originally $10,000) had reached $27,620
by 1992. On top of that, a state party, which often does not have the funds
to take advantage of coordinated spending on behalf of federal candidates,
may pass its limit on to the national party committees through an "agency
agreement:' effectively doubling the congressional campaign committee's
spending limit.10 In 1992, a CCC could potentially contribute $65,240 to a
House candidate: $10,000 in contributions plus $55,240 in coordinated
expenditures (the CCC's limit plus a state party's limit passed on with an
agency agreement).
Although these exemptions in FEC regulations allow parties to have
higher spending limits than PACs and individuals, they often pose a serious
obstacle to allocating party funds in a fully efficient manner: "Once the limits
are reached, party committees can do no more for a candidate, even if the
election is close and more money might make a difference. Hence the law
restricts a party's ability to pursue its collective electoral goal of winning the
largest possible share of seats'' (Jacobson 1985-86:611). The Republicans are
affected more by the spending limits due to their relative wealth. This may
be why the Democrats, by 1990, had nearly caught up to the Republicans in
the amount they spent on cash contributions and coordinated expenditures
despite fewer overall resources.11

Information
The hill committees need accurate infonnation in order to determine
which races to fund. They rely on a variety of sources that do not always
prove to be accurate. Each CCC generally determines whether or not it is
important to defend incumbents or to be more offensive, to place special
emphasis on open seats, or to groom candidates for future elections. But a
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miscalculation of these factors could lead to a misallocation of party funds.
They must also remain flexible in order to take advantage of changing
conditions late in the campaign season. Neither party took advantage of a
strong anti-incumbent sentiment that reached a high point late in the 1990
campaign because possible challengers had made their final decisions to run
long before the fall and the hill committees had determined their spending
priorities much earlier (Jacobson 1993). Indeed, both CCCs have, in the past,
finalized their lists of targeted races by April.
The campaign committees conduct surveys and focus groups, encourage
candidates to do their own polls, and closely watch local newspapers in order
to track the progress of candidates. Both committees maintain in-house
polling experts and are able to provide this service at cut-rate prices, or they
contract it out in bulk orders. The Republicans, because of their greater
resources, are able to do more tracking surveys than the Democrats and may
have a statistical edge in directing campaign funds where most needed. The
CCCs also use field staff who report on the situation in districts, the quality
of candidates and their challengers, their financial capabilities, the local
political climate, and so forth. Field staff personnel are seasoned political
operatives with extensive experience. Clearly, information from any of these
sources is potentially inaccurate and may therefore limit a party committee's
ability to use its resources most efficiently.

Incumbent Pressures
Because the hill committees are creatures of the legislative parties and
are controlled by members of the party caucuses, there may be significant
pressures to use resources simply for reelection. Giving resources to
incumbents who generally do not need additional campaign funds leaves less
money for challengers and open seat candidates. Yet, as discussed earlier,
both parties' CCCs allocate funds to some incumbents who end up winning
by large margins in order to help avoid a serious challenge in the first place.
It is difficult to determine if an incumbent is vulnerable to a challenge and
even harder to determine if party resources helped avoid such a challenge.
When asked whether incumbents influence funding decisions, former
DCCC Executive Director Les Francis said, "Sure, ... we'll have to do some
of that ... if it's an incumbent who has helped us raise a lot of money, or it's
particularly critical to the leadership ... you do it." 12 In their study of 1980
and 1982 congressional campaign committee allocations, Wilhite and
Theilmann found that those incumbents who served on the NRCC received
larger contributions than those Republican candidates who did not (1989:16,
18). Such allocations may serve other party goals, but they do little to help
the party maximize seats.
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Candidate Quality
Sometimes there are not enough high quality candidates for a party to
suppon. The lack of quality candidates to challenge the Democratic majority
in the House has indeed been a serious limitation on the Republican party's
ability to pursue sound resource distribution strategies. It does not matter
how much money the Republicans have; without good candidates and in the
context of FECA limitations, they will not present a serious challenge to the
Democrats' control of the house.

A Longitudinal View or Resource Distribution
Have the CCCs aJlocated their resources in a manner consistent with the
goal of winning as many House seats as possible? Have their spending
patterns changed over time? Figure 11.1 shows the average total CCC
allocation (contributions plus coordinated expenditures) by competitiveness
of races and candidate status for House elections from 1980 to 1988. The
figures are adjusted for inflation in 1984 dollars. Competitive candidates are
those who received between 40 and 60 percent of the general election vote.
Of course, the actuaJ general election vote does not represent the information
available to the CCCs when they made their allocation decisions. Polling data
and other information the parties use is not public information and it is
closely guarded by the parties, candidates, and polling consultants even after
the election.13 As these figures indicate, the hill committees have done a
fairly good job of ascertaining the closeness of races.
The most obvious party difference is the disparity in wealth between the
two party committees. The NRCC was able to give much larger average
contributions to its candidates than was the DCCC, and the greater resources
controlled by the NRCC enabled it to distribute those resources more
efficiently than its Democratic counterpart (Sorauf 1988:140). Although each
party committee started out the 1980s barely distinguishing between different
types of competitive candidates, the NRCC quickly moved to giving more to
close nonincumbents and decreasing its allocations to marginal incumbents.
This is again consistent with the Republicans' need to gain seats. The
Democrats gave more to incumbents in close races than to other marginal
candidates until 1984, when they began to distribute resources more
strategically under Tony Coelho's leadership.
The figure also clearly shows that both the DCCC and the NRCC
increasingly gave larger average contributions to competitive candidates than
to noncompetitive candidates. The growing gap over time between average
contributions to competitive candidates and those to noncompetitive
candidates suggests that both committees have become more focused on the
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Figure 11.1 Average CCC Allocations by Competitiveness of Race and Candidate Status,
1980-1988
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seat maximization goal. This trend is more pronounced for the DCCC,
anexpccted development since the Democrats needed the most improvement
in this area. Indeed, this improvement in their efficiency is most evident after
1982, precisely when newly-elected DCCC chairman Tony Coelho broke with
the past tradition of supporting every Democratic candidate regardless of need
and H decided to ignore those Democrats with 'safe' seats and concentrate
resources on close races'' (Easterbrook 1986:32; Jackson 1988:231, 289-91).
Other trends and patterns become clear with a longitudinal view. The
NRCC after 1980 and the DCCC after 1982 gave smaller average
contributions to competitive incumbents than to other competitive candidates,
indicating each party's improved ability to deny its safe incumbents funds for
the benefit of the more needy competitive challengers and open seat
candidates. This kind of strategy-concentrating resources on dose races, and
denying contributions to incumbents who can more easily raise campaign
funds from PACs and individualrhelps parties win more seats. Thus, as
expected, a pattern of giving to challengers is more pronounced for the
Republicans, because they must gain seats to achieve majority status in the
House.
There are a few other party differences. The Democratic committee
increased its allocations to competitive challengers each year after 1982,
perhaps because the DCCC had more money to allocate. However, there
was a decline in average NRCC allocations to competitive challengers after
1984, not only because the Republicans were unable to find high quality
challengers, but because their net receipts decreased substantially after
1984-going from a high point of $59,270,741 in 1984, to $37,639,975 in 1986,
and dropping to $28,377,978 in 1988 constant dollars (Federal Election
Commission 1980-1988).
A Closer Look: The Distribution or CCC Resources in 1986

In order to assess the efficiency of allocations, I have developed a
hypothetical distribution of resources for the 1986 election given FECA
contribution limits and each party's level of resources.14 This hypothetical
distribution of party resources accounts for the number of candidates running
in each category and thus offers a good test for the actual distribution of party
resources. Tables 11.1 and 112 show this hypothetical distribution against
the actual distribution.15 The tables list the types of candidates in the
descending order of funding priority. The hypothetical distribution in the next
column follows this order and takes into account the FECA and resource
constraints faced by the parties. The data is also disaggregated to separate
first-term incumbents from more senior incumbents.
It was a midterm election year in 1986, when the party controlling the
White House (the Republicans in this case) traditionally loses seats, and in
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fact, the Democrats won back control of the Senate. Much of the country was
deep in recession, particularly farming and textile states. The stage was set for
the Democrats to make substantial gains in the House. An efficient strategy
called for DCCC investment in competitive challengers and open seat
candidates, since incumbents had little to worry about in an off-year election
with a sluggish economy easily blamed on the Republican administration.
However, Table 11.1 shows that the DCCC did not follow this strategy.
For example, they gave higher average contributions to the two competitive
freshman incumbents running in 1986 than to Democratic challengers and
open seat candidates in close races, a strategy that may have contributed to
the party's unimpressive showing (a gain of only five seats). In their study of
the 1986 congressional elections, Jacobson and Kernell found that national
issues proved helpful to challengers with enough resources to take advantage
of them (1990:84-85). The DCCC seems to have missed some opportunities.
Perhaps the Democrats' comfortable majority in the House motivated the
party to hold on to recent gains rather than to make new ones. Indeed, after
the election, DCCC Chair Tony Coelho said that since the Democrats had lost
only 14 seats in Reagan's 1984 landslide election the party did not have to
make up for much lost ground: "We can't win back seats we didn't lose"
(Watson 1986:2842). It appears that the Democrats were satisfied with the
size of their majority. Note, for example, the DCCC's relatively higher
average contributions to noncompetitive first-termers than to other
noncompetitive candidates, reflecting the party's emphasis on seat protection.
Incumbent pressures may have contributed significantly to their lack of
efficiency in the distribution of its campaign resources, but the DCCC's almost
blind emphasis on seat protection (particularly newly won seats) can explain
much of the inefficiency. The DCCC got half of the equation right: it gave
more to competitive than noncompetitive candidates, but it followed the
party's general inclination to protect incumbents just when the opportunity to
win more seats should have motivated the committee to direct resources
elsewhere. In at least one case the DCCC's support of a challenger paid off.
Mississippi's Mike Espy received the largest DCCC allocation in 1986
($52,641 in contributions and coordinated expenditures), and he became the
first black House member from Mississippi since Republican John Lynch left
the House in 1883.
As Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show, the Democrats also suffered from a lack
of resources in 1986. The NRCC gave in excess of two and one-half times
more to its competitive challengers than the Democrats allocated to
challengers in close races. Competitive Republican incumbents received
almost twice as much from their organization. The NRCC's generous support
of its competitive candidates no doubt helped the party keep its losses to a
minimum, as did the less-than-strategic allocation practices of the DCCC.
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Although NRCC receipts fell in 1986 and the committee had less money
to contribute to candidates, it was able to provide generous sums to competitive Republican candidates: the NRCC exceeded the regular maximum limit
of $31,810 for virtually all of its competitive candidates and therefore must
have made agency agreements with state parties for them.111 The fact that the
NRCC found it necessary to increase its spending limits through agency
agreements with state parties illustrates the constraint that the FECA
contribution limits impose on the CCC's ability to efficiently distribute its
resources.

Conclusion
The results of this analysis indicate that both parties' CCCs are highly
motivated by winning. Both improved the efficiency of their distribution
decisions over time, a finding about which previous studies of single election
years could only speculate. The most important factor in the distribution of
party resources for both party committees, but especially for the NRCC, was
found to be competitiveness. Both the NRCC and the DCCC gave larger
average allocations to competitive than to noncompetitive candidates.
However, each committee faced different constraints. The DCCC was and
still is limited by its lack of resources. As a result, its allocations were not
only small, but the overall distribution was not especially efficient.
Furthermore, the DCCC's Jack of resources to spend on gauging the
competitiveness of races, conducting opposition research, and supporting field
staff personnel meant decisions were less grounded in accurate information
and allocations more apt to be poorly targeted.
The NRCC's relative wealth actually deterred the committee from
distributing its resources as efficiently as possible: FECA contribution limits
forced the Republican Committee to direct funds away from the most
competitive candidates once limits were reached. The FECA contribution
limits compelled the NRCC to make special arrangements with state parties
(i.e., agency agreements) in order to spend more on the most competitive
candidates. The limits also forced the Republicans to allocate generous sums
to candidates who either did not need the funds (i.e., safe incumbents) or had
no chance of winning.
Each party's status in the House also affected the way it distributed
resources. For instance, the Democrats place great emphasis on seat
protection in order to maintain their majority status. They tend to
automatically direct funds to incumbents, particularly to the more vulnerable
freshmen. Previous studies have characterized such allocations as inefficient,
but such a strategy is not always so. For example, when the political tide is
flowing against a party it is quite rational for it to protect its incumbents.
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Furthermore, both parties allocate funds to many incumbents who end up winnir
by large margins, for such allocations are made early in the campaign and a:
designed to help the incumbent avoid a serious challenge in the first place.
The Democrats, however, may follow this protection strategy to a fauh-evt
when conditions dictate otherwise and create opportunities to pick up more seal
In 1982 and in 1986, when recessions under a Republican administration insur<
the safety of Democratic incumbents, the DCCC still directed large sums
incumbents.
The Republican committee's activity also confirms that a party's numeric
status in the House can greatly influence its campaign committee's resour.
distribution decisions. As the minority party, the Republicans are highly motivatt
to gain seats. The longitudinal analysis (Figure 11.1) shows that the NRCC d
indeed direct the bulk of its resources to non•incumbent candidates after 1982. Y
the Republican committee also supported incumbents by giving each a $5,000 i
kind contribution. Perhaps if the NRCC were not financially secure, not restrict(
by the FECA limits, and the spread between them and the Democrats not so larg
it might use these resources on nonincumbents.
A reform proposal that enjoys support among scholars and others sugge
that increasing or removing party contribution limits would not only curb ti
influence of PACs, but also help make congressional elections more competitiv
Parties are thought to allocate campaign resources more rationally (i.e.,
challengers) than other contributors (Alexander 1992:172; Sabato 1989:51
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that not only do both parties quite rational
protect their incumbents, but they also focus more intensely on open se
candidates than on challengers. There is little reason to believe the hill committe
will stop supporting incumbents or directing large sums to open seat races
contribution limits are raised or removed.

Notes
1. Campaign finance data were made available in part by the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research. The data for Campaign Expc11ditures i11 tire United States:
Reports 011 Financial Activity were originally collected by the Federal Election Commission.
Neither the collector of the original data noThis data set is hereafter referred lo as "FEC,

Repo11s on Financial Activity:'
Z. The same was found to be true for similar campaign commiuecs on the stale level in
New York, where the legislative campaign committees have come lo play a larger role than the
stale parties in stale legislative elections (sec Dwyrc and Stonecash 1992).
3. Coordinated expenditures (or 44la(d) expenditures) arc party expenditures made in
coordination with candidates but spent by the party on behalf or candidates.
4. For example, if the party CCC conducts a poll for a candidale, the reported value of
that poll diminishes as time passes. Therefore, the CCCs often pul off delivering the results
of the poll to a candidate until it has depreciated so that the party committee can contribute
more to that candidate before reaching the contribution limit.
5. Personal interview with Tom Cole, former NRCC Executive Director, November 13,
1991.
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6. In 1992, House incumbenls spent on average almosl seven times more than their
challengers (Federal Election Commission 1992). In 1990, 80 percent of all political action
committee (PAC) money went to incumbents, only 6 percent to challengers, and 14 percent lo
open scat candidales (Ornslein, Mann and Malbin 1992:91-92). Incumbents also attract the
greatest share of contributions from private individuals, taking in 49 percent of all of the money
contribuled by individuals to House candidates in 1992 (Federal Eelcction Commission March
4, 1993a).
7. Elcclion ligures compiled by author from Co11grcssio11al Quarterly Weekly Report,
November 8, 1986:~2871 and November 12, 1988:3301-3307; and Ornstein, Mann and
Malbin 1992:61.
8. Personal inlerview, October 27, 1993.
9. Personal inlervicw with former NRCC Executive Director Tom Cole, November 11,
1991; sec also" Rules of lhe National Republican Congressional Committee;• 2.
10, This larger amount is al~o the coordinated expenditure limil for slates with only one
House member.
11. In 1990, the Democrats spent $4,208,964 on contributions to and coordinated
expenditures on behalf of House candidates and the Republicans spent $5,028,550 (Ornslcin,
Mann and Malbin 1992:95).
12. Personal interview, November 8, 1991.
13. Green, Robins and Krasno have discussed this problem and have noted that lhe
available sources, such as Congressional Ouarlcrly's prcclcction forecasls (which they call a
"journalistic finger-in-lhc wind') and media polls, provide neither accurale vole c1tpeclations
nor the same kind of information available to candidates and parties from lhe polls they
commission: " ... there arc no easy subslitutcs for polling information thal is both accurate
and kllow11 lo be used by incumbenlS (and parties). Such data arc not easy to come by .. '.'
(Green, Robins and Krasno, 1991:11-13; sec also Green and Krasno 1990:371)
14. 1986 FEC limits for party allocations to congressional candidates: the contribution
limit was $10,000 ($5,000 for the primary and $5,000 for the general election); and the regular
coordinalcd expenditure limit was $21,810, while lhe coordinated expenditure limit when an
agency agrccmenl was made wilh a stale party or in a state wilh only one House member was
$43,620. The total regular maximum contribution limit was therefore $31,810, and the maximum
limit with an agency agreement or for a state with one representative was $53,620.
15. The hypothetical distribution of party resources presented in the tables is clearly not
the only cflicienl distribution that is possible. InrJccJ, cfliciency is characterized according lo
a very sltid standard, whereby the parties arc expected lo allocate funds almost exclusively to
marginal candidates. The hypothetical model for each party might therefore appear lop heavy,
because nearly all of each party's resources arc allocated lo competitive candidates in
recognition of the primary goal of maximizing seals. However, since "competitiveness' is
operationalized generously-a competitive candidate is one who receives between 40 and 60
percent of the general election voti:-the model avoids the danger of a party targeting too
narrowly, a mistake that would cause the party to miss opportunities lo win scats (Jacobson
1993).
16. A full 97 percent of Republican competitive open scat candidates, 76 percent of the
party's close challengers, 81 percent of its competitive freshmen incumbents, and 63 percent of
the marginal nonrrcshman incumbents received allocations over the regular maximum limit.
Remember that an agency agreement allows a state party to pass on its contribution limit to
the national party, thus potentially doubling the national committee's contribution limit for a
congressional candidate.
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Party Resource Allocation: The Timing
of Contributions and Coordinated Expenditures
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier
The institutionalization of the national parties and their increasing role
in congressional politics have been the major impetuses behind studies of
party resource allocation. Party money is important to candidates for a
number of reasons. First, national party contributions serve as a cue for
political action committees (PACs) and individuals to make contributions, so
party money is essentially multiplied. Second, parties are the largest single
source of money for most candidates. Finally, the value of party contributions
has been posited as being worth more than the reported value because party
contributions are often "in-kind benefits," and because of the timing of
contributions (Herrnson 1992; Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1993). The
primary questions of past research on party allocation strategy have been:
Who gets party resources and how much? Additional insight into party
strategy may be obtained by asking: When do candidates get party resources?
The need for longitudinal research on party allocation strategies has been
pointed out by Biersack and Wilcox (1990) as well as Sinclair (1990). Dwyre
(chapter 11) provides a well-crafted longitudinal analysis across elections from
1980 to 1988. This chapter differs by focusing on party allocation strategy
within an election cycle. Longitudinal research of this sort is important for
understanding the dynamics of campaigns.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the literature on party
resource allocation is discussed and it is shown that existing theory and
empirical research can be used to predict which candidate characteristics
affect when resources are received. Second, the question of timing is added
to the existing literature. Third, contrasts and comparisons among the timing
of contributions from parties, PACs, and individuals are drawn. Finally, an
event history analysis is undertaken to assess the factors that influence the
timing of party resource allocation strategies in congressional campaigns.
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Party Resource Allocalion in Congressional Races
Past research about the parties' role in campaign finance has concluded
that candidates in competitive elections have been the recipients of party
resources (Sorauf 1988; Herrnson 1990). Jacobson and Kernell (1983) argue
that seat maximization is the parties' primary goal. Jacobson (1985-86)
extends this by showing that organizational differences between the parties are
important to understanding the distribution of party resources in 1982.
Herrnson (1989) builds upon Jacobson's insight regarding the importance of
the national parties' organizational characteristics and concludes 1) Republicans place the greatest emphasis on competitiveness, campaign quality,
geographic location, and candidate status when distributing coordinated
expenditures; and 2) Democrats place the greatest emphasis on candidate
status (1989:317-18).
There is an ongoing debate over whether parties also consider party
loyalty when distributing campaign resources. Wilhite and Theilmann (1989)
and Leyden and Borrelli (1990) argue that party resources are not only
distributed to maximize seats, but that past party loyalty is also a factor.
Herrnson strongly disagrees: "They [the national parties] are not concerned
with the formulation of public policy, nor do they take members' policy
positions into consideration when distributing campaign money or services.
National party activities are aimed at the attainment or expansion of electoral
majorities, not the building of policy majorities'' (1992:68).
In addition, Dwyre (1992) does not find support for the loyalty thesis and
points out that the Wilhite and Theilmann (1989) and Leyden and Borrelli
(1990) empirical studies have limited explanatory value because only winning
incumbents are examined. The current evidence leans in favor of the seat
maximization theory.
This theory holds that the competitiveness of the election is the primary
variable used to explain party resource allocation decisions. Competitiveness
is typically measured as the general election outcome, which appears to be a
reasonable approximation. The current evidence also shows that incumbency
status is important to understanding party resource allocation strategies
(Herrnson 1989). Dwyre (1992) uses aggregate data and intetviews to draw
her conclusions. Using disaggregated data, I have shown elsewhere that war
chests deter challenger entry, which indicates that incumbency status should
be an important consideration in party allocation strategy, especially regarding
timing (Box-Steffensmeier 1993). Based upon these findings, early party
contribution to incumbents is consistent with the seat maximization argument;
by giving to incumbents early, parties may help incumbents avoid competitive
races. This argument is consistent with anecdotal and journalistic evidence
as well.
Whether the incumbent is a member of the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC) or the National Republican Congressional
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Committee (NRCC) has also been shown to be an important explanatory
variable (Jacobson 1985-86; Wilhite and Theilmann 1989). The hypothesis
is that sitting on these committees assures the member of receiving party
resources. This hypothesis contradicts seat maximization theory since, in most
cases, incumbents are well-funded.
In addition, whether or not the congressional race is in the South was
shown to be important by Herrnson (1989), Squire (1989), and BoxSteffensmeier (1993). Southern races are still more likely to be uncontested
or have low quality challengers because of one party dominance and
"traditionalistic'' political culture (Elazar 1984). Herrnson's ( 1989) results
suggest, however, that targeting Southern races may be a strategy that varies
from year to year.
Finally, the literature agrees that the quality of the challengers is also a
factor in party allocation strategy (Herrnson 1989 and Dwyre 1992). High
quality challengers should receive early party money and candidates facing
high quality challengers from the opposing party should not.

Incorporating the Element of Time

Campaigns are obviously dynamic phenomena. However, the majority of
models in the literature are static and use temporally aggregated data.1 The
importance of the timing of money is often mentioned in the campaigns and
elections literature. Cheney (1980) suggests that early money is particularly
valuable and adds, "a creative political scientist probably could analyze the
timing of contributions and perhaps prove or disprove my theory' (1980:252).
Biersack and Wilcox {1990) point out that if early money is critical to a
candidate's success, then who gives early contributions and to whom is of
particular interest since these contributors are likely to be more influential.
They argue in more general terms that an explicit examination of the link
between when contributors give and the candidate attributes that influence
them is a top priority since it will " .. . enhance our ability to anticipate shifts
in allocation strategies and to understand their causes and impad ( 1990:237).
Ample anecdotal and journalistic accounts also support the supposition that
candidates, campaign strategists, and contributors pay attention to timing and
that the effect of money varies over the course of the campaign (Beaudry and
Schaeffer 1986).
Based on the dynamic conceptualization of campaigns and recognition
that there are distinct stages within them (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1992),
it is expected that the timing of financial transactions is critical to both the
contributor and recipient. In order to sustain this expectation, the distribution
of money within an election cycle should not be equal over time. Of more
interest here, there should be discernable differences among the timing
strategies of different contributors. After all, individual donors, PACS and
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parties are likely to have different motivations when making contributions to
a campaign. The literature suggests that individuals and PACs would be most
likely to contribute to incumbents very early and very late in the campaign to
minimize risk. On the other hand, parties are more likely to give to
challengers and in the middle of campaigns. This pattern reflects the
unwillingness of parties not onll to take sides in primaries, but also to become
involved in riskier campaigns.
What follows is a test of these expectations using temporally
disaggregated contributions from individuals, PACs, and parties for contested
House elections in which an incumbent ran for reelection in 1986.3 After a
brief description of the timing of contributions by source, event history
analysis (a proportional hazard modet)4 is used to analyze the timing of party
contributions and coordinated expenditures in terms of the variables discussed
above: competitiveness of the race, incumbency status, challenger quality,
membership on the NRCC and DCCC, and geographic location of the
district.5

Who Receives Party Resources and When?
Table 12.1 presents the temporally disaggregated contributions from
individuals, PACs, and parties for contested House elections in which an
incumbent ran for reelection in 1986.0 As a group, individuals contribute
more money than PACs and both contribute more than parties. There are
two periods, the first and last, in which PAC contributions to incumbents
exceed individual contributions; the discrepancy is even larger when
comparing median contributions. The first and last stages are exactly when
previous research has shown that expenditures will have the greatest impact
on electoral outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1992). This implies that
candidates will value these contributions more and, subsequently, contributors
who provide money during these stages are gaining more per dollar than those
giving in other stages.
On the other hand, parties give the bulk of their money in periods five
and six. Period five begins when the majority of primaries are over. This is
consistent with the goal of parties to remain neutral during primaries. In
addition, Box-Steffensmeier and Lin (1992) show that money has a big effect
during these periods. So party contributions appear to be consistent with seat
maximization theory. The money given very early in the election cycle is also
shown to have a large effect. More risk is involved in giving money early
since it is more difficult to predict accurately who will win. However, early
incumbent contributions is an important strategy that may insulate an incumbent from facing a challenger (Box-Steffensmeier 1993) and serve as a cue to
other contributors.
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Table 12.1 Congressional Contributions by Source, Incumbency Stalllli, and Timing 1986

Individuals
Incumbents
Period
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
1-7

Challengers
% or the
Mean
Total
Sl9,033
'34,767
25,619
45,357
56,646
15,167
32,019

8

15
11
20
25
7
14

228,608

% or the
Mean
$18,238
31,766
20,310
32,020
36,962
9,830
21,SO!l
170,935

Total
11

19
12
19

22
6
13

% or the
Mean
$795
3,001
5,308
13,336
19,684
5,337
10,211
57,672

Total
1

5
9
23
:34
9
18

PACs
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
1-7

$18,610
24,928
15,173
37,315
44,272
15,563
31,566
187,427

10
13
8
21

24
8
17

$18,471
24,641
14,459
33,246
36,796
12,513
26,333
166,462

11
15
9

20
22
7
16

Parttes
1
2
3
4

s

6
7
1-7

$193
40
35
0
1204
1127
0
2600

7
2
I

0
46
43
0

$120
25
21
0

12
3
2
0

$138

286
713
4,068
7,476
3,049
5,233
20,964

so

1
1
3
19
36
15
25
0

464

47

285

0
0
0
0
45

352
0
982

36
0

:349

5S

0

0

0
1
0

635

N • 246 candidates

Source: Federal Election Commission.

Candidates' status helps to further clarify the timing of contribution by
individuals, PACs, and parties. Of course, all contributors are expected to
give more to incumbents than to challengers because of the high incumbent
reelection rate. But if any kind of contributor behaves differently, it is
expected to be the parties because party contributions come from one, or at
most a few, organizations whose motive is often reduced to maximizing seats
strictly by party label (Jacobson 1985-86; Hermson 1989). These expectations
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are borne out: parties more evenly divide their resources between incumbents
and challengers. Overall, individuals and PACs individuals give contributions
to challengers later than to incumbents. Specifically, challengers begin to
receive contributions when the primaries begin, which is after the first three
periods. Parties show a much more modest version of the same pattern,
giving more than one-half of their funds to challengers in period 6.
Thus, in contrast to individuals and PACs, parties give more to
challengers and later in the campaign. But which kinds of candidates receive
the most support from parties? Tables 12.2 through 1254 test a proportional
hazard model first for Republican and Democratic contributions and then for
Republican and Democratic coordinated expenditures. These data are from
the 1992 election cycle.7 In interpreting these tables, a negative P indicates
earlier receipts of contributions, while a positive signs denotes later ones.
Table 12.2 looks at the patterns of Republican party contributions. First,
the type of candidate most likely to receive early party contributions is not a
member of the NRCC. This is consistent with the seat maximization
hypothesis discussed earlier and contradicts the idea that NRCC members
seek self-oriented goals rather than party goals. Since incumbents were
"running scared" in 1992, these results are especially strong. Second,
candidates in competitive elections are more likely to receive early
Republican contributions. This result is also central to the seat maximization
theory.
Third, all of the variables designed to pick up the effects of incumbency
are significant, indicating that incumbency status is an important determinant
of who receives early party contributions. The final incumbency variable
reveals that in races with two incumbents (due to the 1990 redistricting)
candidates are likely to receive early party contributions. These patterns are
also consistent with seat maximization.
Fourth, the candidate-quality variables indicate that high quality
Republican challengers receive early party contributions. Republicans running
against high quality Democratic challengers do not. Finally, geography
apparently did not play a role in the Republicans' contribution strategy.
Republicans did not target Southern Democrats in their allocation strategy
despite Republican candidates getting stronger in the South and Democratic
candidates' fears of being targeted.
Table 12.3 provides the analogous results for Democratic contributions.
The type of candidate most likely to receive early Democratic contributions
is not a member of the DCCC, faces a low quality Republican challenger (one
that the party may see as more realistic to defeat), and is in a competitive
race and a Southern district. Democrats were protecting potentially vulnerable Democratic incumbents by targeting Southern races. In contrast to the
Republicans' timing contribution strategy, incumbency and the quality of the
Democratic challenger was not as important to Democrats. These patterns
are also consistent with the seat-maximization strategy.
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Table 12.2 Cox Proporlional Hazard Model for 1992 Republican Contributions over lhe
Election Cycle

Variable
NRCC
Com pclitivcness
Uncontested
Double Incumbent
Open Race
Quality]
Ouality2
South

Codlidcnt

Std. Error

t•ratio

-0.5792
-0.0140
-0.2165
0.5653
-0.4943
-0.1239
0.2m
•0,0724

0.0448
0.0023
0.0921
0.0731
0.0843
0.0461
0.0482
0.0414

· 12.916°
-6.111 •
-2.350°

7.736•
•5,865°
-2.689°
5.759°
+1.747

Quality!: quality or Democratic challenger
Ouality2: quality of Republican challenger
• Signicant at .05 level or better
Chi•Squarcd (8) "' 433.76
Significance Level a 0.00
N 3310 contributions

Table 12.3 Cox Proportional Hazard Model for 1992 Democratic Contributions over the
Election Cycle

Variable
DCCC
Competitiveness
Uncontested
Double Incumbent
Open Race
Oualityl
Quality2
South

Coefficient

Std. Error

t•ratio

-0.2159
-0.0207
0.0833
0.5121

0.0839
0.0038
0.2016
0.09425
0.2228
0.0910
0.0857
0.07478

-2.573°
-5.402°
0.413
5.433*
0.185
0.323
-2.955°
3.142°

.0412
0.0294
.Q.2532
0.2350

Qualityl: quality or Democratic challenger
Quality2: quality or Republican challenger
• Signicant at .05 level or better
Chi-Squared (8) ,. 98.10
Significance Level .. 0.00
N " 1020 contributions
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Table 12.4 reports the results of a similar analysis for Republican
coordinated expenditures. The signs of the explanatory variables are exactly
the same as the results for Republican contributions. However, only NRCC
membership, competitiveness, and uncontested races achieve significance.
This suggests that Republicans economized more when making coordinated
expenditures. Coordinated expenditures may be the route to emphasizing the
races in which the party is particularly interested. Thus, the larger and more
sophisticated coordinated expenditures are more narrowly targeted, as the
seat-maximization would suggest.
Table 12.5 contains the results for Democratic coordinated expenditures.
The signs are the same as those for Democratic contributions, except for two
of the incumbency status variables. However, none of the incumbency status
variables are significant. Only the DCCC variable is significant for
Democratic coordinated expenditures. This suggests that Democratic
coordinated expenditures were targeted to safer incumbents. This is the one
finding that does not fully support the seat-maximization hypotheses.

Conclusion

The contribution strategies of party organizations are primarily driven by
a desire to win elections. Like other sources of funds, congressional parties
support candidates with the best chance of winning both in aggregate and
within campaigns themselves. However, unlike other sources of money,
parties give more to challengers and during the middle portion of the
campaign. Thus, these committees do not participate in primaries and their
funds are usually allocated before the last push in the campaign. Overall, the
evidence supports the conclusions that the congressional parties are most
concerned with maximizing the number of seats (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).
In this sense, the congressional parties fund candidates that are best able to
win rather than candidates that are best for the policy agenda of the party.
Such a lack of ideological or policy focus is consistent with other studies of
party strategy.
These findings suggest routes for future research. First, timing is an
important aspect of contributions and needs to be investigated further. Party
money may well serve as a cue for other contributions, and thus enhance the
influence of party donations. And second, the use of split population models
may help distinguish between the effect of the occurrence of a contribution
and its timing.
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Table 12.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Model for 1992 Republican Coordinated Expenditures
over the Election Cycle

Variable
NRCC
Competitiveness
Uncontested
Double Incumbent
Open Race
Quality!
QualitY2
South

Coefficient

-0.4224
·0.0319
-0.7486
0.0714
·0.0082
-0.1377
0.1066
-0,()1)48

Std. Error

0.1169
0.0040

0.2623
0.0708
0.1979
0.0828
0.0716
0.0651

-3.614°
-8.004·
-2.854°
1.008
-0.041
•1,662
1.488
-1.457

Quality!: quality of Democratic challenger
Oualit}'2: quality of Republican challenger
• Signicant at .05 level or better
Chi-Squared (8) a 16.08
Significance Level = 0.04
N = 2830 Coordinated Expenditures

Table 12.S Cox Proportional Hazard Model for 1992 Democratic Coordinated Expenditures
over the Election Cycle

Variable
DCCC
Competitiveness
Uncontested
Double Incumbent
Open Race
Quality!
QualityZ
South

Coefficient

Std. Error

I-ratio

-0.1625
-0.0006
-0.1567
0.0035
-0.0590
0.0072
·0.0360
0.0340

0.0487
0.0023
0.1543

.3.333•
-0.243
•l.016
0.060
-0.563
0.141
-0.685
0.769

Quality!: quality of Democratic challenger
QualityZ: quality of Republican challenger
• Signicant at .05 level or better
Chi-Squared (8) ,. 16.08
Significance Level • 0,04
N n 2830 Coordinated Expenditures

0.0572

0.1047
0.0510
0.0526
0.0442
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Notes
1. Sec Alexander 1992; Jacobson 1980; Green and Krasno 1988; Goldenberg and Traugott

1984.

2. Sec Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1984; Eismeier
and Pollock 1986; Wilcox 1989.
3. The data used here consist of all party contributions and coordinated expenditures for
House campaigns made during the 198S--86 election cycle available from the Federal Elections
Commission. The monetary data arc recorded by the week of the transaction in seven periods
as follows: 1. January 1, 1985, lo June 30, 1985; 2. July I, 1985, to December 31, 1985; 3.
January 1, 1986, to March 31, 1986; 4. April I, 1986, lo June 30, 1986; 5. July 1, 1986, to
September 30, 1986; 6. October 1, 1986, lo October 15, 1986; and 7. October 16, 1986, to
November 24, 1986.
4. Event history analysis is a regression-like procedure for longitudinal data. Event history
analysis focuses on analyzing the length of lime until an event occurs. Herc the event is a party
contribution or coordinated expenditure. Cox's proportional hazards model allows one to
estimate lhe effects of individual characteristics on survival times without having lo assume a
particular form for the distribution function ( or the density or hazard). Explanatory variables
can be added to this mode~ so it is used to determine which variables have significant effects
on length or time until a candidate receives a party contribution or expenditure. The model is
based on the hazard rate at time I, h(t,x) '" h(t,O)c8'• where h(t,0) is the baseline hazard rate
at time t for covariate vector 0, x arc the covariates, and jJ is estimated.
5. The independent variables in the model were operationalized as follows: Competitiveness
is the final 1992 vote outcome. Incumbency takes into account the status of the candidates with
regard to incumbency; three dummy variables arc used: Uncomested equals 1 if the race is
uncontested; Double incumbMt equals I if there arc two incumbents running due to
redistricting; Open race equals 1 if it is an open race. The base category is a race between an
incumbent and challenger. Quality captures the quality of 1he challengers; Quality/ indicates
whether or not the Democratic challenger has held previous political office; Quality2 is coded
similarly for Republican challengers. Congressional Campaign Committees (NRCC/DCCC) is
a dummy variable equal lo one if the candidate is a member of the NRCC or the DCCC
depending upon whether Republican or Democratic resource allocation strategy is being
examined. South is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the congressional district is in
a Southern state.
6. The within-subjcct-by-bctwccn-subjed repeated measures ANOVA was done on a pair•
wise basis for all three sources and confirms that each source follows a different contribution
timing strategy.
7. The data used here consist of all party contributions and coordinated expenditures for
House campaigns made during the 1991-92 election cycle available from the Federal Elections
Commission (sec note 3).
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Explaining Party Leadership Activity among House
Freshmen: The Classes of 1980-1988
Stephen A. Bomlli
Kevin M. Leyden
Party leadership in the House of Representatives is now more visible,
active, and powerful than at any time since the "Czarist Speakership" at the
tum of the century (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1992; Davidson 1992). Party leaders
play a central role on most major issues that confront the House; leaders'
participation now extends far beyond the building coalitions on the floor to
all stages of the legislative process (Sinclair 1992). And while House
members' campaigns are still primarily "candidate-centered," congressional
party leaders and party committees are now playing an historically
unprecedented role in recruiting, advising, and funding candidates (Herrnson
1988; Sorauf 1988). More than at any time in recent memory, the question
of who gets recruited to party leadership positions is of interest to scholars
and political practitioners alike.
In this chapter, we examine recruitment of freshman House members to
positions within party leadership organizations during the 1980s. We believe
that these early entrances onto the leadership ladder deserve more attention
than they have received. As the House parties have extended the leadership
hierarchy to include even the most junior members, some members are able
to get on a "leadership track'' from the day they begin service. While we
know that contests for the more senior leadership positions are influenced by
the intricate internal politics of the House parties, previous research does not
indicate whether access to lower-level leadership positions is equally complex.
We suspect that there are predictable, systematic forcei;--mainly having
to do with members' qualifications and experiences prior to their House
service-that tend to "select in'' some freshmen and "select out'' others for
participation in formal leadership groups. Specifically, we hypothesize that
freshmen with state legislative experience, experience as party leaders in the
state legislature, experience in statewide elective office, and/or experience as
leaders of state party organizations, as well as freshmen who relied heavily on
party support to win election to the House, are more likely than their
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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colleagues to attain congressional party leadership positions during their first
terms in office. The evidence from the 1980s largely supports these
expectations, at least for the Democratic freshmen. To the extent that early
accession to leadership positions gives members an advantage in future
contests, this suggests that a likely "leadership class'' of freshman Democrats
can be systematically identified within each incoming freshman class.
The Recruitment of Freshmen to Party Leadership

Most of the existing recruitment studies focus on contests for the very top
party leadership positions: Speaker, majority/minority leader, and/or
majority/minority whip. In identifying the factors associated with successful
movement to the leadership, most authors have concentrated on attributes of
the candidates' congressional careers: how often they voted with the party in
the past, the services they have performed for other members, the previous
committee and leadership positions they have held within the House, and the
style of the campaign they have waged for their desired position (see Polsby
1963; Peabody 1976; Brown and Peabody 1987; Canon 1989). As Loomis
(1984) has reminded us, however, recent developments in the size and
structure of the party leadership should lead us to expand the focus of our
study of leadership recruitment. Loomis argues that the Watergate and
post-Watergate freshman classes have sought to participate in leadership
activities at an earlier stage in their careers than was the case a generation
ago. And House party leaders have responded to these demands by greatly
expanding the number of leadership positions available to junior members;
the Democrats expanded their whip system from 20 slots in 1961 to 104 slots
in 1991, and both parties have developed extensive systems of permanent and
temporary leadership task forces to deal with specific issues (Little and
Patterson 1993). Leaders were not just being generous by offering junior
members these additional rungs on the leadership ladder. The expansion of
the Democratic ieadership, for example, is part of a deliberate "strategy of
inclusion" that provides clear benefits to the senior leaders: in addition to
more "eye'S' and "ears'' on Capitol Hill, the strategy gives senior leaders the
opportunity to get to know junior members, to socialize them to party norms,
and to groom some of them for future leadership roles (Sinclair 1981; Garand
and Clayton 1986).
Understanding House leadership today, therefore, requires looking at a
larger number of members and looking at them earlier in their House careers.
Assuming freshman entry into the leadership follows any kind of systematic
patterns, those patterns must be determined largely by the precongressional
experiences and qualifications of freshman members.1
In the following sections, we propose that freshmen possessing certain
kinds of objective qualifications and experiences are generally more likely to
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want positions in the leadership structure and more likely to be approved for
such positions by those who appoint or elect leaders. We do not deny that
there are many routes a freshman can take to the leadership, and that each
case involves a somewhat unique combination of self-selection and selection
by others. Even so, we suspect that freshmen's prior legislative or party
experience will affect their motivations to seek leadership positions and
others' motivations to allow them to get leadership positions strongly and
consistently enough to allow us to predict freshman leadership attainment with
a fairly simple empirical model. Underlying all of the hypotheses below is the
theory that freshmen with precongressional experience working in or with
political parties are more likely to join the House leadership than those
lacking in such experience.
Background and Experience

State Legislative Experience. Freshmen with extensive experience se,ving in
a state legislature are more likely to attain Congressional leadership positions
than are those with little or no state legislative experience.
State legislative experience has been cited as the most frequent, if not the
best, kind of preparation for successful House careers (Canon 1990); we
expect that it will be an especially good predictor of successful attainment of
leadership status during the first term. First, we think that longtime members
of state legislatures should be more motivated to seek leadership positions
than their colleagues lacking in such service. In addition, the typical state
legislator is probably more thoroughly socialized in the norms of supporting
the party than would be a public official or private citizen who has not served
in such a partisan setting. Just as important is the possibility that current
leaders and caucus members may think of experienced legislators as better
qualified for such positions. Finally, experienced state legislators may be
more skilled at lobbying and campaigning their colleagues in order to achieve
leadership positions. Berkman (1993) finds that state legislators, particularly
those from states with professionalized legislatures, have "institutional and
policy mastery' that equips them to rise to prestigious committee positions
faster than their colleagues. We see no reason why early attainment of party
leadership posts should not follow the same pattern. In the analysis below,
we measure state legislative experience simply as the total number of years
a member served in either chamber of a state legislature prior to his or her
arrival in Congress; members with no experience are coded "0." 2
Prior Leadenhip Service. Freshmen who have se,ved as party leaders in the
state legislature are more likely to attain House leadership positions than their
colleagues without such experience.
Even if state legislators as a group were not especially interested in
joining the leadership, and/or more attractive as leadership candidates, we
might still expect that those former state legislators with the most directly
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transferable background in legislative party leadership-those who had been
elected to major party leadership positions while in the state legislative
chamber--would be more willing and/or able than other freshmen to continue
such service in the House. We coded members as state legislative leaders if
their biographical data indicated service as a state legislative majority or
minority leader, president of a legislative chamber, assistant majority or
minority leader, and/or chair of a legislative party caucus. The leadership
variable is coded as a simple dichotomy, with "1" indicating a stint of service
as a leader.
Service with Party Organwllions. Freshmen who have served as top-ranking
officials in a national, state, county, or city political party committee are more
likely to attain House leadership positions than their colleagues without such
experience.
In examining the possible effects of previous party organizational service,
we move beyond direct legislative experience to suggest that a general prior
commitment to and affiliation with party organizations influences a member's
willingness and/or opportunity to serve as a party leader in the House (see
Price 1992). Those with a record of service to party organizations have
demonstrated party loyalty (which might make them an attractive leadership
candidate to others, and more likely to volunteer for often thankless and
time-consuming party duties). Moreover, state party officials are used to
thinking of parties as teams, negotiating with different factions within the
party, and putting party success above pure policy concerns, all of which might
be useful skills for a legislative leader. There is also a strong possibility that
a typical former party official has had more previous opportunities to meet
and work with other House members (at least those from his or her home
state) whose support might be helpful in attaining a House leadership post.
In the analysis below, we treat party organization leadership as another
dichotomy; a code of "l" if he or she has any prior service as an executive
officer (chair, president, secretary, and/or treasurer) in any national, state, or
local party organization, and O otherwise.
Statewide Elected Office. Freshmen who have won statewide elective office
prior to their House service are more likely to attain House leadership positions
than their colleagues without such experience.
A number of considerations lead us to this expectation. A successful run
for statewide office requires impressive political skills and connections (and,
in many states, substantial party connections), as well as fundraising ability.
One would think these talents would be respected by colleagues and current
leaders as evidence of House leadership potential. While it is true that states
vary greatly in the extent to which parties and partisanship matter in state
elections, we can say (as we did in the case of former state legislators) that
most elected governors, judges, and statewide executive officials run on a
party ticket and have some experience with the kind of intraparty and
interparty negotiation required of House party leaders. And, as in the case
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of prior legislative service, a former state official-particularly someone who
has had the privileges and perks of executive office-might be less satisfied
with routine congressional responsibilities and more apt to seek positions of
greater authority. This variable is also coded as a dichotomy, with "1"
indicating some service in statewide elective office, and "(J' indicating no
evidence of such service in a member's biography.
Political and Electoral Characteristics

So far we have discussed qualifications and background characteristics
that might mark a freshman as a potential House party leader before he or
she begins, or even considers, a House campaign. As Richard Fenno ( 1978)
and others have recently emphasized, however, we should also consider the
possible effect of the campaign experience itself on members' activities and
opportunities once in office. Fenno points out that members continue to
employ the styles, strategies, and issues developed during the campaign in
their legislative work. In this vein, we suspect that attitudes toward political
parties developed during the campaign might influence members' willingness
and/or ability to participate in House party leadership activities after the
election. We hypothesize that members' initial campaign experience might
affect movement to the leadership in three specific ways.
Levels of Party Involvement in the Campaign. Freshmen whose campaigns
exhibited relatively heavy involvement on the part of party campaign
organizations are more likely to attain party leadership positions than are their
colleagues whose campaigns showed less party committee involvement.
The proportion of a candidate's campaign expenses funded by party
coordinated expenditures might conceivably affect both a member's motivation
to seek party leadership positions and others' willingness to award him or her
such a position. A member who benefited relatively heavily from party
support might feel some obligation to "return the favor' by devoting hours to
party service.3 Alternatively, members might not be motivated so much by
gratitude as by a simple awareness-based on their personal experience of
receiving significant party assistance-that the leadership controls tangible
resources that members value highly and a simple desire to attain positions
through which they can help decide who gets these resources. Turning to the
"demand side:• we propose that leaders and colleagues might regard a heavy
party investment in a freshman's campaign as a sign that the freshman won
the confidence and trust of the party leaders in charge of doling out the funds
and was able to work successfully with them in a winning campaign. Such
considerations might lead colleagues to decide that a freshman has leadership
potential.
We should note that party funding of congressional campaigns can be in
the form of direct contributions to a candidate's campaign as well as
coordinated expenditures. We use only measures of coordinated party
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expenditures, for two reasons. First, the legal ceilings on such funds are
much higher than those for direct contributions. Second, the expenditure of
coordinated funds involves much closer cooperation between party officials
and the candidate's campaign personnel than do direct contributions to the
candidate's campaign. It is this campaign cooperation that we believe would
best predict a member's continued affiliation with the party leadership once
elected. This variable is operationalized as the percentage of total campaign
receipts received in the form of "coordinated expenditures'' made by party
campaign committees on the candidate's behalf.4
Margin of Victory. Freshmen who ran in especially close elections are less
likely to attain party leadership positions than are their colleagues with larger
electoral margins.
Our initial expectation was that the freshmen, their senior colleagues, and
current party leaders might all share the belief that marginal members should
forego party responsibilities and concentrate on constituency service in the
interests of protecting their seat. In other words, both the opportunities for
marginal members to obtain leadership slots and their motivations to do so
would be reduced. However, we cannot dismiss the possibility of an effect
working in the other direction; perhaps in some situations freshmen and/or
their more senior colleagues feel that the additional power and prestige of an
early party leadership position might actually help a marginal freshman get
reelected. We measure "closeness" as the difference between the freshman's
percentage of the vote and that of his or her nearest competitor.
Ideological Considerations. Democratic freshmen from districts where
Presidents Reagan or Bush ran relatively strongly are less likely to attain party
leadership positions than are their colleagues from weak Reagan/Bush districts;
Republican freshmen from strong Reagan/Bush districts should be more likely
than their colleagues to attain party leadership positions.
In general, we expect that Republicans running in strong Reagan or Bush
districts would be most likely to find satisfaction and electoral benefit in party
service, and that Democrats from strong Reagan or Bush districts would be
most uncomfortable helping to implement the largely liberal Democratic
leadership agenda. Similarly, we would expect that those who select future
leaders might be wary of ideologically conflicted members and most trusting
of members whose personal and district ideologies are most consistent with
the party "norms." Students of Congress have traditionally assumed that
members tend to choose ideological "middlemen" as their leaders (Sinclair
1990:124-25).
There are reasons, however, to expect that members from ideologically
atypical districts might not be disadvantaged, or could even be advantaged, in
their bids for leadership posts. There have been recent efforts, particularly
within the Democratic party, to make the party leadership more responsive
to the full range of party opinion, including appointing conservative Southern
Democrats to whip and task force positions (Rohde 1991:185).5
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Structural Factors

We realize that attainment of leadership position is more than just a
matter of member ambition and approval among one's colleagues. There are
structural constraints on the number of opportunities available to a would-be
freshman leader. The most severe constraints are those imposed by both
parties' campaign and committee assignment committees: in order to ensure
broad geographic representation on these bodies, slots are formally reserved
for members from particular states. Although the exact method of reservation
varies, as a general hypothesis we can safely say:
Stale and Regional Delegations. 77,e larger the number of House colleagues
of the same party in a given freshman's state delegation, the less likely that
freshman is to attain a leadership position.
Even on leadership committees where there is no formal allocation of
seats to states or a looser allocation according to regions (as in the whip
systems), there may be informal norms preventing members from the larger
states from gaining too many positions. In addition, both parties may have a
particular interest in making sure that the South is represented on leadership
committees, given the recent complaints about underrepresentation by
Southern Democrats (see Rohde 1991) and the Republicans' interest in
winning and holding seats in this increasingly competitive region. Accordingly,
Southern freshmen are also more likely to attain leadership positioru;-in both
parties-than are non-Southern freshmen. We thus include a variable
indicating the total number of state copartisans during the member's freshman
term (including the freshman in question), as well as a dummy variable for
"South" (defined as the old Confederacy).
Cohot1 FJ/ects. Finally, we also need to control for time-specific
structural factors that may make it inherently more difficult for freshmen
elected at certain times to join the leadership during their first term. Our
purpose is to formulate a general model of freshman leadership attainment,
and apply it to a data set including freshmen classes from five different
Congresses (the 97th through 101st, i.e., the classes elected between 1980 and
1988). Throughout this period, the top party leadership made decisions to
expand or contract the size of leadership groups and to create or eliminate
spots reserved for freshmen members. Moreover, the size of freshman classes
varied greatly from year to year; a larger freshman class might mean more
competition for leadership spots (although it might also mean more vacancies
on leadership committees due to retirement or defeat). Because all these
factors vary from Congress to Congress, we attempt to capture them through
the inclusion of four dummy variables representing membership in different
freshmen classes (1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988, with 1980 being the excluded
category)."
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Two data sets are employed in the analysis, one consisting of all
Democrats newly elected to the House during the period November
198(}-December 1989, and the other consisting of all Republicans newly
elected to the House during the same period.7 Separate analysis of the two
parties' freshmen is necessary because of the different organizational structure
of the two parties and because of possible differences in access to leadership
positions due to the longtime majority status of the Democratic party.
Our dependent variables represent the successful achievement of various
leadership positions by an individual member during his or her first House
term (for members elected in 1980, the period under examination would be
1981- 1982; for members elected in 1982, it would be 1983-84, etc.) Hibbing
(1991) and others who have studied movements into leadership positions have
tended to consider the entirety of the congressional career and are especially
interested in the length of time it takes "the typical membe~• to begin a
career in the leadership (see also Polsby 1968; Canon 1989). Here we focus
on the earliest possible movement to the leadership, that occurring in the first
term. In so doing, we are introducing an automatic control for seniority; if we
compare freshmen members' progress in the first term only, we are forced to
pay attention to variables other than length of service that distinguish those
involved in party governance from those less involved.
Which leadership positions should we consider in constructing our
dependent variables'! In other words, how broadly should we define "party
leadership?' For the purposes of this paper we focus on what could be called
the "middle management" level of the party leadership, and we choose to look
at those committees most closely associated with the party organizations.
While some of the standing committees do have leadership status, recruitment
to these committees has been much more extensively studied (Shepsle 1978;
Smith and Deering 1984), and there is likely to be some controversy as to
exactly which committees "deserve'' this status. For the Democrats, we
analyze entry into the whip system (whether or not a member becomes a
deputy whip, assistant whip, at-large whip, zone whip, or a caucus
representative within the whip system), the Steering and Policy Committee
(which makes all nominations to Democratic committee slots, coordinates
committee activity, and formulates Democratic policy positions), and the
Democratic National Congressional Campaign Committee (which provides
campaign assistance to Democratic House candidates). For the Republicans,
we look at freshmen attainment of positions within the whip system (which
include deputy whips, regional whips, assistant regional whips, class whips, and
the "strategy' whips employed in 1989-90), the Republican Policy Committee
(which formulates party positions on pending issues), the Republican
Research Committee (which studies and evaluates policy alternatives), the
Republican Committee on Committees (which makes Republican committee
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assignments), and the National Republican Congressional Campaign
Committee (which assists House Republican campaigns).8 The primary source
for all data on committee membership is the Congressional Quarterly Almanac
for the year corresponding to the beginning of each new Congress.8
Findings and Discussion: The Democrats
The first, and most general, version of our "leadership attainment"
variable for freshmen Democrats is an index encompassing first-term
membership in three different leadership organizations. A member receives
one point for service in each of the following: the DCCC, the Steering and
Policy Committee, and the whip organization. The maximum value, then, is
"3" and the minimum value "0." Table 13.1 presents the results of an O1..S
regression of this index on the various predictors described above.
Table 13.1 indicates that precongressional experience matters. Variables
measuring the number of years a member served as a state legislator, whether
a member served as a state legislative leader, and whether a member held a
statewide elective office are all significantly and positively correlated with our
dependent variable. In addition, we find the number of Democratic members
in a state delegation also to be significant in the hypothesized direction;
increased competition from fellow members of the state delegation tends to
inhibit leadership service. There is also a significant positive relationship
between district vote for Republican presidents and successful freshmen
leadership attainment. This relationship is somewhat surprising, in that it
suggests Democrats from relatively strong Republican districts are more likely
to successfully join the leadership team. Whether this is a result of an
attempt by leaders, caucus members, and/or would-be leaders to moderate
the Democratic party's ideological profile, or an attempt by the party to
"spotlight'' members from traditionally Republican territory, remains a topic
for future research.
The model presented in Table 13.1 accounts for a third of the variance
in the leadership attainment index. Given the wide variety of selection
methods used to fill these committees and the traditional view of leadership
recruitment as an idiosyncratic and highly personalized process, our general
model does a respectable job of distinguishing leaders from nonleaders with
a small set of general variables. We realize, however, that each arm of the
party leadership emphasizes different functions (vote counting and
mobilization for the whips, committee assignments for the Steering and Policy
Committee, and electoral support for the DCCC). It is very possible that not
all of the variables do equally well in predicting freshman membership on
each of the committees. Combining three leadership positions into one index
might obscure important committee-specific patterns. For this reason we
decided to estimate logit models predicting first-term membership (scored "(1'
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for nonmembership, "1" for membership) on each individual leadership
committee. Unfortunately, problems with lack of variation in some of the
variables and multicollinearity prevent us from being able to estimate a fully
specified model predicting Steering and Policy Committee membership.
We are able to estimate meaningful models predicting DCCC membership and assignment to the Democratic whip organization. The DCCC model
is presented in Table 132. State or local party organization leadership, years
of state legislative experience, and statewide elective office experience are all
significant predictors of freshman DCCC membership. These are exactly the
kinds of experiences-those related to campaigning, fundraising, and other
aspects of electoral politics-we would think to be most directly relevant to
the purposes of the DCCC; the selection process for the DCCC clearly favors
those who are already familiar with the type of work the DCCC does. By way
of contrast, experience as a state legislative leader does not correlate with
DCCC service. Prior state legislative leadership is apparently not considered
an important qualification for DCCC service. As expected, given the empha-

Table 13.1 Leadership Altainmcnt Among Democratic Freshmen, Classes of 1980-1988 (OLS)
Indcp. Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

.015
.316
.140
.701

.008
.124
.111
.172

-.000
.009
.002

.012
.004
.248

2,09••
-1.38

Dem. Reps. in State
South
Class of 1980
Class of 1984
Class of 1986
Class of 1988

.012

.131
.174
.160

.005
.085
.110
.172
.133
.139

.2.19••
-1.06
.90
.76
1.30
1.15

Constant

-.343

.248

•l.38

Ycars as State Legislator
State Legislative Leader
Party Organization Leader
Held Statewide Office

% Campaign $ in Coord. Exp.
District % for Rcpub. Pres.
Margin

.090
.010

t•Ratio
1.83·
2.55 ..
1.30
4.01••·
•,01

Dependent Variable = Total number of positions held during freshmen term on the following
committees: Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Democratic Steering and Policy
Committee, and The Whip Organization.
R2 = .31
n = 143
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01 (two-tailed)
Source: Sec text.
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sis on geographic representation in the DCCC, having a large number of
copartisans from the same state appears to be a significant disadvantage for
would-be first term members.
Perhaps the most intriguing, but not unanticipated, result concerns the
effect of heavy party financing during the previous campaign on a member's
appointment to the DCCC; the larger the percentage of a member's total
receipts derived from coordinated spending by the party, the higher the
probability a member will join the DCCC during his or her first term. As we
mentioned, a number of different causal processes could bring about this
result. One possibility is that members heavily aided by party contributions
become more aware than their colleagues of the personal and institutional
value of having viable party campaign committees and thus more motivated
to seek campaign committee positions. Another is that members who
received a great deal of coordinated aid might be most familiar to current

Table 13.2 Freshman Term Membership on lhc Dcmocralic Congressional Campaign
Committee, Classes of 1980-1988 (Logit Model)

lndep. Variable

Ycars as Slalc Lcgislalor
State Legislative Leader
Party Organization Leader
Held Statewide Office

% Campaign $ in Coord. Exp.
District % for Repub. Pres.
Margin
Dem. Reps. in Stale
South
Class of 1982
Class or 1984
Class of 1986
Class of 1988
Constant

Cocffidcnl

Std. Error

I-Ratio

.090
-.092
1.007
1.444

.048
.525
.437
.573

1.87°
-.18
2.31 ..
2.52..

. 141
.020
.005

.048
.027
.010

2.13..
.75
.48

-.162
.240
.584
.070
-.602
-.173

.066
.400
.728
.925
.847
.832

-2,44••

-2.670

1.925

.60
.80

.08
-.71
-.21
-1.39

Dependent Variable =- "f' iC member joined DCCC during his or her first term, "O' otherwise.
Dhrymes Pseudo-R2 • .41
D = 143

• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01
Source: Sec text.
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DCCC members and to the current party leadership, who are involved in
targeting members for aid (Herrn..~on 1989). The important point is that party
financial support, which did not appear to be related to leadership attainment,
generally speaking (see Table 13.1), is very much related to membership on
the committee that handles this support.
Table 13.3 shows the results of a model of whip organization membership.
Again, the variables relating to prior political experience show an intuitive
pattern. Past experience in the most analogous position to that of House
whip-state legislative leade~is a strong predictor of whip service, and so are
years of legislative experience and prior service in statewide elective office.
This time, it is party organizational leadership that appears less relevant, as
the data indicate that organization leadership is statistically unrelated to
freshman whip service. Since party organizational leaders are concerned
almost exclusively with electoral politics, and state legislative leaders are more
heavily involved in coalition-building and policy making within the legislature,
it is not hard to see why legislative leadership might be considered a relevant
qualification for a whip position while party organizational leadership would
be less so.
Two additional findings in the whip model deserve mention. First,
district-level presidential election results, which did not affect recruitment to
the DCCC, do appear to have an impact on recruitment to whip positions;
members from relatively strong Reagan or Bush districts were more likely to
join the whip organization. As mentioned earlier, further research is
necessary to determine whether this is a product of "revolt from below,"
"inclusion from the top," or a combination of such forces. Finally, members
who were most reliant on coordinated funding were significantly less likely to
serve as whips.10

Findings and Discussion: Republicans
As with the Democrats, we begin by estimating an OLS model predicting
an index of overall party involvement among freshmen (Table 13.4). The
Republican index has a possible range of 0-5, counting membership in five
leadership organizations: the NRCC, the Republican Committee on
Committees, the Republican Policy Committee, the Republican Research
Committee, and the whip office.
Table 13.4 suggest that first-term membership in the Republican
leadership is largely driven by structural factors, and is not as dependent on
members' political experience as was the case for the Democrats.
Republicans from states with few or no other Republicans found it much
easier to gain early admission to the leadership circle, and members elected
in 1986 were significantly less likely than those elected in the baseline year of
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Table 13.3 Freshman Term Membership in the Democratic Whip Organization, Classes of
1980-1988 (Logit Model)

Indcp. Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

I- Ratio

2.()6••

Ycars as State Legislator
State Legislative Leader
Party Organization Leader
Held Statewide Office

.071
1.010
1.033

.034
.415
.522
.586

% Campaign $ in Coord. Exp.
District % for Rep. Pres.
Margin

·.165
.040
•,016

.090
.024
.013

Dem. Reps. in State
South
Class of 1982
Class of 1984
Class of 1986
Class of 1988

-.011
•.512
.210
.418
1.206
1.240

,022
.392
.504
.819
.626

-3.634

1.487

Constant

-.466

.608

2.44•·
+,89
1.76·
. 1,84•
1.68·
-1.23

-.50
-1.31
.42
.51
1.92·
2,04••
-2.44

Dependent Variable ., "1" if member became a whip during his or her first term, "Cl'
otherwise (sec text for dclinition of whips).
Dhrymcs Pseudo-R2 = .34
n = 143
• p < .10; •• p < .05; • • • p < .01
Source: Sec text.
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1980 to do so.
None of the political background variables emerges as
significant or even nearly so, and the overall fit of the model is clearly inferior
to that of the Democratic analogue presented in Table 13.1.
Our ability to perform analysis of membership on each individual
committee is again subject to limitations imposed by the structure of our data.
We can estimate a fully specified logit regression model of NRCC recruitment
(Table 13.5) which modestly replicates some of the findings of the
corresponding Democratic model. (Note that in the interests of conserving
space, the coefficients presented in Table 13.5 represent only those variables
that were close to statistical significance in their respective models.) Prior
service as a state or local party organization leader and service in statewide
elective office are both weakly correlated with NRCC membership, the former
at a .20 level of significance and the latter at a .10 level. Less intuitive
relationships of roughly the same level of significance emerge for the margin
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variable and the years of legislative service variable. It is not at all clear why
prior legislative service would inhibit NRCC membership; perhaps the slight
tendency for marginal members to be more successful at winning NRCC spots
suggests a perception-by would-be NRCC members or those who select
them-that such service might help them in future electoral contests.
Models predicting Committee on Committees membership and Policy
Committee membership can be estimated only if the statewide elective office
variable is not entered (Table 135).12 The Committee on Committees results
are dominated by the committee's requirement of broad geographic
representation; members from states with large Republican delegations are
significantly disadvantaged in attaining membership. In addition, members of
the 1984 and 1986 classes are significantly less likely than those elected in
1980 to join the Committee on Committees as freshmen. The only substantive
effect that is even close to statistical significance is that for district Republican
presidential vote. If we take this variable to represent the conservativeness
of the district, and that in turn to indicate the potential conservativeness of
its representative, this pattern is consistent with what we know about the
standing committee assignment process. To the extent that the Republican
Conference and leadership wants to ensure that the Republican members of
important committees represent "typicar' party views, they would be well
advised to appoint conservative members to the Committee on Committees.
Selection to the Republican Policy Committee is virtually unpredictable
with the data at our disposal. Aside from slight tendencies for some classes
to gain admission more frequently than others, there seem to be no systematic
patterns relating member characteristics to Committee membership. Finally,
obtaining meaningful results for models of Research Committee and whip
system membership requires the elimination of several potentially important
variables, and we are reluctant to draw conclusions from deliberately
underspecified models.

Conclusions
When political scientists and journalists have written about leadership
contests, they have usually chosen to discuss the "heavy weight'' contests
between experienced legislators for the positions at the highest rungs of the
leadership ladder. The explanations for who wins and loses these contests
typically focus on internal congressional politics: who follows the norms, who
votes with the party, who makes the best media spokesperson, who can call
in the most debts from other members, and so forth. In the postreform
House, however, contests for leadership positions involve many more
members, at much earlier stages in their careers, than was the case a
generation ago. In fact, Canon (1989) argues that as a legislative party
becomes more institutionalized in its leadership hierarchy (which has clearly
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happened to the House Democrats), leadership contests at the top become
routine or nonexistent, and the real scramble for power occurs lower in the
party ranks.
It would seem difficult to predict leadership attainment among members
with little or no seniority; it is tempting to conclude that early leadership
success is due to intangible factors such as luck, charisma, and attitude. In
this paper, however, we have shown that freshman entry onto the leadership
ladder shows systematic patterns. The success of individual members at
gaining leadership positions can be predicted on the basis of structural
constraints, and, especially for the Democrats, objectively measured member
characteristics. The process of early recruitment to leadership does not favor
all equally, nor does it arbitrarily discriminate in favor of a mysterious select
few. Particularly for Democrats, the process favors those with predictably
relevant qualifications. To varying degrees, depending on the number and
type of leadership committees in question, prior state legislative service, state
legislative leadership, prior service in statewide elective office, prior service
on a state or local party committee, and/or relatively high reliance on party
coordinated party funds in the most recent campaign can be shown to steer
Democrats toward early leadership posts.
We hope to have raised a number of topics for future research
throughout. First and foremost among them would be explaining why
Republican moves to the leadership are less dependent on prior political
experience. Two explanations come to mind. Perhaps the House Republican
leadership ladder is simply more fluid and less structured than that of the
majority Democratic party. This claim has already been made with respect
to the top levels of Republican leadership (Canon 1989); it may true of the
lower levels as well. This fluidity, in tum, might be caused by the
semipermanent minority status of House Republicans. For a congressional
party that has been frustrated in both its policy and political ambitions for
most of the last fifty years, it may make little sense to develop a highly
structured leadership selection process. Republicans might be willing to
experiment with inexperienced or unorthodox leaders (such as a Newt
Gingrich) in a continuing effort to find something that works (Bader and
Jones 1993:294-295).
A second possible explanation for the lack of a clear Republican pattern
involves the differences in career paths between Republicans and Democrats
(Fiorina 1994). It may be the case that Republican politicians tend to value
previous elective office experience less when selecting leaders, either because
relatively fewer incumbent Republicans have elective office experience
themselves, or because of an ideological distrust of "career politicians''
(Jacobson 1990; Maisel 1992). Republicans have been consistently less likely
than Democrats to offer politically experienced House challengers and open
seat candidates in recent years. Out of necessity or choice, Republican
candidates are less likely than Democrats to have followed traditional paths
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to high political office. Our results raise the possibility that the Republican
tendency to undervalue professional politicians may continue even within the
House chamber.
We should also note that our measure of state copartisans, which in most
cases predicts leadership committee membership for both parties, is no less
interesting because we label it a "structurar' variable. Our results suggest
members from small states and/or states which are typically hostile to their
party are given an important head start in the quest for leadership positions.
The extent to which members are able and willing to exploit this advantage
later in their congressional careers is worth further investigation,
In this chapter, we have discussed our hypotheses and findings primarily
in the context of the literature on Congress, because, appropriately enough,
that is where most of the work on party leadership recruitment has originated.
We conclude, however, by expressing our hope that we have in some small
way advanced the study of political parties more generally. Parties are often
advertised as performing a crucial linkage function in American democracy.
In a political system splintered into variovs branches and levels in an
extremely large and diverse society, political parties are supposed to be a
cohesive force that can bridge the gaps inherent in our constitutional
structure. Our results suggest one way in which this linkage can and does
occur. Democratic freshmen who have been active in party affairs in their
state legislatures are more likely to continue in such a role at the national
level. Moreover, Democratic freshmen who have served as officers in state
party organizations, and/or who have been helped by party organizations in
their campaigns, are more likely to serve on the DCCC once in Congress.
Despite the growing alienation from the parties at the mass level, party
linkages at the elite level-between party-as-organization and party-ingovernment, and between state and Federal parties-persist, and merit
continued attention from academics, journalists, and political practitioners.

Notes
1. While we deal here wi1h the correlates of allainmcnt of leadership positions by
freshman members in their lirst lerms, we also maintain that prccongressional experience
variables might also help lo explain movements lo the leadership by more senior members wi1h
considerable congressional experience under their belts. Fcnno (1978) has argued lhal
precong,essional office and campaign experience has a lingering effect on legislators' altitudes
and behavior, and Barber (1992) has long maintained lhal a politician's firsl indepcndcnl
political experiences have a profound and lasting innucnce.
2. All biographical dala on freshmen come from various editions of 771e Almanac of
American Politics, 171e Congressional Staff Directory, and Politics in America. In all cases, al
least two or these sources were checked; in mosl cases, all three were consulted.
3. Following the same logic, we have elsewhere explored 1hc possibility 1hal party
contributions lo members' campaigns might innuence their propensities to vote with lhe party
on roll call voles (Leyden and Borrelli 1990).
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4. Sec Hcrrnson (1989), Soraur (1988), and Leyden and Borrelli (1990) for further
discussion or the quantitative and qualitative differences between coordinated and direct party
runding. Our sources for financial data were various (final) editions of FEC Reports on
Financial Activity, U.S. Senate and House Campaigns.
5. Our sources for electoral data were various editions of Congressional Quartcrly's
Politics in America and Congressional Quarterly's Almanac. The presidential vole variable is
simply the raw percentage or district votes for the Republican presidential candidate if the most
recent presidential election was 1984 or 1988; if the most recent election was the three-way race
of 1980, we used the Republican percentage of the two•party district vote.
6. Members elected in special elections arc included in our data; they arc lumped in with
the freshmen elected during the previous general election, so that members elected between
December 1980 and November 1982 arc considered members or the class of 1980, etc.
7. Four freshmen Republicans in our data set had previously held and lost U.S. House
scal5 before their ·new" election to the House. We consider them freshmen because their prior
interrupted service, under House rules, is not supposed lo give them any seniority over their
freshmen colleagues,
8. The Democratic Study Group (which conducts research and disseminates information)
was not coded as being part of the Democratic leadership in this analysis. The DSG originated
as an insurgent group within the party and remains officially independent of the leadership.
The DSG is unique for other reasons; a DSG staffer (personal interview, 1993) told us that the
nominal membership of the Democratic Study Group has reached the point where the Study
Group is almost identical to the Democratic Caucus. This said, there arc reasons why the DSG
"should" be considered as a viable part of the leadership (sec Little and Patterson 1993). In an
earlier draft of this chapter we included an additional !able that included the DSG as a part of
our Democratic leadership index. With a few exceptions, lhc results were generally similar but
weaker than those presented in Table 13.l.
9. Most of the party commiuccs retained the same basic size and structure throughout
the period under examination, but there arc some major exceptions. The Republicans gradually
expanded their whip organization from 23 members in 1983- 1984 to 29 in 1987- 1988, then
reduced it to 18 members in 1989-1990. The reported membership of the Republican
Committee on Committees was cut in half between the 1987-1988 and 1989-1990. Both the
size and structure of the Research Committee were altered during the period of our study; the
committee had about twenty members until 198~ 1986, when Co11gressio110/ Quarterly reported
no membership, and then reemerged in 1987-1988 with a reported membership of all
Republican members! In order to preserve some kind of equivalence across time for our
analysis, we considered chairmanship of a Research Committee task force as lhe criterion for
Research Committee membership in 1987-1988, and membership in the cxcculive committee
of the Research Committee as a threshold for membership in 1989-1990.
10. At first we thought this might re0ccl a lendency for whip positions and DCCC
positions (which arc related to coordinaled funding) to be mutually exclusive; on closer
examination, this appears not to be lhc case.
11. The near-significant negative effect of the 1984 cocfficienl is somewhat artificial: as
we staled earlier, we could not locate a list of Research Committee membership for 198~ 1986,
and so the maximum possible index score for the 1984 freshmen is 11 4;' not" 5!'
12 The problem is limi1cd variance; only four Republican freshmen throughout this entire
period arc reported as having experience in s1a1ewide elective office.
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State Legislative Campaign Committees:
New Partners or New Competitors?
Daniel M. Shea
Those who lament party atrophy have found refuge in a host of recent
organizational studies. A new generation of scholars have resurrected the
structural approach to studying parties and, if not directly challenged the
demise perspective, certainly complicated the debate. The party may not be
"ovd' just yet. Indeed, evidence of growth and adaptation seems
straightforward; party organizations have more and are doing more. At nearly
every level budgets are larger, staffing is up, and party clients (candidates) are
receiving greater assistance. One might even go so far as to speculate this
surge is a by•product of decline in other areas-principally mass partisanship.
An important component of the resurgent view has been the rapid
development of legislative campaign committees (LCCs).1 At the national
level these units, often referred to as the "hill committees,'' blossomed during
the early 1980s and are now seen as integral parts of the national party
organizations (Herrnson 1986, 1988; Jacobson 1992; Adarnany 1984). Prior
to the late 1970s, few state legislative caucuses had established centralized
campaign unillrnotable exceptions being in Wisconsin, California, and New
York. During the past decade, however, they flourished and today are found
in 40 states.
In addition to financial help, state•level LCCs furnish extensive high•tech
campaign services: polling. computer data•base facilities, direct mail services
and electronic media production. Many state•level LCCs provide incumbent,
challenge, and open seat candidates with assistance which far outweighs that
of traditional party units and political action committees (Jewell and Olson
1988). In several states they have become the dominant player in state
legislative elections (Shea forthcoming; Dwyre and Stonecash 1993; Gierzynski
1992; Giles and Pritchard 1985; Johnson 1987; Redfield and Van Der Slik
1992; Loftus 1985; Jewell 1986).
Perhaps eager to find party renewal, most students of parties welcome
state LCCs as evidence of party "adjustment'' or "adaptation." John Bibby,
a leading scholar in the field, notes: "State legislative campaign committees,
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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composed of incumbent legislators, operate in both the upper and lower
chambers of most state legislatures. These committees have become the
principle party-support institutions for legislative campaigns in many states''
(1990:31). Anthony Gierzynski, in one of only two full length work on statelevel LCCs to date, suggests they have: "developed, or are developing into
what are indisputably party organizations ... Adaptation (to the modern
political environment] has spread to the state levef' (1992: 116-119).
Nevertheless, the theoretical synthesis of LCCs with an overarching
"party' may conceal profound changes in state legislative politics, modes of
campaigning, and party dynamics. For one thing, it is not clear that LCCs are
linked with traditional geographic party organizations. Although Diana Dwyre
and Jeffrey Stonecash (1993) suggest the only way to accurately gauge the
strength of party committees in New York, for example, is to include LCCs
within the assessment, Malcolm Jewell and David Olson note that "in practice
[LCCs in New York] are about as autonomous as possible" (1988:222).
Recent works on several states seem no less contradictory (Gierzynski 1992;
Shea forthcoming).
Where do LCCs fit in today's political environment and how are they
different from other party organizations? Are they simply appendages of
existing party structures, or are they more akin to PACs and campaign
consulting firms? What variables might lead LCCs to resemble and to work
alongside traditional parties more so than others? Before we rush to
congratulate the adaptability of parties it seems reasonable first to assess
whether these new units are linked with traditional geographic party
organizations. Certainly, if they are not, a host of questions regarding their
activities, goals and impact on existing structures are raised.
This research seeks to shed light on the linkage question. Specifically, it
examines the extent to which state-level LCCs are tied, both formally and
programmatically, to traditional state party committees. It also seeks to
discern what variables play a role in this new dynamic.
Overall, the results suggest that formal bonds and programmatic
interdependence are sporadic. In some states LCCs are clearly partners with
the state party committee while in others they are only distant cousins.
Legislative professionaJization emerges as the most noteworthy control; states
with professional legislatures are considerably more likely to hold fully
autonomous LCCs than are those with part-time bodies.

Searching for Linkages
As noted above, one of the foremost issues raised by the development of
state-level legislative campaign committees is the extent to which they are
coupled with traditional party committees (Dwyre and Stonecash 1993; Shea
Forthcoming; Gierzynski 1992). It should be noted that this issue sets aside
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any comparison of activities and goals. Although LCCs may reside and
conduct projects independent of stale party committees, what they do and
what they seek to accomplish may be similar. This would suggest they are no
less "party-like." The aim here is to take the first step by looking at formal
and informal interactions.

Fonnal Ties
For some scholars, such as Duverger (1954), the prescribed articulation
between party subunits is a critical ingredient of that organization. With
regard to LCCs and state party organizations such linkages refer to party
bylaws or state statutes. Simply put, are LCCs formally connected with party
organizations-as appendages, branches, or service agents?
There are several reasons to suggest formal ties would be common. For
one, "party'' committees have been granted, in both state and federal law,
advantages over nonparty organizations. Twenty-two states now have
programs of tax-assisted funding for state parties (Alexander 1992:141-142),
and all party committees receive the lowest possible postage rates. As party
appendages these advantages would also apply to LCCs. Second, those who
control LCCs may wish for them to be seen as benign, party organizations.
At the very least there is an air of secrecy, particularly in states with
professional legislatures. The use of state employees as operatives is common
but, perhaps, improper.2 Third, our political system is dominated by a
pervasive sense of localism. The idea of nonparty organizations created to
infuse campaigns with external resources may run counter to this norm. In
sum, we would expect most LCCs to be legally linked to the state party
committee.

Project Interdependence
Formal linkages may tell only part of the story.
A functional
interdependence may exist where the two organizations come to rely upon one
another for assistance. Because winning elections might certainly be a shared
3
goal, we would expect a high level of cooperation and interaction. One must
be cautious, however, when assessing this dimension. Speaking of party
subunit interaction, Cotter et al. point out:
Interdependence ... implies joint activity toward common goals, or it implies a
process or reciprocity in which the party organizations at different levels assist each
other in achieving their goals. When one level or the organization consistently
exploits another for its own purposes, such an asymmetrical relationship cannot be
considered interdependent (1984:72).

Additionally, cooperation along a very narrow range of activities does not
imply organizational interdependence.
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In order to be even more precise, we can divide interdependence into
three clusters: 1. institutional support activities, 2. candidate-directed services,
and 3. material interdependence.
Institutional support activities are those projects aimed at sustaining an
organization. For both LCCs and traditional party organization fundraising,
recruiting candidates, and services to subunits are examples. On the whole,
few institutional support linkages are expected. The ability for LCCs to win
state legislative elections is a function of available resources. Conceivably,
certain broad-based goals of traditional party organizations, such as full slating
and support for the entire ticket, may not coincide with-or even run counter
to- LCC objectives. It seems reasonable, then, to expect each unit to focus
on its own support activities. What is more, Cotter et al. found very low
levels of institutional support interdependence between county and state
committees (1984:73), and we would be hardpressed to suggest how relation
would be different.
Candidate-directed activities refer to the services provided candidates,
such as financial support, media assistance, survey research, direct mail,
telephone canvassing, and so on. By pooling resources and expertise both the
LCCs and the state party organization might benefit from greater economies
of scale.
We can further break down candidate-directed activities into strategic
considerations and tangible services. The former relates to behind-the-scene
judgments which determine the direction of a campaign and the appropriate
mix of activities, and the later to specific activities-that is, the
implementation of strategic decisions.
Interdependence is expected to be greater for tangible services than for
strategic considerations. These new units may frequently call upon party
committees to assist with labor-intensive projects. Cooperation on strategic
decisions, however, will be scant. Most LCCs are highly technical, staffed by
professionals, and it is doubtful they would call upon party activists (generally
"amateurs") for strategic advice.
Material interdependence means the sharing of facilities, equipment, and
personnel. Again, economies of scale would suggest the two units interact
along this dimension. Yet, one advantage of a physical dualism would be
unambiguous control of resources. Another important consideration relates
to fundraising.
A pronounced distinction between traditional party
organizations and LCCs is the ability for donors to funnel gifts directly to
legislative leaders through the latter. By doing so, contributors might feel as
though they are getting a bigger bang for the buck-greater access to the
influential. The appearance of being merged with the state committee (by
sharing a headquarters, and so forth) may reduce this advantage. In the long
run LCCs might be better off remaining physically apart from the state
committee.

State Legislative Campaign Committees
Data and Methodology
State legislative campaign committee studies to date have focused on
either campaign finance data or interviews with LCC officials. This study,
while also utilizing finance data, sought the views of state party leaders. In
December of 1992, surveys were mailed to the leaders of each Democratic
and Republican state party committee in all 50 states. In total, 49 of the 100
organizations returned the survey; 36 of these respondents have LCCs in their
state. There are 30 Republican and 19 Democratic organizations included in
the sample; 23 of the Republicans and 13 of the Democrats are from LCC
4
states. The geographic distribution of the sample appears random. It is also
evenly divided between party chairs and executive officers, with a majority of
the latter being Republican. The survey is supplemented with aggregate data,
including demographics, LCC disclosure information, state committee data,
the degree of interparty competition, and numerous other state-level
measures.

Findings

The Formal Relationship
Respondents were asked to note the legal/formal relationship between
their organization and the LCCs within their state, Table 14.l notes the
results, controlled by party. Expectations are only modestly supported; 56
percent suggested there were no formal linkages.5 A slightly larger share of
Republican organizations are nonaligned, but the difference between the
parties appears minimal. The most frequent comment concerning the type of
legal arrangement between the units was that the LCCs are "auxiliary"
organizations or "branch'' committees.
Beyond a fixed, legal arrangement, respondents were asked how the state
party leaders thought LCCs in their state "fit into the overall party structure."
Sixty-six percent said they were not part of the party organization.
Surprisingly, several of the respondents (30 percent) who noted a legal
relationship, also said the LCCs were not part of the state party organization.
Regarding another query,0 only one respondent suggested that their
organization controlled the activities of the LCCs. This was most surprising
because the sample is, after al~ composed of party leaders. Apparently, LCCs
are generally perceived as autonomous regardless of explicit legal ties. This
finding holds true for both parties. It was also telling that just 12 percent of
the respondents noted a "legislative caucus'' was responsible for LCC
activities. Rather, 45 percent said legislative leaders and another 26 percent
said a "small group of legislators" 7 ran the show.
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Table 14.1 Formal Linkages Between LCCs and State Party Committees Controlled by Party
or Respondent

Republicans
Democrats

Legal
Relationship

No Legal
Relationship

38%
(8)

62%
(13)
45%

55%
(6)
44%
(14)

(5)

56%
(18)

Total

66%

(21)
34%
(11)
100%
N - 33

The Question Read: "Do you know if there is any /om1al or legal relationship between these
organizations and the party state committee? If so, what is this rclationship1'
Source: Survey by author,

We might speculate the formal dualism would be most acute in states
where LCCs are fully developed and have bountiful resources; only wellfunded organizations will have the luxury of being autonomous. Although the
small sample makes generalizations difficult, a cross-tabulation between legal
linkages and LCC resource? revealed 75 percent of the well funded LCCs are
autonomous units, as compared to 50 percent in the middle-range group and
66 percent in the low category.
One additional control was the extent of state laws supportive of parties.9
A relationship does appear to exist: states with laws sympathetic to parties
are twice as likely to find LCCs formally linked than are states without such
laws. This would seem to support the conjecture that utilitarian considerations at least in part guide the formal LCC-state committee relationship.

Programmatic Linkages
Although the exact import of legal ties may be hard to discern, nonformal
linkages, or programmatic interdependence, may say a good deal about this
new relationship. How often and on what types of activities do state party
committees interact with LCCs? While there may be no legal tie, by working
together and sharing facilities/equipment they may be part of the same
"team:" The opposite may also be true.

Institutional Support Activities
Activities designed to sustain the organization, such as raising money,
often require a good deal of time and effort. Table 14.2 notes the results of
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Table 14.3 Financial Interdependence between LCCs and State Party Committee

Frequency

Percent

Does Stute Party Give to LCCs?
Yes
Yes, but very lilllc
No

II
3
14

33%
9
49
N= 30

Do LCCs Give to State Party?
Yes
Y cs, but very liule
No

8
8
13

24%
24
39
N = 29

The Questions Read: Whal is the financial relationship between the stale committee and these
organizations? That is, docs the slate committee contribute money to these organi7.ations? Do
these organizations contribute fonds to the slate party commillee?
Source: Survey by author.

two questions regarding a financial interdependence between the state party
committees and the LCCS. The first is whether the state committee
contributes funds to the LCCs, and the second asks whether the LCCs help
fund state party activities.
Again, the sample appears to be divided. Approximately 40 percent of
the state committees give financial help to the LCCs and roughly one-half
suggested LCCs help fund state party activities. A cross-tabulation between
these questions suggests, generally speaking, financial interdependence either
flows in both directions or not at all. Only two of the respondents that
answered "nd' to the first question answered "ye,J' to the second.
Surprisingly, legal ties do not emerge as a noteworthy control, suggesting legal
articulation has little bearing on institutional support activities.
With regard to fundraising projects, findings are similar. Only 24 percent
noted their state committee worked regularly with LCCs to raise money (for
either organization). A second query asked the chairs to use a ten-point scale
to rank the level of coordination between the state committee and the LCCs
on fundraising projects (1 being "very distan(' and 10 being "very close"). The
mean response was a 4.9. Forty-three percent noted a value of" 3" or less.10
There appeared to be a similar degree of cooperation on other institutional
support activities. The mean level of cooperation on get-out-the-vote drives,
using that same ten-point scale, was 6.5. For voter registration drives it was
5.1, and for recruiting candidates the average value was 6.5.11
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Three bivariate ordinary least square (Ol.S) regressions were used, where
LCC resources (measured in dollars) are introduced as the independent
variable. The dependent variables are the ten-point scales measuring
cooperation on fundraising, GOTV drives and candidate recruitment (each
considered institutional support activities). A negative relationship was
expected; that is, the more resources held by the LCCs, the lower the level of
cooperation with the state party committee. Again, autonomy may be a luxury
of the affluent. Results are found in Table 14.4
Only one of the coefficients (Recruit Candidates) is in the expected
direction. Better funded LCCs appear to be somewhat more likely to
cooperate with state committees on voter mobilization programs and
fundraising activities but the regression coefficients are modest. A similar
analysis, not reported here, was conducted for level of party competition.12
Overall, increased party competition seems to lower institutional support
linkages. Each of the regression coefficients are in the negative direction but
are again modest; the r-squares are each less than four percent. While this
finding is certainly tentative, neither does it support the notion that growing
competition leads to the unification of candidate nuclei, as suggested by
Schlesinger (1984, 1985, 1991).
Another control was whether the respondent's organization held a
majority or minority position in the state. We might expect units out of power
to interact with one another more frequently than those in the majority.13
Findings suggest this is not the case; majority units are just as likely to work
together as were minority ones. And LCCs in states with a mixed party status
are less likely to interact with the party than are LCCs in states with a clear
majority/minority division.

Table 14.4 Bivariate OLS Regression with LCC Resources($) as Independent Variable and
Ten-Point Cooperation Scales as Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables:
Voter Mobilization
Fundraising
Recruit Candidates

N•

Slope

S.E.

R-Square

.0010
.0006
-.0004

.001
.001
.001

.38

10

.17

30

.01

27

• The N fluctuates due to the varying number of respondents that suggested the LCCs in their
state engage in each activity.
Source: Survey by author.
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A second area of interdependence may be candidate-directed activities.

Here it was conjectured that interdependence would be greater for tangible
activities than for strategic considerations. Respondents were asked to use a
ten-point scale to assess their organization's input in LCC resource allocation
decisions. A significant portion indicated they had very little say; 44 percent
answered with "4" or less. Although the mean response was 5.0, the mode
answer was" 1" (seven respondents).
Introducing the respondent's party as a control produced an interesting
finding. Democrats were less likely to interact along this dimension than were
Republicans. Also, responses were normally distributed for the Republicans,
but for Democrats significantly skewed toward the low end of the scale. In
fact, 66 percent of the Democrats noted a score of "4" or less, and only eight
percent marked "8" or higher.
A second set of queries referred to a list of tangible services.
Expectations that interdependence would be greater here are supported. As
Table 14.5 notes, the mean for each of the items is higher than for the
strategic cooperation average (5.0). Candidate seminars and direct mail stand
out as cooperative efforts. In addition to having the largest standard
deviation, the survey research question produced a bimodal response
frequency. It appears as though either the two units work together extensively
on polling, or not at all.

Table 145 Cooperation between LCCs and Stale Commiuccs on Tangible Candidalc-Dirccled
Activilics

Activily
Campaign Seminars
Direct Mail Assistance
Media Assistance
Survey Research
Contributing$ to Candidates

Mean Response

S.D.

7.1

3.4
3.0

6.8

S.9
5.8
S.5

3.4
3.9
3.1

S.D.• Slandard Deviation
N • > 22 for each item.
The cooperation scale query read: "Please use the ten-point scale to describe the degree of
cooperation between the state committee and the legislative campaign committee for each
project. In other words, do you work together on the activity?'
Sourre: Survey by author.
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Austin Ranney's frequently used party competition scale was introduced
as an independent variable (see note 12) in an OLS regression. Each of the
candidate-directed cooperation scales were again used as the dependent
variables. Results are found in Table 14.6. Coefficients again suggest
interparty competition does not significantly increase LCCs/state party
linkages.

Material Interdependence
Two questions were used to assess this dimension; whether the two units
shared the same physical space, and whether certain staff worked for both
organizations. Only 24 percent (8) of the respondents reported that the state
committee and the LCCs were located in the same building. Slightly more
respondents noted joint staff (31 percent), but on the whole material
interdependence seems to be the exception rather than the rule. Neither LCC
strength, legal ties, or level of interparty competition had any significant
impact on this finding.

Table 14.6 Bivariate OLS Regressions between Level of Party Competition and Candidate•
Directed Interdependence Sc.iles•

Activity (Dep Variable)
Strategic Cooperation
Tangible Benefits
Contributions S to Candidates
Survey Research
Media Assistance
Direct Mail
Candidate Seminars

Slope

S.E.

R-Square

.04

.05

,03

.08
.06
.03
.02
·.02

.06
.12

.09

.06
.02
.01
,01

.08

.01

.08

N ~ > 22 for each item.
•Toe independent variable is inter-party competition and dependent variables arc cooperation
scales. The fonncr is based on the aggregate outcome of a sci of slate-wide elections. It was
extracted from Bibby, cL al. ( 1990). For more information on the cooperation scales, sec Table
14.6.
Source: Survey by author.
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Linkages and Legislative Proressionalization

Simply put, findings thus far suggest some LCCs are tied to state
committees while others not. None of the controls examined have provided
much explanatory power. Party status and legal linkages do little to explain
levels of interdependence. Nor does the extent of either state committee or
LCC resources. Degree of party competition was perhaps most revealing; the
null findings seem to contradict scholarly conjecture and perhaps conventional
wisdom that uncertainty would lead to the merging of campaign organizations.
One important dimension yet to be examined is legislative professionalization.
The professionalization, or "congressionalization", of state legislatures has
been one of the most dramatic changes in state politics over the last few
decades (Rosenthal 1990; Patterson 1990; Squier 1988). In the past, the
archetypical state legislature consisted of amateur members, few resources and
staff, and little ancillary support. The length of legislative session was short,
and the average state legislator held his/her seat for two or three terms.
Members conducted policy research and constituent services personally. They
generally held other jobs; legislative salaries-if there were any-were meager.
The growth of state government during the 1960s and 1970s and the New
Federalism movement of the 1980s, enhanced the professionalization of many
state legislatures. Changes can be grouped into three areas: the style and
organization of legislative life; the locus of power; and the instruments of
power. The principal change in legislative style has been the growing
perception that legislative service is a career, rather than a temporary
interlude. Longer sessions, higher salaries, increased tenure, and a growing
number of legislators who view their jobs as professions are each clear
evidence of this transformation. With regard to locus of power, throughout
much of this century state legislatures were overshadowed by the executive
and/or urban party bosses. At roughly the same time many of the urban
machines declined, resources and staff within the legislature expanded. Power
slowly shifted from these external forces to legislative leaders. Finally, the
instruments of power available to legislative leaders have changed. The
creation of in-house research units and legislative commissions has allowed
these bodies to reduce their dependency on administrative agencies.
It is conjectured that each of these dynamics may play a role in keeping
LCCs away from the traditional party organization.
As rank-and-file
members see their posts as professions, they will be inclined to keep their
campaign organization (the LCC) narrowly focused and under their direct
control. Along with growing policy and budgetary autonomy, LCCs might be
viewed by legislative leaders as simply a new external resource. What is
more, these units grant legislative leaders autonomy from traditional party
organizations-generally under the governor's control-to reward or punish
caucus members, secure their own leadership posts, and/or augment the
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caucus. A measure of legislative professionalization is therefore introduced
as a control. The distance between LCCs and state party committees, for
both legal and interdependent dimensions, is believed to be greatest in states
with professional legislatures.
14
There are several ways we might measure legislative professionalization.
A parsimonious index has been developed by Kurtz (1992). He uses a threepoint scale based on member pay, length of session, and staffing levels. States
with part time bodies are scored "I", with hybrid bodies "2', and with highly
professional legislatures "3."
At the outset it is worthwhile to note every state in the professional
category has legislative campaign committees, roughly 60 percent of states
with hybrid bodies and only 50 percent of the states with part-time legislatures
have these units.
For both legal ties and notions of "overall fit," levels of legislative
professionalization appeared to play an important role. Seventy percent of
the respondents from states with full-time legislatures noted no formal
relationship, compared with 28 percent in hybrid states and 36 percent in part•
time states.
Results regarding programmatic linkages point to one of the most striking
findings in the data set. The relationship between legislative professionalization and project interdependence-both institutional support and
candidate-directed-is consistently negative. In other words, the more
professional a state's legislature, the less likely the LCCs within that state will
interact with the state party committee. Table 14.7 lists the correlations
between the interaction scales noted above and the legislative professionalization scale. The top set of variables refer to institutional support
activities and the bottom to candidate-directed services. Although a few of
the coefficients are modest, every one is in a negative direction and several are
quite strong.
Legislative professionalization was also telling with regard to material
interdependence. Only 14 percent of the respondents from professional states
said their organization shared either office space or personnel with the LCCs.
Over 50 percent from part-time states suggested this type of cooperation
occurred.

Discussion
This research sought to answer two questions; are state-level legislative
campaign committees linked with traditional state party committees; and what
are the forces that influence this relationship. With regard to the former, a
mixed bag was found. Roughly one half of the respondents suggested there
were legal or formal ties between the units.
Concerning project
interdependence, linkages were also found to be modest. This was particu-

State Legislative Campaign Committees

231

Table 14.7 Correlation between Measures or Project Interdependence and Legislative
Profcssionalizalion

Activity

Correlation

N•

Fundraising
Recruiting Candidates
Voter Registration
Voter Mobilization Programs

-.86
-.81
-.58
-.28

27
8
10

Candidate Seminars
Media Assistance
Survey Research

-.94
•,86

24
23

•.63

16

Direct Mail
Strategic Cooperation
Contributing $ to Candidates

•.19

19
34
29

•,06
•.01

30

• The N lluctuatcs due lo the varying number or respondents that suggested the LCCs in their
state engage in each 11ctivily.
Legislative profcssionalization is based three criteria: legislative pay, length or session, and
staffing levels. For a complete break-down, sec Kurtz (1992).
Source: Survey by author.

Iarly true with regard to institutional support activities. Although there seems
to be a level of cooperation on tangible candidate activities, joint strategic
decision making was sparse. However, in each of these areas the degree to
which the respondent's state legislature was professionalized proved to be an
important control. Levels of project interdependence, in particular, were
much lower in states with full-time legislatures than in ones with part-time
bodies.
Several components might help explain the import of legislative
professionalization. As state legislative service becomes fulltime, well paying,
and prestigious, members begin to view these posts as professions.
Ehrenhalt's argument (1992) that contemporary legislators represent a
different breed, primarily because they see their service as a career rather
than a temporary stopping ground, may be a key part of the dynamic between
LCCs and traditional parties. The more the job is worth keeping, the more
channelled the objectives and activities of the LCCrand consequently their
distance from traditional party organizations.
A second, related possibility is that professionalization places an added
emphasis on majority party control. This is certainly true in states such as
New York, California, and Illinois where the power and perks accompanying
majority status are profound, including complete control over the flow of
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legislation. Majority control may too spill into campaign resources. Rather
than being a tool of membership or an appendage of the state party, perhaps
LCCs in professionalized states are instruments of caucus leadership. As
such, their foremost goal may be to secure and maintaining a majority.
Gierzynski's (1992) finding that LCCs appear more willing to fund close races
rather then safe reelection campaigns seems to buttress this argument.
Finally, with the expansion of legislative duties and resources comes the
growth of professional staff.16 Instead of being granted their jobs as
patronage or working on a part-time basis, as in the past, modern legislative
staff are hired for their skills. They are paid very well and often hold their
jobs at the discretion of caucus leadership. They are not the product of party
politics but of universities and graduate schools. Many of these professionals
are involved (at least on a part-time basis) with LCC activities. In brief, not
only are their paychecks directly tied to the success of the caucus, but they
have few material or ideological links with the traditional party. Interactions
with that organization will thus be calculated from purely an instrumental
vantage.
What does this imply about the future of state parties? It is hard to say
how powerful, autonomous legislative campaign units will impact traditional
party structures. Much of this question relates to the activities and goals of
these new unitr-issues not addressed here. At the very least, this research
calls into question elements of the party adjustment/growth perspective. It
seems tenuous, at best, to lump LCC and state party resources together when
assessing "party'' viability-as is often done (Gierzynski and Breaux 1992;
Owyre and Stonecash 1993). In states with professional legislatures, the very
states where LCC resources are the greatest, the two units are often
structurally and programmatically distinct. With the trend toward full-time
state legislatures, it is certainly possible that linkages found in some states will
become strained in the near future.
We might also speculate as to whether the two will compete for resources.
Contributors might find LCCs more attractive than traditional party units.
And why not, as these seem to be extensions of caucus leadership, those that
control the flow of legislation. If one is interested in influencing policy or
gaining favor with decision makers, it may be more effective to send money
to LCC officials than to party leaders. And, as the power of these new units
increases they become even more attractive to contributors. Although
campaign money may not be zero-sum, growth in one sphere certainly does
not imply growth in the other. In this light, LCCs may be even more
damaging than candidate-centered campaigns or PACs.
State-level LCCs have only recently caught the eye of scholars. The first
impulse was to congratulate parties for their adaptability. Parties have been
important organizations, linking average citizens with their government. They
have helped coalesce an exceedingly complex system and give voters a choice,
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both in candidates and in policies. They encourage participation, mediate
conflict, and empower the economically disadvantaged. Any indication of
party resurgence may be, for some, hard to resist.
Nevertheless, as sovereign, office and level-specific campaign machines,
the impact of LCCs on traditional parties-and for that matter popular
governance-may be serious. They may be fueling what Burnham calls the
"accelerated decomposition of nominally partisan coalitions across office
specific and level specific lines" (1989:20). As the power and influence of
these organizations grows, the powers and activities performed by traditional
party organizations may well decline. Rather than being evidence of party
renewal, state LCCS may be yet another agent in the radical recomposition
of the American political system (Burnham 1989). This may not be the
"party' we had in mind.

Notes
1. These units arc referred to by some scholars as "legislative caucus campaign
committees:•
2. Legislative cnmpaign commiuec operatives in New York were recently accused of
conducting their activities while on the stale payroll. In the fall of 1987 Manfred Ohrenstein,
Minority Leader of the New York State Senate, was indicted on 564 counts of conspiracy, grand
larceny, and related charges. He had, the prosecution argued, used state employees solely for
the purpose of running cnmpaigns. One of the counts claimed operatives were paid up to
$10,000 per month in stale monies. Ohrenstein argued the indictment violated the line between
legislative and executive affairs and that no law had been passed limiting such practices.
Although this claim carried little weight in the lower courts, it was supported by the New York
Stale Court of Appeals in the fall of 1990.
3. While the range of LCC concerns may be debated, and is, (Gierzynski 1992; Shea
1993), few would argue winning elections is not their top priority. The same would hold true
for traditional geographic party organizations.
4. Because this distribution is clearly not optimal, a close eye will be kept on party as a
control.
5. Throughout the survey respondents were asked lo provide both perceptual and some
factual information. This question, as well as several others to follow, deals with the Jailer.
There arc certainly other ways of coUecting this information-including a review of all 100 state
party by-laws. The slight advantages of such a method arc, however, far outweighed by the
costs.
6. This was an open-ended question which read: "Who controls their activities'!'
7. I am tempted to conclude these "small groups' arc indeed composed of legislative
leaders, but we can not be sure.
8. The lauer was created by combining Gierzynski's (1992) data with Jewell and Olson's
(1986) figures. Combined, 20 (of 34) LCC states have aggregate ligure!t-twclvc of which arc
included in our sample.
9. This measure was compiled from an Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Affairs Report (1984).
10. Again, party differences were minimal. Legal connections between the units also had
little impact. In fact, of the state commiuees with legal links to the LCCs, more worked
independently to raise money than together.
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11. These questions were only asked lo lhosc rcspondcnls who believed lhc LCCs in their
stale engaged in these activities. Obviously, if an LCC docs not conduct get-out-the-vote drives,
for example, linkage queslions along this dimension arc mool. In a way, lhen, our measure is
a rather soft lcsl or interdependence.
12. Party competition is measured using Austin Ranncy's scale, recalculalcd for 1988
(Bibby 1990). Herc the 3!!8JCgate outcomes or several state-wide elections arc used; the more
evenly divided the totals (between the two major parties), the higher the interparty competition
ranking.
13. One limit to this control is the dirficulty in defining "minority' or "majority' party
status. Three componcnls should be considered: the party's position in the House; the party's
status in the Scnalc; and the party or the governor. Consequently, I divided the sample into
three groups: respondents whose party controls all three components ( majority); respondents
whose party controls none or the components ( minority), and respondents from mixed party
states (mixed). From these calculations, of the 100 stale party committees, 16 arc majority units,
16 arc minority units, and 68 arc mixed. In the sample, four arc majority, seven arc minority,
and twenty-live arc mixed.
14. John Grumm (1970), for example, suggests there arc at least four dimensions:
compensation or legislators, length or session, expenditures for legislative service and operations,
and" legislative service scores:' While his index is certainly comprehensive, it is not used here
because it is rather dated.
15. I realize the inverse may have occurred. Thal is, the growth of staff has lead to
increase legislative activity. At the very least, there may be a reciprocal relationship.

PART FOUR

Party Policy, Culture, and Values
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A Tale of Two Parties: National Committee Policy
Initiatives Since 1992
Laura Berkowitz
Steve Lilienthal
There is consensus that American politics is in trouble, and many of the
complaints focus on the failures of the system. Dissatisfaction with the
economy, frustration with foreign policy, and disgust with government gridlock
all contribute to this disenchantment. The American electorate, characterized
by declining efficacy and increased levels of alienation and apathy, regard
political parties as having lost touch. Not only is the intensity of partisanship
declining, but the percentage of the electorate who view themselves as
"independeni' is now over 40 percent. There is a growing perception that the
current party system is incapable of responding to the challenges of the 1990s.
The parties themselves are aware of these difficulties, and are recognizing
that people want to be appraised of the specific policy directions. Bill Brock,
a former Republican nationaJ chair, expressed the problem cogently: "Voters
don't have the foggiest idea of what we stand for in terms of governance"
(Cook 1993). Parties are mindful of the chord struck by Ross Perot's charge
that they are not responsive to citizens' concerns. The electorate not only
wants to know what the parties stand for, but also want to be included in
creating those policies.
Both the Democratic and Republican National Committees (DNC and
RNC) have instituted new programs to facilitate party policy making and
involve their own grassroots membership. These initiatives include meetings,
publications, surveys, new organizations, television programs, and media
events aimed at furthering dialogue about issues and party philosophy. The
potential of these innovations to make the national committees into significant
forces for formulating and articulating policy proposals is the focus of this
essay.
Information used for this analysis was developed from personal and
telephone interviews.1 Findings suggest a genuine commitment to enlarge the
scope of party activities. There appears to be enthusiasm for the idea that
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involvement in "the business of ideas'' is not only needed to reinvigorate the
national parties, but also may be necessary for their survival. This represents
a significant change in the focus of the national committees; it is widely
believed that preoccupation with electoral activities seems no longer sufficient
to meet the challenges of the last decade of the twentieth century.

Past Attempts At Party Policy Making
Policy considerations have always been a secondary concern for the
national committees. Their involvement in issues is related to their electoral
role and their function as a communication forum for state and national party
leaders. The DNC and RNC have traditionally exerted some limited
influence in candidate selection and recruitment. Also, their national
convention responsibilities include constructing a party platform, which
necessitates policy considerations. In-party national committees have worked
to promote the president's program, while out-parties have employed a
defensive strategy, often responding to presidential initiatives by simply
criticizing his or her proposals.
There are several factors which restrict the policy-making role of the
national committees. Their historic lack of a strong policy orientation,
competition with others to speak for the parties, little political influence over
party office holders, and the coalition nature of the parties all serve as
constraining influences (Hames 1994). In the past there have been proposals
for the national organizations to become more involved in policy
development. Perhaps the most noted was the 1950 report of the American
Political Science Association Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More
Responsible Two-Party System. The report warned there is a "chance that the
electorate will turn its back upon the two parties unless they become more
participatory and issue-oriented. Those who suggest that election should deal
with personalities but not with programs suggest at the same time that party
membership mean nothing at air' (1950:28). The report urged "formulations
of programs linking state and local issues to questions of national and
international concern [that would] help overcome unduly narrow views of
party' (1950:67). The programs were supposed to "bubble up" from the
grassroots level. Having the parties place more emphasis "upon policy and
the interrelationship of problems at the various levels of government [would
make] association with a party ... interesting and attractive to many who hold
aloof today'' (1950:67).
There have also been previous attempts by both parties to become more
policy oriented. In 1956 the Democrats formed the Democratic Advisory
Council (DAC) to serve as a policy-making body between conventions
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(Roberts 1994). Nine years later the Republicans created the Republican
Coordinating Committee (RCC) in response to the devastating Goldwater
defeat (Bibby 1994). Both initiatives, although short-lived, did succeed in
mobilizing party elites to produce consensus. Policy position papers were
generated by both groups. The RCC was more successful at articulating
coherent policy positions, but some planks of the DAC platforms were used
by the congressional candidates and the Kennedy presidential campaign.
However, both organizations labored under handicaps that limited their
effectiveness. Both were nonparticipatory, elite-based organizations. The
policy positions agreed upon at their meetings did not necessarily translate
into broad party-wide consensus. A similar problem bedeviled policy groups
established with the national committees, such as under RNC Chair Bill Brock
(Klinkner 1994) and DNC Chair Charles Manatt (Menefee-Libey 1994).
One of the few attempts at broader based, participatory policy formation
was the Democrat's abortive midpresidential conventions of 1974 and 1978.
These meetings did not produce a strong consensus, and were eventually
disbanded. However, they are noteworthy in that they foreshadowed both
parties' current efforts to include a wider range of participants in developing
policy stands.
The potential for national committees to advance policy direction is much
greater today than at any previous period. The parties recognize that there
is a danger they may be viewed as mere vote-getting organizations at the very
time the public hungers for meaningful choices and a belief that their choices
will make a difference. The way campaigns are conducted has also
contributed to the growing alienation of the electorate from the parties.
Media driven, candidate-centered campaigns serve to minimize the voters'
role, and the increased reliance on computerized voting lists, mass mailing,
and phone banks combine to depersonalize the connection between the party
organization and its members. Substantive policy alternatives have been
reduced to subliminal imagery and pictorial allusion (Lowi 1992a). However,
technology is now being utilized to bridge the gap with the electorate.
Innovations such as satellite and cable television are heralded as ways to again
involve partisans who found their role devalued by the rise of mass media and
computer technology. The parties hope that these techniques can provide
activists with an opportunity to help shape the party's message. They also
expect these new technologies and their expanded policy orientation will
attract new constituents. While both parties seem eager to embrace this new
technology, differences in how each committee has chosen to apply
technological innovations will also be reviewed. The eventual success of these
recent outreach attempts is yet unclear, as is their influence on the long-term
prospects of both major parties.
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Republicans: Leading the Pack Again

Policy Making
The Republican Party has made the strongest early commitment to better
communicate coherent principles and policies to voters. RNC Chair, Haley
Barbour, recently noted: "the National Committee must take the lead in
emphasizing the principles that unite ... [We] need a strong party per se, and
must resist allowing the party to become subservient to any candidate,
officeholder, or faction" (1993b: 1). Tenets of private enterprise, market
economics, free trade, reduced government regulation, peace through strength,
public and personal security, opposition to drugs and crime, and a belief in
traditional family values are the policy stands being pushed by the
party.
Republicans have established the National Policy Forum (NPF), which
holds town meetings across the country and allows politicians and the public,
not all of whom are Republicans, to discuss issues. Officially, the NPF
operates independently of the RNC, although both organizations share the
same chair, Haley Barbour, and the former is widely perceived as an arm of
the latter. According to Mary Crawford, Communication Director of the
NPF, one rationale for legally disassociating the NPF from the RNC is to
include Independents and even disaffected Democrats in its actualities. In
response to questions regarding the partisan nature of the meetings, Crawford
stressed their participatory nature and likened the sixty NPF forums to "think
tanks in reverse!' In these meetings held across the country, local elected
representatives and a panel of experts give short presentations on a particular
policy issue to stimulate discussion. They then actively seek input from the
audience; two-way communication is encouraged. She stresses how important
it is that people feel included and recognize that their concerns are important
in determining the policy of the party.
The RNC is also directly involved in other modes of two-way
communication. Over 800,000 party officials, elected officials, donors, and
activists were recently polled by mail for their input on issues ranging from
the budget to social policies. Almost 140,000 questionnaires were returned,
a response rate which reflects the respondents' intense interest in expressing
their views. Responses repeatedly expressed frustration that the GOP had not
solicited or advocated the views of its grassroots membership.
The Republicans are also relying on more traditional means of
communicating with voters. The NPF has reissued the journal Commonsense,
which the Republican National Committee had published in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Two issues have been published by the spring of 1994 and
plans are to continue publishing indefinitely. According to editor Judith Van
Rest, articles deal with domestic and foreign policy topics and are geared
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toward fostering the discussion of ideas. It may not influence Republican
policy making directly, but is intended to present a forum for the
consideration of issues. Circulation is approximately 20,000, and recipients
include mayors, governors, members of Congress, heads of university political
science departments, and think tanks. While the RNC has no prior editorial
approval on its contents and it operates under a separate copyright from the
previous journal, Barbour reads all submissions.

New Technologies
Just as the Republicans proved more adept at harnessing the power of
television advertising in the 1950s and computer technology and direct mail
and survey research in the 1960s and 1970s, they are once again leading the
Democrats in the use of cable and satellite television to communicate with
their membership. If the widespread use of television advertising and
computers replaced the old-style political gathering and citizen participation
in politics, the GOP's use of cable and satellite television are helping to bring
them back.
The RNC leaders realize that they have only scratched the surface of the
new technology. Barbour suggests: "We're just starting to use technology in
the way a lot of businesses and industries have been using i(' (Seib 1994).
They utilize satellite technology for its new Rising Tide television program.
This weekly one hour news program, cohosted by Barbour and RNC Deputy
Communications Director Leigh Ann Metzger, is broadcast by satellite to
4,000 local GOP organizations. Rising Tide accepts calls from viewers, and is
structured along the lines of a news magazine. An RNC advertisement
promises "Whether it's welfare reform in Wisconsin, reaching out to
minorities in urban America, or a tough stand on crime in Virginia, Rising
Tide keeps you plugged into Republican messages and ideas at the local
2
level?' RNC communications director Chuck Greener notes that its weekly
airing enables the program to present up-to-the-minute news about important
legislative and political events of consequence to Republican activists. For
example, a show in mid-February featured a discussion with New York City
mayor Rudy Guiliani on crime and the failure of the parole system. Segments
also included discussions with Governor George Allen (RNA) and GOP
media consultant Greg Stevens on how the crime issue was used to win the
governorship in 1992. College Republicans, Young Republicans, and local
Republican Women's groups often plan their meetings around the broadcasts
of Rising Tide.
State parties have also started to work in conjunction with the RNC to
make use of the new satellite technology. Washington state's Republican
Party used the RNC's television facilities to link up party activists attending
precinct caucuses with Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), Sen. Slade
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Gorton (R-WA), and Rep. Jennifer Dunn (R-WA). Both cable and satellites
were used to carry "The 1994 Republican Community Forum," during which
those in attendance submitted issues questionnaires.
Another attempt to initiate dialogue between office holders and party
activists is Lamar Alexander's Republican Exchange Satellite Network
(RESN), which sponsors Republican Neighborhood Meetings.
RESN
spokesperson Kevin Phillips estimates that the April 1994 broadcast was
received by 2,500 neighborhood groups. Originally, they were carried by
satellite but have now been picked up by over one hundred cable companies
with a potential audience of over 31 million. An "Electronic Blackboard'
collects viewer's toll-free calls on a host of issues. Innovative segments help
keep viewers watching; TIie Tennessee Journal publisher M. Lee Smith has
dubbed Alexander "The new Mr. Rogers in the GOP neighborhood' (M.L.
Smith 1993:A-9).
Democrats: Following Clinton's Lead
Policy Making

While Democrats are also concerned about encouraging dialogue on
issues, they are concentrating primarily on developing new means of
communicating the priorities of the President to the party's grassroots. The
DNC is combining its traditional role of building and financing the party's
national political apparatus with generating support for Clinton's programs
(Barnes 1993). According to Craig Smith, former DNC Political Director, the
role of party used to be solely focused on elections, yet both message
development and lobbying are needed today to actively promote the
president's legislative agenda (Tisinger 1993). The DNC and the White
House work in tandem on common goals and coordinated strategy. The
National Committee is concentrating on generating grassroots support, while
the White House has focused its efforts primarily on Congress.
The energized atmosphere at the DNC is attributable to the first
opportunity in twelve years for the Democrats to initiate policy and control
the policy agenda. Anita Perez-Ferguson, Education Director for the DNC,
remarked in a recent interview that there is a significant difference in reacting
to a Republican president's initiatives and following the lead of one's own
president. Health care reform and economic programs are high on the
President's agenda and therefore the DNC's agenda. The National Health
Care Campaign, launched by the DNC in the fall of 1993, typifies this
approach: the deployment of resources to mobilize the governing party
around an issue-oriented agenda.
The DNC has organized telephone banks, blanketed editorial page
editors with letters and op-ed pieces, and sponsored activities designed to
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attract the attention or the press (Tisinger 1993). Arranging for trained and
fully briered surrogate speakers to address local groups on health care is
another new service of the national committee. They are augmenting
grassroots mobilization efforts with an advertising blitz, including extensive
radio and TV advertisements supporting the president's economic plan. DNC
Chair David Wilhelm estimates that these efforts cost between $1.5 million
and $1.7 million, and they resulted in over 1.5 million telephone calls to
Congress supporting the President's economic plan (Barnes 1993b). They are
also spending approximately $2 million on polling to help White House policy
makers determine which issues are of paramount concern to voters (Lambro
1994).
Wilhelm has heralded the creation of an "activist network" that also seeks
to establish a "full scale dialogue between people and their government, and
people and their party." 3 He emphasized that a "citizens' lobby," formed to
fight the special interests in Washington on issues of concern to working
families, will be designed to reach Americans who feel disenfranchised by
politics as usual.
A recently expanded staff permits the DNC to broaden the scope of its
outreach programs. Prior to 1992, the main focus of the National Committee
was regional communication and the election of more Democrats; efforts were
organized around geographic and regional lines. These regional undertakings
have been expanded to include a network of constituency groups whose sole
focus was to build communication around common issues. Alice Travis,
Assistant Executive Director of the DNC, sees the Constituency Division and
the Division of Government Affairs, both of which were founded in 1992, as
significant innovations. The Division of Government Affairs has expanded the
means by which Democratic office holders on both the local and state level
are given relevant information on policy, elections, and all aspects of the party
activity. The Constituency Division is an outreach to specific groups of
Democrats who share mutual interests. The Youth Division, Asian-American
group, women's group, and individuals concerned with disability issues are
examples of initiatives geared toward activating specific elements of the party.
Instead of party elites determining policy for the party's various constituencies,
it is hoped that these groups will contribute input to insure their particular
concerns are addressed.

New Technologies
The Health Care Outreach's innovations are examples of how the
Democrats are also embracing technologies of the 1990s. According to
Deputy Press Secretary Adam Sohn, the DNC has conducted two video
teleconferences with health care spokesperson Hillary Rodham Clinton.
Using hookups with five different media sites, approximately 500 community
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activists were afforded opportunities to direct questions to the first lady. Sohn
sees video teleconferences as an important new mechanism for direct two-way
party communication.
During the 1992 campaign the DNC assisted the Wisconsin Democratic
Party with two statewide issue forums with party activists via satellite.
Undecided voters and those leaning toward supporting the Democratic ticket
were also invited by phone and mail solicitation to watch the meetings.
Regional sites included a sports bar and a college campus. Senator Bill
Bradley (D-NJ), Governor David Walters (D-OK) and then DNC Chair Ron
Brown participated in the forums, which also featured local candidates.
Guests answered phoned-in questions from the regional audiences.
Former state party executive director Jonathan Sender estimates well over
1,000 people attended both meetings. The impact of the meetings resonated
well beyond the halls: television stations would pick up the broadcasts and use
excerpts in their newscasts. The Wisconsin State Journal credited the "video
town hall meetings with providing a chance for people who otherwise never
think or talk about politics to do so. That's what an election year should be
all abou(' (1992:11-A).
The DNC has also made use of satellite technology in more conventional
terms, such as press conferences. One interesting event was conducted in
mid-April 1994 when Americans were filing their tax returns. To demonstrate
how limited the impact on raising middle-class taxes the tax program would
be, Chairman Wilhelm appeared at a large baseball stadium with only 1.2
percent of the seats filled-the exact number Democrats claimed would pay
more under the Clinton tax increase. The event was beamed to television
news stations across the country.
Another important communication iMovation of the DNC is the "morning
briefs," communications which are sent to approximately 2,000 individuals,
including state party chairs, big city mayors, Democratic state officials, and
grassroots activists by fax at least three times a week. They have been
tremendously successful at communicating current party positions and topics
of interest. As one might expect, much attention has been given to health
care issues. Recipients are encouraged to further disseminate the morning
briefings. For example, the New York State Democratic Committee regularly
distributes copies to its local party committees. In all, it is estimated that the
morning briefs have a circulation of over 10,000.
Since 1993 the DNC has routinely conducted ''satellite media tours'' with
cabinet secretaries to discuss issues of importance. Its constituency outreach
also utilizes this technology to facilitate communication with local groups.
However, the Democrats have not approximated the RNC's programming on
a regular basis. Catherine Moore, Press Secretary for the DNC, has voiced
skepticism about the effectiveness of such programs. "What is the value of
reaching people who you are already reaching? I wonder if the Republicans
are reaching the people that are already with them" (Lambrecht 1994:4A).
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Constraints on the Shill to Issues

While there is much enthusiasm about both parties' recent policy
orientation and new mechanisms to communicate about issues, there are
reasons for skepticism about the long term impact of these initiatives. The
national committees have little longstanding commitment to policy making.
They are by nature very responsive to the state and local committees, which
have picked their own officers, nominated their own candidates, developed
their own policy stands, and raised and disbursed their own funds without
regard for the national committees (Beck and Sorauf 1992). They have
become a significant force in American politics by building internal cohesion,
as well as attaining financial and organizational resources. In fact, their "nuts
and bolts'' efforts have been directed toward providing services and funds to
individual candidates and campaigns, not in the development of policy.
While the national committees have achieved some measure of autonomy,
primarily through their fundraising success, they have no scheme for creating
policy. The president and other office holders have always been the source
of policy and dictated the agenda for the party in power. Kenneth Hill, Vice
President of the National Policy Forum, explains: "The whole process of
policy development over the last twelve years (when GOP presidents held the
White House) was an assistant secretary sitting in a Washington office telling
everybody what the policy was." The out-party has historically relied on
congressional leaders to articulate its concerns.
Thus, there is no guarantee that these longstanding tendencies will change
with this new-found enthusiasm for policy pronouncements and discussion.
For example, the DNCs role in mobilizing grassroots support for the Clinton
health care campaign has been drastically reduced in the last year. Control
has shifted to Senator Jay Rockefeller's health care reform project, and the
DNC now primarily serves as a purchasing agent for television advertisements
(Kosova 1994).
There is also a danger that the DNC is likely to become less a vehicle to
promote an issue agenda within the party and to the public and more a public
relations shop for Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign. Many other Democrats
fear their own campaign needs will be shortchanged by the DNC. Instead, its
resources will be expended lobbing for the President's programs: "That is
important to us, but we also need a first-rate political operation up and
running. We've got to turn our attention to reelecting Democrats" (Barnes
1993b:2834). Congressional leaders are careful to guard their own party
leadership roles; party unity does not extend to automatically accepting DNC
pronouncements with which they disagree. For example, Wilhelm recently
attacked the president's congressional Whitewater critics at a DNC meeting
in Cleveland. His words were repudiated the following day by Speaker of the
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House Thomas Foley. Foley suggested, on national television, that personal
attacks on members of Congress make for bad politics (Grove 1994).
There is also a certain amount of skepticism about how long the RNC
chair will remain an important party spokesperson. Many anticipate a change
when the presidential primary season is in full swing with the front runner
encroaching on that position, and the eventual nominee usurping it. The
influence wielded by the nominee and national chair in drafting the RNC
1996 platform is also a matter of speculation.
Another fundamental problem with the national committees taking the
lead in policy initiatives stems from the nature of the parties. Each are
comprised of broad-based coalitions. Authoritative policy statements have
often fragmented these coalitions. The extreme positions of the left wing of
the Democratic Party in the 1970s caused long-term damage. According
to DNC Political Director Don Switzer, "There will always be disagreements
on policy in our party. But our party learned its lessons in 1980 when we tore
ourselves apart ... This is our president. We're not about to get into a
suicide war and tear ourselves apart for 1996' (Lambro 1994). Much the
same thing threatens the Republicans on social issues. RNC Chair Barbour
warns that the Republican party must "be especially diligent in showing that
we are a diverse, inclusive, and tolerant party: that we understand that in a
party large enough to elect a president everyone will not always agree on
everything' (1993b). Morton Blackwell, a member of the RNC from Virginia,
expressed concern that the NPFs plan to air different policy positions might
backfire and foster disagreements. It could encourage publicity about disputes
within the party and portray "the image of a Republican Party badly divided
and fighting itself on these issues" (Berke 1993). Thus, both parties are well
aware of the potential booby traps in fermenting debate.

Conclusion
In order for the National Committees to aggressively advance policy
initiatives, they must walk a fine line. The DNC and RNC must avoid
stepping on the toes of congressional leaders, state and local organizations,
constituencies within the party, and candidates who look to them for support.
If they completely avoid controversy and decisiveness, their efforts may be
reduced to meaningless platitudes and broad generalities. These may not
offend anyone, but neither will they give anyone a clear sense of direction.
There are many indications that the national committees are sincere in
their commitment to move toward a more "responsible" role than merely
dispensing cash and technological services. American politicians are experts
at running campaigns that emphasize their own merits rather than party
programs. Perhaps the new initiatives will enhance the role of the National
Committees in attracting better, more qualified candidates. Individuals

A Tale of Two Parties

247

committed to the party's philosophical direction might be motivated to run for
office due to the appeal of a coherent policy stand by the national
committees.
The success of Perot in 1992 was a clear signal that the major parties
should begin to develop programs which link them and the citizenry on issues
and around broad philosophical principles. Ongoing participatory policy
forums will not only improve communication, but also may result in a more
thoughtfu~ coherent party platform which directly addresses the voters'
concerns. Perhaps the unrealized goals of the RCC and DAC will be
achieved, and issue position documents will be produced on a regular basis.
These policy stances would not be dictated from the top but would arise
bottom up, the result of a grassroots consensus. Technologies developed in
this decade may facilitate this dialogue. While it is premature to evaluate the
success of these endeavors, recent policy initiatives may well affect the role
and the future prospects of both national parties.
Notes
1. Information for this article was obtained through several personal interviews: Mary
Crawford, March 1994; Kenneth Hill, summer, 1993; Anila Perez-Ferguson, March 1994; Kevin
Phillips, April 1994; Adam Sohn, May, 1994; Alice Travis, May 1994; Judi1h Van Rest, April
1994.
2. RNC advertisement (March-April 1994),
3. Remarks of David Wilhelm before the DNC Executive Committee Meeting.
Albuquerque, NM, June 26, 1993.
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The Democratic Leadership Council:
Institutionalizing a Party Faction
Jon F. Hale
Bill Clinton captured the Democratic party nomination and won the
presidency as "a different kind of Democrat." He touted a new governing
philosophy based on opportunity, responsibility, and community; this theme
was designed to appeal to the mainstream voters who had been increasingly
deserting the party in past presidential elections. This message, however, did
not come out of thin air; it was developed by the Democratic Leadership
Council (DLC), a policyaoriented organization unconnected with the
Democratic National Committee. This chapter examines the development
and institutionalization of the DLC, founded in 1985 by a political
entrepreneur and a group of moderate Democrats.1 The DLC helped pull
Democratic elected officials back into national party affairs, established a
niche for itself as a developer of ideas and policy within the party, and served
as a springboard for the Clinton candidacy. Moreover, the institutionalization
of the DLC assures that it will continue to play a significant role in
Democratic party politics and presidential nominations.2
The Birth or the DLC
Many specific factors may lead to the development of alternative party
structures. These preconditions result in the belief that the existing party is
not meeting the needs of its members. This appears to be the case with the
DLC. Perceptions of a liberal bias within the national Democratic Party
arose from reforms in the delegate selection process. The McGovern/Fraser
Reform Commission and numerous subsequent ones limited the control of
formal party leaders over the presidential nomination process and forced
representatives of the "officiaf' party to compete for delegate positions on an
equal footing. The result was a sharp decline in the participation of elected
officials and an overall increase in the influence of liberal activists.3 This
trend was reinforced by the growing number of new style politicians who put
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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together personal political "enterprises'' largely independent of party
organizations (Loomis 1988; Ehrenhalt 1991). Among Democrats, these
politicians tended to distance themselves from presidential politics, seeing no
advantage in tying themselves to a national party perceived by many as too
liberal. While this distancing strategy was an important self-preservation tool,
it helped assure the dominance of liberal activists in presidential politics.
The first organization to emerge because of this perceived institutional
bias was the Committee on Party Effectiveness (CPE) formed by a group of
House Democrats. When a party loses the White House, as the Democrats
did in 1980, the task of idea and policy development is generally ceded to the
congressional party. From 1981 to 1984 the CPE attempted, in the words of
its former leader Rep. Gillis Long (IA), "to reassess our Party's direction and
redefine our message'' (National House Democratic Caucus 1984). The CPE
produced policy documents that were applauded politely as a first attempt by
Democrats to find their voice in the 1980s (Price 1984:284). A 1982
document included a well-received paper on long-term economic policy,
written by Long and Reps. Richard Gephardt (MO) and Tim Wirth (CO). It
was seen as an attempt to reorient Democrats away from their emphasis on
redistribution toward goals of restoring growth and opportunity (CPE 1982).
A more detailed document was submitted to the Platform Committee at the
1984 convention. but the group's contribution was overwhelmed by the sheer
size of the 45,000-word final platform.
Nonetheless, CPE was the forerunner of the DC. This House-based
organization articulated several of the major themes later fleshed out by the
DC: economic growth and opportunity, reciprocal responsibility, community,
and assertive American leadership in global affairs. It was run by Long's top
assistant, Al From, who would later found the DC, and Will Marshall, who
would become From's top assistant at the DC. What is more, 27 of the 41
4
CPE members would later become DC members.

The Early DC, 1985-1988
The 1984 election accelerated the demand for the formation of an
alternative party organization. Democratic nominee Walter Mondale had
built his nomination around the party's liberal wing and as a result was
strongly supported within the party, but had little appeal among the general
electorate. As Pamper notes, "Mondale personified the problem of the
Democratic party generally, the need to define a more general vision from the
clash of competing factions'' (1985:16). In fact, Mondale mixed relatively
moderate economic positions with liberal stances on social and
defense/foreign policy issues, but his call for a tax increase to reduce the
deficit was portrayed by Republicans as an attempt to make the white middle
class pay more taxes for government programs that benefitted an array of
special interests-especially blackrin the Democratic Party (Edsall 1991:205}.
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Not only was the party message perceived as too liberal in 1984, it was
viewed as having a profound negative effect on the entire Democratic ticket.
During the 1984 campaign Republicans tied themselves closely to the popular
Reagan-Bush ticket, while labeling Democratic opponents as "Mondale
liberals." In his state-by-state survey of campaigns in the deep South, for
example, Lamis (1990) found the use of this tactic in virtually every Senate
and competitive House race. Particularly disturbing to Democrats were the
losses of two moderate Senate candidates, Sen. Walter "Dee'' Huddleston
(KY) and Gov. James B. Hunt (NC). These defeats served as "a sober
warning to southern Democrats of the national party's negative impact"
(Cohen 1986:270). As then-Senator Lawton Chiles (FL) stated "Most of us
had been running away from the Democratic Party for years. But we were
beginning to see that you couldn't enjoy the luxury of that anymore. Maybe
some of us would survive, but there wasn't going to be a Democratic Party
behind us in our state" (Barnes 1986:19). Thus, the 1984 election created a
"market'' for membership in the DC among Democratic elected officials who
believed the party's national message was too liberal and who worried about
the impact of the national party identity on their own political careers.
This market was tapped through the political entrepreneurship of Al
From. Formerly Executive Director of the House Caucus under Gillis Long,
From was well respected on Capitol Hill. His tenure at the caucus ended
when Long's term expired in 1984 and his association with Long ended in
January 1985 when the Louisiana congressman died. The formation of the
DC was announced in February 1985. As one founding member later
remarked, "Al From was looking for a job. He had an idea, and he made it
work:'
From's idea was to influence the movement of the national party away
from its post-1968 liberalism, making it more competitive at the presidential
level and less of a burden for Democratic candidates at the state and local
level. He believed the party needed a more moderate message in order to reenlist Democratic elected officials into national party affairs. He conceived
the DC as a supplementary policy-oriented organization, with a membership
consisting of elected officials only.
The initial DC leadership cadre consisted of elected officials who stood
to gain from the achievement of the organization's political goals, and those
who had worked closely with From in the House Caucus. Governor Chuck
Robb (VA), Senator Sam Nunn (GA), and Representative Richard Gephardt
(MO) were the primary DC spokesmen at the news conference announcing
the group's formation. Governor Bruce Babbitt (AR), Senator Lawton Chiles
(FL), and Representative James Jones (OK) were also heavily involved in the
DCs initial activities. The DC was initially perceived as a stalking horse for
southern, moderate presidential candidates in 1988, Robb and Nunn in
particular, and this association helped get the DC off the ground. These
prominent officials linked the group to financial contributors and publicized
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its goals through a series of appearances and media events. In brief, their
association with the DC "helped with prestige and money, and helped make
the organization seem vital and attractive," according to Bruce Reed, the DC
Policy Director.
To recruit members, the DC offered a mix of selective benefits to
supplement the collective benefits associated with the organization's political
goals. Generally, these selective benefits helped elected officials attain their
primary goal of reelection, policy making, representation, and influence
(Fenno 1973 and Loomis 1982). Membership was a little more costly than
contacting the DLC and asking to be put on the list. Nominal dues were
requested, but not required; DLC membership was akin to membership in
many congressional caucuses.
Interviews in 1991 revealed that some DLC members regarded their
involvement as a central component of their political world, while others saw
it as largely peripheral to other activities. Nonetheless, every member
interviewed indicated that the DLC provided some form of selective benefit.
Table 16.1 provides a rough outline of the benefits members believed they
receive from the organization and the career goals served by each.
The DLC's membership grew rapidly, more than doubling from 1985 to
1986, then again from 1986 to 1988, as noted in Table 16.2. Membership
growth was especially robust in the House; several members suggested that
the benefits of DLC membership helped them establish an identity in
Washington. Others believed House members were eager to sign on simply
because of their propensity to join informal caucuses and because of the
personal influence of Gephardt.

Table 16.l Benefits Associated with DLC Membership

Type of Benefit

Career Goals Served

Advertisement in constituency as nonliberal Democrat
Information exchange
Participation in policy development activities
Organizational vehicle for pursuing centrist policy
interests in Washington
5. Alternative leadership structure
6. Association with like-minded colleagues
7. Doing something to help the party

reelection, influence
policy making
policy making. influence
influence, policy

1.
2.
3.
4.

influence
policy making. influence
influence
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Table 16.2 DLC Membership, 1985-1988

Year
Office
Senalors
Representatives
Governors
State & Local
TOTAL

1985

1986

14
17
10

19

24

27

79

99

106

12

14

N/A

N/A

N/A

41

110

137

16
46
195

1987

1988

Relationship to Party
The founding of the DLC sparked controversy within the Democratic
Party. To many, it was seen as a statement of no-confidence aimed at the
new DNC chair, Paul Kirk, and his ability to reinvigorate the party after the
1984 landslide defeat. Kirk supporters feared the new organization would
attract the party's up-and-coming centrist leadership and undercut Kirk's
efforts to moderate the party from within (Gailey 1985). From, however,
denied the DLC had anything against Kirk himself: "It is important to have
an autonomous group constantly pushing for change. To be effective, we need
to be without the institutional restraints Kirk has'' (Cohen 1986). Yet, in an
effort to head off the formation of the DLC, Kirk appointed his own policy
council, the Democratic Policy Commission, just days before the DLC
announced its founding (Gailey 1985).
Once the DLC was in operation both Kirk and the DLC played down
their differences. To recruit and retain members, the DLC needed to be
perceived as an elite group of elected officials, uniquely qualified to formulate
party positions-not as a threat to the DNC. For his part, Kirk needed to be
perceived as having the support of centrist elements of the party if his efforts
to reduce the influence of liberal activists were to succeed. By March 1986,
Kirk could speak of his "positive, constructive relationship'' with the DLC
(Stengel 1986), and by 1988, Jesse Jackson was complaining that Kirk was
"getting too cozy with the DLC' (Elving 1988).

The 1988 Campaign

Few saw the DLC's horizons extending beyond 1988, when it was
assumed the Democrats would have a good chance to retake the White
House. If the DLC were to change the image of the party, the proof would
come during the 1988 nomination process. Although four DLC members
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sought the nomination, their performances disappointed the DLC and seemed
to confirm perceptions that a moderate candidate could not win the
Democratic nomination. Of the DLC member-candidates, only Gore ran
openly as a moderate. Assessing the first four years, From noted: "We were
fine until the presidential nominating process got going in earnest, but then
that process defines the party!'
The initial success, then, of the DLC was rather limited. The group's
message centered on creating the impression that there was life at the party's
center, but there was little in the way of an agenda. The DLC's efforts, along
with those of DNC chair Paul Kirk, helped chart a more moderate course for
the party by 1988, but there was no new centrist message or agenda for
Democratic candidates to run on. Nevertheless, the DLC had become a
viable organization by 1988, with nearly 200 members and growing financial
clout.
Institutionalization of the DLC
The defeat of Michael Dukakis in the 1988 election prompted intraparty
debate over the causes of his defeat. While party liberals generally blamed
the messenger, and his poorly executed campaign, the DLC blamed the
message, seeing Dukakis's defeat as symptomatic of a party with no
alternative to the liberalism caricatured so effectively by the Bush campaign
(Hale 1993). Al From noted: "Dukakis erased the (liberal) graffiti on the wall
but put nothing on it, and Bush painted it for him. Dukakis never articulated
an alternative vision for the country, allowing Bush to use wedge issues
against him. At that point we decided to increase the intellectual effort within
the DLC:' Henceforth, the push would be for the DLC to become less of a
benign forum for elected Democrats to discuss issues and political imagemaker for moderates, and more of an ideas-based movement focused on
shaping a specific, mainstream alternative message for the party.
Expansion of Activities, 1989-1992

To accomplish this mission, the DLC became a more complex
organization after 1988. It undertook four major initiatives: {1) an expanded
fundraising effort, including a project termed the "DLC network," used to
target under-40 contributors; (2) an effort to extend membership to state and
local officials and to create state DLC chapters; (3) development of a think
tank, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI); and (4) creation of a bimonthly
publication, The New Democrat, designed to spread the DLC message to all
Democratic elected officials and grass-roots supporters. The DLC staff also
expanded to fifteen, with various functional specializations, and there were
three PPI staff, plus three resident scholars. The think tank, magazine, and
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the organization of state DLC chapters required substantial amounts of
money. The annual budget in the DLC's early years was around $500,000.
Much of this was raised in large contributions from executives, lawyers,
lobbyists, and other Democratic financial patrons supportive of the DLC's
goals. Early stalwarts like Nunn, Robb, and Gephardt also attracted financial
support to the organization. The annual budget of the post-1988 DLC pushed
the $2 million mark, with corporate sponsorships bringing in substantial
amounts.
Of 100 DLC "Sustaining Members" in 1991-92, 57 were
corporations and another dozen were professional or trade associations. The
energy, health care, insurance, pharmaceutical, retail, and tobacco industries
were all represented.
With its new focus on recruiting members from state and local officials,
the DLC expanded its membership substantially. As Table 16.3 notes,
membership growth among senators, representatives, and governors slowed,
indicating that the DLC had probably maximized its recruitment from those
offices. After 1988, about half of sitting Democrats in Congress and
Democratic governors were DLC members.
Perhaps recognizing that the DLC could fulfill a policy development
function, and that no other intraparty entity was doing it, Ron Brown, who
replaced Kirk as DNC chair in 1989, treated the DLC as a firmly established
supplementary party organization and never challenged the DLC's claims to
represent "the ideas wing' of the party. Early in his tenure, Brown appeared
at the DLCs 1989 annual meeting to demonstrate, following Kirk's lead, his
commitment to moderation in the party (Edsall and Schwartz 1989). When
the DLCs 1990 annual meeting was inadvertently scheduled at the same time
as a DNC meeting, Brown shuttled back and forth to attend both and
emphasized common ground rather than disagreements. In 1991, Brown
attended the DLC's Cleveland convention and praised its efforts to develop
ideas for the party. He did warn, however, that the party "cannot tolerate
code word debates, push-off political maneuvering, or litmus tests by any part
6
of our party." But the chairman's comments had little appreciable affect on
the DLC's efforts to distinguish its ideas from those of party liberals.

The "New Democrat" Message
The intellectual task of developing the centrist message fell to the PPI.
An analysis of PPI publications between 1989 and 1992 suggests three phases
of development: 1. the establishment of the political rationale for a new
Democratic message; 2. the articulation of the core values of a new message;
and 3. the development of an agenda and specific policy positions.6
The effort to establish a political rationale began in earnest immediately
following the 1988 election when PPI published "The Politics of Evasion"
(Galston and Kamarck 1989). Taking aim at those who suggested there was
little wrong with the Democrats' message, the political scientists who put the
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Table 16.3 DLC Membership, 1989--1992

Year
1989
Senalors
Representatives
Governors
Stale & Local

TOTAL

1990

1991

1992

29

29

32

32

106

115

138
25
381
476

142
28
502

15
59
209

21
222
387

704

• Includes former office-holders

report together argued that the "liberal fundamentalism" with which the
Democratic Party had become associated was beyond salvation in national
elections. Making use of polling data, they argued that the public saw both
Mondale and Dukakis as too liberal. And making use of registration and
voting data, they argued that the Democratic ticket would have fared no
better in 1988 had more extensive mobilization efforts been undertaken.
Taking exception with those who saw in 1988 the outlines of a new liberal
electoral vote coalition emerging, the PPI authors contended that no
Democrat could win the White House by writing off the South. Finally, the
authors warned that the Democratic majorities below the presidential level
were imperiled by the possibility of secular, "trickle-down'' realignment.
This critique of "liberal fundamentalism'' was touted by the DLC
throughout 1989 and was a focus of that year's annual conference in
Philadelphia. For 1990, the emphasis turned to establishing a set of core
values that would serve as the foundation of the "New Democrat'' message.
This appears to have been a relatively straightforward task. Themes of
opportunity, responsibility, and community-unveiled ceremoniously at the
1990 New Orleans conference-had been on the minds of From and PPI
President Will Marshall since the CPE days in the early 1980s.
Yet the DLC faced a problem in clarifying its message: how to
differentiate itself from both the left and right sides of the political spectrum
without appearing to be simply posturing in the middle. This seemed the
tendency of the early DLC and is often typical of centrist groups (see Pridham
1988). The DLC centrists tried to extricate themselves from this dilemma by
constructing an approach that questioned the relevance of the conventional
liberal-conservative spectrum. Similar to the claims advanced by Reich (1987)
and Dionne (1991), the DLC argued that liberal fundamentalism and Reagan
-Bush conservatism were presenting "false choices." They proclaimed their
message as a "progressive, third way' to address the problems of the 1990s.
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With election-year politics looming, the DLC and PPI fleshed out its
agenda and policy positions in 1991, adopting the "New Choice Resolutions"
in Cleveland. Its policy positions reinforced the "New Democratsw• faith in a
"reinvented," activist government and clarified their differences with
Republicans. To a far greater extent than Republicans, the "New Democrats''
were willing to use government to promote economic growth and assure equal
opportunity. To this end, they supported increased public investment, and a
restoration of progressivity to the tax code. Indeed, these "New Democrats''
differed with Republicans on a plethora of issues, including environmental
protection, health care, family leave, the guaranteed working wage, abortion,
handgun control, and national service.

The DLC and Bill Clinton

The development of new ideas is primarily an interelection process, but
the acceptance of new ideas ultimately depends on the party's candidates.
Rather than creating a message and agenda out of whole cloth, candidates are
"both consumers and interpreters of policy ideas generated within the party''
(Price 1984:291). Presidential candidates and, ultimately administrations,
need intellectual fuel to campaign and to govern (Hargrove and Nelson 1983).
Just as Kennedy was able to draw on the ideas developed by the Democratic
Advisory Council and Reagan was able to draw on the ideas percolating in the
conservative intellectual establishment in the late 1970s, the DLC sought to
do the same for the next Democratic nominee and administration.

Clinton as DLC Chair, 1990-91
With this in mind, From set out to recruit a chair for the DLC in 1991
who would be considered a plausible 1992 candidate. At the very least, the
chair needed to be someone who could command the attention of other
potential candidates. Bill Ointon quickly emerged as best-suited for the task.
From (1993) later stated, "What I had seen of him in 1987 and 1988 indicated
to me that of all the politicians I've ever dealt with in Democratic party
politics, this guy understood the importance of values in politics. And I
believe the problem the Democrats have is that they think in programmatic
terms while the people think in values terms." Added Will Marshall: "We
thought Bill Clinton had the intellectual capacity to synthesize our new ideas
with the old verities of the party into a new governing philosophy. He was the
obvious choice for the DLC; there wasn't anyone else who had those talents."
The DLC's 1991 annual meeting in Cleveland showcased Clinton along
with its "New Choice'' agenda. Not considered in the top echelon of potential
Democratic contenders prior to the Cleveland meeting, the Arkansas
Governor's stock rose considerably thereafter (Baiz 1991). Throughout 1990
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and 1991, Clinton and From traveled, at DLC expense, to more than two
dozen states to set up state DLC chapters. Among other things, this allowed
Ointon to try on the message and to establish extensive state-level contacts.

The 1992 Presidential Campaign
The OLC connection paid off handsomely for Bill Clinton in 1992. His
position helped him raise all-important early money, develop state-level
campaign organizations, and collect endorsements from contacts made
through the OLC. In Georgia, where Clinton needed a victory to slow Paul
Tsongas's post-New Hampshire momentum, he was boosted by the
endorsements and support of Nunn, Gov. Zell Miller, and Rep. John Lewis,
the former civil rights activist (Baiz and Dewer 1992). All three were fellow
DLC members. Clinton was also helped by DLC members in Congress. One
week after his New Hampshire defeat, 37 of Clinton's first 52 superdelegate
endorsements came from DLC members. At that time, Harkin, Kerrey, and
Tsongas had 12 endorsements each, one-third of which consisted of DLC
members (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1992). Most of the highprofile African-Americans who endorsed Clinton prior to Super Tuesday were
DLC members as well.7
Perhaps even more important, Clinton picked up the DLC message and
ran with it. When announcing his entry into the campaign in October 1991,
Clinton spoke of the need to reinvent government, broaden opportunity,
require greater responsibility on the part of citizens, and restore a sense of
community. Eschewing ideological labels, Clinton took a page straight out of
the 1991 New Choice Resolutions: "The change I seek and the change that
we must all seek, isn't liberal or conservative. It's different and it's both'' (in
Toner 1991d).
Because Clinton entered the campaign after most other prominent
moderates had announced decisions not to run, both he and those at the DLC
assumed he would be the only moderate in a field of liberals. They also
assumed the nomination campaign would be the final battleground for the
intra-party struggle between the "New Democrats'' and the liberals, whose
strongest potential candidate was New York Governor Mario Cuomo. Clinton
would define himself as a "New Democrat' and even if he lost the nomination
to Cuomo, he would be well-positioned for 1996 if Cuomo lost the general
election (Goldman and Matthews 1992b). Ultimately, however, the only
traditional liberal in the race, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, received little
support and Clinton found himself to the left of his chief competitor, Tsongas,
on the foremost issue of the campaign-the economy. Clinton's message was
blurred further because of the time spent explaining character issues. As a
result, even though he stayed well within the parameters of the DLC message,
Clinton had trouble establishing himself as "a different kind of Democrat."
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A renewed effort to appeal to the middle began with the selection of Al
Gore, a fellow DLC member, as Clinton's running mate, and continued with
the adoption of the Democratic Party platform. The Democratic National
Convention was well-choreographed to convey the "New Democrat'' message
and was entitled "A New Covenant with the American People," echoing the
main themes of the DLC.
The text of the platform was structured around notions of opportunity,
responsibility, and community. A comparison of the platform with the DLC's
New Choice Program reveals striking similarities. Of 51 subheadings in the
Democratic Platform, 37 were in agreement with agenda items in the DLC's
New Choice Draft and the other 14 items were in rough accordance with the
DLC document. Nothing in the Democratic Platform was in disagreement.
Clinton won the general election because of widespread concern over the
state of the economy. Yet, his emphasis on middle-of the-road issues before
and after the convention may well have made it easier for many voters to
support the Democratic nominee. The argument could be made that Clinton's
election simply shows that any Democrat could have defeated George Bush
in 1992, given the state of the economy. Others would suggest, however, that
Clinton's 11 New Democrat'' credentials put him in the position to compete with
Bush on a level playing field for the mantle of economic leadership. Before
the election, models used to forecast the outcome on the basis of economic
indicators predicted Bush would win (Pennar 1992). In other words, economic
conditions were poor, but not so poor that Bush was a sure loser. The "New
Democraf' identity made it possible for Clinton to preempt the Republican
tactic of using cultural issues as a wedge to separate white, middle-class voters
away from the Democral5-a tactic that would have been used against a
liberal candidate to divert attention from the economy.

The Clinton Administration
Clinton's election largely fulfilled the mission of the DLC and raised the
question of what the group's purpose would be during the Clinton presidency.
Going out of business is not in the nature of organized groups, and, given the
institutionalization of the DLC, disbandment was probably out of the
question. A postelection fundraiser brought in $3.3 million, a testament to the
DLC's reputation as having helped elect a president (Grove 1992).
Al From played a prominent role in the transition period as Clinton's
advisor for domestic affairs. Ultimately, a number of DLC members and
staffers received administration appointments, as Table 16.4 shows.
Despite these successes, the overall number of "New Democrats''
appointed was relatively small. As Rep. David Price (NC), an active DLC
member noted, "there was some sense that we have not had a full cadre of
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Table 16.4 DLC Alumni in Clinton Administration

Oflice

Name

DLC Position

President
Vice President
Secretary or Treasury
Secretary or Defense
Secretary or the Interior
Secretary or Agriculture
Secretary or Labor
Secretary or Housing
Secretary or Education
Director of 0MB
Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy
Assistant for Domestic Policy
Counselor, National Security Council
Domestic Policy Advisor (V-P Gore)
Assistant Secretary or Labor
White House Political Affairs staff

Bill Clinton
Al Gore
Lloyd Bentsen
Les Aspin
Bruce Babbitt
Mike Espy
Robert Reich
Henry Cisneros
Richard Riley
Leon Panetta
Bruce Recd
Bill Galston
Jeremy Rosner
Elaine Kamarck
Doug Ross
Linda Moore

Chair
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Board of Advisors
Member
Member
Member
DLC Policy Dircclor
PPI Fellow
PPI Vice President
PPI Senior Fellow
PPI Fellow
DLC Field Director

people to recommend for Administration positions'' (Barnes 1993:1408).
From's perception was that many or the key policy-making positions in the
Administration went to party liberals:
or the dozen or so people who were the backbone of the DLC, most of them arc in
the government, but that's not many compared to all the people the interest groups
have who arc geared toward protecting all the old programs and approaches of the
party. So we need to build a much bigger infrastructure if we want to change this
party in a governing sense.

This personnel problem has helped crystallize the DLC's purpose during
the Clinton Administration. In the short-term, it meant that the DLC would
have to monitor the administration closely for deviations from the "New
Democrat' agenda. In the long-term, it meant the DLC would have to devise
ways to develop an infrastructure or political actors and activists committed
to the "New Democrat" agenda.
The relationship between the new president and the DLC thus got off to
a rocky beginning. Taking a page from the right-wing Heritage Foundation,
which published Mandate for Leadership in 1981 (Heatherly 1981), the PPI
published Mandate for Change (Marshal and Schram 1993) in early 1993. This
was a 340-page primer on the "New Democrat' agenda with a brief
introduction by President-elect Clinton. Three months into the administration
From and Marshall (1993a) wrote that the new president seemed to be
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"oscillating between the old and new politics." The DLC-PPI leaders urged
Clinton to get to work on the "New Democrat'' initiatives, to attack
entrenched interests and programs more boldly, and to justify his actions more
resolutely in terms of the core values he articulated during the campaign.
In May of 1993, the DLC strongly opposed the nomination of Lani
Guinier to a Justice Department post (Barnes 1993a), and in July, with much
fanfare, released the results of a poll of Perot supporters conducted by White
House pollster Stanley Greenberg. They argued that Clinton's best bet to
woo Perot voters in 1996 would be to govern as a "New Democrat" (From
and Marshall 1993b).
In the second half of 1993 Clinton pursued a "reinventing government"
initiative, pushed NAFfA through Congress, and began touting "New
Democrat'' ideas on crime and welfare reform. Nevertheless, by the end of
the year trouble was brewing between Clinton and some prominent DLC
officials over budget cuts and health care reform. The administration opposed
an effort led by Rep. Tim Penny (MN), a DLC stalwart for several years, for
a second round of deeper spending cuts. More significant was a health care
bill that rapidly gained bipartisan support in Congress, sponsored by DLC
chair Sen. John Breaux (LA) and DLC member Rep. Jim Cooper (TN). By
not mandating universal coverage, the Cooper-Breaux bill struck at the heart
of Clinton's own health care reform proposal (Baiz 1993). By early 1994, the
DLC itself had not repudiated the call for universal coverage contained in
Mandate for Change, but many of its members in Congress were supporting
the Cooper-Breaux alternative.
The cost of success for the DLC appears to be the group's inability to
control the on-going definition of what it means to be a "New Democrat."
Speaking to the DLC conference in December of 1993, Clinton proclaimed
that he was proud to have campaigned and to govern as a "New Democrat."
As long as he embraces the "New Democrat'' label, the president's words and
actions will define precisely what it means.

New Directions in Party Organization

What does the experience of the DLC portend for the future of American
party organizations? It suggests a model for intraparty groups to organize and
change the party's policy direction. It also illustrates the weakness of the
official parties in policy development. Supplemental party organizations tend
to emerge to fulfill functions that the official party is neglecting (Lawson and
Merkl 1989; Loomis 1982). The national party organizations have never been
well equipped to fulfill the function of ideas development largely because of
the heterogeneity of the parties themselves. Policy development groups
sanctioned by either the national party organization or the congressional party
face pressures to represent the party as a whole. When such groups attempt
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to define party policy, the result is often a watered-down statement that
practically everyone can agree on, but that is equally easy to ignore. This has
been the fate of most policy councils. The major exception is the Democratic
Advisory Council (DAC), set up after the 1956 election by DNC chair Paul
Butler (Roberts 1994}. The DAC was successful precisely because Butler
ignored pressure to defer ideas development to the congressional party or to
balance the group and filled it instead with party liberals, who proceeded to
define the message and agenda of the party for the 1960s (Arden 1988, Peters
1990).
What the experience of both the DAC and the DLC suggest is that
parties cannot forge new directions without a fight. Most of Butler's
successors at the DNC have been brokers between party factions and thus
unwilling to risk their limited political capital on policy development.
Independence from the official party gave the DLC the ability to develop its
message and give it a sharper definition than is generally possible within party
organizations. Once the message was developed, Clinton carried the flag and
won.
The DLC, as a supplementary policy-oriented organization, provides a
model for factions who wish to hone their message in preparation for intraparty warfare. The DLC's success helped spawn the 1991 formation of a
liberal Democratic group called the Coalition for Democratic Values and, in
the aftennath of the 1992 election, at least one moderate Republican group,
patterned after the DLC (Zaldivar 1992). Even the new leaders of the Israeli
party Likud, reeling from its 1993 election defeat, have consulted with DLC
officials on how to develop a new party message.
The DLC also illustrates a method for getting elected officials involved
in party policy debates. In the candidate-centered era, elected officials must
view involvement in party affairs as furthering their primary career goals, be
they reelection, policy making, or institutional influence. The DLC was
structured around that basic premise. It enhanced members' reelection goals
by providing a" moderate" party organization with which they could identify,
while continuing to distance themselves from the liberal wing of the party. It
enhanced members' policy-making goals by providing ideas, policy
information, and forums for discussion. The DLC enhanced members'
influence generally by serving as an alternative leadership structure to
enhance personal influence and leadership skills. The success of the DLC is
tied to this incentive structure. Without it, the DLC would not have drawn
the membership or leadership necessary to carry the "New Democrat''
message into the electoral arena. As parties move toward becoming what
Pamper (1992:114-- 115) has called "leadership coalitions," which are "centered
on and largely directed by the principal public office-holders elected under the
party labef' rather than by ideologically motivated activist groups,
organizations such as the DLC, may be increasingly central to the
development of party messages.
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condition that they would not be identified. lnlcrvicwecs outside or Congress who agreed to
interviews on the record arc identified in the text.
3. The withdrawal or Democratic senators and representatives was particularly acute after
1968. In that year 61 percent of senators and 32 percent or representatives allended the
convention. In the three subsequent amventions, the percentage of senators allending averaged
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138).
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Proclaiming Party Identity:
A View from the Platforms
Terri Susan Fine
Symbols are a key component of political persuasion and one that is
particularly important for political parties. After all, mobilizing political
support lies at the heart of party activity, and failure to be persuasive can
have devastating consequences. Symbols are valuable in reaching out to the
mass public because they dramatically communicate the party's identity, foster
antagonism toward the rival party, and illustrate the party's value to its
constituencies. In light of declining partisanship and rising split-ticket voting,
symbols are a powerful means of demonstrating how one party can better
serve voters' values and interests. Indeed, symbols may give an uninformed
and disinterested electorate cues with policy relevance.
Party platforms provide an excellent opportunity for the use of symbols
to frame the party's identity, discredit the opposition, and appeal to key
constituencies.
They are the only written documents adopted by
representatives of the party faithful, and as such express the party's core
beliefs. In addition, they reveal the party's perception of itself, its
expectations of the voting public, and its understanding of the competitive
situation.
The following analysis is an exploratory look at the role of symbols in
party platforms. It begins by outlining the use of symbolism in the persuasion
process, including a discussion of the various kinds of symbols and how they
might be utilized by parties. Then the discussion turns to the use of symbols
in the 1992 Republican and Democratic platforms and what they tell us about
each party's perception of its own identity, prospects for public support, and
understanding of the competition they faced.
Political Persuasion and Party Platforms

Political persuasion is a conscious communication process where the
sender of the information is attempting to achieve cognitive and/or behavioral
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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change on the part of the receiver (Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985). A
requisite element of the persuasion process is shared meanings, images, myths,
and symbols (Nimmo and Coombs 1980; Edelman 1971). Two factors must
exist in order for persuasion to occur. First, there must be a receiver of the
communication. Persuasion will not ensue without an audience that is
receptive to the message. Facilitating the process requires a common
language or vocabulary. This vocabulary need not hold the same meaning to
both the sender and receiver, but the sender must incorporate language into
the message that will likely elicit predictable responses from the receiver.
The three key elements of persuasive communication are arguments,
evidence, and goals. Once the sender has outlined the proposed course of
action, arguments favoring it must be communicated. These arguments
require factual evidence for support and statements of the goals to be
achieved (Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985:159). Political symbols are an
important currency for this process because they are meaningful to both sides
of the interaction. Symbols are political objects that have been endowed with
meaning, value, or significance, and can thus serve as a rallying point for
mobilizing support (Elder and Cobb 1983:17). They allow political leaders to
summarize, classify, or efficiently communicate their agenda. Symbols can
thus suggest arguments, serve as evidence, and illustrate goals in the process
of persuading voters to support a particular agenda.
By using symbols, leaders try to establish their own identity by drawing on
common myths (identity symbols), thus implicitly making arguments on their
behalf; distinguish themselves from their opponents by linking them to
undesirable things (oppositional symbols), therefore providing evidence for
their arguments; and by summoning up heroes and villains from the past
(condensational symbols) that point to their goals.
Myths are important to political persuasion because they hold meaning
among significant numbers of people (Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985:199;
Edelman 1971}. Political leaders who cue myths by means of symbols in their
written and oral communication are using a common language:
Because myths arc frequently couched in tcnns or or revolve around specific symbols,
they not only give substantive content lo one's political world view but also tend lo
define how that content is lo be linked to specific political symbols. In this sense,
myths represent prepackaged symbolic orientations that arc simply internalized
(Elder and Cobb 1983:54).

Party myths allow the public to develop a psychic connection to government
and politics, and thus serve as shorthand for arguments in favor of the party.
They help voters cope with ever-changing policy environments and political
leadership by tying these actions and individuals to a particular set of values
under a common party banner. Drawing on these myths is a potent means of
establishing and reestablishing the party's identity. Oppositional symbols
illustrate what is wrong with the rival party by linking it to poor values, bad
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behavior, and unpopular activities. Such symbols are often couched in terms
of the presenting party's own myths, thus offering tangible evidence of the
negative consequences of supporting its rivals. Making distinctions with
oppositional symbols bolsters the argument in favor of one party by providing
evidence of the failing of the other.
Condensational symbols summarize and condense experiences, feelings,
and beliefs, and hold complex, emotional meaning beyond a clear definition
of the object being used as a symbol (Firth 1973; Edelman 1964; Sapir 1934).
Political leaders often take on heroic or villainous meaning, and their names
become associated with key concerns and aspirations. Thus, condensational
symbols bring to mind commonly accepted goals of the parties, either directly
by citing heroes or indirectly by reference to villains from the opposition.
Party platforms provide a strong vehicle for political persuasion: as
written guidelines for campaigning and governance, they are designed to
proclaim the party's program to potential supporters and motivate public
support to achieve its goals. Consistent with the requisite elements of the
persuasion process, platforms include arguments, evidence, and goals.
Symbols are a potent means to communicate these matters. After aJI, political
socialization includes attachment to political objects (policies, public figures,
events) that are then associated with party labels (Hess and Torney 1967:96).
The following analysis focuses on the use of symbols in the 1992
Democratic and Republican Platforms. The first section will analyze the
framing of party identity by means of symbols linked to common myths,
followed by a discussion of the oppositional symbols employed, and finally, a
look at the condensational symbols. The implications of these symbols for the
party's expectations regarding the public and its understanding of the
competitive situation in 1992 will be addressed as well.
Who Are We? Shaping Party Identities with Symbols

The 1992 party platforms reveal stark differences between the identities
of the Republican and Democratic Parties. The Republicans enjoyed the
advantage of incumbency, but were hampered by a weak president. The
Democrats carried two burdens: challenger status and reputation. Both
parties spoke to these matters. In addition, each party's symbolism revealed
their expectations of voters and their understanding of the competitive
situation.
Early on, each party put forth its basic myths within the context of a new
approach.1 The Democrats offered a "new covenant'' based on expanding
opportunity while promoting greater individual responsibility and restoring
community. By comparison, the Republicans offered a "new paradigm" or a
"new consensus'' founded on individual choice/empowerment and
decentralized authority. Symbolic meaning was attached to these phrases in
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terms of the prevailing myths of each party: aiding the "common man" for the
Democrats, enhancing "individual freedom'' for the Republicans (see Table
17.1).
The term "new:' in and of itself, is symbolic because it suggests a
directional change. One might expect that the challenging party would be
unique in putting forth a symbol indicating that the old ways will cease. Yet
both parties promised change founded on existing principles. Both
organizations believed the public wanted an alternative, and each used their
platform to suggest their responsiveness to this demand for change. Although
each party benefited from controlling at least one branch of government, the
demand for change warranted seeking control of the other branch.
In framing their identities, each party took into account public
expectations and the competitive situation it confronted. The Republicans
used incumbency to argue that they had achieved a great deal, but that even
more was possible in the future. Indeed, much of what was" new' about their
agenda was, in fact, "old," if perhaps unrealized. On the other hand, the
Democrats directly confronted their reputation and electoral misfortunes:
"We welcome the close scrutiny of the American people, including Americans
who may have thought the Democratic Party had forgotten its way, as well as
all who know us as the champion for those who have been denied a chance"
Interestingly, the language chosen for outlining party myths suggests
similar beliefs: each party argued that the best government could do was
nurture the individual spirit and provide the necessary support system.

Table 17.1 Identity Symbols in the 1992 Democratic and Republican Panics

Democrats
Symbol: "New Covenan('
Meattillg: Expanding opportunity for all citil.cns (broad based, non-inOationary economic growth
and the opportunity that flows from it) while expecting individual responsibility (ethics
practiced, values instilled, pride in work, and religious faith followed) in the context or restored
community (strengthen families and neighborhoods, public schools, religious institutions,
charitable organizations, civic groups and other voluntary associations).

Republicans
Symbol: "New Paradign'' or " New Consensus'
Meaning: Individual Choice/Empowerment (prosperity and process through individual
opportunity and freedom) in the context of decentralized governmental authority C' Government
has a le~timale role to play in our national life, but government must never dominate thal life:'
"Bureaucracy is the enemy or initiative and self-reliance').
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However, it is the meaning attached to these symbols that differentiates the
two parties. Approaching government performance in this fashion seemed
appropriate in light of the fiscal and economic woes of the country. The
Democrats sought a government that would responsibly help people help
themselves, while the Republicans argued that reducing government would
unleash individual initiative.

Tattle Tales: Telling on the Enemy

Both parties utilized oppositional symbols that were couched in terms of
their own party myths, and each spoke of the evils of its enemy (Table 17.2).
The Republicans attempted to discredit the Democrats by tagging them as
"liberar' and linking them to "bureaucracy" and "trickle-down government,"
(a play on the Democrats' accusation that Republicans believed in "trickledown economics'). The Democrats, by contrast, avoided ideological language
in framing their identity, even when they were distinguishing themselves from
the Republicans. They chose instead to focus on the inactivity of the
Republican administration with such symbols as "do-nothing government'' and
"gridlock."

Table 17.2 Oppositional Symbols in the 1992 Democratic and Republican Platforms
Democrats

Symbol: " Do-nothing government"
Meaning: Republicans believe "government has no role'' ; irresponsibility, neglect.
Symbol: "Gridlock"
Meaning: Republicans engage in "politics of diversion and evasion' ; "everyone in Washington
blaming one another for inaction'

Republicans
Symbol: "Bureaucracy'
Meaning: Democrats advocate bureaucracy, which is the enemy of initiative and self-reliance;
big government is danger to liberty and prosperity.
Symbol: "Trickle-down government"
Meaning". Democrats believe in over-taxation, hyper-regulation, mega-government
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The oppositional symbols included in these platforms outline the
differences between ea-h party's electoral and historical circumstances. The
Republicans were advantaged by negative public sentiment toward previous
Democratic presidents and candidates as well as their prior success attaching
negative meaning to liberalism. The Republican Party used oppositional
symbols more often than the Democrats, a tactic that reflected their successful
negative campaign strategy in 1988. They were determined to remind voters
of the unpopularity of recent Democratic presidents and presidential
nominees.
In seeking to foster a new image of their party, the Democrats put forth
their vision to draw distinctions between their historical reputation and the
opposing camp's suggestions. Negative perceptions of Presidents Carter and
Johnson, as well as previous Democratic presidential candidates, compelled
the Democrats lo confront their reputation. In so doing, they sought to
persuade the public that they had rehabilitated by developing a new approach
that was the better alternative to the Republicans. This persuasion strategy
coupled self-deprecating remarks with anti-Republican discourse.
The Revolution or 1992 is about a radical change in the way government
operates-not the Republican proposition that government has no role nor the old
notion that there's a program for every problem, but a shift to a more efficient,
Dcidble and rcsults•oricnted government.... We believe in activist government, but
it must work in a different, more responsive way.
W c reject both the do,nothing government of the last 12 years and the big
government theory that says we can hamstring business and tax and spend our way
to prosperity. lnslead, we offer a third way.

Condensational Symbols: Personalizing the Parties

Condensational symbols provide easily recognized names and images that
facilitate party linkage with current and past political issues. Condensational
symbols provide the parties with easy shorthand for political persuasion. While
both parties incorporated condensational symbols in their platforms, positive
ones greatly outnumbered negative ones. As with oppositional symbols, the
Republicans were helped by recent Democratic woes. The Democrats were
blessed by a weak opponent and a difficult economy. Both parties described
the first president bearing their moniker in a positive light, and the latest
president from the rival party was portrayed negatively (Table 17.3).
The Democrats emphasized Thomas Jefferson and his commitment to
"activist, responsive and decentralized government,'' and then moved forward
to the twentieth centuty to FDR and Harty Truman. Although the latter were
both "olcf' Democrats, they were founders of the present-day Democratic
coalition and predated the more recent party woes. The Republicans showed
a similar pattern, beginning with Abraham Lincoln, who is celebrated for his
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commitment to individual freedom and initiative, and then moving forward to
Theodore Roosevelt, identified with social responsibility, and Ronald Reagan,
noted for strong foreign policy. All told, these presidents encapsulate the key
goals of each party.
The absence of certain condensational symbols in the Democratic
platform is also noteworthy. A recurring theme throughout the Clinton
campaign was his reverence for, and homage to, John F. Kennedy. Clinton's
efforts to associate himself with this strong condensational symbol were
especially pronounced at the Democratic National Convention. During the

Table 17.3 Condcnsational Symbols in the 1992 Democratic and Republicans Platforms.

Democrats

Symbol: Thomas Jefferson
Meaning: Spirit or revolution; believed in activist, responsive, decentralized government.
Symbol:

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Meaning: "Faith in America demands that we recognize the new terms of the old social
contract. In the strength of great hope we must all shoulder our common load:'
Symbol:

Harry S Truman

Meaning: Redefined "global security with bold approaches lo tough challenges:'
Symbol:

George Bush

Meaning: "America's leadership is indifferent at home and uncertain in lhc world:'
Republicans
Symbol:

Abraham Lincoln

Meaning: "The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever
they need to have done, but cannot do al all, or cannot so well do, for 1hemsclvcs in their
separate and individual capacities."
Symbol: Theodore Roosevelt
Meaning. Believed thal corporations have responsibilities to socicly, conscience alone should
prevent outrages.
Symbol:

Ronald Reagan

Meaning: Foreign po&cy legacy becall5C he swept away communism and America won the Cold
War.
Symbol: Jimmy Carter
Meaning: "Arc we safer and stronger today, in 1992, than we were in 1980, when Jimmy Carter
was the Democrat president1'
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balloting on the third night of the convention, he walked to the podium amid
great fanfare right after the Ohio delegation had cast the necessary votes for
his nomination. He thanked the delegates like another Democrat had done
about thirty years earlier. The following evening, a short film included a
segment where Clinton, as a young man, met President Kennedy. Clinton's
voice-over text described how that experience motivated him to pursue a
public service career. Yet the platform made no mention of Kennedy.
Kennedy's image as an "old Democrat'' may have prompted the exclusion of
his name because it would be inconsistent with the "New Covenant'' model
that was being projected.
The Democrats also avoided two obvious negative condensational
symbols: Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Nixon's reemergence as an
elder statesman with foreign policy expertise may have hindered a successful
negative association with government corruption. More likely was the
perception that Nixon had not hurt either the Reagan or Bush campaigns. In
addition, Reagan's lingering popularity meant that the Democrats would not
successfully portray him negatively. Instead, "Republican Administration over
the last 12 years•• or a variation thereof, was selected as a symbol.

Conclusion
Platforms provide the parties with the opportunity to tell the public who
they are and what they stand for; the use of symbols is an integral part of this
presentation. More importantly, symbols assist with all three elements of the
process of persuasion, argument, evidence, and goals. The 1992 platforms
refer to party myths to frame identity, the employment of oppositional
symbols to illustrate the failings of the opposition, and the deployment of
condensalional symbols to articulate key goals. The competitive environment
further facilitates this process because a known enemy can be identified and
information about the opposition can be easily integrated in the persuasive
message. Thus, a party's electoral situation strongly influences the way it uses
symbols. In 1992, both parties promised a new direction, understood in terms
of their dominant myths, their expectations of the electorate, and their
understanding of their competitive situation.
This brief analysis of symbols in party platforms suggests an avenue for
future research. The use of symbols in other forums such as speeches,
campaign literature, and advertising campaigns may be quite revealing. And
connecting such symbols back to their sources and forward to their effect on
both elites and the electorate could tell us a great deal about how parties
understand the persuasive process, as well as how persuasion takes place. It
may be, for instance, that there is more substantive and policy content in party
messages than is commonly realized. While symbols are hardly substitutes for
detailed and differentiated party programs-and informed debate about
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them-they may give an uninformed and uninterested electorate cues on
which to make judgemenLc;. Hence the careful analysis of the role of symbols
in party proclamations may reveal more depth to party identity than is
commonly supposed.

Notes
1. All rcforcnccs lo the 1992 party platforms arc taken from Co11grrssio11a/ Quarterly
Weekly Report Volume 50, Number 29 (Democratic Platform) and Number 34 (Republican
Platform).
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Party Culture and Party Behavior
Philip Klinkner
The notion of party culture is familiar to even the most casual observers
of party organizations. At a superficial level, many political scientists have
commented upon the striking differences one sees in the appearance and
operation of the Republican and Democratic Party headquarters. At a deeper
level is the recognition that Republicans and Democrats are often
fundamentally different in their behavior and outlook, independent from
differences in ideology. As William Crotty notes: "Despite their deceptively
similar governing forums, national and local party structures, and even-to the
unpracticed eye-apparent unity on such matters as general policy, the two
national parties are distinctively separate entities, each with its own traditions,
social roots, and organizational and personal values'' (1983:205-206).
Yet, party culture is only rarely discussed as a relevant device for studying
and understanding party organizations. For proponents of rational choice
theory, notions of distinct party cultures run directly counter to their view that
parties are best viewed as symmetrical organizations, indistinguishable from
one another in their single-minded pursuit for office. The distinctive cultural
traits of the parties are either ignored or written off as irrelevant to their
larger purposes. More traditional analysts of party organizations are more
likely to recognize differences in the culture of the two parties, but only rarely
do they attribute any significance to these differences.
This lack of attention to party culture is regrettable. Party culture, as I
hope to show, provides a useful tool for analyzing and explaining the behavior
of party organizations. For example, much of the Democratic Party's focus
on procedural matters stems, in large part, from a party culture that stresses
inclusion and participation, while the Republican Party's emphasis on
organizational and managerial activities arises from a party culture that values
the techniques and technology of business enterprises.
In analyzing party cultures and the roles that they play in the behavior of
party organizations, I will first attempt to show how other fields have defined
and used the concept of culture to explain the behavior of organizations.
Second, I will describe the cultural attributes of the Democratic and
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Republican Parties. Finally, [ will review the ways in which party culture may
influence the behavior of party organizations.

Theories

or Organizational Culture

While politicaJ scientists might be unwilling to rely upon cultural concepts
to explain the behavior of party organizations, such is not the case in other
disciplines that study organizations. In fact, analyses of "organizational
culture'' have long played an important role in sociology, administrative and
management sciences, and organizational theory. Today, organizational
culture is a widespread and important device for understanding the behavior
of business organizations and public bureaucracies (Shafritz and Ott 1986).
In fact, thinking about organizational culture has begun to go from the
theoretical to the practical, as more and more firms seeks to "reengineer'
their cultures to meet changing competitive environments (Hammer and
Champy 1993).
Within these disciplines, the concept of organizational culture
encompasses the following:
Jl)t is the culture that exists in an organization, something akin to societal culture.
It is comprised or many intangible things such as values, beliefs, assumptions,
perceptions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns or behavior. It is the unseen
and unobservable force that is always behind the organizational activities that can be
seen and observed ... organizational culture is a social energy that moves people
to ad. "Culture is to the organization what personality is to the individual-- a hidden,
yet unirying theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilization' (Ott 1989:1).

The most specific and common definition of organizational culture is
offered by Edgar Schein. According to him, organizational culture consists of:
A pattern or basic assumptioll!t-invcnted, discovered, or developed by a given group
as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integratioi?-that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation
to those problems (1985:12).

Organizational culture rests upon certain basic assumptions held by the
members of an organization which condition their behavior. Over time, these
assumptions become imbedded in the minds of those within an organization,
becoming the types of routines and procedures which define "the way we do
things here:' Thus, in organizations with strong cultures, these assumptions
become powerful enough to influence or control the behavior of the
organization. For example, with business firms, the culture of an organization
may prevent it from making the changes necessary to adapt to an altered
environment (Ott 1989:~5 and Schein 1985).
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An organization's culture represents the composite of several factors: the
societal culture in which the organization resides, the nature of the
organization's business and its business environment, the social and professional background of the organization's members, the impact of important
leaders, particularly those who help found the organization, and the historical
memory of important or crisis events, among others. Since these factors will
differ from organization to organization, no two organizations will display the
same culture. Moreover, the culture of an organization may be strong or
weak, depending upon the degree to which these factors reinforce one another
and the perceived accuracy and success of the a,;sumptions underlying the
culture.
Once developed, an organization's culture tends to remain strong and
resistant to change. This endurance results from several factors. First,
organizations tend to recruit and hire individuals who already possess the
assumptions and attributes found in its culture. According to Schein, an
"organization is likely to look for new members who already have the 'right'
set of assumptions, beliefs, and values'' ( 1990: 115). Such a process is natural,
since those who hold these views will be more likely to seek positions in such
organizations, and the organizations will more readily select persons who
seem most likely to "fit'' their organization. Second, organizations socialize
new members into the basic assumptions and norms of their culture. This
acculturation takes many forms, from formal instruction in the organization's
standard procedures and routines to the more informal "learning the ropes''
which all new members absorb over time. Third, organizations tend to
marginalize or remove members who deviate too strongly from the basic
precepts of its culture (Ott 1989:87-97).
While often strong and stable, organizational cultures are not static; they
can and do evolve over time. Several factors may trigger such an evolution.
One is a changing external environment. When an organization confronts new
problems and situations, it may find that the old behaviors, procedures, and
routines dictated by its culture no longer work. Such stresses, if strong and
persistent enough, will usually lead to change in the organization's culture.
Strong and dynamic leaders may also play a role in changing an organization's
culture, particularly when they are able to exercise decisive and effective
leadership in a period of stress or crisis.1 Finally, an organization's culture
will evolve to reflect changes in the larger society in which it resides.

Republican and Democratic Party Cultures
Using the definition and descriptions of organizational culture gleaned
from other disciplines, how might one characterize the cultures of Republican
and Democratic Party organizations? An analysis of the Republican and
Democratic National Committees (RNC and DNC) indicates that each
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possesses a distinctive culture. With the RNC, there is a focus on the
technical and managerial aspects of party activities, "nuts and bolts'' and
"business values!' The Democrats, however, have a culture that focuses on
party procedures, making it a much more democratic party. They are
continually concerned about inclusion and representation within the party and
they tend to see the party as both the arena and arbiter for such questions.2

Tlze Republicans: The Culture of Business
One important element in the development of an organization's culture
is the social background of its members. In this respect, the Republicans are
the party of business. The relationship between Republicans and the business
world has traditionally been understood in ideological terms, but that relationship encompasses more than just supporting the political agenda of the
business community. Much more so than Democrats, Republicans tend to
come from business backgrounds, they associate with business people, they
admire and emulate the efficiency of business organizations, and, as a result,
their culture shows a marked similarity with that of the business world
(Kayden and Mahe 1985:69).
One aspect of the business-like culture of the Republicans is their reliance
on business technology and methods in their approach to party activities.
Over the last 30 years, the Republicans have been much more likely to use
techniques first developed and perfected by the private sector-direct-mail
solicitation, computerized data bases, professional consultants, marketing
research, and television advertising. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to
lack familiarity with such techniques. Where Republicans often seek to copy
technological and managerial innovations from the private sector, Democrats
have usually viewed such methods as extraneous to the more expressive
purposes of political activity.
The business orientation of the GOP has been evident since at least the
1950s, when Hugh Bone observed that the Republicans were explicit in their
desire to run the RNC "like a corporation," and he quotes Stewart Alsop's
description of the RNC as looking like the "home of a large and successful
business concern." In contrast, he found the Democrats to be much more
informal and disorganized (Bone 1958:44-45). A few years later, Cotter and
Hennessy made a similar observation, stating that while each of the
Democratic national committees does "what it damn well pleases:' the
"Republicans approach the problem of national party financing with businesslike matter-of-factness" (Cotter and Hennessy 1964:176-178).
Though made thirty years ago, these observations still provide an accurate
description of current differences between the parties. In a more recent
analysis of national party activity in congressional races, Paul Herrnson states
that Democratic Party staff members "work in a highly politicized environ-
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ment which lacks the business-like ethos of its Republican counterpart"
(1989:317-18). According to John Bibby:
The observer of DNC and RNC meetings is immediately struck by the fact that the
differences between the two committees go well beyond their respective sizes
Differences in scylc of operation and party constituencies arc apparent. Republican
National Committee meetings arc extremely wcU organized and professionally staffed.
There is an air or formality and relative order about the conduct or the meetings.
DNC meetings arc bs well organiud, informal, and have a rather ad hoc character.
Orderliness prevails in RNC sessions, while confusion is common al DNC meetings

(1992:85-86).

My own observations of the national party operations and staff reinforce
this view. On several visits to both party headquarters, I quickly noted the
modem and efficient operation of the Republicans, in contrast with the
informal and less organized Democrats. A trip to the RNC is like visiting an
investment bank, while going to DNC was akin to stopping by the offices of
junior faculty members at a small college.3
One important clue to understanding the culture of an organization is the
language that its members use to describe their activities and goals (Ott
1989:22-31). Not surprisingly, Republicans speak of politics in much the same
terms as business people speak of an industry or a market One of the best
example of how Republicans use business terms to describe politics comes
from a 1962 speech by Dwight Eisenhower. According to him:
We [the Republican Party) have a good bill of fare, or you might say, stock of goods
on the shelf, but the trouble is that wc chink that because they arc good in the cans
and packages, we can let them get dusty on the shelves ...
The Dcmocracs have less value in their goods, but they paint up the can, tidy
up the store, and then they have a better, more appealing idea to put before a
prospective customer.
Now, I think we ought to read chis very objectively and see wherein we arc weak
and wherein we arc strong. and if we arc happy with the package ... I think we
should find out whether this [the Republican program) is saleable and we ought to
use salesmanship in getting it before the public (Kcsaris, Reel 2, Frames 354- SS).

In interviews with the leadership of the RNC, business and managerial
language was frequently used, while such terms where almost never heard
from Democrats. The Republicans constantly relied on phrases like, "make
the sale," "marketing" a candidate or an idea, the "corporate wheer• of the
party, and "distribution system,n among others. Indicative of this reliance on
business terms is the campaign manifesto used by Haley Barbour in his
successful 1992 bid for RNC Chair, which describes the RNC as a "Board of
Directors" with the chair as the "CEO" and "manager' who must "ensure
productivity, accountability and quality contror by relying on "good business
practice" (Barbour 1993).
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The most commonly used term among Republicans is former RNC
chairman Ray Bliss's favorite expression, "nuts and bolts." Nearly every RNC
member or RNC staff person that I have ever spoken to describes the efforts
and purpose of the RNC in these terms. Additionally, in 1993, each of the
contenders for the RNC chairship sought to use the "nuts and bolts" label to
characterize their proposed efforts. Certainly Ray Bliss's success and high
regard within the party help to account for the common and continued use of
this term, but it also seems likely that accurately reflects the technical and
business-oriented nature of the Republican Party.
In addition to their role as the "party of business," the high degree of
homogeneity within the Republican Party is another likely reason for its "nuts
and bolts'' culture. According to Jo Freeman, the social homogeneity of the
Republican Party helps to create a sense of trust "The Republican Party sees
itself as an organic whole whose parts are interdependent. Republican
activists are expected to be good soldiers who respect leadership and whose
only important political commitment is to the Republican Party'' (1986:339).
In turn, this centralization and hierarchy creates an environment
hospitable to the "nuts and bolts" activities used by the Republicans. In her
words, a party "which is hierarchical, unitary and in which power tlows
downward' will be better "able to use more of its resources for attaining its
goals and direct them more efficiently'' (Frantzich 1989:90, 345).
The Republicans' experience as a minority party also seems to have
helped shape their party culture, contributing to their affinity for "nuts and
bolts'' activities. Perhaps following another example from the private sector,
the Republicans have emulated Avis Rental Cars by acting according to the
claim, "We're number two, so we try harder." According to Cotter and
Hennessy, the behavior of the RNC might be explained as "the frugality of the
minority party aware that organization may compensate for numbers''
(1964:183). Since their banishment to minority party status in the 1930s, the
Republicans have often operated on the assumption that while they might be
outnumbered by the Democrats, their emphasis on organization would serve
as an equalizer. As one study of party organizations states:
The Republicans, in the lirst years or the New Deal, preached organization for the
out party as the key to mitigating the adverse consequences of Democratic hegemony.
In subsequent decades they practiced organization as a key to reversing electoral
adversity. In short, the national party organizational elites in the 1920s and 1930s
perceived a relationship between long-term electoral trends and organizational
strength (Coller, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1984:164).

As with cultures in other types of organizations, the role of leadership,
particularly Ray Bliss and Bill Brock, has also influenced the culture of the
RNC. Each came from predominantly Democratic areas where superior
organization was the Republican party's only hope and each first succeeded
by building political organizations capable of competing with the numerically
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larger Democrats. Bliss first began in politics in Akron, Ohio, where the
Democratic Party, bolstered by the political organization of the rubber
workers' union, dominated local elections. He eventually moved on lo the
larger stage of Ohio state politics, but here, once again, the Democrats had
an edge in voter registration. Bill Brock began his political career in the
solidly Democratic South, becoming the first Republican elected to Congress
from his district in Tennessee since the 1920s.
While serving as RNC chairman, both Bliss and Brock emphasized the
importance of party organization that they had gained from their previous
experiences. And in both cases the strategy was perceived as successful since
the Republican Party won the White House during their tenure. As a result,
they are held in high esteem by their colleagues and successors, who often
refer to them in tones best described as reverential. Their methods are still
used although they have Jong since departed from the RNC.
As much as Bliss and Brock might have influenced the culture of the
Republican Party, it is also reasonable to see these two leaders as products
of that same party culture. As mentioned above, organizations tend to recruit
persons who share its cultural values. One can see evidence of this process
at work in the selection of Bliss and Brock as RNC chairs. Both men had
reputations as nonideological leaders who would emphasize organization and
activities over factional maneuvering, characteristics that fit well with the
existing Republican culture (Klinkner 1992:chs. 4, 7).

The Democrats: The Culture of Democracy
While Republicans have a cultural affinity toward business, the primary
cultural referents for Democrats are interest and constituency groups. Many
of these Democratic group!!-women, minorities, gays, labor, and otherrhave
traditionally perceived themselves as powerless and locked out of America's
important social and political circles. According to Jo Freeman, Democrats
"do not think of themselves as the center of society. The party's components
think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the door seeking programs that
will facilitate entry into the mainstream. Thus the party is very responsive to
any groups, including such social pariahs as gays and lesbians, that claim to
be left out' (1986:338). These groups view the Democratic Party as an arena
and a vehicle to achieve the representation and power denied to them by
other groups and institutions. Freeman adds that representing these groups
"does not mean the articulation of a single coherent program for the
betterment of the nation but the inclusion of all relevant groups and
viewpoints. Their concept of representation is delegatory, in which accurate
reflection of the parts is necessary to the welfare of the whole" (1986:337).
This view is supported by the observations of a recent DNC official, who
states that the Democratic Party allows these groups to "express their heart
and soul!' Moreover, in her view, the Democratic Party is the only instrument
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for this expression, since the Republican Party is "not big enough to give them
any power'' (Klinkner 1992:332).
Attempting to achieve an "accurate reflection of the parts'' led the
Democrats to stress procedural reforms during the 1970s and 1980s. These
reforms were intended to provide each of the party's constituent elements
representation in party circles. Even those Democrats who criticized the
particulars of the party's reform efforts did not challenge the idea that the
party should strive to be as open and inclusive as possible. Instead, they
tended to argue over the extent of reform necessary or that by opening the
party to such groups as blacks, women, and young people, the reforms had
inadvertently excluded other groups, such as organized labor, or blue-collar
whites (Klinkner 1992:chs. 5,6). In short, nearly every element in the
Democratic Party is devoted to making it a democratic party.
The Democrats' cultural biases can also be seen in their language. Where
Republicans speak of" markets'' and "nuts and bolts," the Democrats rely on
terms like "voice," "representation," "inclusion," "participation,"
"empowerment," "fairness," and "democracy." Such terms are rarely used by
Republicans.
While Democrats revel in their concern for internal party democracy and
the consequent focus on procedural reforms, Republicans approach such
matters with a distinctly different attitude. The party has not engaged in
significant procedural reform since 1912, and when current Republicans are
asked why they did not undertake procedural reforms similar to those of the
Democrats, their responses fall into one of two categories. One answer is the
along the lines of, "Why would we want to do something like that?' The
second is not so much an answer as an uncomprehending stare, much as one
might get if you had asked them why the Republican Party had not called for
a confiscatory tax system, a command economy, or unilateral disarmament.
The quest for inclusiveness that spurred much of the Democrats'
procedural efforts is not absent in Republican Party. Many, if not most,
Republicans want to make their party more inclusive, particularly of women
and minorities, but they are willing to do so only as long as these new entrants
act as Republicans rather than as organized groups. According to an
organizer of the Republican Women's Task Force at the 1976 convention, the
Republican Party is not "an interest group party. And consequently the
Republican Women's Task Force is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars
have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest''
(Pressman 1978:682). Not surprisingly, constituency groups within the
Republican Party seem unwilling to challenge this attitude and, therefore,
usually do not attempt to voice strenuously their demands within party circles.
In comparison, the Democratic Party seems much more attractive to new
groups since the Democrats do not require group loyalties to be replaced by
party loyalties. The culture of the Democratic Party is such that interest and
constituency groups are allowed, even encouraged to organize and pressure
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the party. Furthermore, the Democrats often offer new groups, by virtue of
their legitimacy as a group, direct representation and power in the party
decision-making process. Though the DNC under Paul Kirk began to temper
its formal support for constituency groups, their role still remains very strong
(Klinkner 1994).
The different approaches of the parties to organized interest groups is
best summed up by John Bibby, who states:
The major subunits of RNC gatherings arc meetings or slate chairmen and regional
associations. There arc also informal mcelings of various ideological and candidate
factions. The DNC has all of lhcsc types of subunits and factions, but in addition has
active caucuses for blacks, Hispanics, and women which have played a major role in
DNC meetings. . • . There is no comparable specialized representational structure-formal or informal-within the RNC. This no doubt rcnects the important role
which organized interest groups have traditionally played within the Democratic
coalition. By contrast, the Republicans, with their more homogeneous constituency
and middle class orientation, have had a less extensive and explicit relationship with
organized groups (1992:86).

Just as the homogeneity of the Republican Party bolsters its organizational tendencies and reduces the role of interest groups within the party,
the heterogeneity of the Democrats reinforces their affinity for procedural
matters. Party procedure provides the Democrats with the "consultation,
representation, and participation" required of a heterogeneous party and is an
expression of cultural makeup of the Democratic Party (Freeman 1986:351).
On the other hand, the more homogeneous party Republicans need less of
this and, consequently, are less disposed to tinker with procedures.
The Democrats' heterogeneity also limits their ability to carry out
organizational reforms as easily as the Republicans. Without the bonds of
trust established by a homogeneous membership, it becomes very difficult to
institute the centralization and hierarchy necessary for a business-like organization.
Organizational decisions are scrutinized not only for their
effectiveness, but also for the impact that they will have on the party's
constituencies, which often makes those decisions more difficult to implement.
This difference between the parties emerges in discussions with members
and staffs of the national committees. As for the Republicans, one gets the
impression that the chair is given great latitude to make and implement
decisions for the party. These decisions do not necessarily have unanimous
agreement, but most seem willing to defer to the judgment of the party
leadership. With Democrats, however, one constantly hears of how decisions,
even those regarding relatively minor matters, must be cleared with important
constituency groups. For example, after Paul Kirk became chair in 1985, the
DNC took great efforts to ensure that minority-owned businesses received an
adequate proportion of DNC business. One DNC staffer commented,
anonymously, "Working at the DNC is a Noah's Ark kind of thing. You have
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to make sure to have two of everybody before you do anything'' (Klinkner
1994).
Since the 1930s, the Democrats have viewed themselves as the majority
party, a perception that has also aided their predilection for procedure.4 As
the majority party, the Democrats believe they will naturally win every
election so Jong as they are united and procedure provides the means by
which the party can achieve unity, or so the thinking goes with many
Democrats. The history of Democratic Party reforms provides evidence of
such reasoning. They have continually attempted to devise a procedure for
nominating presidential candidates that satisfies the desires of all party constituencies and thus keeps them unified for the general election. After 1968
the party reformed itself to bring back the McCarthy supporters who had
defected or stayed at home. After 1972 they took steps to give greater say to
the state and local party officials and union leaders who had abandoned
McGovern. After 1980 the Democrats created the superdelegates to give
more representation to elected officials. After 1984 the DNC supported
"Super Tuesday'' to give conservative whites more influence over the
nomination. The Democrats have seemed to operate under the assumption
that if only they could construct an ideal nomination system that properly
represents each of the party's constituencies, then the perfect nominee would
emerge, leading a unified party to victory. To some extent the party's 1992
nominee, Bill Clinton, succeeded in this effort, though it is uncertain how
much the Democrat's nominating system influenced his nomination and
election (Klinkner 1994).
A final reinforcement to the procedural impulse in the Democratic Party
is the impact of the 1968 election. How an organization deals with critical
incidents, such as a challenge to authority, has a strong influence on its
culture. According to Edgar Schein:
One can sec in [organizations! how nonns and beliefs arise around the way members
respond to critical incidents. Something emotionally charged or anxiety producing
may happen, such as an attack by a member on the leader. Because everyone
witnesses it and because tension is high when the allack occurs, the immediate next
set of behaviors lends to create a norm (1990:115).

The events of 1968, culminating in the riots outside of the Democratic
convention in Chicago, were "emotionally charged and anxiety producing' for
the Democrats, and their response to those events had an important impact
on its culture. In 1968 liberal insurgents challenged the traditional leadership
of the Democratic Party. The party leadership responded to that challenge
by beginning a series of procedural reforms that would open up the party to
insurgent groups. This helped to create a cultural norm in which it was
legitimate for party constituencies to demand procedural changes and for the
party leadership to provide such changes as a method of unifying the party.
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Party Culture and Party Behavior
How might the cultures of the Democratic and Republican Party
organizations influence their behavior? Elsewhere (Klinkner 1992; 1994 ), I
have argued that party culture is the chief factor in determining the response
of out-party national committees to presidential election losses. Between 1960
and 1992, the Republican National Committee relied on organizational
rebuilding efforts (defined as improvements in financial operations, media
usage, candidate recruitment, polling, issue development, data analysis, and
fundraising) to respond to each of its losses in the preceding presidential
election. The best known examples of this were the party-building activities
of Bliss and Brock. In the same period, the Democrats were nearly as
consistent in their reliance on procedural reforms ( defined as changes in their
rules and procedures for internal governance and the selection of presidential
candidates and convention delegates) to respond to their losses (see Table
18.1).
Though the Democrats during the 1980s did make an effort to include
organizational improvements, even these partial exceptions do not contradict
the type of behavior posited by theories of organizational culture. The
Democrats' efforts to incorporate nonprocedural responses came during a
period of stress and crisis (a string of poor performances in presidential
elections) which is usually associated with change in an organization's culture,
and the continued presence of procedural reforms shows the endurance and
evolutionary nature of cultural norms.

Table 18.1 Out-Parties Responses 1960-1992

Period

Losing Party

Response

196(H964

Republicans
Re publicans
Democrats
Democrats
Republicans
Democrats
Democrats
Democrats
Republicans

Organizational
Organizational
Procedural
Procedural
Organizational
Procedural/Organizational
Procedural/Organizational
Procedural/Organizational
Organizational

1964-1968
1968--1972

19n--t976
1976-1980
1980-1984
1984- 1988

1988-1992
1992-1996
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The way in which the parties went about selecting these responses also
shows the importance of culture in understanding party organizations. Unlike
rational choice theories of party behavior, the parties not only failed to select
responses used by the other party, but also rarely even considered doing so.
Instead of engaging in a "rationaf' search for the most efficient means of
responding to their defeat, objectively assessing the causes of their loss and
considering all possible responses on their merits, the parties tended to assess
their defeats in ways that led them to rely on the measures that they had
employed in the past and that fit with their culture. For example, the RNC
consistently viewed their losses as the result of poor grass-roots party
organization and an excessive focus on internal party divisions, thus causing
them to rely on the type of nonideological, "nuts and bolts'' rebuilding that fit
so well with their party culture. On the other hand, the Democrats tended to
view their losses as the result of failing to give the proper amount of voice
and representation to each of the party's various constituencies, which not
surprisingly led them to the types of procedural reforms characteristic of their
culture. In short, rather than selecting the most appropriate response for the
cause of their defeat, it seems that the parties usually selected the cause of
defeat most appropriate for their party culture (Klinkner 1994).
It is unlikely that the influence of party culture on the behavior of party
organizations begins and ends with how the national committees respond to
defeat. Another way party culture might influence the party behavior is in the
creation and maintenance of competitive advantages. Research on business
firms suggests that culture might be a reason why some firms develop
sustained competitive advantages, and the same might be true for parties
(Barney 1986). From 1968 to 1988, the Republican Party had a sustained
competitive advantage in presidential elections, which might be accounted for
in part by the ability of its party organization to develop a unified message
and run a technologically sophisticated campaign, two activities that seem
directly influenced by a party culture which emphasizes hierarchy, unity, and
intensive use of technology. During this same period, the Democrats have
had a sustained competitive advantage in congressional races. A party culture
which emphasizes decentralization and diversity might help to account for
their ability to develop the vast coalition of groups interest-black and white,
North and South, urban and rural, liberal and conservative-that allows them
to consistently win the majority of seats in Congress.5
Party culture might also disadvantage a party organization. As mentioned
previously, organizational cultures change very slowly, thus a firm or a party,
blinded by a culture that no longer fits current realities, might find itself at a
distinct disadvantage. One might argue that the Democrats' excessive concern
with questions of voice and representation, and the consequent emphasis on
procedural reforms, handicapped it during the 1970s and 1980s when it should
have, like the RNC at that time, been improving its fundraising and ability to
provided services to campaigns and state and local parties.
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The same might be true of the Republicans in the aftermath of their
defeat in 1992. The "back to the future" contest for Chair of the RNC in
January 1993 saw each of the contenders trying to lead the party in the 1990s
by wrapping themselves in the memory of Bliss and Brock and emphasizing
the techniques used in the 1960s and 1970s. The eventual winner, Haley
Barbour was very explicit in his desire to "be a nuts and bolts organizational
leader like Ray Bliss or Bill Brock'' (Barbour 1993a).7 As they entered their
fourth decade of "nuts and bolts'' organizational efforts, no one in the
Republican Party seemed willing to consider whether the point of diminishing
returns for these activities had already been reached.
From the preceding analysis of the national committees it seems clear
that party culture can have a significant influence upon the behavior of party
organizations. While culture is not determinative, it does provide an
important and often significant element in the behavior of party organizations,
an element that is often lacking in other types of analysis. Most importantly,
an emphasis on party culture can help remind us that party organizations are
not symmetrical organizations possessed by the single•minded purpose of
winning the next election. Instead, the organizations of the two parties are
distinct entities, displaying characteristics unique to their membership and
historical experience. By taking party culture into account, perhaps future
research can provide richer and more realistic explanations of party behavior.

Notes
I. This point is echoed by He"nson and Mcncfoc-Libey's discllS.'iion (1990) of
entrepreneurial party leaders, though organizational culture theorists would argue that an
organization's culture has a powerful constraining errcct on such leaders.
2. The following dcsaiptions of party cultures draws heavily from my analysis of out-party
national commiuecs from 1956 to the present. (Sec Klinkner 1992 and Klinkncr 1994).
3. While I am a junior faculty member at a small college, I imply no value judgment with
this observation since my wire works for an investment bank. Not surprisingly, she is a
Republican and I am a Democrat.
4. The Democrats' perception that they arc the natural majority party seems, at first
glance, to contradict their belief that they arc the party of the nation's out-groups. Yet most
Democrats would attribute their "oul'' status not to their lack of numbers, but to their lack of
political representation, economic power, and social respect.
5. Sec Ehrenhalt ( 1991) for a related argument.
6, One might attnl,u1c the Republicans' desire to return to "nuts and bolts' of the 1960s
and 1970.s to the recent trend in popular culture lo resurrect artifacts of fashion and music from
these decades, but unlike platform shoes and disco, the "nuts and bolts' trend never went out
of style with the Republicans.
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Responsible Political Parties and the Decentering of
American Metropolitan Areas
Michael Margolis
David Resnick
The highest achievements of man are language and wind•swift thought, and city
dwelling habits:-Sophocles, A111igone, circa 441 B.C.
The lights are much brighter lherc,
You can forget all your troubles, forget all your cares
So go downtown ... Tony Hatch," Downtown:' 1%5.
I came here from Oregon in April, 1982. I have been downlown about six limes in
11 years. I live in Springdale. I have ready access lo Forest Fair Mall, Tri-County
Mall, Norlhgalc Mall, various supermarkets clc. There arc numerous movie houses
in the area, a library, posl office, parks, pools, etc. If I never sec downtown
Cincinnati again, I will have lost nothing. (Letter lo the Editor, Ci11c:innali Enquirer
August 17, 1993)

Much of the recent literature on American political parties at the local
level has focused upon their "revitalization" and "transformation."
Researchers have suggested that local parties have increased their
organizational efficiency and professionalism (Cotter et. al. 1984:ch. 1;
Schlesinger 1991:chs. 1,7). As such, researchers have measured the extent to
which parties register new voters, recruit candidates for local office, consult
with and coordinate the efforts of local candidates' campaign organizations,
raise money, distribute literature, and otherwise publicize candidates'
qualifications, campaign activities, and policy positions. Contrary to popular
and scholarly perceptions of decline, several important studies have produced
evidence of revitalized party activity at the local level (cf. Frendreis and
Gitelson 1993). In addition, even though local parties continue to act
independently, the Democratic and Republican party organizations have
become more integrated across levels of government. As the national and
state party organizations have acquired professional staff and permanent
headquarters, they have increased their capacity to provide research and
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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polling services, technical assistance, training for candidates and campaign
managers, and cash transfers in support of local electoral campaigns,
especially for Congress and the state legislatures (Cotter et al. 1984:ch. 4;
Cutler 1993; Gibson and Scarrow 1993; Herrnson 1993; Pitney 1993; Sturrock
et al. 1994).
How local political parties interact with office holders and community
organizations in addressing the problems of governing metropolitan areas,
however, has received less attention. The lack of attention stems in part from
the financial and logistical difficulties of collecting data on the thousands of
local party organizations that operate under diverse state laws. Study is
further complicated by the formal nonpartisanship of about half the
municipalities, not to mention the governing bodies of many special districts
(Margolis 1993:33; Herson and Boland 1990:chs. 7, 12).
Furthermore, there is a disjunction between the governmental units for
which local parties run candidates and the scope of the problems which affect
metropolitan areas. The borders of these problems do not correspond to
electoral or jurisdictional boundaries of cities, townships, counties, or in some
cases, even states (Dahl 1967; Rusk 1993). This disjunction creates problems
for political analysis. Just as the boundaries within a metropolitan area tend
to narrow the perspectives that public officials, party leaders, community
activists, and the mass media bring to metropolitan problems, so they tend to
limit the purview that political scientists bring to the problems they choose to
study. Political institutions often place constraints over how political actors
perceive problems and solutions. When political scientists focus on political
actors too closely, they are liable to accept the actors' own understanding of
the real and the possible. This leads them to underestimate the influence that
institutions have on the actors' day-to-day political behavior ( cf. March and
Olsen 1984:74~47).1
This chapter looks into how local political parties operate in metropolitan
areas (MA).2 Our concerns go beyond the parties' ability to recruit and run
candidates for local elective office. In particular, we ask how, if at all, local
party leaders have altered their strategies and behaviors to adjust to the
relative (and sometimes absolute) shrinkage of the population and resources
of central cities (and counties) even as population and resources of MAs have
grown. The party organization may hold a virtual monopoly on partisan
elective offices by maintaining the loyalty and support of the party-in-theelectorate; but it is another matter for that party to work with candidates and
elected officials toward solutions to the problems of declining central cities
surrounded by burgeoning suburban municipalities, villages, and townships.
The latter role ca1ls for party organizations to link the party-in-government to
the party-in-the-electorate (cf. Price 1984:ch. 4).
We find that local party organizations have been reluctant to recognize
the new urban circumstances, however, and slow to adjust their operations to
accommodate them. More broadly, we conclude that local parties are not
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alone: other political, civic, and market institutions have also been reluctant
to address metropolitan problems. This gives rise to calls for public
authorities to surrender their resources and power to nonpartisan quasigovernmental entities designed to take on these issues. A proposal to create
an independent management corporation to run downtown Cincinnati like a
suburban shopping mall is a good example.
In the next section we review the nature of the changes in the central
cities and how these have affected urban lifestyles. We then discuss the role
that theorists have argued "responsible parties'' should play in democratic
politics. This is followed by an examination of how well local parties fulfill
this role: in this section we present data on local parties in Hamilton County,
the central county of the Cincinnati Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical
Area (CMSA). Finally, we present our tentative conclusions and suggestions
for further research.

The Decentered American City
Once upon a time, before the authors of this chapter became political
scientists, the downtowns of America's great cities held a special wonder.
They boasted ornate first-run movie houses, great legitimate theaters, concert
halls, museums, churches, cathedrals, libraries, the biggest and best hotels,
skyscrapers, restaurants, night clubs, department stores, specialty retailers,
even stadiums, coliseums, and arenas. Built mostly along rivers or natural
harbors, they were centers of transportation and commerce, the areas at which
the highways and railroads converged. As late as the 1950s, respectable folks
still "dressed up'' before "going downtown."
The cities themselves still had the flavor of self-contained economic units.
Many of the factories, markets, and warehouses that served the cities lay
within their boundaries. Most of the businesses were still locally owned, and
even the larger corporate enterprises usually had their home offices near their
factories. The cities also served as the principal local markets for the farms
in the surrounding areas.
Since midcentury, metropolitan areas of the United States have
undergone a process of" decentering." The typical decentered MA no longer
consists of a central city hub surrounded by a wheel of suburbs connected by
spokes of railways and highways. The new metropolitan area may even lack
a dominant urban center, and its geographic borders are not at all obvious to
the casual observer. It consists of interspersed residential, recreational,
industrial, and commercial zones that not only sprawl across traditional
governmental units like cities or counties, but often extend across state lines.
These dispersed elements are connected by grids of highways and, served by
scattered shopping malls.
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As the metropolitan areas have grown, the central cities' populations have
declined, not only relative to the total population of their MAs, but often in
absolute numbers. As disproportionate numbers of middle and upper class
urban dwellers have moved outside the central cities' limits, the relative (and
in some cases absolute) affluence of the central cities has declined. As
industries have moved their plants to cheaper tracts outside the cities'
boundaries, the cities' tax bases have shrunk.
Meanwhile, crime in central cities has increased relative to population.
The cities have also become burdened with problems of air and water
pollution, public transportation, public education, and poor housing stock.
Providing adequate street and bridge maintenance, public sanitation, trash
collection, solid waste disposal, police, fire, emergency medical services, public
parking, and traffic control present further problems.
The central cities now have disproportionately nonwhite and poor
populations; most of the surrounding suburbs remain disproportionately white
and affluent. A generation of suburbanites has no familiarity with the life of
the old downtown. For most Americans under forty, the city center is at best
a place to which they or some friends or acquaintances must commute to
work. Fortunately, when they function properly, the superhighways (and in
some cities, systems of rapid transit) can safely whisk suburbanites back and
forth between their homes and downtown without requiring their paying much
attention to the deteriorating city neighborhoods through which they pass.3
Far from being cultural wastelands, suburban communities have
developed their own theater groups, night clubs, movie complexes, restaurants,
and even symphony orchestras. The shopping centers, easily reached by
automobile, provide clusters of services, including community meeting rooms.
And in contrast to downtown, parking is usually free.
Kenwood Towne Centre is an example from the Cincinnati area. The
"Towne Centre' is a shopping mall composed of specialty shops, restaurants,
three department store "anchors," and a movie complex, but it serves as a
reference point, art gallery, social center, and tourist attraction. Realtors
advertise developments as located in Kenwood; people refer to themselves as
living in Kenwood; Montgomery and Kenwood Roads even have signs telling
drivers they are entering Kenwood.
The energy of the old city
center-restaurants, office complexes, hospitalrradiates along the highway
grids near Towne Centre.
But governmentally, Kenwood Towne Centre is the center of a town that
does not exist. It has no mayor. Its "citizens'' elect no representatives. An
anonymous corporation controls what businesses are established in the Towne
Centre, what types of public messages are tolerated, what art is displayed, how
many seats are provided in common areas, even what the temperature will be.
The corporation employs a private security force to maintain law and order.
Nominally, the Towne Centre and all the surrounding households and
businesses fall under the jurisdiction of four elected officials of Sycamore
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Township-a three person board of trustees and a clerk. Notwithstanding
their location in Sycamore Township, the Towne Centre and the surrounding
complex draw people from various cities and townships throughout the
Cincinnati area, including residents of the city of Cincinnati proper. More
generally:
Families creale lheir own II cities' oul of lhe destinations lhey can reach (usually by
car) in a reasonable length of time. Indeed, distance in 1he new cities is generally
measured in terms of lime rather than blocks or milcs....771c pal/cm fom,cd by tltcse
destinations n:pn:scnts Ht/1c city" for 1/ial particular family or i11divid11af. The more
varied one's destinations, the richer and more diverse is one's personal II city:' The
new city is a city a la carte (Fishman 19'J2:19).

As the decentered American city stretches across local governmental (and
sometimes state) jurisdictions, developing and implementing public policies
that address its problems becomes more complex. Officials or governmental
bodies elected at the county level or below are disinclined to take
responsibility for area-wide problems, such as public transportation,
environmental pollution, economic development, low-cost housing, or crime.
Indeed, most, elected officials we interviewed (see below) emphasized their
efforts to do the best job governing their particular bailiwick, not taking on
metro-wide problems. Even though certain metropolitan problems affect their
localities, officials suggested that their constituents hold them responsible only
for those problems for which they have formal legal authority.4
Those who want the public authorities to attack these problems face a
dilemma. Either they must call for state or federal government to impose
policies that intervene in local affairs, or they must call for local authorities
to surrender powers to special districts or quasi-public commissions usually
not elected by the public and not scrutinized by their representatives.
Responsible political party organizations, at least in theory, offer one potential
solution to this dilemma.
Parties and Metropolitan Politics in a Democracy

Political scientists who favor a "responsible parties" model of governance
have argued that of all the major organizations that participate in American
politics, political parties are "critical to achieving democratic accountability
and responsiveness, to relating citizens to their broader political community,
and to developing a capacity for cooperation and for addressing hard
problems within and between the organs of government'' (Price 1984:116;
American Political Science Association Committee on Political Parties 1950).
Only the parties are expected by law to have one or more of their
representatives-either elected or appointed-placed in every electoral pre-
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cinct in the nation. Only the parties are so permeable that citizens can gain
the rights and privileges of membership simply by declaring their desire to
join. Only the parties have elected members who exercise public authority in
nearly every locality and at all levels of government. Just as American
political parties counteract the separation of executive, legislative, judicial, and
state versus federal powers, so too they can overcome the separation of
powers and jurisdictions within MAs.
In its strong form the responsible party model calls upon party
organizations to recruit candidates, conduct election campaigns, and develop
principles, platforms, or programs which their candidates pledge to support.
Once elected, public officials have a duty to implement these programs to the
extent practicable. They must communicate and consult with party leaders,
and they must work with other elected officials, especially members of their
own party, to develop the appropriate public policies to achieve these
programs.
In its weak form, the responsible parties model calls for parties to register
voters, raise funds, recruit candidates, and conduct electoral campaigns, but
not for them to generate party programs and policies that their candidates are
pledged to implement. Candidates need only declare their agreement with
general party principles. Between elections parties facilitate communication
between elected officials and interest groups and among officials at different
levels of government. The success of public policy, however, depends upon
the demands of various interests among the electorate and the ideas and
abilities elected officials. As a rule, the party is indifferent to the content of
the policies (cf. Frendreis and Gitelson 1993; Schlesinger 1991:ch. 6).
In theory, responsible parties are the ordinary citizens' best hope for
exerting control over decision-making elites. Without responsible parties,
theorists suggest, elections tend to degenerate into exercises in demagoguery.
And once elected, most officials lack the connections to forge the coalitions
necessary to carry out their campaign promises. The policy process tends to
be dominated by well-organized, and often well-endowed, interest groups
with their own particular agenda. Public policy leadership, if any, tends to fall
to officials like presidents, governors, and mayors, who have privileged access
to the mass media (cf. Bachrach 1967; Ginsberg 1986; Lowi 1979).
Democracy generally begins at the local level. Here citizens can organize
parties or interest groups to press their demands and to elect representatives
to satisfy them. The scale of government is small and politics is more
understandable and less intimidating. Moreover, the cost of political
participation is usually not exorbitant. Guided by parties or local interest
groups, citizens can engage in a rich exchange of ideas, facilitated by new
communication technologies (Abramson et al. 1988).
The responsible parties model, however, is not the only model for
effective democratic politics at the local level. In response to the corruption

Political Parties and the Decentering of Metropolitan Areas

295

of a few powerful tum-of-the-century party "machines," the reform movement
developed a nonpartisan model. Local government should concern itself with
"efficient business-like" delivery of services, not with matters of partisan
politics. For municipalities this nonpartisan politics is often facilitated by a
council-manager form of government. In this form of government, an "honest,
representative" nonpartisan council determines basic policy "that would work
for the general interest of the city," and the city manager determines the best
way to implement that policy (Charter Research Institute 1991:5).15 For
townships in Ohio this ideal can be realized through a limited government
headed by four elected officials: a single administrative clerk and a
nonpartisan board of three trustees with no legislative powers beyond those
delegated by the state.11 "There is no Democratic way to pick up garbage.
There is no Republican way to pave a street: only an honest and efficient
way'-so went one of the original Charter rallying cries still pertinent today
(Charter Committee 1988:7).
There is a limit to the ability of a council-manager government to carry
on its policies in a business like manner. A city government, unlike a
business, cannot follow its customers when they move to the suburbs. The
nonpartisan model can work as long as the city maintains a "great, orderly,
prosperous, middle-class backbone." Unfortunately for Cincinnati and other
declining central cities:
The great, orderly, prosperous, middle-class backbone of the city that made city
manager government work is now the . . . backbone of the suburbs. And those
economically segregated suburban municipalities arc now bigger than the city they
surround . ..
City managers arc just the ticket for places like (affiucnt suburbsI where the
most intractable problems have to do with traffic lights and where the social issues
have to do with prom dates. City government in Cincinnati has problems . . . like
crack cocaine, teenage pregnancy, racial isolation, suburban shopping malls, radio
talk shows and institutionalized panhandling. Political problems.
Fountain Square West (a prime block of downtown real estate earmarked for
retail development) is not a management problem, it's a political problem. The city
needs a political leader to jawbone, flatter, threaten, wheedle, and knock heads until
the right store gets built. ... The city manager just can't (Pyle 1993:25-26).

Even among traditional opponents of powerful local party organizations,
partisan politics may be coming back into vogue. As the central cities'
resources have diminished, cities with strong mayors have been able to garner
more federal and state dollars through grants than those with council-manager
governments. They also have been able to lure more private investment back
into the city center (Herson and Boland 1990:chs. 14-15; Cole 1974;
Cincinnati Enquirer 1993).7 There is a trend among central cities to change
from council-manager to a strong mayoral forms of government. St.
Petersburg, Florida, has abandoned its city manager. Toledo has just elected
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its first strong mayor. Dallas, Sacramento, and Dade County (Miami, Florida)
are contemplating similar changes. Even Cincinnati's leadership have
discussed revising the city charter to grant more power to the mayor
(Cincinnati Enquirer 1993).
Nevertheless, no one contends that central cities can solve their major
problems by reforming their charters. Regardless of their formal powers,
strong mayors will still be leading central cities without the resources to solve
their problems on their own. The leadership of villages, townships, smaller
cities, and counties must become convinced that their communities have an
important stake in the fate of the central cities. Otherwise, the cities are
bound to decline further as high paying jobs and capital continue to now
toward the suburbs (Herson and Boland 1991:442-45).
Two other mechanisms have been proposed to bring city and suburbs
together:
nonpartisan quasi-governmental commissions that plan and
implement public policies and special metropolitan authorities that provide
or regulate particular services. Nonpartisan commissions, a time-honored
tradition in Cincinnati, usually arise in MAs with council-manager cities.
Metropolitan authorities usually arise when several neighboring communities
in the MA have been individually burdened by problems of sewage, waste
disposal, pollution, public education, transportation, or safety.
In recent years the federal government has begun to require that local
communities conform to regional plans for clean air and water and public
transportation. Metropolitan Planning Organizations, often regional Councils
of Government composed of representatives from local governments, have
been given greater control of the distribution of federal largess throughout the
MAs (Rusk 1993:112; OKI 1993). As we shall see in the next section, both
city and suburban public and party leaders see the greatest potential for
fostering greater cooperation between central city and suburban governments
in these regional councils.8

Responsible Parties in the Decentered Metropolilan Area
If local party organizations operated in accordance with the responsible
parties model, we would expect parties to play a significant role in addressing
the problems of the decentered MA. The model calls for parties to raise
funds, recruit candidates, assist in their electoral campaigns, maintain
communication with officials between elections, and impose some form of
party discipline. In addition, if the strong form of the responsible parties
model applied, we would expect that parties that develop platforms or policy
positions to deal with local and metropolitan problems, that agreement with
these party positions would be a precondition for party endorsement, and that
elected officials would consult regularly with party leaders to implement them.
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In most cases, metropolitan problems such as traffic flow, sewage, air
pollution, water purification, and crime control impinge upon life in the
municipalities, villages, and townships outside the central cities. Even if local
party organizations did not address metropolitan problems, we would still
expect to find that other organizations, public officeholders, or civic-minded
individuals would. As we suggested above, however, most of these groups and
individuals have no responsibility to the general public. Only elected
officeholders are directly responsible to constituent publics, and only those
commissions or intergovernmental bodies appointed by elected officials have
clear responsibility to the public's representatives. Actions of civic-minded
individuals, independent commissions, or other organizationreven those
appointed by public administratorrare at least two steps removed from
review by the electorate.
If success for local party organizations were winning office in the short
term and fostering policies that preserved their electoral and organizational
advantages in the long term, we could declare local party organizations
healthy and flourishing. Paradoxically, we could make this judgment even if
their actions were largely irrelevant to solving the pressing problems of the
MAs in which they operated. Indeed, we believe this sort of reasoning
accounts for the judgment of researchers who present evidence that local
parties have increased their resources since the 1950s and conclude that "the
level of party organizational activity is in general far higher today than it was
in the past, and, as a result, the effectiveness of parties is most likely
increasing rather significantly" (Gibson and Scarrow 1993:240).
Our concerns, however, extend beyond short- and long-term electoral
effectiveness. We are interested in determining the extent to which local
party organizations play a responsible role in dealing with metropolitan
political problems. To this end we have reviewed the judgments of party
scholars about the political activities of local party organizations; we have
examined recent studies of how political and civic organizations and actors
have addressed the problems of deccntered MAs; and finally, we have
conducted our own investigation of the role of local political party
organizations in addressing the problems of the Cincinnati CMSA. To
anticipate our findings: we uncovered few instances of party organizations
playing what we have described as a responsible role in metropolitan
governance. Our interviews with Hamilton County party leaders and public
officials revealed not only the political parties' low level of involvement in
addressing metropolitan problems, but a low interest-and among some
officials, a low comprehension-regarding any responsible role party
organizations could or should take in addressing these problems.
Even though party scholars have debated the proper policy roles that
American political parties should play at various levels of government, limited
resources have forced most researchers to focus on higher levels of
government.8 Most research, in fact, concerns the organization and behavior
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of national party committees. Relatively less is known about the policy efforts
of most state party organizations.
A general pattern of increased
professionalism and electoral effectiveness of state party committees, however,
has led researchers to suggest that state parties too are playing a stronger
policy role than in the past. This is particularly true with regard to candidate
recruitment where state parties are increasingly moving into the roles that
satisfy what we have called the weak model of responsible party governance
(Gibson and Scarrow 1993:244).
Political scientists have done much less research on the policy roles of
local party organizations than they have on the roles of national and state
organizations. We know that local parties can no longer provide sufficient
material incentives, such as local jobs and patronage, to gain mass electoral
support. However, we have little evidence that they have successfully
substituted ideological or policy (purposive) incentives in their stead. What
evidence there is suggests that personal loyalty to candidates provides a more
common motivation for party workers than does loyalty to party policies
(Keefe 1991:25-27; Margolis and Owen 1985). Moreover, despite increased
party professionalism at the state and national levels and increased electoral
activity at the local levels, candidate-centered rather than party-centered
campaigns remain the norm at all levels of government (Crotty ed. 1986;
Salmore and Salmore 1989:255-56).
Local party organizations do not seem to be directly involved in
addressing metropolitan problems. The Cincinnati Enquirer's extensive report
on "saving' the downtowns of seven midwest cities suggests that local political
parties have made little, if any, impact on public policies aimed at revitalizing
the city centers. Although the Enquirer's reporters conducted interviews with
public officials, business and civic leaders, and ordinary citizens, they spoke
to no one in his or her capacity as a party official. In fact, the political parties
received only two significant mentions in some twenty-two full pages of
newsprint.10
Nonetheless, it can be argued that researchers have failed to find local
party organizations playing significant policy roles simply because they have
not looked very hard. Most studies of local parties, after all, have focused on
how well parties have performed electoral tasks. Other studies of urban
politics have tended to focus on how officeholders, local elites, and interest
groups-not political partier-have addressed the problems of central cities.
Our study makes a deliberate effort to look at the policy role of local
political parties. Beginning in July 1993, we conducted interviews with party
leaders and public officeholders in the Cincinnati CMSA The interviews
were designed specifically to assess both the roles parties currently play in
developing policy for the CMSA and the roles that party leaders and public
officials wanted them to play.11
On the surface, the Hamilton County Democratic and Republican party
organizations look stronger than average. Each has a permanent head-
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quarters staffed by full- or part-time professionals. Each has auxiliary clubs
or affiliated organizations. Each endorses candidates for local office, raises
and disburses campaign funds, does mailings, and makes phone calls on
12
behalf of party candidates. Moreover, the city of Cincinnati itself has a third
party, the Charter Committee, that also maintains a permanent headquarters
with a professional staff, endorses candidates for city council, and carries out
other tasks similar to those performed by the Democratic and Republican
13
party organizations. Electorally, these parties are remarkably successful.
Nearly every elected officeholder in the county is affiliated with one of them,
even though election for Cincinnati City Council, township trustees, and some
municipal councils are officially nonpartisan.
When we scratch beneath the surface, however, a less flattering
organizational picture emerges. While each of the parties has a role in
endorsing candidates, party officials readily admit that most candidates are in
fact self-starters. There is little, if any, active candidate recruitment. The
party endorsements go mainly to incumbents and to those self-starters who
party officials judge to be most electable.14 Even after endorsement
candidates remain mostly on their own. The party endorsement confers a
bona fides that helps candidates garner coverage in the local news media; it
also facilitates access to lists of individuals who have contributed to the
campaigns of previously endorsed candidates. The parties do little, however,
to develop issues or strategies for the campaign; nor do they normally
distribute substantial funds to support particular candidates.16 By and large,
candidates must develop their own personal organizations. In fact, officeholders report that many precinct executives--mostly Democrats-cannot even
be relied upon to pass out party slate cards on election day.
The city of Cincinnati has lost approximately 138,000 people since 1970.
Its 362,000 residents now comprise less than 40 percent of the county's
population, and barely one quarter of those living in the CMSA. Nonetheless,
the county parties do little tracking of where their voters have moved. Each
of the county party subunits--township, village, and municipal party
committees--essentially runs its own electoral operation. Both county parties
concentrate the lion's share of their efforts on winning offices in the city of
Cincinnati and county-wide. If anything, the parties still devote more
attention to city than to county politics and elections.
Neither the party leaders nor the officeholders whom we interviewed
indicated they had made significant adjustments to their electoral strategies
or their policies to accommodate metropolitan problems. County party
leaders lamented the flight of the middle class from the city to suburbs
together with the attendant loss of revenues, stable neighborhoods, and
potential for political and civic leadership. Nevertheless, they had nothing
more to suggest concerning how the parties or government could cope with
these problems beyond setting up (another) independent commission to study
them.
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Party leaders and public officials showed a remarkable tendency not
only to focus almost exclusively on problems within their own particular
bailiwick, but also on problems related to their own formal responsibilities.
Democratic and Republican party leaders saw their organizations as primarily
in a struggle to control the Cincinnati City Council, the County Board of
Commissioners, and the independent County Offices. The Executive Director
of the Charter Committee emphasized that Charter had to reinvigorate its city
organization before it could concern itself with metropolitan problems.
County officials claimed they did not have power to do much for the subunits
of government, particularly the city of Cincinnati. Township and municipal
officials outside the central city expressed concern about the problems of
public safety, parking, and shopping downtown, but pointed out that they
could not do much about them. Their constituents were more concerned with
maintaining local roads and providing good local schools, police, and fire
protection. Air and water pollution were problems, but they did not view
them as their responsibility nor, as they saw it, did their constituents. Public
transportation was a problem only if a local municipality lacked access to a
line for those who needed to commute to the central city.16
Except for federally mandated contact through the Regional (OhioKentucky-Indiana called "OKf') Council of Governments, interviewees
reported little or no contact with their counterparts in other counties in the
CMSA Indeed, Roxanne Qualls, the Cincinnati Council representative to the
OKI, indicated that most elected officials didn't even know who their
counterparts were in counties across the state borders. Although the federal
government now requires that OKI certify that all new local initiatives accord
with regional plans for public transportation and pollution control, the idea
of metropolitan government remains an anathema. Interviewees generally saw
metropolitan government (or "unigov'') as the intrusion of big government
into local matters.17
The parties have no long-term strategies. When we asked party leaders
what they would do differently if they had all the money and staff they could
use, they answered that they would continue to do what they do now, only
more effectively. They would hire more staff, conduct surveys of voters, spend
more money to advertise candidates, improve party headquarters, and the like.
None expressed any desire to win over electors by promoting any ideas or
recruiting better candidates.
In sum, although the local parties remain electorally successful, neither
their leaders nor their public officeholders envision them fulfilling the active
policy role called for by the strong model of party responsibility. In fact, the
party leaders generally are not interested in policy at all. Nor do the parties
fully satisfy the criteria of the weak model of responsibility. They don't raise
much money, they do little active recruitment of candidates, they rarely
attempt to enforce party discipline, and even these rare attempts usually
fail.
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Conclusions

Political scientists are worried about the changes in the American political
system that might make the political parties irrelevant. There has been a
significant amount of research on local parties focused on the question of
decline and possible revitalization, but most of that research has been
centered on the political party as an electoral organization. There is relatively
little research on other aspects of local party behavior which might erode the
significance of party in American politics. Political scientists have argued that
the electoral role is the key role of political parties. If they do not perform
that role successfully, they are much less likely to perform other roles
successfully, such as political socialization, facilitation of mass political
participation, leadership recruitment, agenda setting, policy development, and
the like.
Yet even if the electoral role of local political parties is a necessary
condition for them to remain significant players in the nonelectoral aspects of
American politics, it is not a sufficient one. Party organization and electoral
influence may be on the road to recovery, and yet the role of parties may still
be in a relative decline. Local parties in Cincinnati define their role very
narrowly and show little interest in broadening their understanding of what
they actually should do. Parties seem to be simply trying to survive and make
a good showing in the next election.
Parties must have both the will and the opportunity to play other roles.
It is not sufficient to assume that if they have a continuing place in the
electoral arena they will automatically fulfill other functions that theorists
have assigned them. At the local level we have a myriad of local jurisdictions.
Political parties have the potential to unify our fragmented political system
by uniting both citizens and officeholders across jurisdictions, thereby making
local politics less parochial (cf. Beck and Sorauf 1993:16; Price 1984:116).
It has become a elide to say that all politics is local. Whatever weight
such a generalization carries at the national level, it certainly carries much
more at the local level. The problems in a small town may actually be
regional problems, but local politics is local. The problem of parochialism
cuts across the question of whether or not we have responsible political
parties. Even if local parties conformed to the responsible party model,
providing party principles and programs, controlling the process of nomination
and imposing party discipline upon elected officials, they would not necessarily
have any impact on the problems of fragmentation and parochialism. In
theory the party label, the party principles, and the organization as a whole
are not constrained by the legal boundaries and powers which comprise local
jurisdictions. The practice of local politics is full of self•imposed constraints.
Because political parties have been narrowly defined as electoral
organizations, the logic of responsible parties has been turned inside out.
Responsible parties are supposed to elect candidates in order to achieve

302

The State of the Parties

public policy goals. Elections are the means; policies and programs are the
ends. But for local parties in Hamilton County, electoral victory is the goal,
and policies and programs are but one of the less important means of
achieving this goal.
According to Beck and Sorauf the entire argument for responsible
political parties "rests on replacing individual or group responsibility for
governing with responsibility of the political party' (Becka and Sorauf
1993:452). Yet, for the most part, the local political parties in our study
prefer to shun responsibility. They prefer leaving political responsibility to
public officeholders and others. The party will render candidates assistance,
often rather minimal, during electoral campaigns. But once they are elected,
the officeholders become the visible standard-bearers of political
responsibility. Between elections the party fades into the background.
Even this picture of individual political responsibility is too optimistic.
Individual standard-bearers often prefer to hand the standard to someone
else, anyone else, who seems capable of handling the tough issues. The
tendency of local political parties to shun responsibility for governing is
something they share with local officeholders. Elected officials try to maintain
that whatever is wrong is not their problem, and even if it is their problem
you can't really expect them to solve it. Is there too much crime in the
central city?
Neither the suburban nor the county politicians have
jurisdiction; and how can the voters expect the city officials alone to control
the out-of-state drug traffic coming up 1-75? Is traffic snarled? Are the
sewers backing up? Is much of the housing dilapidated? These are problems
that require the resources of state or federal authorities, the efforts of civic
association, or the investment of private corporations. Local politicians are
constantly searching for nonpolitical solutions that relieve them of
responsibility for making tough decisions. The seeming inability of local
political parties to respond creatively to the changing urban environment is
symptomatic of a general loss of faith in the ability of government to solve
political problems.
Consider the following editorial from the August 18, 1993, Cincinnati
Enquirer. It is written to back a new plan for the revitalization of downtown
Cincinnati. The plan advocates targeting affluent downtown workers while
still working on long-term plans to compete with suburban malls. What is
interesting about the editorial is not the viability of the proposed solutions to
Cincinnati's urban problems, but the assumptions it makes about the political
process at the local level:
At last, steps arc being taken to form an independent group to do for downtown
what management companies do for malls. It's an idea whose time came and went
elsewhere. Leadership has been lackluster; city council bickers, staff is shell-shocked
by turnover and r~ and a posse or tommiltees rides off in all directions to rescue
downtown ...
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Key groups such as the Downtown Progress Committee have been weak. The
city leans on the Cincinnati Business Committee like a crutch. The Chamber of
Commerce has not been the catalyst it could be. And egos have eclipsed the sun in
a struggle for obsessive control.
But now downtown business leaders at the Chamber of Commerce, the
Cincinnati Business Committee and the Downtown Progress Commiltee, with acting
City Manager Frank Dawson, arc getting their act together.
The goal under discussion: raise up to $1.4 million to form an independent
management corporation.
By comparison, suburban malls often spend more each year for marketing,
management and security. Half of the $1.4 million goal may be sought from
business, half from taxpayers. That sounds like a big hit on taxpayers ... But without
revival, the tax base will shrink with each closed business, as taxpayers arc stuck with
a swelling bill for city services.
An umbrella management corporation could finally tackle parking, security,
promotions, development and a shopping list of other issues.

The preferred solution is the establishment of a nonprofit management
company to implement suggestions in a plan commissioned by the city council,
but actually developed by private consultants. The plan is a true nonpartisan
plan, not a Democratic, Republican, or Charterite plan. Even more
significant is that the editorial does not even conceptualize the problems as
remotely partisan. The solutions to the city problems will not arise from the
existing electoral political process. That is, the way out of the spiraling decline
of the core city is not to back the candidates or platforms of one of the
established political parties. The answer is not to throw the rascals out and
elect new members to the city council.
Cincinnati is one of the few remaining core cities in CMSAs which still
operates under the council-manager form of government, but the proposed
solution also does not draw upon old-fashioned reform ideology. It does not
blame partisanship for thwarting the political process. Nor does the proposed
solution call for a more competent city manager. Increasing the powers of
city government, reorganizing its bureaucracy, and eliminating political
bottlenecks seemingly could not provide the city with the means to execute
the new plan for reviving downtown Cincinnati.
The difficulty goes much deeper. Local government is incompetent to
implement workable solutions. Yet the free market is not viewed as the
alternative to incompetent government. The editorial assumes that if market
forces are allowed to continue, the core city faces ongoing decline. More and
more retail merchants will move to the suburbs or simply go out of business.
Another sign that market forces alone cannot revive downtown is the
suggestion that significant public tax money is necessary to implement this
plan; the collective self-interest of downtown merchants is not sufficient.
A revitalized downtown will benefit both city taxpayers and business
interests, yet the means for achieving collective renewal require a model that
combines the virtues of both public and private management. The solution
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proposed by the Enquirer is to establish a quasi-governmental entity which
would do what both the free market and municipal government are incapable
of doing. The solution might be called "reform-reform" government or
privatized government. Appropriately, the model for this entity is the
suburban shopping mall. People often blame the decline of the old central
city on suburban shopping malls. They say that malls create a substitute for
main street and a sanitized middle class version of the old lively cityscape
where, among other things, politics and political problems have vanished.
Self-government has been replaced by faceless management corporations.
The solution to the decline of Cincinnati is to treat the center city like a
shopping mall. The core city must be made more like the suburbs and treated
as simply another shopping node. It must be adapted to the lifestyle and
assumptions of suburban retail shoppers, to the citizens of the suburbs
accustomed to their own way of interacting with city services. The city itself
is struggling to adapt to this new reality, but the political party is nowhere in
evidence. It is irrelevant and has nearly vanished. Privatized government
does not even have to fight entrenched city political machines for reform. It
simply has to build a consensus and have the political system turn over power
and money.
Whether this model will in fact be embraced by the city of Cincinnati is
difficult to predict. It has apparently proven itself in other old core cities
which have employed some form of the new privatized method for economic
renewal (Cincinnati Enquirer 1993). The political system seemingly cannot
provide leadership and expertise. The business community by itself cannot
organize a successful revitalization campaign. Only the new nonprofit
semipublic management structures can do what in the past had been done
either by local government, by the market, or by local government in
partnership with business. What role does the local political party
organization have in this major process of urban transformation? Seemingly,
little or none.
Researchers have heralded the news that the reported terminal decline
of local political parties has been greatly exaggerated. They claim to have
found a revitalized and transformed party organization. Yet from the
perspective of those who look for responsible parties to play a dynamic role
in the process of governing, such optimism seems unwarranted. Local parties
may not be declining as electoral organizations, but instead of confronting the
new realities of decentered metropolitan areas, they are conducting business
as usual.
We end on a rather pessimistic note. Though much of the data for our
study come from the Cincinnati region and further research in other
metropolitan areas will be necessary to confirm our findings, we still feel
confident about our overall conclusions. The old central core city has under-
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gone a profound transformation, but local political parties have not
responded. Despite our hopes to the contrary, we find no evidence that they
intend to respond in the future.18

Notes
1. For example, the Cirrci11rra1i E11quirer distributed three separate fall election guides in
the Sunday paper of October 24, 1993. Readers received the guide for Hamilton County
(Cincinnati and suburbs), the guide for Clermont, Butler, and Warren Counties (Southwestern
Ohio), or the guide for Boone, Campbell, and Kenton Counties (Northern Kentucky). No
special section covered Dearborn Counties, Indiana, Gallatin, Grant, and Pendleton Counties,
Kentucky, or Brown County, Ohio. In short, the E11q11irr:r prepared no comprehensive (or
summary) guide for the metropolitan area for which it is the principal newspaper.
2. A Metropolitan Arca (MA) consists of a central city with a minimum population or
50,IXXl or an urbanized area of 100,000 or more people (75,000 in New England) as delincd by
the Bureau of the Census. Geographically, an MA consists of one or more central counties,
but it may also include adjacent counties with strong economic or social tics to the center. For
statistical purposes an MA is designated either as a Metropolitan Statistical Arca (MSA) or as
a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Arca (PMSA) or a larger Consolidated Metropolitan
Statistical Arca (CMSA). CMSAs consists of MAs over 1,000,000 people that have one or
more large central cities. CMSAs may contain smaller PMSAs. The key requirements for
determining the boundaries or an MA arc that the outlying counties (or cities in New England)
have spccilied social and economic relationships to the central counties as measured by levels
of commuting. population density, urban population, and population growth (U.S. Department
or Commerce, 1992). Ordinarily, no governmental unit to which citizens elect representatives
corresponds to the boundaries of the MA.
3. Actually, more people commute from suburb to suburb than from suburb to central
city. More ofliccs arc located in the suburbs than in central cities. Suburbs also have more
retail sales than do central cities. (Sec Fishman 19'J2:1&- 17).
4. lncrc is also some evidence that voters do not hold local government responsible for
problems like layoffs and unemployment. (Sec Margolis, Burtt, and McLaughlin 1986:22)
5. The philosophy behind Cincinnati's Home Ruic Charter remains as baldly "good
government' as it was in 1924 when the VOlcrs adopted the Council-Manager form championed
by the National Municipal League. " .. . council should hire a City Manager with a thorough
knowledge of municipal services and proven skills as a professional administrator. This system
was also inaugurated lo dcpoliticiz.c the city administration, and the Manager is responsible for
running departments and programs without political bias. Council hammers out those political
decisions lhat arc part of the legislalivc process in a democracy, while the Manager is free to
deal with the nuts and bolts of a large municipal administration" (Charter Research Institute
1991:5). Sec also Seasongood (1954).
6. Sec Dorsey (1993:59) for a paean to township governments or" limited power, decisions
by peers, land) administration by consensus:'
7. Of the six midwest cities the Enquirer team compared with Cincinnati, the four with
the most vibrant downtowns-Cleveland, Columbus, Indianapolis and Louisvillc;-have strong
mayors, while the two with the most depressed centers-Dayton and Toledo-have city
managers.
8. We skip a discussion of the pros and cons of metropolilan government simply because
consolida1ed metropolitan government is not a viable possibility at this time. Only three major
consolidations have occurred in metropolitan areas over 250,000 since 1907: Indianapolis,
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Indiana (1969); Jacksonville, Florida (1967) and Nashville, Tennessee (1962) (Herson and
Boland 1990:260 ff.).
9. Schlesinger (1991:ch. 1), for example, argues that policy concerns detract from the
parties' main mission: electing candidates lo office. Gibson ct al. (1989) on the other hand,
argue that ideology can help rather than hinder electoral success. On the difficulty or doing
comparative studies of local party organizations, sec Margolis (1993).
10. In both instances, the stale party organization, rather than the local party, played a
critical role. The first involved the Republican business leaders of Cleveland seeking Governor
James Rhodes' blessing for his Lieutenant Governor, George Voinovich, to return to the city
and run for mayor against the politically unpalatable (and increasingly unpopular) Democratic
incumbent, Dennis Kucinich. The second involved Louisville Democrats petitioning the
Democratically controlled state legislature to authorize a referendum lo allow their mayor lo
serve three consecutive four-year tenns instead of being limited lo only one term. In each case,
we have at best an instance of the stale or local party organization acting in accordance with
the precepts or the weak model 0£ party responsibility to recruit or retain a strong candidate.
A consolidated copy of the full series can be obtained from the E11q11ircr.
11. Interviews were conducted by the authors in person or by telephone using a directed
list of questions, but not a formal interview protocol. They lasted between 30 and 120 minutes.
See below (after the references) for a list of interviewees.
12. The Republican Party is far better organized: it has a bigger budget, larger staff,
more active committees, and more active affilialed organizations.
13. The Charter Commiuce is technically not a party. Ohio law requires that
organizations maintain a slalcwide presence in order to qualify as official parties. (Sec Slurrock
et al. 1994).
14. This appears to be consistent with endorsement processes in other localities (See
Maisel ct al. 1990:150-52).
15. Neither 0£ the major parties develops a platform or principles lo which candidates are
asked to adhere. Rarely do the parties repudiate one or their own, regardless or his or her
performance. When the Republicans did refuse to endorse incumbent Guy Guckenberger for
Council in 1989, he ran successfully as an independent Republican. (The party subsequently
relented and appointed him lo a vacancy on the County Board of Commissioners). The
Democrats were happy to endorse Tyrone Yates in 1993 even though he was first appointed
and then subsequently elected to Council as a Chartcrite. The Republicans have been similarly
happy to accept Democratic turncoats, such as Kenneth Blackwell and James Cissell. The
Charter Commiucc's principles preclude their imposing any more guidance on candidates than
the general admonition to campaign and lo govern "for the good or the whole city' as
opposed to any particular neighborhood or special interest (sec Miller 1993).
16. Even here the view or lransportation is rather parochial. County Commission
Chairman, Robert Dowlin, recently complained that even the OKI metropolitan transportation
plan assumes everyone wants to travel downtown. "I don't sec enough cross-town
transportation. There arc as many jobs in Blue Ash as there arc in downtown Cincinnati:'
(Calhoun 1993).
17. Qualls' recent elevation rrom council member lo mayor has signaled a new emphasis
on regional concerns. Her" State of the City Address' (January 6, 1994) called for regional
cooperation to solve the city's problems. Among other things, she proposed formation of a
Cmcinnati/Northcrn Kentucky port authority lo tackle big 1ickc1 projects like financing a new
stadium and expanding regional convention facilities. This regional focus is her own initiative.
The local Demoaatic party has never taken any position on lhcse issues, and Qualls has always
run as an independent Democrat.
18. Interviews: Tim Burke, Chairman, Hamilton County Democratic Party, August
1993-present; face to face, August 19, 1993. Loi ConW11y, Executive Director or Charter
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Committee; face to face, , August 3, 1993. Robert Dorsey, Chairman, Anderson Township
Board of Trustees, Republican; face to fac:c, August 19, 1993. Robert Dowlin, President,
Hamilton County Board of Commissioners, Republican, Former Mayor, City of Sharonville;
fac:c lo faa:, August 23, 199'3. Gn:gory Janis, City Manager, Covington, Kentuclcy; face to fac:c,
October 7, 1993. Thomas Luken, Former Mayor of Cincinnati, former Member or Congress,
Chairman, Hamilton County Demoaatic Party, 1991-93; successful candidate for City Counci~
1993; fac:c to fac:c, August 25, 1993. Also short interview by telephone in July. Zane Miller,
Former Ward Chairman, Cincinnati Dcmoaatic Committee, Campaign Manager for
Southwestern Ohio, Eugene McCarthy for President, 1968, Professor of History and Co•
Director, Center for Neighborhood and Community Studies, University of Cincinnati; face to
face, August 12, 1993. Roxanne Qualls, Member, Cincinnati City Council, Democrat, Council
Representative to OKI Regional Council of Governments, Elected mayor in November 1993;
Telephone, August 27, 1993. Brewster Rhoads, Democratic party campaign consultant and
manager, Member, Hamilton County Democratic Executive and Steering Committees; face to
face, October 11, 1993. Dusty Rhodes, Hamilton County Auditor, Democrat; face to face,
August 27, 1993. Eugene Ruehlmann, Chairman, Hamilton County Republican Committee,
Former Mayor of Cincinnati; face to face, August 16, 1993. Grq: Vehr, Executive Director,
Hamilton County Republican Committee; fac:c to fac:c, August 16, 1993. Brandon Wiers,
Fonner Mayor of City of Forest Park, Member, Commission on County Government Reform,
Member of Forest Park Democratic Committee, Served on commission as representative of
Charter Committee of Cincinnati, Forest Park has nonpartisan council•manager charter; face
to faa:, August 17, 1993. T)Tone Vales, Member, Cincinnati City Council, Democrat, elected
as Charterite for 1991-1993 term, Former Democratic Party Candidate for Congress, Adjunct
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati; Short interviews: face lo face
and by telephone: July 1993.
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The Resurgence of Party Organization?
A Dissent from the New Orthodoxy
John l Coleman
Forty year.; ago, the American Political Science Association's Committee
on Political Parties (1950) precipitated a storm of controversy with a critique
of American parties. While many political scientists were sympathetic to the
committee's call for responsible parties, an equally sizable contingent agreed
with Pendleton Herring's (1940) classic analysis: the United States had
parties appropriate to its political culture and government structure, attempts
to change these parties were probably futile, and any such changes would be
dangerous for American democracy.
Twenty years ago, scholars began to diagnose the decline of American
parties as central organizing structures in American politics.1 Many writers
pointed to decline stretching half a century or longer, while others argued that
the decline was particularly severe in the postwar period. In effect these
writers viewed even the parties criticized by the APSA party report to be
preferable to the parties of the late 1960s.
Today, a new orthodoxy in party organization scholarship challenges the
party decline analysis. With few exceptions, writers concentrating on party
organizations argue that parties are more active and more significant than
earlier literature implied. According to this view, the party decline school
mistakenly assumed that problems in Congress and in the electorate indicated
the decline of the party system and, by extension, party organizations. While
these scholars concede that the strength of the party system cannot be
inferred from the strength of party organizations, they also argue that such an
assessment has to include party organizations (Gibson, Cotter, Bibby,
Huckshom 1983:194). The logical implication of this analysis is that the party
system is stronger than the party decline model implies. The irony is rich:
the "revivalists:' who usually express sympathy with the Herring view of
parties, argue that some of what the APSA committee demanded has come
to pass and the American political order is better for it (see inventory in Baer
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and Bositis 1993:appendix). But they challenge the "declinists'' who grudgingly accepted the Herring-approved political parties of the early postwar
period.
Once we move beyond the notion of increased party activity, several
shortcomings in the recent party revival literature become clear. Here I
address several of these deficiencies. Because it is done so well in many of
the sources I cite, I will not provide an extensive review of the findings in the
literature. Moreover, despite a critical tone, this essay should not be
construed as a wholesale indictment on an impressive body of research.
Recent party organization research has filled a large gap in the study of
parties, addressed with precision several anomalies in that larger literature,
been innovative in measurement and research design, and proven remarkably
cumulative. My objective is to point out research gaps and to encourage a
more integrated analysis of the party system.

The New Orthodoxy
The past decade has seen a sea change among party scholars regarding
the health of party organizations in the United States. Where fifteen years
ago there was consensus that party organizations were weak, today the
consensus argues that party organizations are revitalized, resurgent, and
relevant. Scholars have conducted large-scale surveys of state and county
party chairs and found that those organizations report performing more
activities today than at any time since the second World War.2 Campaign
finance studies indicate that ever-larger sums pass through the hands of
various party committees on the national, state, and county (local) levels and
that these funds, with some party differences, are generally targeted toward
competitive races.3 These scholars are enthused about what they see
happening with the party organizations and are convinced that "parties
matter" (Gibson and Scarrow 1993).
Virtually all party scholars agree that there has been real change in party
activity on the national, state, and county levels. But there are some
peculiarities in the data. Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn (1984:39, 54),
for example, find that most of the increase in state and county party
organizational strength occurred in the 1960s, which is not widely considered
the heyday of party organizational resurgence. Indeed, Herrnson and
Menefee-Libey (1990), begin their overview of party organizational change in
the late 1960s, and many writers focus on changes in the late 1970s and early
1980s. A second disturbance in the claims about party organizations concerns
the status of local parties. Most of the literature focuses on county party
organizations, and here, like with the national and state parties, the consensus
is that parties are doing more today than previously (cf. Lawson, Pamper, and
Moakley 1986). Studies of cities, however, show a more mixed pattern, with
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the authors in Crotty (1986) generally encouraged by what they see while
authors like Ware (1985) argue city party organizations have lost so many of
their traditional functions, especially control of nominations, that they are but
a shell of their former selves (Johnston 1979).
Despite these peculiarities in the data, the case that party organizations
are performing more activities and raising more funds today is strong enough
that one can not get very far arguing that it is not so. But armed with this
data, the party organization literature has leapt too quickly to words like
"resurgence" and "revitalization." Increased activity should only be the start
of a conception of resurgent parties. That conception also needs to account
for the party organizations' relations with other actors and institutions in the
political universe. To make a business analogy, over the past few years there
has been much speculation in the business press about the troubles afflicting
the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). Suppose that with
new leadership, IBM was to begin restructuring and reallocating
organizational responsibilities, changing prices, and introducing new product
lines. It is difficult to imagine that we would hear much about IBM being
resurgent and revitalized unless customers returned to IBM products and
IBM's profitability improved, even if analysts admired IBM's efforts. Even
praising the company's ability to hold its market share steady would be
considered at best a backhanded compliment. We should ask the same
questions of parties: are the customers returning and are the parties increasing
their " market" share? One might argue that if market share is measured as
the percentage of offices held by the two major parties or by candidates' use
of party services, then indeed market share is high and perhaps growing. But
if market share is measured in other ways-such as the percentage of voters
given enough incentive to turn out to vote-a different picture might well
emerge. However one measures the benchmarks, the point is that resurgence
is indicated not by organizational restructuring alone but by the effects of
restructuring.

Bringing the Voters Back In
One striking anomaly in the contemporary party system is that scholars
argue party organizations are reviving while the public has become
increasingly skeptical about the relevance of political parties to governing and
the desirability of partisan activity (Fiorna 1980; Burnham 1982; Brady 1990;
Milkis 1993). More citizens say that interest groups better represent them
than do political parties, and the interest group advantage is particularly heavy
among the young (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
1986:52). Record numbers of voters split their tickets and record numbers of
districts have split outcome!i-that is, supporting a president of one party and
a member of Congress from another. Voting patterns are increasingly
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inconsistent: it is harder to predict what will happen in one race by knowing
the outcome in another and it is harder to predict voting patterns two years
hence based on voting patterns today. Only half the electorate bothers to
vote in presidential elections while about one-third votes in off-year
congressional elections. Electoral turnout varies substantially across states
and across offices; in the absence of a gubernatorial campaign, turnout is low.
Local turnout is usually low as well. In 1992, nineteen percent of the voting
public supported an independent candidate for president who had held no
political office, was all but unknown seven months before the election, and did
almost no campaigning in the traditional sense.
It is difficult to understand any of these developments through the lenses
provided by party organization theory. Perhaps one could argue that
decreasing party loyalty is a sign of party organizational strength: that is, the
organizations have become so effective at campaigning that they uproot
traditional voter loyalties (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshom 1984:103).
Perhaps organizational strength would explain the phenomenon of segmented
or dual partisanship, but segmented partisanship is difficult to correlate with
the data indicating that party organizations are also becoming more
integrated-unless national-state-local integration is devoid of substantive
policy contenL But we know that this is certainly not true for the Republicans
and their widely praised service-provision activities for candidates at all levels.
These arguments reverse the causation in Schlesinger's (1991) much-cited
formulation that decreases in voter loyalty led to increased party
organizational efforts (it is not clear in Schlesinger what led to the decreased
loyalties). In short, no compelling case has been made within the
organizational framework to explain increasingly variable voting patterns
across offices and years.
Thus, widespread lack of trust in parties and the increasing tendency for
voters to view parties as unnecessary and perhaps unhelpful appendages to the
political system pose a large puzzle for the new orthodoxy (Wattenberg 1990).
Now, this is not to argue that antipartisan attitudes are unique to the present
period because they have to one extent or another been a common part of
American political culture (Epstein 1986). But the level of disgust and
bitterness with "politics as usuaf' is exceptionally high-and political parties
are surely part of "politics as usual:' Though today many political scientists
do indeed scoff at the public's discontent, suggesting that the public is either
spoiled, ignorant, manipulated by demagogues, or all three,4 the negative
public mood is reflected in turnout, voting behavior, and attitudes toward
parties. Though party organizations have increased their activity levels,
voters are unimpressed. Ross Perot may not be easy to explain in any
context, but within the celebration of party resurgence and revitalization in
the party organization literature he becomes an enormous enigma. If the
dominance of offices and votes by the two major parties is a measure of party
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strength, then it is hard to understand why one-fifth of the electorate
abandoned the parties' presidential candidates after a sustained period of
party II resurgence." 5
One might argue that this discontent is a result of particularly effective
campaign tactics spearheaded by party strategists. From this reading,
discontent is actually a result of party organizational strength. Certainly many
postmortem analyses of the 1988 Bush campaign reached such a conclusion.
But for the party organizations, such a resolution is hardly satisfactory because
it suggests one of two things: 1. party organizations help candidates whip up
discontent about real issues to win office, but along with party-in-government
they are unable to do anything to restore public confidence once in
office-i.e., the problems are real but the parties are unable to effect any
change; or 2. party organizations help whip up discontent about nonexistent
or irrelevant problems. The first alternative suggests a collapse of
accountability in the political system, at least accountability oriented around
political parties; the second suggests that party organizations willingly debase
public discourse to win office, which raises disturbing normative issues (see
below).
The striking contrast between the literature on party organizations and
observations on partisanship in the electorate results from the dominance of
supply-side analysis in this literature, namely, examining what parties are
doing (or say they are doing). From such analysis it is easy to conclude that
parties are resurgen~parties must be stronger if they are doing more rather
8
than less.
But what this literature has ignored is the demand-side
represented by the electorate. While studies of late nineteenth and early
twentieth century party organizations place a great deal of emphasis on the
interaction between party officials and the citizenry (McGeer 1986; Bridges
1986; Shefter 1976, 1986; cf. Brown and Halaby 1987), studies of recent party
organization stress what the party is supplying and de-emphasize how the
public is responding. The emerging "truncated' or service-provider model of
the party teaches us about changes in modem campaigning, but not about the
broader place of party in American politics. How much must public discontent with the parties grow before organizational studies recognize the
implications of those negative signs for party "revitalization'' or "resurgence''?
Is it more important that targeted party activity might raise turnout two or
three percentage points in a given election or that turnout has dropped
steadily over time and is lower now than when the party organizations were
"weak''? Only an unduly narrow view of party organization can suggest our
primary interest is whether candidates think party assistance is helpful.
A handful of studies do look closely at the link between party organization ( or party competition, which is not necessarily the same thing) and
public response. These studies stress primarily the parties' direct and indirect
influence on turnout; they usually find that party activities indeed have some
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impact.7 But if public response to turnout efforts is a valid part of party
organization scholarship, why not public views or behavior toward party? One
argument might be party organizations see voter turnout as one of their
functions, but public attitudes toward parties are not in their purview. This
argument misses the point. Intended or not, party behavior through governing
is a public act and may produce public discontent. Parties ignoring this
discontent because "it's not our problem" have a history of being deformed
through reforms. Public opinion matters.
What about linkage at the other end? Although my focus is on the
linkage between party organizations and voters, studies of the connection
between party organizations and party-in-government have been similarly
limited. Two strong supporters of contemporary party organizations
acknowledge that "much less is known about how party organizations affect
public policy'' (Gibson and Scarrow 1993:245) than about how they affect
elections. They note that while there is some possibility that these
organizations can affect policy direction, on the whole it is "highly doubtful
that (they] have much of an ideological effect'' (1993:245) once public officials
take office. But, they point out, there is some possibility for affecting party
policy at the margin through the recruitment and nomination process (Gibson,
Frendreis, and Vertz 1989). One small group of recent studies does attempt
to discern whether party organization activity has any influence on elected
officials' policy decisions; the influence is at best slight (Cotter et. al 1984;
Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Dwyre 1992, 1993). As Lawson, Pamper, and
Moakley (1986:368, 369) point out, our knowledge about the parties'
performance as linkages between citizens and the state "remain[s] fragmentary
and inconclusive."
Methodological obstacles have surely been one hindrance to examining
the linkage between party organizations and party-in-government. Cotter,
Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn's warning in their discussion of party
organization relationships with elected officeholders that "these interpretations
must be treated as only suggestive because of the small number of cases, the
lack of control variables, and uncertainty about the appropriateness of
generalizing from the high and low strength ranges that are actually partyspecific' (1984: 118) gives a good sense of the difficulties. Similar complexities
face the analyst examining whether party organizations influence election
results.
Linkage at both ends-citizen to party organization and organization to
elected officeholder-is strained. But because I believe the problems with
voters desetve special attention, I have placed extra emphasis on the former.
If parties' "raison d'etre is to create a substantive connection between rulers
and rulecf' (Lawson 1980:3),8 then we have a problem if voters pay little
attention to party efforts or their antipathy to party grows. It is misleading to
cast stepped-up party activity as yet another indication of party "resurgence."
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Before drawing such conclusions, we need to look beyond party intentions to
their results, and these results must encompass the behavior and perceptions
of the public as well as candidates.
Accentuate the Positive, Ignore the Normative

Part of the reason that party organization scholars have been eager to
move the discipline away from the notion of party decline is that these
scholars tend to believe deeply in the positive contributions parties make to
the American political system. Even though many and probably most disagree
passionately with E. E. Schattschneider's vision of the ideal political party for
the United States, they typically endorse Schattschneider's frequently-noted
contention that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the
parties" (1942:1). When party organization students contend that "farties
matter," they are making both an empirical and normative statement.
Despite this normative endorsement of parties, the organization literature
has been surprisingly quiet about key features of American politics during the
era of resurgent party organizations. Beyond the problem of the electorate's
response to party organizational changes are questions concerning practices
in American politics that are directly related to the parties' service-provider
activities. The results of these activities have not always been pretty. Yet the
party organization literature has said little about their normative implications.
Our interest in the health of political parties should not be divorced from
our interest in the health of politics or the political system. For example, the
new orthodoxy is generally very positive about the efforts of the parties to
raise and distribute more campaign funds and their efforts to coexist
peacefully with interest groups and political action committees. Yet other
studies raise troubling questions about the parties' increasing reliance on
raising huge sums of money from special interests (Edsall 1984; Ferguson and
Rogers 1986). The implicit stance of organization theorists is that the parties'
ability to raise this money is more significant than the effects of this reliance
on massive fundraising. Are party organizations part of the problem with
money in politics or part of the solution? Are they making a bad
situation-the intersection of money and politics-worse? Indeed, the
intersection of money and politics is a significant aspect of the public
discontent mentioned above. It is one thing to note that a party committee
is holding a "breakfast' for important contributors; it is quite another to
ignore that these activities may resonate very poorly within the public at large
and may, in the long run, be harmful for the credibility and legitimacy of
political parties. The party organizations' tremendous "success'' at funneling
"soft money'' into campaigns raises similar problems. While some studies
make the plausible argument that parties make the situation less distasteful
than it might be by serving as an intermediary of funds for candidates-and
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as the largest single provider for most candidates (Hermson 1988,
1990)-these important nonnative questions are discussed infrequently.
Another nonnative issue concerns voter turnout. As I mentioned above,
several studies indicate that party mobilization efforts can have a positive
impact on voter turnout. But studies of organization tend to ignore the flip
sid~parties can and do effectively demobilize as well (Shefter 1984; Piven
and Cloward 1989). This is certainly not news, as the trajectory of Southern
politics after the turn of the century makes clear. Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993:162-77, 215) attribute the bulk of the decline in turnout since the early
1960s to decreasing efforts to mobilize voters by various organizations,
including most prominently the political parties. One explanation is that the
parties have chosen to de-emphasize labor-intensive mobilization in the new
capital-and-technology-intensive electoral system (Frantzich 1989). While
officials and workers in party organizations may not have the luxury to
contemplate the participatory implications of this kind of shift, it is incumbent
upon party organization scholars to do so. Organizational adaptation that is
rational in the short term may not prove to be so in the long term.
The point here is simple: we either believe that declining turnout is bad
for the political system or we do not. If we do, we need to be clear about the
parties' contribution to something we consider corrosive to democracy.
Without denying the need for technological adaptation and sophistication, we
can question whether the extent of the move away from labor-intensive
mobilization is as inevitable as it is normally portrayed. It may be the case
that county chairs see their efforts as most significant in "grass-roots activity
emphasizing ties to local people" such as organizing campaign events and getout-the-vote drives (Frendreis, Gitelson, Flemming, and Layzell 1993:10), but
the dismal state of turnout (especially in local races) has to lead one to
question how effective or extensive these activities are. What do we want
from parties? A party organization and party system that I would label
resurgent or revitalized would not be one that witnesses sustained declining
participation or one with participation levels as low as at present.
A third normative issue concerns the quality of modern campaigns. As
party organizations claim increasing involvement in recruiting candidates,
assisting the strategy and conduct of campaigns, and acting as intermediaries
between the candidates and the private market of campaign services (Maisel,
Fowler, Jones, and Stone 1990; Kazee and Thornberry 1990; Frendreis,
Gibson, and Vertz 1990), they should be judged on the quality of these
campaigns. I do not want to overstate this point. The organization literature
is, it seems to me, very careful to avoid projecting party organizations as the
lead institutions in contemporary campaigns but rather as the supporting cast
for candidate organizations (which some students might, of course, reasonably
note as a sign of party decline). Again, while party organizations do not have
the luxury of stepping back to analyze the quality of campaigns, political
scientists, even those enthused about the changes in party organizations,
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should. There are plausible arguments on each side of this issue-some argue
that modem campai~ are informative (Popkin 1991) while others assert that
campaigns have become shrill, uninformative, divisive, and unrelated to the
real tasks of governance that follow the election (Blumenthal 1990; Dionne
1991; BeMett 1992). Are the resurgent party organizations helping corrode
the discourse of American campaigns? If campaigning is increasingly divorced
from governing. we should question the contributions of institutions intimately
involved in campaigns and campaign strategy.
The point of these examples is that such normative issues should not be
ignored by the proponents of party organizational resurgence. The literature
lacks a critical appraisal of the content of the activities the parties perform.
By way of contrast, analyses of interest groups often manage to merge support
of interest group involvement in the political process with critical assessments
of the impact of interest groups on the political system. This omission is
important, for as Lawson, Pomper, and Moaklcy (1986:369) note, " the parties,
including their hard-working activists, may be willing to endure public
contempt so long as they win elections, but how long will the public tolerate
such parties?'
Successful at What?
One message found throughout the party organization literature is that
party organizations play an important role in American politics. Surprisingly,
however, the exact nature of the success achieved by these organizations is
often left vague. And measures of success that appear obvious are
overlooked. This problem is related to the more general tendency to focus
on activities and pay less attention to effects.
Most studies on party organization are particularly impressed with the
efforts of the Republican Party to restructure its organizational apparatus,
upgrade its service capacities, and improve the product it offers candidates
and potential candidates. What is surprising, however, is the lack of hard data
in the literature showing that the Republican efforts have made much
difference in the electoral landscape. Republican organizational efforts have
probably boosted the party's fortunes in the South, though certainly the
internal collapse of the Democrats was also a factor. But more generally one
can ask: where is the evidence that Republicans have received much of a
return on the massive amounts of money they have spent on campaigning over
the past decade or so? Perhaps the Republican capture of the Senate in 1980
was due in large part to Republican organizational efforts, with the
cooperation of sympathetic groups like the National Conservative Political
Action Committee. Some scholars argue plausibly that Republican losses
might have been much more severe in the deep recession of 1982 (e.g.,
Jacobson 198~86) if not for the efforts of the Republican campaign
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committees but the data is not hard.10 Other possibilities---general approval
of the Reagan governmental-reduction agenda, skepticism about Democratic
competence given recent experience, lack of a Democratic program, a change
in political culture that increased the level of unemployment necessary to
create political outrage-are also plausible. For all the apparent Republican
advantages in party organization, both at the national and state level, one
might have expected some larger payoff.
Beyond the question of recent Republican "success," evidence is mixed
regarding the effect of party organizations on election outcomes. Gibson and
Scarrow (1993:242-43) note that evidence suggests party organizations made
a difference in election outcomes in specific cases. Cotter et al. (1984), on
the other hand, found that over time a party's relative electoral success
(measured by the Ranney index) bore little relationship to the strength of its
state party organizations. A mild to moderate relationship was, however,
uncovered for nonsouth gubernatorial elections. Both studies properly note
the methodological difficulties inherent in teasing out the effect of party
organizations on election results.
Success is also related to what writers believe the important role of the
parties to be. As mentioned above, the service-provider and party-as-broker
views have clearly gained ground in recent years, but it is not generally
acknowledged that we should consider the set of tasks confronting parties---or
that they choose to confronrwhen we estimate whether party organizations
are resurgent and revitalized. In other words, what are we expecting parties
to do? The more limited our expectati:ms, the more likely we see success and
resurgence. Ware perhaps puts this point most clearly when he observes that
A strong party organization is one which at the very least, can determine who will be
the party's candidates, can decide (broadly) the issues on which electoral campaigns
will be fought by its candidates, contributes the 'lion's share' or resources to the
candidates' elections campaigns, and has innuence over appointments made by
elected public officials (1988:x).

For scholars the question must be whether the "successes" garnered by the
truncated party are as significant as the "successes'' of past parties as depicted
by Ware.
An increasing party role in campaign finance is seen by many as a key
success of modern party organizations. But while it is true that the parties
raise more money than previously and that they use that money more
carefully, it is also the case that legislative campaign committees have become
dominant in the funding of legislative races. Rather than increasing the
influence of party or working to pull parts of the party together, Sorauf and
Wilson (1990) argue that the dominance of the legislative campaign
committees reflects an effort by legislators to remain autonomous from the
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wider party (see chapter 14). Therefore the increasing role for the parties in
this aspect of campaign finance may increase the likelihood of party members
winning but it does not, as Sorauf and Wilson suggest, increase the integration
of the party.
Another irony regarding success is that as party organizations became
more efficient in campaign finance and campaign assistance, fewer members
of the parties in Congress needed the services as incumbency reelection rates
and margins increased. When one half of the challenger party's adherents
abandon party identification to support their incumbent member of Congress
(Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1994), the incumbent's party organization is
being asked to play a truly relevant role in fewer contests. This is useful,
because it allows parties to concentrate their resources, but it does suggest
how much of the electoral universe is largely beyond the influence of party
organizations.
As noted above, organization scholars are careful to avoid attributing too
much influence or strength to party organizations. In campaigns, for example,
the party is clearly seen as a supporting institution to the candidate. Yet the
line between success and failure is perilously close. To take the most recent
data ac; an example, Frendreis et al. (chapter 8) report that state legislative
candidates rate county party organizations as slightly effective only in
recruiting campaign volunteers and getting-out-the-vote. On organizing
campaign events, fundraising, and campaign management and development
of strategy, the county parties rate somewhere between "not important'' to
"slightly important." Even discounting for candidate hubris, this is of rather
minimal importance. It is difficult to imagine that someone attracted to the
party decline idea would find this evidence particularly challenging. The
literature needs to provide a better sense of why this level of influence
matters. Party organization students clearly want to believe that parties are
an important and necessary part of modern campaigns and elections, even if
idealistic, responsible parties are implausible: "While adaptive brokerage
parties may be less than perfect vehicles for the organization of political
debate and the development of public policy, the alternative-electorally
irrelevant parties-are wholly inadequate to the requirements of American
politics" (Frendreis et al. 1993:14). But scholars need to spell out why these
parties would be wholly inadequate. Indeed, Bledsoe and Welch suggest that
this electoral role may be the least significant one parties perform and not one
they need perform alone: "Though these other agents [interest groups,
political action committees, consultants, etc.] can replace the party
organization as an election vehicle, they contribute nothing to the process of
governing: the coalition building, political accountability, and policy coherence
that may be offered by a healthy party system'' (1987:265).
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Fighting the Last Battle
One reason for the shortcomings in the party organization literature, I
believe, is an ongoing interest in challenging the thesis of party decline. The
argument between these schools is remarkably reminiscent of the responsible
parties vs. functional (or indigenous) parties dispute that swept the field forty
years ago. But like that dispute, today's debate has become unproductive.
First, there has been a tendency in the organization literature to overstate
the central thrust of the decline argument. While some decline analysts
projected an extremely dim view of party prospects, most writers on decline
were making the simple point that the contemporary parties were in several
respects less central to the political process than they were previously. It is
correct to note that they usually overlooked party organizations. But it seems
to me unhelpful to caricature the party decline approach with terms like
"demise," "prophets:• "strident," "impressionistic," "exaggerate:• "swamped:'
or "decimated:' or to suggest that party decline theorists yearned only for the
"golden age" of party modeled on a "few'' urban political machines or
"disciplined, socialist'' parties as found in Europe (all in Patterson 1989).11
For many decline writers it was difficult to imagine the trends changing
dramatically. As we know, however, the trends did partially change: parties
in the Congress and party organizations both showed new signs of life in the
1980s. But when most of the decline arguments were being written, it was
indeed difficult to see signs of renewal. This was especially true because of
the lack of any overarching theory of party that integrated the developments
at each geographic level of party and for each of the three major party
components. Yet rather than exaggerate or falsely assume party decline, the
decline theorists did not typically make arguments that were incompatible
with "the facts" as presented in the party organization literature. Herrnson
(1988), for example, accepts that the party organizations from World War II
to the mid-1970s were clearly inferior to and of lesser significance than the
party organizations before the war. For a decline writer to assume weak party
organizations was not advisable, but apparently not incorrect. Herrnson
argues that the party organizations adapted and took on new roles after the
mid-1970s and that the party organizations now fit their environment well
(Herrnson 1988:30). But he does acknowledge that they may not be needed
to the same degree they were in the environment of the late nineteenth
century-i.e., the "constituent" nature of and demands on parties had shrunk
(Lowi 1975 and also chapter 4).
With its interest in demonstrating that at least part of the party system
was not declining, a second problem is that the party organization literature
has placed too little emphasis on integrating party theory. As I stated above,
this relative neglect has meant turning a blind eye to the response of the
public to the improvements in party organizational strength. Cotter et al.
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(1984:167), for example, who are interested in integrating party organizations
into the bigger party picture, devote but one paragraph to the relations
between party organizations and the public, and that one paragraph seems to
dismiss the reality or significance of negative public perceptions.12 I would
suggest that the failure to deal with normative questions also stems from this
desire to demonstrate that not all of the party system has declined. While this
approach was perhaps warranted at the outset, it has now become
counterproductive.
Third, there is a real risk of walking into the same analytical trap that
ensnared writers on party decline: if you build your theory on only one part
of the data trend you find it very difficult to explain how that trend might
stop. The variables examined by party decline analyses pointed in the
direction of future decline; by limiting the dependent variable to periods of
decline, declinists overlooked independent variables that might alter the trend.
Today, the party organization literature faces the same problem. To build
more theory into these studies, revivalists need to consider seriously what
could disrupt the projected trajectory of ever more involved, ever more
relevant party organizations.
Finally, this concern with fighting the last battle leads to the use of a
"counteracting" party model (see Cotter and Bibby 1980:26-27, for an early
example; see Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990 for a recent treatment). This
model suggests that even if there is some sign of decline elsewhere in the
party system, say among voters, the revival in party organization "counteracts"
that decline. Unfortunately, it is not clear what is entailed in counteracting
other parts of the political system. What would be different if this
counteraction did not occur? How do we know? How does this
"counteraction" affect what happens in those areas that might indeed be in
decline; i.e., what does this mean for the "counteracted'? How are party
organizations different because they play a counteracting rather than parallel
role with other party elements? A stronger version of the counteracting
model argues that party organizational resurgence depended on party decline
among voters (Schlesinger 1991). But while this idea may be consistent with
recent American politics, a look back to the late nineteenth century suggests
that this is not a general principle of party development. A more modest
version asserts that strong party organizations have counteracted party decline
elsewhere in the system, "thus making the party system more resilient to antiparty and dealigning influences' (Bibby et al. 1983:26). But how do we know
if these organizations have indeed made the system more resilien~what is
the null expectation? Looking at the recent developments in public opinion
and behavior makes one wonder just how effective these counteractive party
organizations have been in resisting these influences.
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Searching ror Integration: "The State or the Parties'
I have suggested in this chapter some reasons to question the new
orthodoxy that party organizations are "resurgent'' or "revitalized." In
conclusion I want to focus less on the organizations per se and more on the
political science analysis of these organizations.
Party scholars need to take seriously the goal of integrating party theory
and probing the relationships between different parts of the party system.
Herrnson reports that
Some analysts have questioned the propriety or using evidence about the party-in-the•
clcdorate and the party-in-government to support the hypothesis that political parties
in general, and especially party organimtions, arc in decline. Blurring the distinctions
between the three dimensions of the political party may lead to a misunderstanding
or the nature of party development and rcsull in faulty conclusions about the
condition or party organizations (1988:5).

I am not arguing that the distinctions be blurred, only that we understand
better how these aspects of party fit together. Indeed, many party
organization studies touch on these connections. I am not arguing that we
aim for faulty conclusions, only that we recognize that because the party
system fits together it is misleading to ignore the other components when
studying any one of the three. If there is finally something called "party" that
exists beyond these individual components, it is at least partially defined as
the centrality of party organizations, party-in-government, and party-in-theelectorate to the way in which the business of democracy gets done: selecting
candidates and running campaigns, deciding how to vote, designing and
implementing public policy, and so on. If voters were exceptionally loyal to
parties and thought they mattered greatly, but parties in Congress were hardly
cohesive and party organizations did next to nothing, I would be
uncomfortable talking about parties being healthy. Similarly, it is unwise to
overlook party-in-government but especially public opinion and political
behavior when assessing the health of the party system even if it has active
organizations. When party organizations begin to pull the electorate along as
they perform their activities, my enthusiasm about the revitalization of
American party organizations and the party system will increase.
Though there are good reasons to begin integrating party theory, less
clear is how one goes about this (Epstein 1986; Schlesinger 1991). Elsewhere
I make the argument that party decline-and party improvement-can be
understood only if parties are analyzed within their structural and policy
settings (Coleman 1993, 1994). For the postwar period, this means tying party
decline to the construction of a "fiscal state" in the 1930s and 1940s that
oriented party competition around macroeconomic management issues on
which the parties in Congress tended to converge at crucial moments (e.g.,
recessions). At the same time, this state structurally limited party responsi-
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bility for the economy. Voters, sensibly, paid decreasing attention to parties,
and either exited the electorate or focused on individual candidates. When
this macroeconomic system began to crumble in the stagflation of the 1970s,
the collapse of the Keynesian consensus created an opening for improvement
in the status of political parties.13 Increased party cohesiveness in Congress
and new attempts to enhance the capacities of party organizations reflected
this improvement. But enough of the fiscal state remained intact that these
changes did not filter down to the electorate. Because elites and voters can
restructure the state, especially at crisis points, the decline of party need not
be inevitable or irreversible. From this approach, "the state of the parties''
is a phrase rich in meaning.
There are three important points here. First, this kind of approach
suggests that party organizational resurgence occurred when it did for some
concrete reasons. Herrnson and Menefee-Libey's (1990) outline of the
development of party organization since 1968 is a necessary but not sufficient
explanation of what happened because it overlooks the success of the parties'
fundraising efforts from the donors' perspective. To understand the changes
in party organization over the past twenty-five years, we need to know why
donors were particularly willing to give in the late 1970s. With the collapse
of the postwar macroeconomic governing consensus and dramatic changes
emerging in the global economy, it is not surprising that concerned elites and
members of the middle class would find Republican appeals to be particularly
attractive. That is, Republican organizational improvement depended
crucially on the availability of a large body of willing givers, and a model of
party development needs to explain why those givers were available at that
particular time. Organizational and technological changes may have helped
locate these donors, but it was less responsible for creating the incentives to
contribute than were the events in the political economy. In this vein, one
might say that the difference between Barry Goldwater in 1964 and Ronald
Reagan in 1980 was not that the Republican Party organization had become
so much more proficient, but that Goldwater was running in 1964 and Reagan
in 198~years that were worlds apart politically and economically.
Second, while political scientists have learned a significant amount by
analyzing the components of political parties in isolation from each other, in
a period of transition such as the present this tripartite model of parties
obscures our understanding (Baer and Bositis 1988:chs. 1-2; ch. 6). We
cannot understand what has happened with party organizations or, more
importantly, the significance of any changes that have occurred, unless we
demonstrate concretely how party activity affects citizens, public officials, and
elections.
The final point is that in a democratic polity the status of political parties
ultimately boils down to the public. Despite the enthusiasm in the party
organization literature, party decline does not end until the voters return to
party. The public's beliefs and behavior regarding the salience and relevance
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of party has to be the ultimate standard of party decline or resurgence. Not
just changes in party activities, but also changes in the state-the structural
settings of parties-are required before the voters return. Voters (and
nonvoters) must believe parties control policy areas, that these policy areas
are important, and that the parties differ in significant ways before we can
expect any resurgence at the voter level. Short of this change, the plausibility
of parties as grassroots, representative institutions comes under serious strain.
The meaningfulness of party organizational "resurgence" in such a system is
dubious.
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it. 1£ we do, it's politically impractical, anywaf (Putnam 1993).
5. Two•party dominance is not in fact a compelling measure of party strength. One can
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and Welch 1987; Caldeira, Clausen, and Patterson 1990; Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990;
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Roscnstone and Hansen 19'J3; and Huckfeldt and Sprague 19!12. In some cascs, however, party
activities and campaign activities arc lumped together. Sec, for example, Caldeira, Cla115cn, and
Patterson (1990). This study also provides a unique measure of turnout as the number of
offices for which a voter recalls voting. While the recall of this information might be
questioned, this is a novel altempt to view voting as a continuum rather than a dichotomous
variable and deserves testing elsewhere.
8. Lawson's (1980) elegant essay acknowledges the difliculties inherent in such a
seemingly simple statement.
9. To avert misunderstanding. I will simply state here that I also believe that parties can
and have made important contributions to American democracy and that they arc crucial agents
of representation. For an elegant discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of party
organizations in pursuit of these functions, sec Pompcr (19!12:2(r 34).
10. On the other side, one might suggest that the improvement in Democratic fortunes in
the late 1980s and 1992 were a result of organizational efforts, but one would need lo contend
with the argument that a fundamental fissure in the Democratic Party organization exploited
by the Democratic Leadership Council was as responsible for this renewed party success (sec
Rae 1991 and Hale (chapter 16) for overviews of the development or the DLC).
11. TI1c notion of a" few' political machines is particularly misleading. Brown and Halaby
(1987) show that from 1870 lo 1945 at least SO percent of all middle and major sized U.S. cities
featured machine politics, from the mid-1870s to the mid-1930s the figures were above 60
percent, and in the early 1890s the figures were at least 80 percent of all cities.
12. Baer and Bositis's (1988) excellent study of how social movements revitalized party
organizations runs into similar difficulties, especially when attempting lo explain low voter
turnout (118--19). This is an important problem for their approach because it is never very
clear why, if social movements infused the political parties with new life and new
representativeness, the impact in the public was rather muted. Jr social movements were
sweeping through party organizations, os the authors argue, then where were the followers of
these movements? Why did movement elites fail to bring their adherents into the party system?
Why is voting turnout stagnant or declining during most of the period they study?
13. Though with a different interpretation than that suggested here, Cotter and Bibby
(1980) also link changing national party organization to the evolution of the New Deal political
settlement.
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Confusions in the Analysis of American Political Parties
Tim Hames
Many, if not most, discussions on the state of modern American political
parties open with what would appear to be relatively straightforward and
simple questions: "Is the party system reviving?' and "Are party organizations
getting stronger'!' Yet despite the seemingly simple nature of these questions,
it is one of the few topics that one can predict will generate controversy.
Many scholars believe the party system is still declining, while others point to
organizational innovations as evidence of revival. l will address two issues
concerning the assessment of changes in American party strength. First, why
is it that political scientists, operating on the basis of very substantial research,
cannot reach agreement on this issue? Second, is the conventional "tripod'
model of American political parties still a valuable way of looking at parties?
On the first count, I will advance three conceptual reasons why political
scientists do not agree on party strength. To begin with, there is confusion
over the functions political parties are supposed to perform, and thus the
frame of reference for improvement or decline. Next, it is unclear against
which yardstick changes in party strength are to be assessed. And finally,
there is disagreement over which aspects of party are most important and,
hence, whether changes in them matter. I will attempt to convince the reader
that many of the differences among political scientists on the state of the
parties derive, explicitly or implicitly, from these conceptual disagreements.
On the second count, I will focus on the last part of the previous point,
namely how parties are defined, particularly the tripod model of American
political parties. Deriving principally from V. 0. Key (1947), this model
identifies a three-fold division of parties: party-in-the-electorate, party-as
organization, and party-in-government. I will attempt to persuade the reader
that this model fails to address some critical matters. For instance, are the
three components equally important or does one matter more than the
others? How does change in one aspect of party affect the others? What
exactly is the relationship between these components and the political party
as an institution overall?
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Taken together, these points produce criteria to assess whether significant
revival of "party-as-institution'' can be achieved through organizational
innovation. Is there revival across all components of party, and if not, why
does the nonrevival or even decline of certain components not matter? Has
the alleged revival of party organization had a beneficial transmission effect
on the party-in-the-electorate? And has the alleged revival of party
organization had a beneficial transmission effect on the actions of the
party-in-government?
I will argue that party organizational revival which does not produce a
sizable transmission effect on party-in-the-electorate and party-in-government
is not worth a great deal; is an interesting phenomenon, no doubt, but hardly
institutional revitalization. In fact, the evidence we have is that the
organization-based renewal has stern limits with regard to party-as-institution
in the wider sense of the term.

The Parties: Declining, Reviving, or What?

An enormous research effort covering virtually every aspect of American
political parties has not, it seems, helped political science achieve a consensus
on the seemingly straightforward question of the direction American political
parties are travelling in. Confusion and disagreement have marked a rollercoaster debate over the last half century. Joseph Schlesinger sums this up by
asking:
What then do we make of parties that win all the elections yet do not control their
nominations, parties that take distinct policy positions yet whose leaders have little
inDucncc over their members, parties whose organizations have decomposed or
atrophied yet whose personnel and payroll have blossomed, parties whose support by
the electorate has declined yet which win more and more of the elections?
(1984:371).

What makes the discussion over party status especially complex is that
scholarly argument rarely consists of individual pieces of evidence being
scrutinised and debated. Instead, different forms of evidence (about say
ticket-splitting or the activities of the Republican National Committee) are
offered. All of this goes to support Jack Dennis' observation: "Despite there
being a quite voluminous literature on partisanship as of the 1980s, one looks
in vain for any comprehensive statement on the theoretical meaning or
purpose of the construct'' (1988:78). In other words, because there is no
agreement on what constitutes party strength, it is not possible to say whether
they are ascending or descending.
There appear to be three major areas of academic dispute that underpin
the division between party "declinists" and "revivalists": what are the
functions of American political parties as institutions; what yardstick is used
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to measure the strength of American political parties; and what aspects of the
American political party are being described. Revivalists may well benefit
from answers to the first two questions, but do much more poorly with
answers to the third.
I. Whal are the junctions of political parties? Perhaps the central issue to
address in this regard is whether political scientists can produce a set of
functions expected of all party systems in all industrialized democracies. If
such a checklist could be created, then it would presumably be possible to
determine how well a particular party system performs and whether it is
getting better or worse.
In fact, this is precisely the approach of many contributors in the field of
comparative party systems, such as Duverger (1954). Some Americans,
including Neumann (1956) and Schattschneider (1942, 1960), have followed
this lead and advocated a version of "responsible" parties. A good
contemporary example is Mileur (1989), who, in offering a model party statute
on behalf of the Committee on Party Renewal, laid down ten principles of
strong party organization in hope of encouraging the developments along this
line. These scholars tend to find that American parties perform poorly, and
are getting worse. But other scholars, such as Epstein (1986), have advanced
an opposite view, claiming that the special circumstances of the United States
have produced a unique set of party institutions. Drawing on this insight,
Schlesinger confidently charges that "there is one standard, a party's ability to
win office" (1984:1153), thus endorsing a version of the "rational-efficient'
party model (Downs 1957).1 Declinists have tended to favor the former view,
while revivalists like the latter.
Given the enormously different aspirations that commentators have for
American political parties, it is hardly surprising that they come to vastly
different conclusions about the state of American political parties at any point
in time. Even assuming that a common goal could be found, the next taskthat of measuring decline or revival in the performance of these functiom;will prove equally taxing.
2 "'11at is meant by decline or revival? If something has allegedly changed,
no matter in what direction, it must have changed relative to some sort of
yardstick. Nevertheless, it is not always obvious what American political
parties are being compared to when participants in the party debate claim
that parties have declined or revived.
For example, one could measure American parties in comparison to the
actual functioning of party systems in other countries. And indeed, the vast
majority of research on American political parties proceeds on the implicit
assumption that American parties can be found lacking by comparison to
European systems (see Epstein 1980). This point of view is a particular
favorite of declinists. However, comparisons to other countries are quite
facile in this regard. International comparison has value only when one
compares like with like, and very few countries have similar constitutions,
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political arrangements, and demography to make a useful standard for the
United States. Observers of U.S. political parties have to look to their own
history and circumstances to evaluate the performance their parties.
Revivalists draw on these arguments to a considerable degree.
This leads to another approach, loaded with common sense, which is to
make a historical comparison. This is not as easy as it sounds because that
first requires agreement on the past strength of the American party system,
and even then a suitable time frame must be chosen. Should we be
comparing the parties of the 1990s with the 1870s or 1970s? Most academics
accept that parties were strong in the period between the Civil War and the
Progressive Era (Silby 1991). That assertion is made because the loyalty of
voters and officeholders to the party appears to have been strong and the
level of party activity high. Declinists most often compare contemporary
parties to their late-nineteenth-century ancestors. On the other hand, the
post- Second World War era appears to have been marked by the decline of
machines, patronage, voter partisanship, and officeholder regularity (Ware
1985). Revivalists most often compare today's parties to their immediate
predecessors (see for example, Sabato 1988:ch. 1). These differences are
compounded by further uncertainty over what part of the parties one is
supposed to pass judgement on.
3. Which aspect of the political party? For most of the last four decades
American political parties have been analyzed according to the formula
devised by V. 0. Key. He argued that:
There are other senses in which the term "party' is used, Often ii refers to an entity
which rolls into one the party•in•the-electorate, the professional political group, the
parly•in-the-lcgislalurc, and the parly-in-thc-govcrnmenl • .. In truth, this all•
encompassing usage has its legitimate application, for all types of gro~ called "party'
interact more or less closely and at times maybe as one (1947: 156)

At some point the party-in-the-legislature and the party-in-the-government
merged so that the standard division bequeathed by Key to American political
science included three subsections: the electorate, government, and
organization.
As a number of observers have pointed out, the core of the dispute
between those favoring party decline or revival has come through employing
different parts of Key's tripod. The party decline school initially came to
dominance based on evidence about the decomposition of
party-in-the-electorate. The party revival school has been based on evidence
about party-as-organization. Even those strongly committed to one school or
the other have been known to concede that their opponent's views on their
particular leg of Key's tripod may be valid. The reaction of most outside
observers has been to recognize two different trends and either declare the
contest a draw or award victory on points to whichever side they believe has
displayed the greater degree of change. Very few have categorically rejected
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the view that the party-in-the-electorate has declined or that party-asorganization has revived. Even fewer have asked whether Key's model is
sufficient to base such judgements on.
Unanswered Questions in the Analysis of Parties

The gridlock that exists in the debate over the plight of the American
political party is thus strongly related to the Key tripod. Conventional wisdom
seems to accept that there are different trends evident in the electorate and
organization, while no dear view has been established on the party-ingovemment.
In my opinion, use of the conventional tripod model produces a more
complex analysis still. For there appear to be opposite trends within the
electorate, government, and organization as well as across them. Although
there has been a general decomposition in the party-in-the-electorate, as
witnessed by the rising numbers of independents, greater ticket-splitting, and
lower voter participation (Wattenberg 1990), this has coincided with a process
whereby the most politically interested members of the electorate have been
sorting themselves out along a liberal-conservative spectrum. In other words,
at exactly the same time that the great mass of voters have disengaged from
the parties, Democrats and Republicans have displayed greater philosophical
consistency.
Similarly, although national and state party organizations have dearly
shown a resurgence over the past two decades (Cotter et al. 1984), there is
very little evidence that this change has translated into stronger vitality in
party-in-the-electorate. Likewise, within the party-in-government there is also
the paradox that most research indicates that individual members of Congress
are more independent from their party, yet at the same time the proportion
of all roll-call votes that can be described as party-based has increased
(Davidson 1992).
The Key tripod, if employed in its usual form, is thus likely to leave
political observers in deeper confusion about what the present tendencies
really are. There are three very important questions that the conventional
formulation does not explore which seem quite fundamental to the question
of party strength. Do all elements of the tripod have equal value? What is
the relationship between changes in one component to the others? And is
party-as-institution more than the combined effect of the three components?
1. Do all the elements of pmty have equal value? Key provided no ranking
to his three components of party. Should we therefore assume that the three
are equal? Are we to assume that the three components of party are all
influenced by similar external phenomena, or can they exist quite
independently of each other? If external factors have an impact on any one
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component of party, should it be assumed that there will also be a strong
effect on the other elements, only a weak effect, or no such effect at all?
In my view, it is possible to rank the three components of party in a
meaningful manner, and a rough ranking is implicit in the literature. If given
a choice, many if not most scholars would give priority to
party-in-the-electorate or party-in-government over party-as-organization. A
choice between the first two would depend on whether one preferred an
integrated public or government accomplishment It is unlikely, however, that
such an observer would believe that enhancing party organization was equally
worthy. Put differently, if with a stroke of a pen the United States could be
given party loyalty from its the voters or party government from its politicians
at the price of weakened party organization, there are few revivalists who
would not accept the bargain.
2 Do changes in one component produce changes in the others? The role
of party organization would be significantly more flattering if it was believed
that through invigorated organization there also emerged-by some form of
transmission mechanism-greater prospects for citizen loyalty to the party or
greater probability of allegiance to the party among officials. Which brings
in the second question left unanswered by Key: the relationship among the
party components. If improvement in party organization produced a strong
positive impact on the party-in-the-electorate and/or party-in-government
then, then it would have a meaningful role in reviving the overall party as an
institution. If it does not, then its value is much diminished. If the
Republican National Committee's budget doubles and its payroll triples,
increasing the scale of support services it can provide to candidates-but
without effecting the electorate or elected-then it might be of interest to
candidates, campaign managers, and consultants, but it would be of only
marginal consequence to those hoping for a stronger party institution. It is
barely more significant than if a conservative-inclined interest group doubled
its budget, tripled its payroll, and boosted its support services to
(predominantly) Republican candidates.
The questions of "Is the party system reviving?' and "Are party
organizations getting stronger?" are, therefore, not two ways of saying the
same thing.
Unilateral improvements in (especially national) party
organization that have no transmission effect on the electorate or elected are
not particularly important. The emergence of the national Republican and
Democratic party organizations as "super PACs'' could in this sense be
regarded as a sign of weakness in that it is the only role left to them because
the really important ones of motivating voters and politicians have been lost.
3. Is party-as-institution more than the combined effects of its components?
In this author's view, political parties, even in the American setting, could
and should be more than just bodies that stand political candidates under
their label. After all, nearly every conception of party contains the core notion
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that the value of such institutions comes from the linkage they provide
between the governed and the government. The importance of this linkage
in the relationship between organizational activity and the other components
of the tripod is implicitly recognized in much of the organizational revival
literature: "Thus the strengthening of the party organizations, and especially
national party organizations, may lead to the development of a more partyorientated electorate and a more cohesive set of government parties"
(Herrnson 1986:590).
Yet there is a bit of a contradiction here. Those who accept the
rational-efficient model as the limit of reasonable aspirations for American
parties must acknowledge that this model is indifferent to party-in-government
and party-in-the-electorate. This view of parties (Downs 1957) makes the
capture of reliable political support the ultimate goal; notions of articulating
and implementing policy demands, aggregating interests, educating the pubic,
and providing avenues for the fulfillment of perceived civic duties are byproducts of electoral activity-that is, if they occur at all. Party revivalists,
many of whom would be happy to endorse the rational-efficient model, have
conceded the demise of party-in-the-electorate and party-in-government, but
want to argue that this is counteracted, perhaps overcome, by an increase in
party-as-organization. This seems a major inconsistency on their behalf. If
they chose to espouse a rational-efficient view of parties, nonorganizational
components would be of little consequence. On the other hand, if they hold
a more responsible view, as much of the literature seems to suggest, how
might they, in all good conscious, speak of revitalized parties when the ingovernment and in-electorate components lag far behind?
If political parties can no longer fulfill at least some responsible functions
in the electorate, as well as help over come, in V. 0. Key's terms,
"constitutional obstruction" in the government, why then do we persist in
suggesting that "the party goes on" (Kayden and Mahe 1985), instead of" the
party being over'' (Broder 1971)? As Kay Lawson put it when discussing
organizational improvements at the Republican National Committee: "Such
steps are commendable and should be continued, but by themselves do
not...suffice to renew parties. The parties need to undertake changes that
expand their role, not merely those that make them better at doing the little
that presently remains for them do to'' (1987:257).
The Limits of Party Organization-Based Revival

The challenge for those who want to demonstrate the overall revival of
party-as-institution through organizational improvement is thus stronger than
merely showing that national party organizations are carrying out more
activities. Real institutional revival requires three things:
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It should be shown that there is significant organizational revival across
all levels of party organization in the United States-or it should be
explained why revival in one or more levels is sufficient.
2. It should be shown that as a consequence of party organizational change
voters are casting more party-based ballots than previously.
3. It should be shown that as the result of party organizational change,
practicing political figures are acting in a more party-oriented manner.
1.

Unless positive answers can be given to these questions, why should
political scientists be any more interested in the precise activities of the
Republican National Committee than the American Medical Association
PAC? Indeed, unless linkage relationships are present, it is perfectly possible
that in any given year party organizations may raise more money, hire more
employees, finance more programs, and give more money to the candidates
without any significant effect on the political system.
Overall, there is no substantial and convincing evidence that any of the
three criteria for genuine party organization-based revival have been met.
Even at the height of the Republican National Committee's fundraising
success in the mid-1980s, Kayden a11d Mahe (1985) conceded that local
political parties were in a state of collapse. Although some evidence has been
presented that state parties were developing their own bureaucracies, that
process seems to have stopped once the peak in national committee
fundraising was passed.
Likewise, no major evidence has been outlined to show that national party
organizational activity has transformed unattached citizens into partisans.
Although donations from the major parties may assist a candidate in
advancing their message in a particular contest, it is unclear if such activities
have persuaded voters not just to vote for a particular candidate, but also to
vote for another candidate from that party in a future election.
Until now, there has also been no overwhelming evidence that party
activities have produced party-oriented legislators. This should not be
surprising, given that party donations to candidates are still small compared
to gifts from individuals and PACs. In addition, those candidates most aided
by parties were invariably in the most competitive districts and are thus most
likely to represent their district's interests at the expense of party unity.
Indeed, most evidence suggests that major party candidates in danger of
defeat will receive funding from their parties regardless of their record of
party loyalty in office.

Conclusion
The first section of this chapter noted three reasons why there is such
disagreement among political scientists on the present strength of the
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American party system, namely, the lack of an agreed set of functions for
American political parties, the uncertainty over the yardstick with which to
assess decline or revival, and disagreement over which component of party is
most important. I noted that many of the unfavorable comparisons that have
been made involving American parties involve-implicitly or explicitly-a
universal set of objectives for all party systems regardless of the wider political
system in which they operate. I also noted that many of the unfavorable
historical comparisons that have been made about the modern parties might
also be criticized. In the sense that these comments lower the threshold that
the American party system has to meet to be thought of as performing
satisfactorily, they are obviously of more help to the revivalists than their
declinist opponents.
From there, though, the chapter noted that much of the current discussion
about the parties performance was cast in terms of Key's division of the
American party into three distinct components. In recent years, party
observers have reached broad agreement that the party-in-the-electorate has
continued to decompose, but that party-as-organization has been strengthened.
The attitude of many has been to see the two movements as canceling each
other out. This chapter strongly disagrees. Changes in party organization that
cannot trigger development in party-in-the-electorate or party-in-government
have little if any impact on the wider party-as-institution. In this sense, the
correct answer to the question of" Are party organizations getting stronger?"
is "Who cares?" And the question of"ls the party system reviving?" cannot
be yet answered in the affirmative.

Notes
1. For a concise review of both the responsible and rational-efficient models of political
parties, sec Wright (1971).
2. It should be stressed that Key borrowed this formula from Ralph Goldman, M Party
Chairmen and Party Factions 1781r 1900' (University of Chicago, doctoral diss, 1951).
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Voters, Governmental Officials, and Party
Organizations: Connections and Distinctions
John Frendreis
This chapter provides a response to the chapters by Coleman and Hames
in this volume (chapters 20 and 21). The two authors essentially address the
same issue: Are American political parties of genuine relevance to the
outcomes of American electoral politics? The answers provided by these two
authors are guarded, but negative. In particular, both take aim at what
Coleman describes as "the new orthodoxy in party scholarship," which he feels
has declared American political parties to be resurgent Both of these authors
feel this conclusion is overstated, arising from a misplaced emphasis upon
party organizations and a failure of contemporary party scholars to take into
account evidence of continued party decline among voters and in government.
Since I was asked to respond in part because I am a contributor to the new
orthodoxy (e.g., Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989; Frendreis, Gibson, and
Vertz 1990; Frendreis and Gitelson, 1993), I will not disappoint either the
editors or readers by failing to disagree with both Coleman and Hames.1
In the grand tradition of such responses, I agree with much that both of
these authors say, but I also disagree with both on a fundamental point. My
agreement is with what they identify as weaknesses in our current state of
knowledge, particularly with regard to the relationship between party
organizational activity and what happens in the electorate and in government.
My disagreement, however, is over what constitutes party activity, or, more
precisely, what constitutes our objects of inquiry-American political parties.
With apologies to Frank Sorauf, V. 0. Key, and Ralph Goldman, I will
suggest that it is time to bid farewell to the idea that parties have three
component!t-parties-as-organizations, parties-in-the-electorate, and parties-in
govemmen� whose joint condition define the fonn and function of American
political parties. I will argue instead that it is only the first of these that
comprises "political parties'' and that recognition of this offers the best hope
for the advancement of our knowledge about the place of parties in American
politics. Before presenting this model of American political parties, however,
I will first directly address the arguments advanced by Coleman and Hames.
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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Both of these scholars offer similar accounts of recent work on political
parties. They note that a steady stream of work over the past fifteen years
has found party organizations as being active, and to the extent that trends are
apparent, they appear to becoming more, rather than less, active (see Cotter
et al. 1984; Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989; Frendreis et al. 1993). This
is especially true of national (Longley 1992; Herrnson 1990; Bibby 1986) and
state (Bibby 1990; Patterson 1989) party organizations, but also extends to
local parties (Gibson et al. 1985). Increasing levels of activity are found in a
variety of areas, including the bureaucratization of party organizations, the
variety and level of campaign activities performed, and the amounts of
campaign money raised and distributed (Herrnson 1993; Dwyre 1993).
Neither Hames nor Coleman dispute the substance of these studies;
rather, they argue that the implications which are drawn from them are
flawed. In Coleman's view," the party organization literature has leapt too
quickly to words like 'resurgence' and 'revitalization.' Increased activity
should only be the start of a conception of resurgent parties" ( ch. 20:xx,
emphasis in original). Coleman goes on to argue that the behavior of the
party-in-the-electorate is key to assessing the vibrancy of American parties and
that the new orthodoxy has failed to uncover evidence of resurgence or
revitalization in this area. In a similar vein, Hames contends that a correct
understanding of contemporary American parties must focus on the
interrelationships between the three _components of parties. Since he finds
little evidence of "transmission effects'' between active organizations and
either the party-in-the-electorate or the party-in-government, he dismisses the
increasingly bureaucratized and active party organizations as being little
different from PACs. He concludes: "Changes in party organization that
cannot trigger developments in the party-in-the-electorate or the party-ingovernment have little if any impact on the wider party-as-institution. In this
sense, the correct answer to the question of 'Are party organizations getting
stronger?' is 'Who cares?"' (chapter 21:xxx).
It is here that I part company with both scholars. I believe their accounts
of recent scholarship are accurate. Beyond this, their identification of a key
problem-the apparent lack of parallel trends in party activity, mass
partisanship, and party government-accurately identifies what should be the
target of the next wave of party research. My main problem with both
authors' arguments, however, lies in the implications of Hames's phrase, "the
wider party-as-institution." In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that
there is no "wide!'' party beyond the party-as-organization, and I will suggest
how the acceptance of this perspective will define how research aimed at
understanding the problems Coleman and Hames have identified should be
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oriented. Before turning to this task, however, I must respectfully disagree
with a few of the specific positions advanced by the authors, particularly
Coleman.
While I am flattered to be listed among the creators of a new orthodoxy,
I must confess that such an orthodoxy is based upon a fairly small amount of
research. Particularly with respect to state and local party organizations, there
has been one major study, the Party Transformation Study (Cotter et al.
1984), two partial follow-up studies (Gibson et al. 1989; and Frendreis et al.
1993), and an unrelated comparative analysis 0£ party organizations in several
major American cities (Crotty 1986). Aside from this, there have been only
scattered studies of organizations at one point in time in a few locales (e.g.,
Lawson, Pomper, and Moakley 1986; Pomper 1990). Alan Gitelson and I
have discussed this problem at length elsewhere (Frendreis and Gitelson
1993); I will simply note briefly tha~despite the presumed importance of
political parties to the American poli~we have relatively little contemporary
data on parties, compared with other political phenomena, such as the
behavior of voters, legislators, or candidates. This is especially true with
regard to the functioning of state and local parties in state and local politics
and government. While I agree that the central focus for our research should
shift from documenting what parties do toward understanding what difference
parties make, we should recognize that there continues to be an urgent need
for more complete cross-sectional and longitudinal data on party activity.
In a similar vein, I would also disagree that this research suffers from a
mindset based upon "fighting the last battle."
The original Party
Transformation Study was conceived at a time when Broder's view that The
Party's Over (1971) really was orthodox. The research I did with Gibson and
Vertz followed fast upon Wattenberg's documentation of what he felt was The
Decline of American Political Parties 1952-1980 (1984). In our 1990 article
(Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990), we described the lack of correspondence
between organizational and mass partisanship trends as paradoxical, an
observation which still holds true. Rather than being consumed by a desire
to further dispute Broder's twenty-year-old position, however, I see this work
as an ongoing attempt to make sense of what continues to be a paradox.
Finally, I would dispute that this research suffers from a misplaced
emphasis upon party organizations, rather than the really important things like
governance or mass political behavior. First, it should be evident from my
comments thus far that I believe we still lack a clear understanding of what
contemporary parties actually do. Second, it is not exactly the case that
research has ignored the relationship between party activity and other
electoral phenomena. In addition to my own work cited above, this question
has attracted the attention of a number of other scholars, including Herrnson
(1986, 1988), Gibson and Smith (1984), and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992).
(For an extension of this work to a comparative setting, see Whitely and Seyd
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1994). Indeed, this represents the latest wave in a line of research that
stretches back to Eldersveld (1956), Katz and Eldersveld (1961), Cutright
(1963), Kramer (1970-71), and Crotty (1971). To me, the problem is not that
previous research suffers from a misplaced emphasis upon uninteresting or
well-worn organizational phenomena; rather, it is that there has been too little
research to confidently describe contemporary parties in very much detail.
Our lack of understanding of the electoral relevance of contemporary parties
is merely one symptom of this broader problem.

A Model or American Political Parties
My basic disagreement with both Coleman and Hames is with the model
of political parties implied by Hames's phrase, "the wider party-as-institution."
Following Schlesinger (1984), I would argue that the party should be
conceived as consisting of those individuals and institutions whose manifest
purpose is the contesting of elections with a goal of winning the elections.
Obviously, this is hardly a novel conception of party. It corresponds closely
to the "minimal definition" presented by Sartori: "A party is any political
group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable
of placing through election (free or nonfree), candidates for public office''
(1976:63). Even Key, it should be noted, stressed the importance of focusing
on those who "carry on the routine work in the winning and maintenance of
power," a group termed the "party organization" or "inner core" (Key
1947:247, quoting Gosnell's entry in Volume XI of the Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences). Key concludes: "Nevertheless, in the examination of
political party activities it is well to concentrate attention on the inner core
or the organization, for that really is 'the party"' (Key 1947:247).
Beyond this, party scholars need to take seriously the word "organization"
in the phrase "party organization." Organizational theory is well-developed,
yet insights from this field are only beginning to be adapted to the study of
party organizations. Identifying the degree of bureaucratization of state and
local parties and assessing its connection with programmatic activity ( e.g.,
Cotter et al. 1984; Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989) represents one step in
this direction. Another recent example is Baer's (1993) discussion of the role
of the "integrative community life" of parties, a concept she draws from
March and Olsen (1988).
Although analogies are imperfect, I would link organizational theory with
the definition of party I have set forth above as follows. In the electoral
setting, the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States can be
considered to be two finns, competing for customers in such a way that a vote
for the party's candidates represents a purchase of the firm's product.
Currently, the two parties collectively dominate the market, essentially
because of the high cost of entry into the market. For a number of reasons,
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particularly favorable state laws and the absence of proportional representation. it is difficult for a new firm (i.e., a new party) to successfully enter
the market. As a result, the two parties operate as a duopoly, dominating the
market, as Schlesinger (1991) has noted.
Furthermore, these two finns operate in an atmosphere of declining brand
loyalty, i.e., a weakening of partisanship. This means that the reliability of
consumers' purchasing decisions is declining, as is apparent in the increase in
independence, split-ticket voting, and defection by party voters. However,
this decline in partisanship should be seen for what it is-a change in the
marketplace in which the firms compete rather than a direct symptom of
organizational decline by the firm. As I note in the next section, a
methodological decision not to view mass partisanship as a component of the
political party has important consequences in a search for connections
between party activity and mass political behavior.
At the same time, while the structure of the electoral market has
insulated the two parties from ready competition, the declining brand loyalty
means that the system is potentially unstable. This has a number of
implications. First, it would suggest that, ceteris paribus, greater than
average swings in outcomes from election to election are possible. (Of course,
not all things are equal, e.g., trends of increasing incumbency advantages.)
Second, there should be a drop-off in purchases based solely upon brand
loyalty, e.g., an increase over time in ballot roll-off for minor offices. Third,
if a new firm is capable of absorbing the costs of entry into the market, it has
the potential for significant market penetration. From this perspective, the
1992 presidential campaign of Ross Perot is less a sign of the further decline
of the two parties than it is the exception that proves the rule: a "third party'
candidate threatens the recent dominance of the two parties described by
Schlesinger (1991) only when he or she is backed by the considerable
resources necessary to overcome the high costs of market entry.
In the next two sections, I describe the implications for further research
of this model of American parties as firms operating in an electoral
marketplace. In particular, I discuss how this might guide our research into
the two critical linkages highlighted by Coleman and Hames: the linkages
between parties and voters, and between parties and government officeholders.

Parties and Voters

Coleman's essay identifies two central questions that must be answered
about voters: "What has caused decreased partisanship?' "What has caused
declines in voter trust of political parties as institutions?' At first glance, it
would seem that these two questions are linked and, moreover, that the
answers must focus at least in part upon the behavior of parties themselves.

344

The State of the Parties

Wattenberg's decision to title his studies of declining voter loyalty as portraits
of declining political parties rather than declining political partisanship clearly
implies this (Wattenberg 1984, 1990).
The methodological peril of trying to consider trends in mass political
behavior as an attribute of parties becomes readily apparent when one adopts
the perspective that parties and voters are as distinct as firms and their
customers. What causes changes in consumer tastes? To be sure, the
experience of U.S. automakers in the last twenty years suggests that brand
loyalty may break down in the face of poor product quality or bad service.
Yet economic history is full of examples of firms losing customer support
because of exogenous factors, such as technological change or changes in
customer needs and wants.
Considered in this light, the behavior of the parties becomes only one of
several possible causal agents which might influence trends in partisanship.
An example of another potential culprit is the rising level of education and
middle-class sensibilities among the American electorate. Coleman notes the
breakdown in the apparently strong linkage between party machines and
voters that existed in the late nineteenth century. Accounts of this breakdown
generally stress the role of rising education and the bureaucratization of the
welfare function as causes. Neither of these factors could be regarded as
evidence of poor performance on the part of the parties, behavior which
might induce a turning away on the part of voters.
If we only take the period for which we have reliable time series data on
mass political attitudes and behaviors-roughly the last 50 years-it is difficult
to identify any long term trend in the behavior of parties which correlates with
the decline in mass partisanship. Consider the products that the parties have
to offer to the voters: candidates and party platforms. With the possible
exception of presidential nominees, any analysis of today's candidates with
those of the 1950s would show today's to be better educated and more
knowledgeable about policy problems and the powers of the offices they are
seeking (Ehrenhalt 1991). One of the effects of the decline in political
machines was the elimination of offices awarded to party regulars who were
unprepared for and uninterested in them. Similarly, it is not at all clear that
the quality of party platforms has declined over this period. On the other
hand, it is certain that other trends, many of them long-term, underlying
demographic changes, can be discerned over the same time period, and some
of these may be substantially correlated with changes in mass partisanship.
None of this is meant to indicate that there is no connection between
party activity and the attitudes of voters. Yet, it is a very different proposition
to regard party activity as one of many potential factors which might influence
consumer preferences rather than to see these preferences as direct reflections
of party failure or irrelevance. Coleman is correct in asserting that we do not
understand the decline in partisanship, but this assertion cuts both ways.
Coleman's skepticism of a "counteracting party model," in which party
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organizational strength may be offsetting the effects of these broader social
trends, is equally unwarranted. If it turns out that the widespread and welldocumented decline in partisanship during the 1960s and 1970s slowed or
even stopped during the 1980s, it may yet support the view that party activity
has altered an otherwise exogenously determined decline in partisanship.
Coleman's dismissal of what was never more than a hypothesis is premature;
more appropriately, the "counteracting party moder" needs to be tested.
Parties and Government Officials

The view of American political parties as two firms competing in a
duopolistic electoral marketplace marked by declining brand loyalty addresses
most directly the relationship between the parties and the voters. However,
with some modifications, this can be extended to address the relationship
between the parties and government office-holders. Before directly addressing
this linkage, it is necessary to briefly discuss the relationship between parties
and public policy.
The conception of political party I am arguing for does not make direct
reference to parties as agents of policy formation and enactment. If one
focuses on parties as purely electoral actors, policy is relevant only to the
extent that it enhances or retards the ability of the parties to attract voters.
Clearly, this is neither how voters nor normative treatments of democracy
view public policy. For example, it is likely that at least some of the current
voter distrust of political parties is part of a general lack of regard for
government institutions, a sentiment based at least partially upon the
performance of these institutions in enacting policy.
At the same time, to consider the behavior of Congress as a manifestation
of the activities of the political parties-of the parties-in-government-just as
surely does violence to the truth. Congress and the parties are separate
institutions; as a result, they must be kept analytically and methodologically
distinct. However, members of Congress are part of both of these institutions.
How is their behavior to be understood? Using the market model I have
proposed, they are either the product being marketed, or the sales force, or
both; perhaps the best corporate analogy is that they operate as independent
franchise holders.
The logic of this argument is that the behavior of legislators and political
executives should not be seen as the behavior of parties, but as a function of
the behavior of parties. Legislatures and executive agencies are not a
component of the parties, but are institutions which the parties seek to
control. Considered from this perspective, two questions emerge as being
critical. In what way do parties control the behavior of governmental office
holders? What is the relationship between the behavior of governmental
office holders and the linkage between parties and the voters?
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The first of these two questions is the most accessible and is indirectly the
subject of a substantial body of recent research, especially with respect to
Congress (e.g., Little and Patterson 1993; Rohde 1991; Huitt 1990; Sinclair,
1983; Jones 1970; Ripley 1969). However, in general this work approaches
the relationship of party to Congress from the congressional perspective. As
a result, it focuses less on the means by which the parties control legislators
and more on the mechanisms of partisan influence that exist internal to the
legislature.
From the perspective of the party organizations, a somewhat different set
of questions emerges. To the extent that the organization (the party) has a
set of institutional goals regarding the behavior of legislators, (e.g., that the
legislators seek to enact a specific set of policies), the problem for the party
is insuring that the individuals making up the organization (i.e., party
members) behave properly, that is, in concert with the organizational goals.
The problem of American parties is immediately apparent: unlike many other
organizations, American parties cannot usually replace recalcitrant members,
at least the members who hold elective office. The direct primary, more than
any other factor, is responsible for the weak hold of American parties over
government institutions. Although this is fundamental to understanding the
operation of American parties in a comparative perspective, the diffusion of
the direct primary is essentially a historical fact. The question for scholars
now is how the party exerts control over its office-holders in the absence of
the ability to readily replace them.
Here, organizational theory offers some clues. Perrow (1979) observes
that the surest means of organizational control is the inculcation of the
organization's norms in its members. Baer's (1993) discussion of the
integrative community life of parties suggests that parties do indeed attempt
to do this. In addition, like all organizations, parties seeking to structure their
members' attitudes should utilize recruitment and socialization as means to
this end. Finally, even though parties cannot definitively eliminate deviant
members, they still can seek to influence these members via the offering of
selective incentives, such as funding and support by other group members.
Seen in this light, many of the party organizational development activities
over the last two decades documented by party scholars may be seen as
manifestations of the efforts of parties to achieve greater control over their
office holders-assuming they wish to do so. Still unclear is the relationship
between achieving such control and the manifest purpose of parties, to contest
and win elections. More important, however, is the fact that in this area of
party life, too, we actually possess little systematic evidence assessing the
linkage between party activities and manifestations of partisan control over
their office holders. It is clear that parties are weaker in this area than a
century ago; however, there is no real data to support Hames's and Coleman's
assertions that recent efforts toward strengthening party organizations bear no
relationship toward recent trends in parties' influence over office holders.
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Party Organizations, Governmental Officials, and Voters
It is easy for someone whose vision is narrowed by their own research
agenda to construct a party-centered vision of American political life.
Coleman and Hames raise the question: Is such a perspective justified? This
question might be approached in two ways, normatively and empirically.
From a normative perspective, the answer is surely yes. Although the U.S.
Constitution is silent on the subject of political parties, it is virtually
impossible to discuss the operation of the U.S. polity as a democracy without
reference to parties. Technological change may eventually foster the creation
of governing mechanisms embodying direct democracy, but for the near
future, it is likely that most of our vehicles for self-governance will embody
representative democracy. Given this, it seems likely that political parties-even weakened ones-will remain central components of discussions of the
linkage between voters and governmental officials, between the public will
and public policy.
The empirical basis for seeing political parties as central to the workings
of a democratic American polity are less clear. Both Coleman and Hames
are skeptical of the relevance of parties to either voters or government,
although they temper their concerns with a desire for more research.
Obviously, on this latter point we are in agreement. A general theme
throughout this essay is that we actually know very little about the
relationships among parties, voters, and government. To say that parties are
not moribund-as might be expected if trends in mass partisanship were
closely tied to the internal vitality of the parties-is not to say that we are
certain that they exert a powerful hold over both voters and office-holders.
The new orthodoxy that Coleman claims to see is based on a few summary
speculations rather than upon the main substance of what party organizational
scholars have said.
Throughout this essay I have identified a number of significant questions
which should be the target of the next generation of party scholarship. What
has caused decreased partisanship? What has caused the declines in voter
trust of political parties? In what way do parties control the behavior of
governmental office holders? What is the relationship between the behavior
of government office-holders and the linkage between parties and the voters?
That these questions could be deduced from the old three component
model of American parties does not mean that this is simply "old wine in new
wineskins." The conceptualization of parties as having three components
confuses the objects of party activity with the party itself. This is more readily
apparent with regard to the voters, but is true nonetheless for government as
well. That parties seek to control government does not mean that party
members within the government are acting upon the shared organizational
norms that define the party when they exercise their authority as office
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holders. Conceiving of the office-holders as a "party-in-government'' has
diverted attention away from the very real question of how the institution of
the party seeks to influence and control the institutions of government.
Perhaps it seems unexceptional to argue for a continued and expanded
research agenda for the study of American political parties. To avoid
appearing pedestrian, I will offer a somewhat bolder suggestion. I believe that
it is time for scholars of American politics to come together to support a
substantial data collection effort, which will provide a basis for extensive
analysis of American political parties in the same way that the National
Election Studies surveys have created a foundation for work in electoral
behavior. At a minimum, the scholarly community should systematically
collect data on party activity, electoral behavior, and governmental policy
making for a broad cross-section of political systems and over an extended
period of time. An obvious setting for such research would be the states,
which would permit some variation in significant social, political, and legal
variables to be manifested in the data. Even focusing on the states, though,
we know that data on both local and national party activity (and probably
electoral and governmental activity) also need to be incorporated into such
a research effort. As Alan Gitelson and I have suggested elsewhere, such an
effort argues strongly for the development of a consortium of scholars who
will bring diverse concerns and perspectives to a common effort to raise our
understanding of parties to the level already enjoyed by other key aspects of
American politics, such as voting or the operation of Congress (Frendreis and
Gitelson 1993).
Throughout this essay I have argued for the adoption of a perspective that
sees the party organizations as the party. A specific formulation that I have
offered is to conceive of the Democratic and Republican parties as two firms
competing in a duopolistic marketplace marked in recent years by declining
brand loyalty among consumers. Further, these firms can be seen to face
unique problems of internal cohesion in that some of their key members,
candidates/office-holders, cannot be controlled via replacement. I have tried
to indicate how adoption of this perspective might focus subsequent
scholarship on the beckoning research frontier. Whatever perspective is
adopted, however, one thing is clear: without additional research, future
volumes on the "state of the parties'' will continue to substitute discussions
based upon a clear understanding of the actual relationships among parties,
voters, and office-holders with ones driven by speculation, skepticism, and
hope.

Notes
l. I wish to thank Laura Vertz and Alan Gitclson for their comments on this chapter.
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Understanding Organizational Innovation
and Party-Building
Andrew M. Appleton
Daniel S. Ward

This chapter reports early results of a project examining patterns of
innovation in party organizations. The question we address is: why and how
do parties introduce innovations in organizational structures and behavior?
For example, to which forces do parties respond when they employ new
methods, install new structures, or involve new personnel? Equally so, what
forces push parties to abandon certain practices, to dismantle parts of their
structure, and to distance themselves from particular people? It is perhaps
axiomatic that organizations have a built in resistance to change. Yet
ecological theories of organizations emphasize an environmental imperative:
either organizations adapt to new conditions in the environment or they
perish. As we will argue below, one pole of the continuum of adaptation is
represented by innovation. At a time when the American political system is
in a state of flux, many are attempting to predict the future of the political
parties. To a measurable degree, that future is inextricably linked to the
capacity and willingness of parties to innovate. Although this chapter will
concentrate on the recent past of state party organizations, the goal is to help
us better understand the impact of certain events on those organizations and,
in doing so, increase our predictive ability.
The State Party Archive Project, of which this study is part, has as its goal
the collection of observed, as opposed to reported, data on party organization
and behavior. Although not critical of previous attempts to open up the
"black box'' of party organization through the use of survey-based measures
(eg., the Party Transformation Study {PTS] of Cotter et al. 1984), we have
argued that the continuing neglect of observed measures of party organization
limit our ability to test hypotheses regarding organizational practice and
behavior. Our work is intended to demonstrate that such measures are in fact
available, primarily through the records kept by many party units; records
which have been dramatically under-exploited by the recently revitalized study
This material is copyrighted (1994) and posted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
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of party organization. As party scholars heed continued calls to incorporate
the organizational dimension into the study of party development, we hope
that the State Party Archive Project can contribute a rich source of data to
complement the existing survey-based information already generating much
lively scholarly interest and debate.
In the first stage of this project, we sought to demonstrate the utility of
exploiting party records to generate observed measures of organizational
practices and behavior (Appleton and Ward 1993b). Our approach was to
select a small number of state parties and to gain access to any records they
might have produced over a limited period; we then examined the feasibility
of generating standardized measures that ultimately could be used in the
construction of a longitudinal dataset. Our interest in sound longitudinal
indicators is derived from our broader theoretical interests in party
organizational adaptation, laid out in earlier work (Appleton and Ward
1993a). Using this limited case strategy, we hoped to provide a focused
comparison of one feature of party organizational adaptation, namely the
propensity of parties to respond to unanticipated electoral events. For
reasons of time and access, this chapter concerns only two state parties, both
of which had experienced unexpected electoral breakthroughs in the early
1960s. However, the long-term consequences of these victories were rather
different; the use of party documents allowed us to conclude that a significant
factor in the ability of a state party organization to build around previous
success was the absence of factionalism in the party elite. This in turn, we
argued, was linked to the ability of the party to maintain a distinction between
organizational and electoral efforts (Appleton and Ward 1994). While this
distinction is not always perfect even at the conceptual level, it corresponds
to that which organizational theorists have made between activities that are
either of an organization-maintenance nature or of a goal-directed variety
During the course of this examination of party records, we also became
interested in distinguishing between different kinds of change in party
organizations. One of the advantages of our observed measures of party
behavior is that they permit us to make relatively precise recordings of the
introduction of new forms of organization. Not only can we account for the
extent and timing of such changes, it is also possible in the majority of cases
to trace the stimulus for them. On the basis of the information that we have
collected from our pilot study, and building upon the intellectual and
theoretical foundations of organizational literature, we will outline a scheme
by which innovation in party organization may be classified and suggest a
model by which this phenomenon may be better understood at the state level.
Before we do so, however, we will briefly report the location and extent of the
data gathered in the course of our study.

The Patterns of Organizational Innovation

351

The Republican Party Archives or Texas and Arkansas
Our pilot study of party organizational development was undertaken in
Arkansas and Texas and has served several purposes.1 First, it has allowed
us to explore the implications of our more general model of party
development. Thus in our previous case study, we examined the hypothesis
that party organizations would respond to unexpected electoral victories by
implementing a program of organizational development, independent from the
campaign activities of the party (Appleton and Ward 1994). The use of party
records enabled us to provide an explanation of the relative success of the
Texas Republicans in their efforts to capitalize on John Tower's 1961 Senate
election victory, and compare it to the relative failure of the Arkansas
Republican Party to build a durable winning coalition in the wake of
Winthrop Rockefeller's tenure as governor.
The second benefit of the pilot study has been our ability to evaluate the
utility of archival data sources for students of party organization and
development. Below, we will briefly describe the extent and location of the
party records that were available in our research. In a follow-up to this work,
we conducted two surveys-one of state parties, the other of state archives
(see Appleton and Ward 1993b for the detailed results) which have shown
that these two states are not atypical in the party records that they have to
offer the scholarly community. Thus we feel confident that our pilot project
has demonstrated the feasibility of constructing valid observed measures of
party organization.
Third, this pilot study has convinced us of the need to refine our notions
of organizational adaptation and change. Just as we believe that there are
qualitatively and quantitatively different orders of change manifested in party
organizations, we are also convinced that it is possible to distinguish between
the forces that drive organizational change. In the second part of this chapter,
we will offer a framework by which one kind of radical change-innovationmay be illuminated through the use of observed data derived from party
archives of the Republican state parties in Texas and Arkansas.2

Texas Republicans
The records of the Republican Party of Texas consist of bound copies of
all state committee and executive committee meetings, from 1957 through the
present. The minutes are comprehensive and reliable documents that track
every important development in state party history for the period covered.
Issues of staffing, budgeting, candidate recruitment, party leadership, and
relations between the state and local parties and the state and national parties
are covered in detail. Transcripts of speeches made at committee meetings
by prominent candidates, office holders, or party leaders normally are
included as well.
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The minutes are particularly informative on the topic of party programs.
In other words, debates about party building and organizational structure are
prominent. Efforts at candidate recruitment are another frequent topic at
committee meetings, as are discussions about voter mobilization. Finally,
reports of finance committees and chairs provide systematic accounting of
party budgets and fundraising efforts. One deficiency with the Texas
Republican archive is the absence of original reports and documents referred
to in the minutes. Party staffers were unable to locate these other materials.
By themselves, however, we believe the committee minutes may serve as a
road map for archival research. Because they are internal documents, they
are likely to avoid the biases that public records often display.
Arkansas Republicans

The records of the Arkansas Republican party are stored, uncatalogued
and largely unidentified, in a commercial storage facility along with spare
office furniture, convention banners, and other political memorabilia. The
task of sifting through unmarked boxes dating from the mid-1960s to the mid1980s was the most challenging of our efforts, but in many ways the most
rewarding. Because we had complete access and freedom to photocopy any
document of our choosing we were able to "sample" from a wider array of
materials.3 The downside is that we can say more about the type of material
contained in the archive and less about its consistency or temporal coverage.
While we came across many copies of executive committee minutes, the lack
of cataloguing prevented us from determining whether a complete set of
minutes is available, as in the case of the Texas Republicans. Likewise, a
substantial number of reports, polls, and pamphlets were encountered, but we
are less certain of the proportion of such material contained in the archives.
We can report that all of the same types of material referred to in the
Texas Republican minutes were discovered in original form in the Arkansas
Republican records. In addition to executive committee minutes, we found
rules, daily schedules, correspondence with county, national, and other state
parties, records of party functions, and virtually a complete set of budgetary
data. Each of these categories of information serves some useful purpose for
understanding party organization and change. In the following section, we
hope to demonstrate this point more concretely. One important caveat with
regard to the Arkansas Republican Party records is in order. A fair portion
of the party's records for the period 1967-1970, Winthrop Rockefeller's
governorship, are contained in Rockefeller's own papers, housed at the
University of Arkansas, Little Rock. Our surveys of state party archives and
state archives indicate that this situation is not uncommon (Appleton and
Ward 1993b).
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Patterns or Organizational Innovation
Elsewhere we have discussed the organizational experiences of intermediate level political parties in the wake of important electoral victories
using the terms "adaptation'' and "change'' (Appleton and Ward 1993a; 1994).
However, as Harmel and Janda point out:
Party change (in the broadest sense) is any variation, alteration, or modilication in
how parties arc organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon,
what they stand for, and what they do. But this usage is so broad that it raises
unrealistic expeclalions about the scope or a theory or party change (1992:14-5).

While we concur with their point, our earlier work has been intended to
establish a key fact, namely that parties do change and, furthermore, that such
change cannot be understood independently of the environment within which
parties operate. As we have shown, there are good theoretical and empirical
grounds for believing that state parties have responded to certain events
through change in their organizational structure and practices.
Here we wish to focus on one specific form of change which we have
chosen to label organizational innovalion. We are most interested in exploring
two related questions. First, what exactly is organizational innovation? And
second, if parties innovate, from where do they get their ideas?
What do we mean by organizational innovation? Innovation is defined
in Webster's Dictionary as "the change made by innovating; any custom,
manner, etc. newly introduced:' Innovation should be understood as a subset
of change, which encompasses the notions of variation, modification, or
alteration in existing forms. Organizational change may be quantitative (doing
more of what is already done) or qualitative (improving what is already done).
These kinds of change are differentiated from innovation in that they do not
replace or supplement past practices with completely new ones. Thus
organizational innovation may be seen as the attempt to introduce new
organizational forms and practices without precedent. It should be noted that
innovation does not necessarily entail replacing old forms and practices; in
some cases, it merely supplements what already exists.
The literature on party organization does not always make this distinction
clear. For example, Pannebianco draws a line between "continual change"
and "fundamental change" (1988:243). Further on, he refers to the latter as
"considerable alteration" and then "innovation." But the empirical examples
that he provides of such processes (the British Conservatives, the PCI in Italy
in 1956, the SPD in 1958-60, and the CDU in the 1960s and 1970s in
Germany) do not really display innovation as we have defined it above. Some
have considered the place of innovation in the study of party organization in
the U.S., particularly in the move by the Democrats and Republicans towards
a service-vendor model (Frantzich 1989). The Republican Party has generally

354

The Stale of the Parties

been found to be more innovative than the Democrats, at least in the period
of the 1960s and 1970s (Sabato 1981; Sorauf 1980; Cotter and Bibby 1980).
While many of the changes identified by these authors do conform to our
definition of innovation, others do not.
Theorists have argued that innovations in organizations are likely to occur
when an equilibrium has been disrupted from the outside (Scott 1961). The
quest for innovation is often one to respond to a negative change in the
environment. Party specialists have emphasized this particular condition,
which might be called perfonnance innovation. Thus Harmel and Janda
propose (1992) and test (1993) the hypothesis that, "For vote-seeking parties
. . . the more pronounced their electoral failures, the more likely their
organizational modification'' (1992: 19). Frantzich argues that party decision
makers "clearly indicate that they credit election defeats as the stimulus for
innovation''; obversely, "As a basic rule, winners seldom innovate" (1989:91).
Yet the organizational theory literature argues two further cases where
innovation may occur. The first may be called periodic innovation, where
orgartizations may seek to innovate even if their perfonnance trend is upwards
but they feel that the possibility exists for a quantum shift in their behavior.
The second case is that where organizations undertake accidental innovation
when opportunities to innovate present themselves unexpectedly (March and
Simon 1959).
The data from the Texas and Arkansas Republican parties reflect these
different cases of innovation. While we find evidence to support the
proposition that parties innovate when they are not meeting their performance
goals, there is also much that points to innovation of the periodic and
accidental varieties. Cotter et al. (1984) conceive of the institutionalization
of party organization (i.e. "positive" change) as a strengthening of two
components, organizational complexity and programmatic capacity. Using
their measures for each, we can classify innovations by type (performance,
periodic, or accidental) and by the particular facet of party organization that
they alter (organizational complexity and programmatic capacity). This
framework for understanding party organizational innovation is shown below
in Table 23.1.
From where does innovation come? At the outset, a distinction must be
drawn between invention and innovation. The former may be defined as "the
discovery of a new process or form," while the latter is better understood as
"the widespread adoption of a new process or form" (McNutt 1990:156).
Students of technological changes provided two theories which explain these
phenomena. One may be labelled diffusioni.st, the main argument being that
innovation is an invention that is gradually diffused throughout a social group.
This theory of innovation makes two assumptions; first, that inventions can
occur only at one time and place, exogenous to the locus of innovation; and
second, that they are diffused relatively rapidly by infection (exposure to
knowledge of the invention). Others have criticized these assumptions and
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Table 23.1 Classification of Party Organizational I nnovalion

Innovation
Measures 01
Institutionalization
Orgamzallonal Complexity:
- Party HO
Division of Labor
• Budgets
- Leadership
Programmatic uipaaly:
• Institutional Support
- Candidate-Directed

t'erlormancc

Periodic

Acc111enta1

-

proposed an alternative innovation choice model, in which it is assumed that
inventions may reoccur without infection and that the application of
inventions (i.e., innovation) does not necessarily follow automatically, but
depends on social and political factors.
Furthermore, March and Simon (1959) argue that innovation may result
from either exogenous or endogenous stimuli. Exogenous stimuli are
environment-dependent; that is, they occur as a result of changes in the
environment and may diffuse from the top of the organization, from the
bottom, or horizontally across units. Endogenous sources of innovation come
from within the organization and may be divided into two categories. First,
there are those stimuli that result from internal dissatisfaction with the
organization's own goals (even though external evaluations of performance
may be positive). Second, innovation may be "programmed'; that is,
organizations may have components whose mission is to seek innovation (for
example, research and development units). Table 23.2 offers a classification
of the types of innovation by the source of stimuli.
In this classification, diffused inventions are those that come from outside
either the state party organization or its immediate environment. Diffusion
may occur from the top-down (i.e. from the federal to the state level), from
the bottom-up (i.e. from the county/district to the state level), or horizontally
(that is, across states). Nondiffused inventions are those that occur within the
state party organization or its immediate environment. These inventions may
be either of the performance variety (that is, generated by internal
dissatisfaction with the state party's own goals) or of the programmed kind
(from a component of the state party charged with seeking to innovate).
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Table 23.2 Classification of Stimuli for State Party Organizational Innovation

Source
l:ype or lnvcnbon

txogcnous
(environmcnlal)

01

Contact

tndogcnous
(intra-organizational)

Diffused:
- Top-down
- Horizontal
• Bollom-up
Nondlll11Scd:
- performance
- programmed

Whether the invention is diffused or nondiffused, the stimulus to innovate may
come from environmental pressures (exogenous) or from intra-organizational
processes (endogenous).
While it may be hard to conceptualize nondiffused, exogenous invention
leading to innovation at the state-party level, it is not too difficult to find
empirical cases. For example, in 1971 the Arkansas Republican Party
commissioned a study of their strengths and weaknesses from a private
organization. One major weakness identified was the lack of communication
between state and county parties. The criteria used for such an evaluation
were imported from the business world. This report was discussed at a State
Executive Committee meeting on February 14, 1972. As a result of the
discussion, five changes were proposed and adopted relating to the size and
composition of the Executive Committee. The value of using data garnered
from party records is that we have a relatively unbiased source for classifying
and quantifying innovational stimuli; in the above case, we see the import of
organizational techniques from the immediate environment (the Arkansas
business community).
In the rest of this section, we will give examples of such stimuli that
conform to the schema proposed above. This discussion will be confined to
examples of endogenous (intraparty) stimuli. While we came across many
examples of new organizational behaviors and practices that had seemingly
been imported from nonparty sources, we are not presently in a position to
undertake the detailed examination of such cases in order to verify their point
of origin. There is little doubt that party records by themselves are more
revealing of intraparty processes, whereas contacts between parties and their
environments are harder to quantify from party records alone without inde-
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pendent validation. Since access to these other data sources is far more
difficult and time consuming, we have hitherto only considered innovations
that have been imported through contacts with other party units.
Cases of Diffused Innovation

Top-down Innovation

The 1960s and 1970s were decades of innovation for the Republican
Party. At the national level, "chairmen Ray Bliss (1965-69) and Bill Brock
(1975-80) deseive much of the credit for redirecting party efforts' (Frantzich
1989:91}. In particular," Under Bliss, the Republican Party as a national force
would become much more professional, prepared to win those marginal races
that would be crucial to the party's comeback hopes for 1966' (Knaggs
1986:64). In Texas, the Republicans looked to the RNC as a source of
learning, picking up on the seminars organized by the national chairman.
"Operatives for Tower and the state GOP attended such seminars, learning
new techniques." (Knaggs 1983:64). The opportunities for innovation opened
up by the appointment of Bliss were discussed early on at the state level; for
example, Texas chairman O'Donnell, "made an estimate of the way in which
Ray Bliss would handle the job of national chairman. Although Mr. Bliss has
personally stated that he was more conservative than Barry Goldwater, he saw
his job as primarily one dealing with finances and organization with the
objective of electing Republicans of every persuasion to office" (RSEC,
1/16/65). The records of the party from this period offer a unique
perspective upon the adoption or rejection of the RNC s steady stream of
proposals.
In Arkansas, the party appears to have been rather less driven by
proposals for innovation from the RNC in the 1960s, with Rockefeller's
operatives and money underpinning the party's development strategy. Yet,
with the passing of the Rockefeller era, the Arkansas Republicans appear to
have turned to outside help in their efforts to revitalize the organization. One
of the important arms of the State party, the Candidate Services Bureau
{CSB} decided in 1972 to remodel their training seminars for Republican
candidates for statewide office. As part of this effort, they produced a new
campaign manual for all prospective candidates (3/31/72). This manual
included a first for the Arkansas party in the form of a twenty-six-page section
on opposition research. The manual aims to demonstrate how to proceed so
that:
if proper information is collected regarding a Democratic candidate's personality,
family life, business career, political career, altitudes, and voting record, a complete
picture of the candidate can be developed. His strengths and weaknesses can be
assessed and, if handled properly, those weaknesses can be exploited.
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The manual was not, however, unique to the CSB or indeed to Arkansas, but
was a generic model developed by the RNC. At the campaign seminar on
June 24, 1972, we find that one session (lead by Gene Wirges, not a member
of the State Party committee at this juncture) is devoted to opposition
research (Letter, 6/17/72). Thus the innovation of systematic research is
introduced into the battery of organizational techniques employed by the
Arkansas Republican Party in a top-down fashion.
In 1977, the Arkansas Republican party decided to set up a Black Council
(part of the long-term effort to reach out to the African-American community
in the state; the experience was typical of Republican parties in the South).
Once again the innovation is top-down; the Black Council was to be modeled
after that of the national group. Jim Cummings, chair of the Republican
National Black Council, visited Arkansas to hold talks with Elijah Coleman,
a long-time black Republican activist in the state. The records make it clear
that Cummings' visit and the talks are intended to help Coleman organize the
venture. Thus a proposal was presented to the State Executive Committee on
September 17, 1977 to establish the Arkansas Republican Black Council. The
records also include a subsequent letter from Brock congratulating the party
on this innovation.
These are just two examples chosen from many contained in the Arkansas
records. Others that show the range of innovations diffused in a top-down
manner include the hiring of two organizational directors in 1978 (paid by the
national GOP); the effort in 1977 to set up an Arkansas Republican Political
Action Committee (ARPAC) patterned after the RNPAC; preelection studies
conducted in 1980 by trained personnel of the RNC; the introduction of a
precinct leader's manual in 1969, and the introduction of state-party direct
mail in the early 1970s. In each of these cases, the choice to innovate
followed contact with the national party organization. At times efforts to
import innovations from above verged on the comic; thus the party's efforts
to develop its own direct-mail operation appears to have initially ended in
failure when the firm hired to treat and store the data accidentally (and
irretrievably) merged the state party's list with that of the national party.
Attempts to recover either the data or the money paid or both from the data
management firm appear to have met with little success.
Horizontal Innovation

When we first considered the question of innovational stimuli, our
assumption was that diffused innovation was either top-down or bottom-up.
Much as Frantzich does, we assumed that where innovation takes place at the
state level and is then diffused throughout the party organization this process
would operate through the national party organization. However, once we
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began to look at the data it became clear that this is not always the case and
that horizontal contact between state party organizations has an important
role in the diffusion of innovation.
Such contacts have been institutionalized in the form of (a) the national
association of state party chairs, (b) various regional association of state party
chairs, and (c) other meetings and seminars bringing together organizations
from the state parties. Furthermore, while the national party may serve as the
conduit through which information about new techniques and practices flows
(coverage in the party newspaper, newsletters, brochures, other circulars), that
does not preclude direct contact between state party organizations. The party
archives showed that all of these mechanisms were influential in the
horizontal diffusion of innovation.
Documents from the Workshop on Political Organization hosted by the
Southern Association of Republican State Chairmen in Atlanta, September
24-25, 1965, illustrate the process well. The meeting was introduced by
Raymond Humphreys, Director of Education and Training of the RNC. In
his remarks, Humphreys referred to the recent appointment of Ray Bliss.
"We have a new national chairman, a great national chairman, a man who
understands the importance of bringing people together and utilizing the
strength that they can contribute. He also feels that it is necessary to evaluate
our progrest (WOP manual, 2). No doubt such contacts helped foster a
climate receptive to innovation within state party organizations throughout
this period.
Humphreys was succeeded by Dr. Thomas Brigham, Chair of the
Republican State Executive Committee of AJabama, speaking on the topic of
"What is Party Organization?' Brigham outlined many of the activities and
publications of the AJabama state party, examples of which he had brought
with him to give to the other participants. Among other items, Brigham noted
that organizations should:
Give your parly leaders n feeling of imporlancc by using proven techniques. l nm
speaking now of awards in lhe form of pins, or keys, or ccr1ifica1cs. I'm wearing
here a gold key which has been a very successful liule gimmick to slimulale
fundraising activities. We got the itka, of course, from Texas. We have just ins1i1uted
lhe program in Alabama, and ii is going very well (emphasis added).

The representative from Texas, Barbara Man, emphasized the importance of
horizontal pathways to innovation in her talk on "Improving Organization
Efficiency." Man notes that, "Following the 1964 campaign, we took a long
hard look at what we were doing in Texas plus what we have learned from our
friends in other Southern stales and have introduced some new concepts .. ."
(18, emphasis added).
Man stressed the need not to accept the response "that won't work here"
to innovational diffusion. One of the key features of the "innovation choice"
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model is that it allows for inventions to be rejected by potentials innovators,
often on the grounds of unsuitability. In 1979, the State Executive Committee
in Arkansas invited George Despot, State Chairman of Louisiana, to be the
guest speaker. Despot outlined the steps that the Republican Party had taken
in Louisiana to build a strong organization, and made several suggestions for
innovations that could be introduced in Arkansas (RSEC, 4/6/79). Chairman
Lowe thanked Mr. Despot for his "tell it like it is' comments. At a breakfast
meeting of the committee the following day (with Mr. Despot no longer
present), Congressman John-Paul Hammerschidt "told the group that
Louisiana politics is very different from Arkansas. He commented that
Arkansas was a much more difficult state in which to build a party because
Arkansans are less interested in philosophical issues' (RESC, 4/7/79).
A third example of innovation through horizontal stimuli can be seen in
the exploration by the Arkansas Republican Party of internships for college
students to work on party campaigns. In May 1976, the Executive Director,
Bob Luther, sent out a letter to all heads of journalism and political science
departments of Arkansas colleges and universities. In the letter, Luther stated
that, "It was recently announced that students from Ball State University and
Indiana State University will work as interns on the staff of the Indiana
Republican State Headquarters.
The Arkansas Republican Party is
considering the adaptability of such a plan" (4/6/76). Attached to the letter
is a copy of an article from an unidentified newspaper (probably the
Republican News of Indiana, although this is not certain). As emphasized
above, the innovation choice model stresses the role of social and political
factors in the adoption (or nonadoption) of new processes. In this case,
Luther's willingness to pursue college internships with the state GOP may
have been facilitated by his background as an academic and former dean of
the College of the Ozarks.
The last example that we will present also involves horizontal contact with
the Indiana Republican Party. Again in 1976, we find Bob Luther writing to
Thomas Milligan at the Indiana Republican State Central Committee. The
purpose of this letter is to request information concerning a slide presentation
that had been put together by the Indiana Republicans. Luther does not
mention from where knowledge of the slide presentation came, but he writes
that, "Lynn Lowe, our State Chairman, indicated to me that it has been a
successful project for the Party in Indiana." Continuing, he says, "If you
agree, our plans are to duplicate it. This would mean that we need some way
of photographing your slides' (3/1/76). One of the implications of the
innovation choice model is that leadership change often signals a change in
the potential for innovation. The tandem of Lynn Lowe (State Chair) and
Robert Luther (Executive Director) appear from the records we have
examined to have been especially favorable to the import of innovative
techniques from outside the state party organization.
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Bottom-up Innovation

If we had under-estimated the importance of horizontal pathways to
innovation, we also over-estimated the potential for innovation from below.
Several factors may account for the lack of evidence pointing to such a
process. First, the two states which we chose for the pilot study were both
struggling to create viable country-level party units. The preceding discussion
of the decades following the Tower victory in Texas and the Rockefeller win
in Arkansas has shown that these were periods in which party-building was a
"top-down" process; hence, party organization at the local level was in a
position of relative weakness. As a rule, "weak" party units tend not to be
exporters of inventions. Second, the nature of county parties (less
professionalized, less bureaucratized) means that the types of inventions that
they may produce are generally less adaptable to a state-wide context.
Innovation at the local level is more likely to be low-level innovation. Third,
related to the last point, even where state parties pick up innovation from
local units, the party records may be much less likely to detail the process.
Finally, in the light of all of the above factors, it may be necessary to review
the data that we have used for this study to pick up examples of bottom-up
innovation that we may have overlooked.
Those examples that we do have of bottom-up innovation strain the
definitions that we have introduced. We have cases where new financial
relationships were introduced between state and county parties in Arkansas
in the wake of persistent criticism of the quota system in place from the
counties and their perennial inability to meet these quotas. Under pressure,
the State Committee first introduced a 20 percent rebate scheme for counties
who met their quotas early, and then allowed counties to set their own quotas.
While these mechanisms were installed by the State Committee, it must be
remembered that the predominant portion of the membership of this body
was composed of county leaders. We may also cite the example of the
Pulaski County (the largest county in Arkansas, which includes Little Rock)
organization allowing the media access to its executive committee meetings,
a practice that was subsequently adopted by the State Executive Committee.
However, we admit that, for the time being, we do not have much evidence
of a strong stimulus from county to state level.4
Cases of NondilTused Innovation
Nondiffused innovation, it will be recalled, takes place (endogenously)
within the particular organizational unit under study-in this case, the state
party-or (exogenously) within the immediate environment of that
organizational uniL In our data search, we identified a very high number of
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such innovations. However, a note of caution should be inserted before we
present examples. This category is residual, in the sense that any innovation
for which we have not identified an external stimulus will revert to it.
Without a detailed and exhaustive analysis of each case, it is likely that cases
will be accorded this classification even though in reality there were external
stimuli that we have failed to identify. Our present nonquantitative approach
reflects our reluctance to introduce a masked error in the data before we have
conducted the required analyses,
In 1970, the Arkansas Republicans introduced the GOP roster (see
above) that gave a full listing of all state and county officials, as well as
campaign materials available, filing dates and fees, and other information of
use to party organizers in the state. In the forward, then-Executive Director
Neal Sox Johnson writes that this is "an innovation for the Republican Party
in this state" (4/6/70). A second example occurred in 1973 when the party
decided to set uf a committee to report on patronage recommendations
(RSEC, 1/16/73). For the next four years, we have complete records of the
committee's report for each recommendation, as well as correspondence with
the office to which the recommendation is addressed. A whole range of
nondiffused innovations are included in a plan passed by the State Executive
Committee on January 26th, 1974, entitled" A comprehensive statement of
what will be done, who will do it, when it will be done, and how much it will
cost in the Arkansas Republican Party." Among others, one proposed
innovation is the creation of a Media Relations Committee.
Many of the organizational efforts of the Arkansas Republicans covered
in the previous discussion were home-grown products, examples of nondiffused innovation. What is interesting is that there does not appear to be
a trade-off between diffused and nondiffused innovation. Rather the party
appears to go through periods of high levels of inventions, searching
simultaneously for innovations from the outside, from other parts of the
Republican party, and from its own internal groupings. In part, this is a
product of the search for ways to institutionalize the party following the
Rockefeller years; in part (and not unconnected to the first point) these
periods of innovative activity correspond to the tenure of particular
individuals. Thus the Lowe-Luther tandem may not have been solely
responsible for innovatory activity within the Arkansas Republican Party in
the mid-1970s, but it proved particularly favorable for the adoption of many
new ideas and practices at this juncture in the party's development.
The correlation of endogenous, nondiffused innovation with periods of
leadership needs to be emphasized. Two important points should be
highlighted; first, some leadership combinations are demonstrably more
disposed towards the search for innovation that others (e.g. the Luther-Lowe
partnership in Arkansas); and second, all things being equal, leaders seem to
be more likely to innovate during the initial period of their tenure than at
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other times. Both of these observations are in keeping with the more general
assumptions about the role of leaders in influencing the rate of the diffusion
of new practices, behaviors, techniques, and technologies throughout
organizations that are built into our model. Although this discussion has been
strictly qualitative, we are confident that a systematic coding of party records
can and will enable a quantitative test of the class of hypotheses that may be
derived from our framework approach. In so doing, we will contribute to the
growing understanding of the ecology of party organization.

Conclusions
In the introduction of this chapter we argued that "innovation" is just one
of many types of change that can overtake a party organizations. Innovation
represents an adaptive strategy that allows an organization to survive despite
changing environmental conditions. As the cases of the Texas and Arkansas
Republican parties show, innovation itself comes in many forms, and can be
more or less successful. Texas Republicans were able to institutionalize their
innovations and forge a long-term competitive political system. Their
Arkansas brethren were not so fortunate. For reasons we discuss briefly
above and more extensively elsewhere (Appleton and Ward 1994), Arkansas
Republican fortunes were linked so inextricably to their patron, Winthrop
Rockefeller, that efforts to innovate often were unsustainable. The party did
not, however, return to its previous level of futility following Rockefeller's
defeat and death, and in fact succeeded in electing another governor in 1980.
More recently, Republicans won two of the state's four U.S. House seats in
the 1992 election and the 1993 special election for Lieutenant Governor.
Although the party is still not a fully competitive force in the state, it has
experienced episodes of competitiveness subsequent to the era of innovation
discussed above.
It would be wrong to overstate our capacity to test models of innovation
through the kind of qualitative treatment used here. However, the evidence
that we have gathered has tended to indicate the determinant effects of
leadership upon the capacity and willingness of parties to innovate, whether
the innovation be exogenous or endogenous in origin, diffused or nondiffused.
In fact, we would argue that according to our preliminary analyses, the
innovation-choice model is superior in its ability to capture observed
sequences of organizational innovation than the alternative diffusionist model.
We would argue that party units are constantly faced with opportunities to
innovate, through contacts with both the immediate and the proximate
environment, with the continual reception of both intra-organizational and
external stimuli. Yet dearly some parties innovate more than others, some
innovate more at certain periods than others, and the success rates of inno-
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vations are variable. Our hypothesis for future research, based on this
preliminary study, is that leadership is a key variable in explaining this
dynamic.
One purpose of this study was to demonstrate the utility of innovation as
a concept for understanding the actions taken by parties and for categorizing
those actions in a coherent framework that may lead to more complete
explanatory models in future work. Important questions remain to be
considered, however, before such a model can be proposed. Are formally
dominant parties (eg., Texas Democrats) likely to choose similar or different
strategies of adaptation compared to their nascent competitors? How and
why does organizational innovation emerge in stable partisan systems? Do
patterns of organizational change apparent at the state level suggest parallel
patterns at the local level?
A second purpose of this study has been to propose a research strategy
to bring together the rich theoretical and empirical worlds of party research.
By turning to new sources of data, i.e., party archives, the development of
finely tuned measures of party organization necessary for sophisticated
quantitative analysis may be within reach. At that time, comparative and
longitudinal analyses of party change in a variety of political environments will
be possible. The evidence presented here is among the first steps toward that
goal. We hope that it will encourage other scholars to explore party change
in the context of innovation choice and to begin the work of mining party
archives for vital, but previously obscured, data on party organization.
Notes
1. Arkansas and Texas were chn5en for scvcral reasons. First, our earlier study (Appleton
and Ward 1993a) focused on partisan electoral response to exogenous shocks to the system,
which have been concentrated in the South most recently. In the follow•up study (Appleton
and Ward 19CJ3b) we sought cases where parties had an opportunity to respond organizationally
to electoral change. Both states fit this criterion. Second, archival data were available and
accessible in three or the four parties in Arkansas and Texas. Third, for practical reasons, the
two states were chosen because they arc closest to the home base or one or the coauthors.
2. Records or the Texas Democratic party were examined in situ at the State Archive in
Austin, Te,cas, where they had been deposited. No access was permitted by the Democratic
Party or Arkansas. Although the Te,cas Democratic records were extensive (perhaps the most
rich or all three sets or records examined), wc have not used examples in this chapter for the
sake or symmetry and brevity.
3. The only restriction on our use or materials was on documents re£crring to a likely
£uturc candidate for governor.
4. In contrast, wc have much evidence or the efforts or the state parties to induce
innovation at the county level.
5. The need £or patronage recommendations increased in particular as a result or the
election of John Paul Hammerschmidt to Congress.
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